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Minutes of the 52nd National Security Panel Meeting

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Others
Published
February 13, 2009

The Foreign Policy Stance of the Obama Administration

There is confusion regarding the interpretation of current U.S. foreign policy domestically, with opinions divided between those who believe the Obama administration is attempting a fundamentally new policy and those who argue it is not significantly different from that of Bush. An objective analysis of the Obama administration's foreign policy stance is needed at this time.

The National Security Panel views the current foreign policy focus of the Obama administration as "Power of Balance." The core of this balance is not to pursue a Balance of Power solely based on hard power, but to utilize both hard power and soft power simultaneously. It also entails recognizing the importance of transnational actors, such as international institutions, in addition to nation-states in international relations. In other words, balance must be sought on two dimensions: actors and the distribution of power.

A) Balance at the Actor Level

During the Bush administration, the U.S. conducted foreign policy based on its own capabilities and judgment, rather than requiring cooperation and collaboration from other countries. Although partnerships were sought in the process of conducting the war on terror, the participation of other countries was very limited, suggesting that the partnerships of the Bush administration remained largely rhetorical. However, facing the dual challenges of the Iraq War's failure and the economic crisis, the Obama administration finds it difficult to conduct foreign policy independently. The Obama administration seeks to resolve issues by actively sharing roles with other countries and, at times, utilizing transnational actors such as international and multilateral organizations. This is the balance at the actor level.

B) Balance Between Hard Power and Soft Power

The Obama administration seeks to move away from the excessive emphasis on the military sector during the Bush administration and pursue a balanced allocation of resources across various sectors beyond the military, including economy, culture, diplomacy, and knowledge/information. This does not mean completely abandoning military power, but rather seeking a balance with non-military means, moving away from the over-reliance on military solutions seen during the Bush administration.

The Obama administration's East Asia strategy will be formulated based on the concept of "Power of Balance." Although the Obama administration's East Asia policy has not been officially announced, recent statements regarding its East Asia policy reveal two key points. First, the Obama administration acknowledges that the U.S. cannot bear the sole responsibility and burden for security in the East Asian region. It believes it is time to share security responsibilities with regional countries. This does not imply a passive stance by the U.S. in Asia; rather, by sharing responsibilities and managing current crises, the U.S. aims to solidify its position in Asia.

Second, while maintaining its standing in the Asia-Pacific region, the U.S. seeks to acknowledge China's role as a responsible major power within the region. Based on its rapid economic growth, China aims to gradually expand its role in the East Asian region. The Obama administration recognizes China's growth and believes that China's role and status within the East Asian region must be accommodated to a certain extent.

To understand the Obama administration's foreign policy stance, a thorough comprehension of the concept of power balance is essential.

Offshore Balancing Theory and U.S. East Asia Strategy

Examining the Obama administration's East Asia strategy, it is structured as follows: 1) the U.S.-Japan alliance serves as the basic axis of the East Asia strategy; 2) South Korea/ASEAN/Australia are partners in economic/security cooperation; 3) India is a partner in political/economic relations; and 4) China will engage in closer security negotiations if it demonstrates responsible behavior. Superficially, this appears not significantly different from the Bush administration's East Asia strategy.

Some realists argue that the U.S. need not intervene in the balance between Japan and China in East Asia; instead, it should adopt an offshore balancing strategy where China and Japan mutually check each other, and the U.S. reaps benefits from this dynamic. The rationale is twofold: First, from a realist perspective, Asia does not involve vital interests for the U.S. that warrant the costs of intervention. No country in Asia is projected to grow to a level that threatens the U.S. without U.S. intervention. Second, it is argued that if the U.S. does not intervene directly, China and Japan will compete, and regional competition will, in turn, help the U.S. enhance its relative national interests.

While this position seems plausible on the surface, it tends to overemphasize the benefits of the military aspect. The world today is characterized by a high degree of economic interdependence and has become significantly more integrated economically. In a situation where global production networks are tightly woven, conflicts in Asia inevitably impact the market, and the United States would also be directly affected. From the perspective of relative gains, US interests might increase, but considering absolute losses, the arguments of extreme realists lack realism.

Furthermore, the intangible benefits the U.S. has gained by maintaining leadership in the East Asian region should not be overlooked. Assuming leadership allows for benefits in various domains, including not only security but also economy, information, knowledge, and culture. Realists are limited by their focus solely on security in their cost-benefit calculations. Expanding the scope beyond security to include information, knowledge, culture, and economy reveals valid reasons for bearing the costs of maintaining leadership. Considering these aspects, despite the arguments of some realists, the U.S. strategy toward East Asia will likely not change significantly, and U.S. efforts to maintain its leadership in the region will continue for a considerable period.


[1] Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Nomination Hearing To Be Secretary of State.” Available at
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/01/115196.htm

This summary was published by the East Asia Institute (EAI) Asia Security Research Center. EAI established the Asia Security Research Center in January 2009 to conduct specialized research and policy development on regional security in Asia, following its selection as a core research institution for the Asia Security Initiative by the MacArthur Foundation.

*This text is an AI translation of an original written in Korean. Some translations or nuances may be inaccurate.

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