[EAI-CISS NASD 2008] The North Korean Nuclear Crisis and ROK-China Relations: ROK-China Cooperation as the Foundation for Peace on the Korean Peninsula

EAI-CISS Joint ROK-China Northeast Asia Security Dialogue

Expert Panel

Security Briefings Series No.1-1

Zhu Feng, Professor, Peking University

Introduction

Since February 2009, North Korea has engaged in a series of provocative actions, including a second nuclear test, missile launches, a declaration of withdrawal from the Six-Party Talks, and a declaration to terminate the 1953 Armistice Agreement. These actions have posed a serious threat not only to peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula but also to security in Northeast Asia. More critically, North Korea faces widespread condemnation from the international community. The UN Security Council, in particular, recently passed Resolution 1874, demonstrating the international community's strong will to condemn North Korea's provocative actions that challenge global peace and security. This measure confirmed that political means and diplomatic efforts to manage the crisis had reached a dead end. It also acknowledged the collapse of the multilateral regional security efforts, namely the Six-Party Talks, aimed at resolving the North Korean nuclear issue.

In this context, what can we consider to sustain security on the Korean Peninsula and, by extension, in Northeast Asia? What security measures can we envision following the efforts of the Six-Party Talks to ensure denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula?

To identify the core reasons why the North Korean nuclear issue has not only failed to find a path toward gradual resolution but has instead worsened, we must focus on North Korea itself. Specifically, we must pay attention to the situation where the 'North Korean issue' has not shown significant change or flexibility and remains at an impasse. While it is true that major East Asian countries maintain relatively stable and harmonious relations, and regional security has been preserved since the end of the Cold War, it is by no means easy to firmly sustain regional security in the absence of an institutional security cooperation framework. Furthermore, relations with major powers that have interests in the region cannot be disregarded. If we ignore the 'security structure,' encompassing both institutions and relations with major powers, in matters of security, we will be unable to accommodate the security needs of other countries or objectively assess the regional security level.

Since the end of the Cold War, the security structure in East Asia has been undergoing a process of readjustment and integration. In this process, some regional actors are experiencing conflicts of interest and friction by refusing to accept the security order desired by major powers. The most typical examples of such states are South and North Korea on the Korean Peninsula. The Cold War still lingers on the Korean Peninsula. Despite the end of the Cold War, North Korea has continuously threatened regional security in East Asia by creating nuclear crises. Today, the Korean Peninsula has become the most dangerous powder keg in East Asia, and furthermore, it has become a source of global instability.

China, a participant in the Korean War in the 1950s, a proponent of the Six-Party Talks, and a geographically adjacent country, has very significant national interests concerning the Korean Peninsula. Therefore, the North Korean issue cannot be considered without China.

On one hand, China and North Korea continue to maintain friendly cooperative relations. China is North Korea's most important trading partner and a major supplier of energy. In 2008, the total trade volume between China and North Korea reached $2.8 billion, accounting for 73% of North Korea's total foreign trade. North Korea relies heavily on China for a significant portion of its economic activities. On the other hand, since the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1992, China and South Korea have continuously developed their relationship and enhanced their friendship. Furthermore, following the launch of the Lee Myung-bak administration in 2008, the two countries advanced to a 'strategic cooperative partnership.' Given that the Korean Peninsula issue and China are inextricably linked, cooperation between South Korea and China as strategic partners is paramount to achieving North Korea's denuclearization and maintaining and developing peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.

Therefore, this paper will first review the role of North Korea in the development process of relations between China and South Korea, and then analyze the core factors of the North Korean nuclear issue and China's core interests. Subsequently, it will discuss the future direction of ROK-China relations amidst the current North Korean nuclear crisis.

Development of ROK-China Relations and the North Korean Factor

Since the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1992, ROK-China relations have made remarkable progress across various fields. The two countries have achieved significant results in economic and trade sectors, and in the cultural sphere, the 'Hallyu' (Korean Wave) and 'Hanfeng' (Chinese admiration for Korean culture) have deeply permeated Chinese society. Although political relations were somewhat underdeveloped, they were elevated to a strategic cooperative partnership in 2008. ROK-China relations can be described as one of the most robust bilateral relationships in East Asia. However, looking back at the overall development of ROK-China relations, there has been a persistent shadow: North Korea. As ROK-China relations developed, the political and strategic relationship between China and North Korea somewhat cooled. Since the late 1980s, when relations between China and South Korea began to take a special turn, the relationship between China and North Korea gradually distanced.

In 1983, Beijing applied to host the 11th Asian Games. If Beijing's bid to host the Asian Games were successful, all members of the Korean Asian Games Committee would participate, and it was anticipated that Kim Il-sung would reluctantly accept China's goodwill. In 1991, China tacitly accepted South Korea's UN membership and simultaneously persuaded North Korea to agree to the simultaneous admission of both North and South Korea to the UN. It is true that this also displeased North Korea.

Beijing agreed with the 'cross-recognition model' proposed by the United States at the time—establishment of diplomatic relations between China and South Korea, and between the United States and North Korea—but this was met with opposition from North Korea. On August 24, 1992, after a series of exchanges and preparations, China and South Korea formally declared the establishment of diplomatic relations. Kim Il-sung responded to China by saying, 'If China has already made this decision, then so be it. We will continue to adhere to socialist construction and will resolve any difficulties that arise on our own.' At this time, the relationship between China and North Korea, described as fraternal, may have suffered serious damage and fractured. This is despite the fact that China continued to provide significant assistance to North Korea, such as a constant supply of food and crude oil.

The establishment of diplomatic relations between China and South Korea and the smooth development of their relations are not only in line with China's national interests but also beneficial to North Korea. This is because North Korea could anticipate the reunification of the Korean Peninsula through the normalization of ROK-China relations. However, North Korea perceived the growing closeness between China and South Korea as a betrayal and began to distance itself from China, and consequently, from the rest of the world. China became more open and stronger, while North Korea, a fellow socialist country, became more conservative and impoverished. The primary cause of this situation is undoubtedly the stalemate in North Korea's ideology and political system. Nearly 18 years have passed since the end of the Cold War. Yet, Pyongyang remains entrenched in the Cold War era. North Korea's political ideology and national development have not been integrated into the development process of East Asia since the end of the Cold War.

Consequently, North Korea's 'insecurity' has not been resolved in the changed security environment of East Asia. This insecurity stems from a closed psychological state. North Korea could not help but react sensitively to the normalization of diplomatic relations and increasing exchanges between China and South Korea. In response, North Korea consistently adhered to ideological rigidity and closed-off reactions. Believing that trust with China had been broken, North Korea felt hatred and even a sense of betrayal... (continued)