[EAI Online Seminar] “North Korea in a New Era of U.S.-South Korea Partnership”

YouTube 링크 : https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R6Cv-OMkW_4

The East Asia Institute (President Yul Sohn) held the 10th online seminar of the COVID-19 and the New World Order series, titled “North Korea in a New Era of U.S.-South Korea Partnership,” co-hosted with the Center for East Asia Policy Studies at Brookings Institution. The May 2021 U.S.-ROK joint statement addressed expanding the U.S. alliance with South Korea to address regional security, marking a new era of expanded U.S.-South Korea partnership. In this context, how will the two countries pursue North Korea policy? During this seminar, experts from the U.S. and South Korea will discuss the status for the complete denuclearization of North Korea, prospects for the Biden and Moon administrations’ efforts for resuming talks, U.S.-ROK cooperation and the end-of-war declaration, and North Korea policy under a new Korean administration.

Time & Date: December 7 (Thurs) 22:30-23:30 (KST)

Panelists: Jihwan Hwang (Professor, University of Seoul), Jina Kim (Professor, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies), Soo Kim (Policy Analyst, RAND Corporation), Sue Mi Terry (Director of the Hyundai Motor-Korea Foundation Center for Korean History and Public Policy, Wilson Center

Moderators: Andrew Yeo (SK-Korea Foundation Chair in Korea Studies, Brookings Institution)

Opening remarks: Yul Sohn (President, EAI)

I. U.S.-ROK Relations and North Korea Policy

The Current Status of the Denuclearization Agenda

• Efforts between the U.S. and North Korea in negotiating a denuclearization agreement are at an impasse – more than two years have passed since the leaders of the two countries last met. Kim Jong Un is likely to continue investing in North Korea’s nuclear weapons program given that its nuclear arsenal is key to the regime’s survival.
• Ms. Soo Kim, Policy Analyst at the RAND Corporation, states that while the U.S. should continue to indicate its willingness to negotiate, it should do so in the form of financial sanctions, criticism that harms the North’s reputation, and strengthening alliances in order to leave Kim to negotiate for survival.
• Professor Jina Kim at the Hankuk University of Foreign Studies states that Biden will prefer to maintain the status quo instead of pursuing change if North Korea continues to stay unresponsive to the resumption of dialogue. Professor Kim argues that such a situation may lead to arms control becoming a more persuasive option to crisis management than arms control.
• Professor Kim asserts that North Korea is likely to focus on military modernization and engage in a tit-for-tat rivalry if it is seeking a new equilibrium on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea will avoid unnecessary escalation by walking away from its previous commitment to the moratorium of testing nuclear weapons and ICBMs, causing concern about the stability-instability paradox.

Prospects for U.S.-ROK Coordination on the End-of-war Declaration

• Dr. Sue Mi Terry, Director of the Hyundai Motor-Korea Foundation Center for Korean History and Public Policy at the Wilson Center, claims that the U.S. and South Korea are not on the same page regarding the end-of-war declaration. While the draft is expected to include clauses indicating that the declaration will not affect the status of armistice between the two Koreas, it will not be easy to gain U.S. domestic support given that North Korea has not shown any inclinations to denuclearize.
• Dr. Terry adds that if Biden were to proceed with a declaration, he would have to reassure the U.S. public that the U.S.-ROK alliance remains as strong as ever, thereby reducing the declaration’s attractiveness to the North.
• Ms. Kim states that while Washington is willing to discuss the declaration, it should question whether the declaration is sustainable amid the missile testing and nuclear development in North Korea and the leadership transition in South Korea – it is not well timed. Ms. Kim stresses that the declaration further bears the risk of estrangement between the U.S. and ROK and questions the presence of U.S. Forces Korea on the peninsula.

Return to Strategic Patience?

• Professor Kim states that a return to strategic patience is not a good idea; maintaining the status quo does not guarantee stability. The absence of talks on confidence building may be conducive for choosing an arms race as the national course of action. Professor Kim stresses that the new government needs time — North Korea may test the waters if the new administration does not provide institutional mechanisms to continue talks with North Korea.
• Ms. Kim says that conditions at the moment are geared favorably towards the Kim regime – summits and negotiations are unlikely to help the U.S. regain the upper hand. While this does not mean that the U.S. should rule out the option of diplomacy, the U.S. must take into account that previous efforts to engage have only created opportunities for the Kim regime to buy time and build a bigger, more capable nuclear arsenal.

II. Implications of the 2022 Presidential Elections on South Korea’s North Korea Policy

Key Differences between Candidates Lee and Yun

• Professor Jihwan Hwang at the University of Seoul explains that while Lee’s policy can be described as a “peace-first policy,” Yun’s policy is considered “hardline policy” —both candidates are likely to inherit their predecessors’ policies. Lee’s policies are focused on bringing peace back on the Korean Peninsula based on the belief that the collapse or instability of the North Korean regime would neither directly lead to unification nor peace on the Korean peninsula. On the other hand, Yun’s policies are focused on pressurizing Pyongyang to give up its nuclear weapons program and coordination between the U.S. and South Korea on sanctions.
• Professor Hwang adds that both candidates agree on the importance of the U.S.-ROK alliance, although differences may exist in how they perceive its role in maintaining the ROK-U.S.-Japan trilateral alliance.
• Dr. Terry states that the election of either candidate entails opportunities and challenges. Risks under a potential Lee administration include disagreement between the U.S. and South Korea, but opportunities may be found if North Korea is open to dialogue. On the other hand, a potential Yun administration could negatively impact inter-Korean relations.

Foreign and Domestic Policy Challenges For the Next Administration

• Dr. Terry explains that the biggest concern South Korea faces in terms of the U.S.-ROK alliance is “abandonment vs. entrapment.” How South Korea will navigate this amid U.S-China tensions is of question. She points out that South Korea is willing to chart its own course and that it must deal with China accounting for high levels of trade and North Korea.
• Professor Hwang states that the domestic policy environment the next Korean president will face is bound to be unfavorable. He points out that political polarization, both in terms of political orientation and generational gaps is a key domestic concern.
• On China, Professor Hwang claims that regardless of who gets elected, policy toward China will remain similar. South Korea’s foreign policy framework was geared towards strengthening the U.S-ROK alliance and improving ROK-China partnership simultaneously. He stresses that there is strategic room for the South Korean government to maneuver in East Asia. 

III. Speaker, Discussant, and Moderator Bios

■ Jihwan Hwang_ is Professor in the Department of International Relations at the University of Seoul. Dr. Hwang’s research interests include diplomatic policy and relationship between South and North Korea. He has published articles including "The Paradox of South Korea’s Unification Diplomacy: Moving beyond a State-Centric Approach", "The Two Koreas after U.S. Unipolarity: In Search of a New North Korea Policy," “The Political Implications of American Military Policy in Korea: Learning from Theoretical and Empirical Evidences" and so on. He received a B.A. in Diplomacy from Seoul National University and his M.A. in Political Science from Seoul National University and University of Colorado. He received a Ph.D. in Political Science from University of Colorado.

■ Jina Kim_ is Professor in the Division of Language and Diplomacy at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies. Previously, she was Chief of the North Korean Military Division at Korea Institute for Defense Analyses and Adjunct Professor of Yonsei Graduate School of International Studies. She is on multiple advisory boards for the Republic of Korea Blue House National Security Office, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of National Unification, and Peaceful Unification Advisory Council. She also served as a member of the Advisory Board for the US-ROK Combined Forces Command and a member of the Policy Evaluation Committee for the Prime Minister’s Office. She holds a Ph.D. in International Relations from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, and an MA in International Studies from Yonsei Graduate School of International Studies.

■ Soo Kim_ is a policy analyst at the RAND Corporation and an adjunct instructor at American University. Her research interests include the Korean Peninsula, Russia, Indo-Pacific strategy, near-peer competition, decision making, propaganda, and the intelligence community. She served as an analyst in the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and also worked at the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Kim earned an M.A. in international relations/strategic studies at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), and a B.A. in French from Yale University.

■ Sue Mi Terry_ is Director of the Hyundai Motor-Korea Foundation Center for Korean History and Public Policy. Prior to joining the Wilson Center, Dr. Terry served in a range of important policy roles related to both Korea and its surrounding region. Formerly a Senior Fellow with the Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), she served as a Senior Analyst on Korean issues at the CIA. (2001-2008) She holds a Ph.D. (2001) and an M.A. (1998) in international relations from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University and a B.A. in political science from New York University (1993). She was born in Seoul and raised in Hawaii and Northern Virginia.

■ Andrew Yeo_is the SK-Korea Foundation Chair in Korea Studies at Brookings Institution’s Center for East Asia Policy Studies. He is also a professor of politics and director of Asian studies at The Catholic University of America in Washington, D.C. His most recent book publication is “State, Society and Markets in North Korea” with Cambridge University Press. Yeo received his doctorate in government from Cornell University, and bachelor's in psychology and international studies magna cum laude from Northwestern University.

■ Typeset by Seung Yeon Lee Research Associate

    For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 205) | slee@eai.or.kr

영상 스크립트

greetings everyone i am yo son president of the east east asia institute eai and ayonse university professor uh it is a great honor to invite distinguished panelists and guests to this webinar titled north korea in a new era of u.s south korea partnership co-hosted with with the center for east asia policy studies at brookings institution two institutions actually have developed partnership over the years including an online conference held last november i mean november last year under the title

of new prospects for u.s south korea cooperation in an era of u.s china's strategic competition which actually featured a member scholars from each side this time we come to discuss north korea in a new era again of expanded u.s south korea partnership here the goals and tasks of the alliance partnerships are increasingly complex and multi-dimensional the relationships are extended from the peninsula to the regional affairs and from the military traditional security to a wide range of issues including

trade advanced technology climate change and the pandemic under the changing dynamics of alliance relationship in these areas this uh seminar will discuss uh the two countries navigating their strategic interest on the denuclearization of north korea uh impacts of uh the u.s china strategic competition uh on the denuclearization ef efforts and the prospects uh for um rok us alliance and north korean policy uh in the context of the upcoming rok presidential election um with uh the great interest um and excitement to the discussion uh

let me introduce to you today's moderator dr andrew ya andrew uh is sk kf chair in korean studies at the brookings institutions center for east asia study east asia policy studies he is also a professor of politics at the catholic university of america in washington dc and the author of the forthcoming book state society and markets in north korea uh from the cambridge university press um andrew has worked uh closely with the eai for many years and i'm excited he landed in brookings and i hope that we work even

closer together and we feature four excellent scholars in the area of north korean affairs miss sue kim dr gina kim dr chihuan huang and dr sumi terry thank you so much for sharing your time with us and let me further uh give a an individual introduction of today's speakers first miss sue kim who is a policy analyst and a rand corporation and a junk professor at american university she has previously uh served as an analyst in ncia and also work uh at the department of homeland security uh she's

an expert uh on korean peninsula her research interests also um covers russia uh america's indo-pacific strategy uh propaganda and the intelligence community uh next we have dr gina kim who is a professor uh in the division of language and diplomacy at hanguk university of foreign affairs um previously she was chief of uh north korean military depart division at the korea institute for defense analysis kaida and adjunct professor of the yonsei university's graduate school of international studies

that i belong to and dr kim is an expert on u.s north korean relations nuclear non-proliferation and northeast asian security affairs and next doctor chihuan huang who is a professor of international study international relations at the university of seoul he is one of the leading scholars in the field of security studies in korea dr huang has published a wide range of articles including the paradox of south korea's unification diplomacy and the two koreas after us unipolarity and many more and finally um

dr sumi terry uh director of the hyundai motors hyundai motor korea foundation chair center for korean history and public policy at wilson center she's a leading expert on north korea worked formally as a senior fellow with the korean chair at csis and a senior analyst on korean issues at cia her latest article is north korea's nuclear family how the kim's got the bomb and why they won't give it up uh appeared that the 14 affairs this year so with this uh great lineup uh andrew now uh the floor is yours

thank you dr son and good morning or evening to our global audience and thank you once again dr sun for your opening remarks i also want to thank eai for organizing and hosting this webinar jointly with the center for east asia policy studies at the brookings institution our partnership allows us to draw insights from experts in korea and the united states ensuring wider and more balanced perspectives on the u.s south korea alliance we only have a short one hour so i want to jump right into our topic for today

north korea and a new era of u.s south korea partnership and to maximize our time with our distinguished guests i'll just mention that our webinar is organized into two halves or two interrelated mini panels in the first half we'll be joined by miss suk kim from the rand corporation and dr gina kim from hanguk university of foreign studies to discuss the moon invited administration's current efforts to pursue negotiations including the much discussed end of war declaration and then in the second half dr jiwan

fang from the university of seoul and dr sue terry from the wilson center so i almost said csis again uh so dr sue terry from the wilson center will address north korea policy in the context of upcoming south korea elections and a new current government next year so we'll be talking about uh north korea policy in the current context and then moving forward with the next south korean government as well as other issues that might pertain to the u.s south korea alliance so without further ado let me first turn

to sue kim from rand to address our opening set of questions sue can you give our audience here a rundown on the current status of where we're at regarding steps towards denuclearization on north korea and while we're there how would you evaluate the biden administration's approach to north korea thus far sure thank you andrew uh good morning d.c and good evening to our colleagues in seoul um just to get the ball rolling i'll be touching upon nuclear talks from north korea by the administration's

approach to kim jong-un thus far and finally our approach to this topic du jour and war declaration so where are we when it comes to the nuclear talks um two years actually three have passed since trump and kim have been they walked away from the hanoi summit with a no deal and of course north korea has been diligently pursuing its nuclear weapons development and missile delivery systems so i would say that the threat is actually an immutable constant and we know that kim jong-un is going to continue to invest hundreds of millions

if not billions of dollars in perfecting and diversifying his nuclear weapons program he's not going to be easily deterred so long as the weapon system remains inherently tied to the regime's existence and of course kim's survival and even if the united states and south korea their military capabilities are superior and more advanced than north korea's the lethality of the dprk's nukes and missiles as well as i would say the intent to use them towards the region and the united states is an issue that's going to be

underscored and i think equally worrisome is the dprk's proliferation of illicit activities so we're talking about the the steadily expanding creep um the criminal creep in cyberspace uh human rights violations and other behaviors that actually go against the the grain of international norms and you want to see resolutions that become more and more ingrained and deep seated into the dprk's being so this makes it all the more challenging for us to tackle the dprk problem beginning with of course the

nuclear weapons so in this respect the sooner we can address the nuclear issue the better obviously but right now we've not heard of any contact between the united states and the dprk negotiators but i don't think this is such a bad thing um rather than laying out all of our cards before the north koreans to clinch an agreement we should continue to indicate the willingness to dialogue while also applying the the appropriate inducements to bring the north koreans back to the negotiating table and by inducements

ideally it would be less in the form of concessions that reward and validate kim's behavior but more squeezing the kim regime financially through sanctions uh reputationally by exposing and shaming kim's crude divides of human rights and diplomatically by strengthening our alliance strategy towards the dprk and also the broader regions that ties together to leave kim essentially with no choice but to negotiate for survival and lately two topics have been dominating the discourse in seoul and one of course is the uh the upcoming

elections and two the end of war declaration so the timing and rationale for the the declaration it seems to be more along the lines of like grafting peace onto reality that that seems a little bit distant from being fertile when it comes to a declaration in addition to weapons testing pyongyang doesn't seem to have an appetite for this proposal which could of course be part of the strategy it makes seoul more anxious and and more insistent and urgent to bring a declaration into fruition and washington for its part

has been expressing willingness to discuss this topic but i think we should ask ourselves here whether the declaration now amid the the ongoing testing you know his determination to keep his nuclear weapons and at the cusp of a leadership transition in south korea is actually going to be sustainable so both from an implementation implementation perspective as well as the potential security alliance and regional applications of a precipitous dash to on the end of ward declaration doesn't seem to be

well timed so the fact of the matter is both proponents and opponents of the end of our declaration they're well aware of the fact that this is going to have broader implications so this is not merely a symbolic document it's it's not going to you know place it it is going to place the korean peninsula and the broader northeast asia region on a different trajectory so it spells implications for the alliance which rests on the foundations of you know the common north korean threat um but it's seeking to also advance

beyond um to work together on the shared political and ideological values among common regional threats including china's aggression and new challenges including supply supply chain disruptions pandemic etc etc so i think for north korea the end of our declaration is going to help kim inch closer towards other milestones including the estrangement of us rok relations um the overall reduction if not expulsion of us fk troops from the peninsula which consequently is going to weaken seoul's foothold and and the place it's

going to place seoul under a firmer north korean hand it's going to reverse the political economic and social progress it's made over the past seven decades so there's a lot to think about and what the end of what declaration in one hand and then the nuclear weapons and the other i think it's going to make him even more strongly positioned to subdue the cell so this is a good place for me to pause and i'll look forward to my co-panelists and i look forward to the discussion thanks so much sue and you preempted me

because i was going to ask a follow-up question about whether the end of war declaration has helped build any momentum towards korea peace but it sounds like you think in some ways it may have an opposite effect of even perhaps destabilizing the region so i know uh are some of our listeners may have questions on that or different views um but yes let's let's move on now to dr gina kim uh gina so let me turn now to you to offer a few remarks you know president moon has clearly signaled his interest in engaging north korea and the

biden administration has also stated it's pr that it's prepared to meet north korea anytime and anywhere what is the motive though behind kim jong-un's critical stance towards biden and moon's efforts for resuming talks because it sounds like uh president moon for sure and even the biden administration are open to some sort of negotiations but kim jong-un has really given uh both governments the cold shoulders so could you uh could you maybe describe what you think is happening behind uh behind north korea

and their rationale all right um i would like to thank the brookings and eai for giving me this opportunity to share my thoughts with other distinguished experts on korean peninsula issues well many scholars present skeptical views on the reversal of the nuclear program of the dprk because its nuclear armament aims to improve self-defense externally and to cement its authority internally so in particular experts on nuclear arms control argue that the dprk lacks a reason to choose denuclearization

in addition to that the means of pressure are quite limited besides the leadership in pyongyang cannot be entirely immune from the political cost of high profile meeting that failed once clearly the dprk is seemingly refraining from taking steps that could lead to escalated tension on the korean peninsula however the fact that the dprk remains unresponsive to the continued message of resumption of dialogue from the biden administration as you said raises some concerns among many of the parakeet watchers

in the absence of a response from the dprk the by the administration will prefer in the long run to maintain the status go instead of offering drastic incentives to negotiations with the dprk and in my opinion if this situation continues the idea of crisis management through arms control instead of the denuclearization of the korean peninsula will become increasingly persuasive that's something the dprk may want to wait and see moreover in a situation where competition between the u.s and china is

intensifying the motivation for the dprk and china to tighten their strategic relations will certainly increase this will raise alarm at least among south koreans about losing leverage on north korea and seoul will try actively engaging with pyongyang then either way the dprk will not think that it is losing a game to keep the size of the wind steps so small and rigid um which will give the dprk a bargaining advantage the dprk will pretend that it is not really bothered by any cost caused by no agreement

if the dprk pursues a near-term interest in revitalizing economy conditions then its immediate goal is to return to the talks with the intention to discuss what was previously offered by the north koreans in february 2019 that is partial sanctions relief in exchange for partial declaration of its nuclear program and the dprk's strategy will be avoiding unnecessary tensions on the korean peninsula and obviously action for action is a principle that the dprk has adhered to for many many decades if the prk believes that it can model

through then it is likely to seek a new equilibrium on the korean peninsula through military modernization in a tit-for-tat rivalry with south korea in this case the dprk will also avoid unnecessary escalation but there will be a much concern about the instability instability paradox to complete the pre-planned research and development cycle the dprk will need testing new weapon system before deployment for technical reasons the peer case strategy to up the ante to achieve political compromise and to be

recognized as a nuclear weapon state will be the worst case scenario in my mind then pyongyang need to speed up efforts to demonstrate credible deterrence capabilities but this strategy is not without risks confirming its commitment to invest more in force enhancement well helps the leadership in pyongyang increase the audience cost internally and therefore demonstrate externally that north koreans are not in position to make compromise or flexibly negotiate with the the u.s however escalation to a degree

in which pyongyang can increase just attention just enough to get international attention in a way not to upset beijing and moscow will be the challenge for the dprk currently the moon administration has confirmed many times that it would pursue at least the minimum goal with which is recreating the condition for starting a dialogue within the term it seems that um the south korean government worries that time is running out and therefore tries to push hard to declare and end the war on the korean

peninsula that does not have any legal implications in the expectation of creating a momentum for talks so the question is and i i also wonder if we have any alternative option right now obviously acknowledging north korea as a de facto nuclear weapon states will be a potential blow to the geneva agreement six party talks and related inter-korean agreements because all of these are based on 1991 joint declaration of the denuclearization of the korean peninsula well returning strategic patience may

not be a good idea because the perceived status quo does not necessarily mean stability because in the absence of talks on confidence building measures the arms race can be a natural course of action between the two koreans in south korea's presidential election is coming and a new government will need time to review the previous dprk policy then the dprk may want to test the water and refrain from making any suggestions for further dialogues if we don't have any institutional mechanism to continue

talks with the dprk separately from domestic political events however there will be a rough road if we link end of war declaration with denuclearization only then the dprk will resist it and the dprk set the precondition of declaring and end the war that is resolving the issue of u.s hustle policy well because the term house policy includes comprehensive issues political economic and military so we need to think ahead how to tighten the linkage of key issues that all concerned parties intend to address

well um i'll stop here and look forward to further discussions thank you okay excellent now sue and gina it seems like you know both of you are pretty you're more between skepticism and optimism you're more on the skeptical end if i were to ask whether the moon government will be able to make any progress towards korea peace before the end of end of the term um but i wanted to pick up on a thread that you guys uh both addressed uh directly for gina and indirectly for soon it's this idea of strategic

patience and as we all know for north korea in the land of lousy options on north korea it some think that strategic patience at this time may actually be better than pushing for uh engagement but gina you just mentioned that strategic patience may not be may not be ideal because it could we might end up leading to an arms race so in your case it sounded like you were leaning towards the argument that perhaps strategic patience is all that we can do for now because um you know again because there aren't

great options and now is just not the time to really push for something like the end of war declaration so if i could just have either of you follow up a bit on on whether you think the strategic patients given the risks that are involved with it if this is if this is really the only option that we have or if there's some something else that we should be we should be trying and i think that's where the end of war declaration comes in it is uh i have my own uh views on this but i i'll put those aside but i was wondering if

you could say something about strategic patients being the only option or whether we should try to push ahead with engagement so i don't know who wants to go first maybe maybe i'll go back to sue sure so i think when i guess the point of my talk was that you know we're not just sitting and not doing anything it's just that the more we try to push things when things are not conducive to a not even a friendly agreement but just a productive set of talks with north korea and negotiations that are going to

be constructive i just don't see that being there not just from the perspective of north korea but also from the perspective of the south korean government again the atmospherics are not really appropriate to to to call an end of war to to the korean war and and to build the steps toward the two koreas peacefully coexisting when kim jong-un actually has the weapons in place and when he doesn't have the intention to to be friendly what are we trying to get in return um we're just going to be allowing things between the united

states and south korea to be further divided uh where we're going to there's just a lot of factors that i don't think we're considering because we're thinking about this political goal um which is going to leave whichever administration comes in with with a bigger set of problems to handle so i think when it comes to strategic patients it's not about just sitting and not doing anything you can you can signal just look just like what we're doing we're signaling willingness to dialogue and we're also keeping a

watchful eye on what north korea is doing and responding in ways that are not going to put the united states and south korea in a position where we're jeopardizing we have to basically be dragged into negotiations without really knowing what we're going to want to expect from north korea and also what we're willing to give and take and i think that's the problem that i see uh before i turn to gina i would also like to encourage audience members if you have a question you can use the q a function to to ask a question but uh

since we i don't see any uh anything in there right now gina if i can turn to you and if i could just add one uh question to to this chain of thought but you had also mentioned arms control um as uh as an alternative and i know that that's not something that you uh that you advocate especially if we think about the risks of of proliferation uh but despite those risks should do you think there should be more serious attention uh to that option given the impasse of looking at arms control as an intermediate step so i'll also throw

that question in there so gina to you yeah um currently the biden administration is left with how to break the deadlock on the korean peninsula and um in my opinion the dprk policy of the u.s show some flexibility regarding how to negotiate but not what to negotiate with the dprk and even president trump could not change uh basic demands priorities and terms of the trade-off and certainly north korea will know it as long as china is helping north korea i think um north korea can buy time um so uh how to make a breakthrough um

the thing is well declaring the end of war is very much different from signing a peace treaty perhaps north korea wants a legally binding document to end the armistice treaty not a political statement because north korea emphasizes irreversible matters um but the south korea what what south korea is trying to pursue at this moment is not a treaty but a decoration with some symbolic meaning if the armistice treaty is replaced by a peace treaty then it'll become a dead letter and in the case the basis for the

existence of the u.n command on the korean peninsula and the unc real basis in japan becomes questionable because the unc is based on our mystic treaty by the way so it'll be a big challenge to the u.s and um and south korea uh considering the the allied defense posture in this region therefore i think uh we have to have a uh have to consider condition-based phased approach toward north korea we can talk about the contents of the peace treaty but we can sign it later once north korea completes a

denuclearization there are many creative ways to approach and um dprk is uh highly likely to seek a long-term survival strategy of bandwagoning with china instead of embarking on denuclearization negotiations with a political risk so alternative solution as i told you to the problem is exchanging a condition based rewards such that the dprk can perceive the benefits of denuclearization through a thorough verification mechanism that reduce the possibility of defection from an agreed framework by raising the cost of

non-compliance and in the long run um the two couriers can talk about confidence building and even arms control perhaps we can start talking about operational com arms control then uh move on to discussing structural arms control all this can be included in in a in a big package of phase a condition based phased uh implementation by both sides in my opinion okay thanks gina so it does seem like arms control it's if it's carefully put as part of a conditioned um effort may there may be a possibility

for that option and of course uh arms control is not the final goal you wanted them move towards denuclearization so uh so those are some thoughts i have one just a final uh final question before we move on to to the second half of our but but gina in your i believe it was in in the comments that you had had sent me it sounded like with the pandemic um you know once once the pandemic is over yo kim jong-un has his own timeline and he may just resume the timeline for whatever goals that he wants to achieve

is is it uh looking at this from from from the regime's perspective do you think it's better off to try to have some kind of agreement or negotiation while in some ways north korea is very weak they're weakened because of covet 19 because of the border lockdowns and does that give the u.s and south korea any leverage while they're in that state but the earlier there was talks about offering vaccines or some kind of humanitarian assistance um so it is opportu is there a better opportunity now during the pandemic to

try to engage north korea or would it make more sense to wait when when the pandemic is over knowing that north korea is not really willing to do uh do much or come out of its shell well now what nurse curry is suffering from it's not just a pandemic its food security situation is really dark dire this year and in order to actually revitalize its economy north korea these foreign assistance as well and all this should be done uh can be done during the pandemic or after the pandemic there should be a strategic

decision uh made that should be made by the leadership in permanent but i think what north korea is doing is uh just uh looking at the right time for opening up the uh opening up uh for uh having another round of dialogue because it seems to me that at least in the eyes of the north koreans in pyongyang a lot of uncertainty is there as as i told you the presidential election in south korea will be another variable uh in mind uh of the north koreans so we have to uh wait and see okay great um i'm so in the interest of time i'm going

to move move on to the second half of our panel where we discuss u.s south korea cooperation and north korea policy under the next south korean government so as as most of our listeners know there's an election a major election coming up next march uh in south korea so let me turn to dr jihuan fong who's in seoul to give us a rundown of how the two major south korean presidential candidates might approach north korea so g1 uh if if we can turn to you how would you describe to u.s policy makers the

main differences between the two major south korean presidential candidates it would be and regarding north korea policy so uh dr pong okay okay okay yeah okay thank you uh thanks uh andrew and thanks for uh having me here uh actually let me uh speak about the uh the presidential election and uh north korea are policy uh first you know the uh the basically two major south korean uh presidential candidate you know the jiameong and yung seongyeon i think have they have almost almost the same the position from their the predecessors

you know that yam from tim dejung nom muhan and the current president uh the moon jae-in and the young from uh the the the the president his predecessors the uh the imminent back and the uh uh and their policies you know north korea policies are based on uh their the ideological differences i think uh between the conservative and the progressive uh the candidate the izam young i think the support uh supports the engagement policy toward north korea and i think uh he can be described uh regarded as his his policy as a peace

first policy i mean uh that is to uh the focusing on the bringing peace back first on the korean peninsula uh just as the kim de jung nomihan and the mundane current president moon jae-in you know supported and also i think the injurement belief that the collapse of the instability of the north korean regime would neither directly lead to unification uh nor the peace on the korean peninsula so they he insisted that the benefit of the engagement and peace building uh policy and mechanism outweigh

uh the coast but uh conversely the candidate uh yoon sang yeah i think support uh the sanctioned regime on north korea and i think we may uh describe his policy as uh the hotline policy you know uh that the to focusing on the uh putting on pressure to uh the you know the pressure to enforce uh the pyongyang the kim jong-un to give up its nuclear weapons program so his policy may be also be the the regarded as is the unification of the policy of the sanctioned regime uh policy and that argues that he argues

that the unification will lead to peace uh just as the two previous uh the conservative lead uh the president uh immun back and back uh pursued so uh yosemite uh appears to believe that the united states and south korea should cooperate uh to keep sanctions uh keep going and pressure uh sanctions and pressure uh keep going and to in order to enforce pyongyang to back down so even if the the headline policy by him may destabilize the north korean domestic uh situation uh to the point of the collapse so

but the easement you know uh they appear to believe that the sanctions may uh destabilize the north korean domestic uh situation and may be very dangerous and even uh you know the leading to the humanitarian disaster and the systemic uh dysfunction so the south korean uh people uh he believes that should work on a long-term engagement strategy toward pyongyang by lifting uh of course the conditions based uh sanctions and the promo by promoting the korean economic uh corporation uh so he believes that

the invocation comes you know and the comes only gradually you know only by when the piece is brought back first to the korean uh peninsula but uh the candidate you sang yeah you know uh the beliefs that uh like uh just like the many many from the conservative groups uh in his uh party the people's uh power party believe that the only uh you know unification uh will that uh you know spell uh the disaster but solve many you know in the immediate uh problems such as the nuclear issues and the internal uh chaos and humanitarian

crises uh etc and it will uh he believes that the you know produce the massive economic and social benefit of the korean uh peninsula and also the northeast asia so it seems to me that we are more likely to see uh you know the the their policy to be repeated in the uh dear future the actually just just like we have seen uh in the previous you know the presidential uh the election because we already have seen that there there has been a really a serious debate between the conservative groups and uh the progressive uh the

uh groups of how to you know the deal with the north korean uh issues but uh i think they uh agreed to the how to uh you know the uh the get support from the united states because in that sense uh the young sangria and vision are not really different uh because both of them you know the stresses the the importance of you know the uh the strengthening uh the the korea u.s alliance uh in dealing with the uh the the north korean uh issue uh although they may be some uh you know uh may have some difference in you know the uh the how to

combine the uh the korea us uh the uh relations and the cooperation uh including the trilateral relations with uh the u.s korea and uh the japan uh but mostly i think uh their approach to the alliance issues is really uh dissimilar uh and also but somewhat uh different in the dealing with the north korean issues but the mostly i think they agreed to uh those issues that about the how to uh you know improve the uh the cooperation between u.s and south korea on the north korea policy let me stop here

okay thanks jihan um i'm going to uh turn to dr suteri just in the interest of time but uh jihan went just to get you thinking during the moderate discussion you know what kind of policy environment domestic policy environment will the next south korean president face in dealing with north korea issues because i think that's something that maybe those in washington or in the united states don't really understand the policies domestic policy space in south korea and what especially if there's an engagement approach so if you could just

think about that but right now let me turn to dr sue terry to give us some perspective from washington just in light of what um jihan was saying sue what challenges or opportunities will the biden administration face on north korea policy if either the main conservative or progressive candidate wins the election in march so sue over to you yes thanks andrew um this is really an interesting race because we have two non-traditional candidates um and they don't really have foreign policy experience or or

um so that's gonna be interesting on the north korea question specifically um let me talk about it beyond first um as dr huang said you know egypt is obviously expected to continue the ruling party's current focus on engagement with north korea um and lee has said that his approach to north korea would be practical without ideological considerations at least he says this right um and you know the word practical is fine since the body administration says their approach is also practical but but what i'm concerned about is

even now to be very candid um i don't think washington and solo are exactly on the same page in in their approach to north korea even though they say they are coordinating very very closely and they are to their credit um still they're not exactly on the same page i mean just take this end of war declaration that you guys just finished talking about um the moon administration has asked the budget administration to consider it so the by the administration said okay we will since you're a close ally and you're asking us to consider it

to break this current impasse with north korea um and supposedly their draft is in the final stage of the coordination and negotiation with washington so be too much as well which is interesting to me by the way because we're closely coordinating but we have no idea what the north koreans are going to say um but still um and the draft is going to it's expected to include all kinds of clauses about how this is not going to affect united nations command not going to impact u.s versus korea they're going to water down

their language but then it's going to reduce its attractiveness to north korea right um so to me the body of administration is doing this more of as an alliance management exercise not really going full force with it um they're sort of kind of being dragged to it and they they are doing it but it's again to me it's more of an alliance management exercise they know this is not north koreans are probably not going to accept this and they also know that it's going to be difficult to sell domestically in the us given that north

korea has not made a single step towards the degradation and given the recent testing campaign uh the north koreans were you know with their in their effort to diversify their missile arsenal so the peace declaration at this point when north koreans haven't done anything could leave the bodily administration um you know the republicans are going to accuse the biden administration for being solved in north korea and so on so um again i i and so i think that's going to be a main challenge with lee if he gets

elected again being on the same page between between washington and seoul um president lee if he's he will get elected i think would be more forward leaning on north korea more eager to accommodate north korea than the biden administration um and you've seen this in the past year uh andrew uh you know washington was unhappy with this legislation they came out of south korea criminalizing this a propaganda leaflets balloon towards north korea for example that's just another example um but that's so that's going to be the

challenge in terms of opportunity i do think that um if north korea is interested in negotiation and coming back to dialogue and having any kind of deal with washington then you know there is an opportunity because everybody will be for that right there's soul is not going to put a uh pause to that um in terms so i think that could be a potential um opportunity and maybe a worsening of relationship with north korea could be avoided under yoon um i do think there is a possibility for closer coordination um

yoon has criticized the moon administration's drive for this end of war declaration he has signaled that he's going to have a break from this current approach um more hard line in a way policy towards north korea is expected as you heard from dr huang um but i do think that final administration is going to be okay with that okay with seoul being less muted about north korea's human rights abuses um or being more vocal about china's role in north korea sanctions violations uh and so on um so and you know yoon has vowed to

strengthen u.s rock extended deterrence which is good news to the u.s um you know and so the strength of the u.s rock alliance and all that um oh the one risk though um i was because you asked me to think about the opportunities and challenges one risk obviously under yoon would be that north-south relationship could deteriorate and escalate and we saw this emo bach uh for example 2010 was particularly a difficult year or 10th year uh between the two koreas with chanan and yamchang shelling and so on so i do think those

are sort of um some of the challenges and opportunities you can think about with with you know with the presidential election and the outcome okay thanks sue and again for our audience if you have a question for dr terry or dr hong feel free to add ask your question in the question and answer chat box but uh jihan if we can go back to the domestic policy environment in south korea and what the south korean president has to deal with uh when it comes to north korea nuclear issue and peace related issues could you just give us a

brief uh comment about what what that policy landscape looks like what challenges the next south korean president may face and trying to address uh north korea or into korea peace okay i think that the palace landscape in south korea next year i mean after the presidential election uh will not be very favorable to the korean president uh because you know first of all there is a very serious you know the political polarization uh inside south korea uh you know just like the the united states uh the

uh you know the blue there is there are the blue america uh america and the the the red america uh and also like the united states in south korea there is a conservative south korean progressive south korea and then i don't think the any the presidential uh the candidate will uh win the landslide of victory uh even if he uh the wins the the election next uh march so uh the kind of the political polarization will make it uh makes it very difficult for the any you know uh the uh presidential uh the candidate

whoever wins the election to uh make it very difficult to you know the uh the deal with the north korea issue and also the nuclear and all the peace related uh issue the second uh the issue is about the generation generation uh gap you know uh there is a very serious you know generation gap in south korea then uh mostly in the the korean people in their 30s and 40s are more likely to support the uh regime while the uh the the fifties and uh sixties are uh more likely to uh the support uh the young jungle the conservative uh

candidate but the thing is that what matters uh is that the the korean people in uh their the 20s you know the the research saying about the uh in korea uh that the mj mgs uh the uh generation choice is really important in deciding the the outcome of the next presidential uh election but the thing is that they are not really interested in the dealing with north korean issues they are uh more interested in uh the getting a job and how to uh buy your apartment in seoul because you know that the korean the the domestic uh the economic

situation uh is not really uh favorable uh to uh do to that uh generation so i think that those two uh the issues are really uh important issues in next year even uh when we deal with north korea and uh the peace uh related uh things uh the next year uh so i think that the land the political landscape next year uh will not be not really good for uh the next korean uh president thank you okay thanks jihan and uh you know i know we've been focusing a lot of on north korea here but of course north korea the

north korea issue exists within a broader uh context within east asia and within the indo-pacific so i wanted to first go back to uh dr terry and just ask you you know moving beyond north korea what other issues concerning the broader indo-pacific region will remain important to the u.s south korea alliance moving forward well andrea i think you know you know first and foremost is china china and china um and how south korea would navigate that u.s china competition conflict i think it's fair to say i think for the koreans

just historically the two big fears in terms of alliance with the us have always been either abandonment or entrapment right and their nightmare scenario is this u.s china competition deteriorate further and potentially if there's ever a conflict like in the taiwan strait this is truly a nightmare scenario for the koreans so i think china is going to be a huge factor uh to consider in the in terms of alliance relationship um of course the second um is also i think ties with japan um you know you know there's

no south korea japan ties have worsened um in the past few years and the biden administration wants to really improve this and here i think when you look at yoon or lee i mean you know use position at least uh is more favorable uh well it sounds good better to the united states right because the ppp and yoon have been um saying they want to restore ties or they will try at least you know i think have said something like restore ties so yoon has been more critical of beijing uh in terms of just the two candidates while

being more vocal about allies with us and also restoring ties with japan um but this i think is going to be uh just both how the south koreans deal with china and japan are going to be uh interesting to watch um yoon also has been critical of president moon's hedging approach who is concerned about china's human rights abuses in hong kong and xinjiang um they also talked about you talked about south korea joining quad uh i have not heard i'm young talking about this um and so you know i think these issues are

going to be some things that that that's going to be of interest to the united states um you know we watched everything right we saw that you know um governor lee meeting with china's ambassador to south korea um and talking about ties with china so these are all i think it's going to be important for us but to be very candid i'll just make this point um i brought up this um point earlier by yoon and both candida yoon and candidate lee's lack of foreign policy experience i think that might be of a concern to the by the

administration and on china you know whichever presidential elect candidate wins in march we do know the u.s acting knows there's this intrinsic limit uh to what south korea can do with china because the fact that we're not changed is that south korea there's more trade with china than it does with the u.s and japan combined and south korea still has to deal with china in the context of its relationship with north korea and so on so there are still going to be limits on how far of south korean present can go

really in confronting china um that says south korea does not want to be a pawn either with beijing and wants to chart its own course uh in technological and competition economic policy and as well strategically so um we're seeing but this these are some of these other issues that that there will be watching very closely thanks sue and it's interesting that you mentioned that uh the lack of foreign policy experience might be of some concern and so at least for those of us in washington su and myself i guess we

should brace ourselves as we get towards elections uh there'll be more trips from south korea coming into dc just to get the lay of the land on u.s south korea alliance and foreign policy issues but jihad i want to also turn to you if you had any thoughts about what broader issues or concerns beyond north korea may be of interest to the u.s south korea alliance and of course dr terry mentioned china china china that's absolutely the same thing for the biden administration um but again if i were to bring up domestic

politics you know is there more convergence in south korean domestic politics on some of these issues like china i know we've seen poll numbers indicating that south koreans are also wary or concerned very very negative perceptions about china and i don't know if that would change someone like yu jim young's position on on how he approaches china so uh jihan any thoughts there uh okay you know that paul number shows that until 2015 the south korean people's you know attitude towards china was very favorable you know that i think

i as far uh as i remember that maybe the almost a two-third of the korean people have the favorable you know the images of china but after the third issue uh the south korean uh people's you know the image of china was getting worse uh much worse you know to the to the point of like the you know the korean people's you know image of maybe the north korea old the japan which is which is uh very low uh so maybe that kind of the public opinion may affect really greatly uh to the both the uh young male old the

easier amounts you know policy toward uh the china but uh i think i have a little uh different you know the opinion uh because uh you know whoever uh the takes power i think uh there are polish uh china would be really uh similar because uh you know that throughout the uh the consultative and the progressive uh the government uh like the kim daejung hyun and all and also uh in the the south korean government all the south korean government you know foreign policy uh the framework was to how to you know that the

uh strengthen the korea u.s alliance and also to improve the the korea uh china uh the the partnership simultaneously so uh and also the younger also you know had recently had trouble with the china by saying some kind of unfavorable uh things too about china but uh he also you know recently met with the chinese ambassador ambassador to korea this thing timing and talked about korea uh the china issue so i don't see any real difference between the uh the youtube and yemen and how to deal with the

chinese issue uh i know that china issue is a real challenge to korea uh but i think there is some kind of uh the strategic room for the korean uh the government to maneuver be maneuvering uh in east asia in the uh after the next presidential election okay thanks jihan and uh you know certainly the biden administration is going to be looking towards south korea for uh for their support their cooperation when it comes to u.s china u.s china competition so it's going to be another big issue that that faces the

u.s south korea alliance now so we we began with you know talking about north korea and we ended with broader issues in the indo-pacific but you know we were actually out of time i think it was a very uh very uh compact compact webinar and there really are no easy answers when it comes to especially north korea but i do want to thank dr sue terry dr chuan huang dr gina kim and ms sue kim for helping us better understand where we're at and what we might expect in regards to north korea and the indo-pacific and the u.s south korea

alliance before we close i'd appreciate if you could fill out a brief survey before exiting the webinar the survey responses will be used to plan future webinars catered to the interests of the public on behalf of eai and on behalf of the east asia institute and the brookings institution i'd like to say good night to our audience in korea indonesia and good day to everyone in the united states so thanks again for joining us and look forward to seeing uh seeing everyone hopefully in person the next time thank you

thank you bye you