[EAI-CISS NASD 2010 Security Briefings Series No.1] The Cheonan Incident and U.S. Policy on North Korea's Nuclear Issue: Analysis, Prospects, and Implications for South Korea and China

1. Problem Statement: The Northeast Asian Security Environment and the Cheonan Incident

Northeast Asia, with the Korean Peninsula at its center, is home to major powers such as China, Japan, and Russia. The United States, a superpower, also exerts direct and indirect influence, considered a key actor in the region. While Northeast Asia was a theater of intense confrontation between the communist and free worlds during the Cold War, various factors of tension persist even after its end. The two Koreas remain divided and in confrontation, and China and Taiwan are also divided. Japan is engaged in territorial disputes with all three neighboring countries. In relation to the two Koreas, South Korea maintains an alliance with the United States, while North Korea maintains an alliance with China. Concurrently, the U.S. is also allied with Japan. Furthermore, the U.S., China, and Russia are all permanent members of the UN Security Council and rank among the world's top military powers. Thus, global powers are concentrated in this region, and various tensions and constraints exist. However, on the other hand, the top three global economies are located here, with highly active economic and human exchanges, and deepening economic interdependence among these nations. Moreover, in the context of the recent global economic crisis, the economic power of Northeast Asia, including China, Japan, and South Korea, is being evaluated with increasing importance. Ultimately, Northeast Asia can be characterized as a complex security environment where confrontation, competition, and cooperation occur simultaneously.

Amidst this situation, North Korea's nuclear development poses a serious threat to regional stability. North Korea's nuclear development is primarily fatal to Korean Peninsula security as it threatens the military balance between the two Koreas, which are in an armistice state. It not only heightens tensions in inter-Korean relations, increasing the possibility of conflict, but can also trigger an arms race in South Korea. Similarly, in terms of the Northeast Asian security environment, North Korea's possession of nuclear weapons carries the potential for a chain reaction of nuclear proliferation in the region, including Japan, which possesses sufficient nuclear development capabilities, and Taiwan, which China most fears. This could also influence Japan and Taiwan to increase their military spending, potentially initiating a regional arms race. North Korea's nuclear development, at the heart of these issues, is understood as an attempt to simultaneously overcome internal problems and external threats. Given the possibility of regime collapse due to severe economic hardship, nuclear possession is seen as essential for regime stability amidst Kim Jong-il's deteriorating health and the ensuing succession dynamics. Concurrently, with the widening military imbalance between the two Koreas since the end of the Cold War, North Korea aims to compensate for this through nuclear possession and, by extension, to gain leverage for concessions in negotiations with the U.S. or South Korea under the condition of denuclearization (Shin Sung-ho 2010, 140-144; Wang 2009, 52-53).

Since the first North Korean nuclear crisis in 1993, when North Korea's nuclear development first came to light, successive U.S. administrations, starting with the Clinton administration, have strived to dissuade North Korea from pursuing nuclear weapons. However, during this period, North Korea obtained necessary concessions from the U.S. through nuclear negotiations with both Clinton and Bush, while covertly continuing its nuclear development. Conversely, the U.S. found itself facing a situation where, instead of achieving the denuclearization it had expected from negotiations, North Korea posed a greater threat through more advanced and materialized nuclear capabilities. These outcomes are attributed to policy failures of the past two administrations, and the Obama administration is unlikely to repeat such mistakes. Obama demonstrated his commitment to resolving the North Korean nuclear issue prior to his inauguration and has clearly designated the North Korean nuclear problem as a top national security agenda item (The White House 2010, 4; 23-24). Consequently, various diplomatic means have been employed to pressure North Korea, with economic sanctions, imposed following the second North Korean nuclear test and enacted through UN Security Council Resolution 1874, being central. South Korea's Lee Myung-bak administration has also adopted a firm stance towards North Korea, diverging from previous administrations.

While South Korea, the United States, and various other countries were pressuring North Korea to abandon its nuclear program, an incident occurred on March 26th when North Korea attacked and sank the South Korean naval vessel Cheonan, resulting in the deaths or disappearances of 46 South Korean sailors. This was a clear act of provocation by the North Korean military, causing the most significant casualties since sporadic clashes between the two Koreas after the armistice. Prior to the Cheonan incident, inter-Korean and U.S.-North Korean relations were already strained, but they deteriorated further afterward. The Cheonan incident, occurring amidst efforts to resolve the complex Northeast Asian security environment and the North Korean nuclear issue, drastically heightened regional tensions. The Obama administration strongly condemned North Korea's actions and adopted a firm stance. The Cheonan incident occurred at a time when the U.S. was already grappling with the North Korean nuclear issue. Therefore, it is reasonable to anticipate that U.S. policy towards North Korea would become tougher following the Cheonan incident. This raises the question of how the Cheonan incident has influenced U.S. policy toward North Korea, particularly its nuclear policy. However, despite South Korea's firm response, contrary to many expectations, no significant shift in U.S. policy toward North Korea has been observed. Understanding this phenomenon requires a comprehensive analysis and review of U.S. policy options regarding North Korea's nuclear program.

2. U.S. Policy Options on North Korea's Nuclear Issue

The objective of U.S. policy on North Korea's nuclear issue is to compel North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons. This implies not only the dismantling of its current nuclear program but also ensuring it does not pursue nuclear possession in the future. While the definition of coercion is not universally agreed upon, it is generally understood as the ability to induce a change in behavior through the threat of using military force and the limited use of military force to demonstrate that threat (Byman and Waxman 2002, 30). Similarly, the strategy of coercive diplomacy aims to persuade an adversary to cease threatening behavior through threats or limited military force (Craig and George 1983, 189). Therefore, in international politics, coercion or coercive diplomacy can be understood as one state pressuring another to do or refrain from doing something it does not want to do. However, coercive diplomacy, similar to influencing an adversary through threats, can also utilize positive rewards or assurances (George 1991, 10-11). That is, it involves making the adversary take the desired action through inducements alongside threats or sanctions.

In this context, the various means employed by the U.S. to compel North Korea to abandon its nuclear program fall broadly under the category of coercive diplomacy. The Obama administration's first National Security Strategy (NSS) states, "If North Korea abandons its nuclear weapons program, it can join the international community in a process of political and peaceful integration; however, if North Korea refuses these international obligations, we will pursue multiple means to further isolate North Korea and compel its compliance with international non-proliferation norms" (The White House 2010, 23-24). This indicates that U.S. policy on North Korea's nuclear issue, while perhaps rhetorical, exhibits characteristics of both inducement and coercive diplomacy.

More specifically, U.S. policy on North Korea's nuclear issue manifests in three main options, categorized by dimensions of coercion and inducement. On the coercion dimension, the U.S. has two policy choices: one is the use of limited military force, and the other is the exertion of pressure through sanctions. The former manifests as surgical strikes on nuclear facilities, while the latter takes the form of economic sanctions. The option of inducing North Korea to abandon its nuclear program involves persuading North Korea to voluntarily give up its nuclear weapons, which implies a method of dialogue and compromise, i.e., diplomatic negotiation. The U.S. aims to make North Korea perceive that abandoning nuclear weapons is more beneficial than developing them through certain levels of compensation, thereby encouraging voluntary denuclearization. Each of these options will be selected based on U.S. policy judgment, assuming their feasibility. Fundamentally, these U.S. options—military strike, economic sanctions, and diplomatic negotiation—were already considered during the first North Korean nuclear crisis under the Clinton administration (Chung 2007, 87).

(1) Limited Use of Military Force (Surgical Strike)

The use of limited military force as a means of coercion is an option frequently employed in U.S. foreign policy. A prime example is the NATO airstrikes during the Kosovo War to compel Milosevic to cease his policy of oppression against ethnic Albanians. In the context of U.S. policy options on North Korea's nuclear issue, this could involve surgical strikes on nuclear development-related sites such as the Yongbyon Nuclear Complex or other military facilities. Strictly speaking, coercion aims to achieve objectives through limited military force without resorting to full-scale war; thus, limited surgical strikes represent the most typical option of coercive diplomacy.

Of course, the U.S. could also contemplate a full-scale war, akin to the Iraq War, rather than coercion, when considering the use of military force. However, the likelihood of this is very low and can be considered an option that is practically unselectable. This is because the conditions under which full-scale military force can be employed are extremely stringent, making it virtually impossible. Since the end of the Cold War, U.S. military intervention has begun to exhibit different characteristics. During the Cold War, major powers were divided into East and West blocs, competing with hostile ideologies, and disparities in development levels between the Global South and North made it impossible for international bodies like the UN to reach a consensus (Cronin 2002, 157). However, after the Cold War, the UN Security Council, which had played a minimal role, swiftly approved military intervention in response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990, without the exercise of veto power by permanent members. Subsequently, the U.S. utilized the UN Security Council as a diplomatic tool to obtain international approval for military interventions. Although explicit authorization for the use of force has not been obtained since the Gulf War, resolutions have been passed that provide post-hoc legitimacy or at least a pretext. In cases like the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, the U.S. was able to launch full-scale military operations because the 9/11 terrorist attacks on U.S. soil were recognized by the international community. Ultimately, for the U.S. to deploy large-scale military force to subdue North Korea, it must resolve the issue of legitimacy. As long as China, an ally of North Korea, remains a permanent member of the Security Council, legitimacy cannot be secured through the UN. Unless a situation arises where the U.S. is attacked by North Korea, thereby enabling the exercise of self-defense rights as stipulated in the UN Charter, there is no grounds for a full-scale attack on North Korea.

Therefore, the scope of military force that the U.S. can employ against North Korea is inevitably limited. Consequently, the use of limited military force represents the highest-level option available to the U.S. However, even in cases where limited military force is used, such as surgical strikes on nuclear facilities, China's diplomatic position must be carefully considered. This is because the alliance treaty between North Korea and China includes a provision for automatic intervention in case of external aggression. Given that North Korea holds significant strategic value for China, the option of using limited military force would necessitate careful consideration of China's subsequent backlash and the U.S. response to it. Ultimately, the use of military force, even if limited, is assessed as having a low probability.

(2) Economic Sanctions

As a state policy, influencing the actions of other countries through economic means encompasses both sanctions and inducements. Among these, economic sanctions are used to coerce the target country into complying with the sanctioning country's intentions (Blanchard, Mansfield, and Ripsman 2000, 3). This involves compelling a change in the adversary's behavior through methods such as reducing financial aid, prohibiting trade and investment, and freezing assets. Such sanctions exert pressure not only economically but also politically and militarily on the target country. Indeed, the U.S. has employed economic sanctions to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, promote human rights, halt support for terrorism, eradicate narcotics, protect the environment, cease armed aggression, and facilitate regime change (Haass 1998, 1-2). These economic sanctions have often been used in situations where the use of military force is difficult.

In the context of North Korean nuclear policy, the U.S. is also employing these economic sanctions. Following North Korea's two nuclear tests, the UN Security Council passed resolutions enacting these sanctions. The Obama administration is implementing economic sanctions in coordination with the international community based on Resolution 1874. The impact and effectiveness of sanctions can be considered not only in terms of their direct impact on the target country's economy but also, more fundamentally, in their capacity to drive changes in the target country's diplomatic and military behavior (Sung Chae-ki 2009, 11). Therefore, in such cases, it is necessary for the U.S. to clarify the objective of sanctions against North Korea, i.e., the desired end state it seeks to achieve. The U.S. may aim to exacerbate North Korea's already severe economic difficulties through economic sanctions, with the objective of overthrowing the regime. Alternatively, it may aim to compel denuclearization through strong economic pressure, or it may aim to force North Korea to engage in negotiations... (continued)