[North Korea and the World] Kim Jong Un Directly and for the First Time Discloses Uranium Enrichment Facility... Is the 7th Nuclear Test Imminent?

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=boRbsH6UPpk

Video Script

North Korea's Escalating Nuclear Threat and "Divide-and-Conquer" Strategy

With the US presidential election drawing near, questions arise about whether North Korea will conduct its seventh nuclear test. Based on the logic I've previously presented, I assess that Kim Jong Un has been employing a "divide-and-conquer" strategy this year. I sincerely thank you for watching "North Korea and the World" with Park Won-gon. I will share my assessment regarding North Korean leader Kim Jong Un's disclosure of uranium enrichment facilities on September 12th and 13th. I will discuss the overall implications of this action and why Kim Jong Un chose to personally reveal these facilities at this particular time. I believe this carries a significant message to the United States. Therefore, I will present my predictions and analysis, including whether North Korea will conduct its seventh nuclear test, which has been discussed since last year, before the US election. On September 13th, North Korea's Korean Central News Agency and Rodong Sinmun reported that Kim Jong Un personally guided the Nuclear Weapons Institute and nuclear material production facilities on the 12th. According to the reports, Kim Jong Un stated while observing these facilities, "Just looking at them gives me strength," and expressed great satisfaction upon receiving reports of enjoyable nuclear material production. While some reports had previously mentioned these facilities, North Korea had never disclosed them before. Some uranium enrichment facilities are located in the Yongbyon nuclear complex, and the only ones disclosed were those shown to American nuclear expert Dr. Siegfried Hecker during his visit in 2010. No facilities have been disclosed since then. However, South Korean and US intelligence agencies have suggested possibilities in various locations, and the facility disclosed this time is presumed to be one of them. While the facility visited by Dr. Hecker was confirmed to be Yongbyon, the one disclosed this time could be Kangson, near Pyongyang. Of course, government authorities likely have a definitive judgment. However, from my perspective as a civilian researcher, I cautiously suggest that it might not be Yongbyon for the following reasons: First, the facility appears very new. The Yongbyon facilities are over 30 years old and quite dated, whereas the facility disclosed this time appears to be very new. Second, there are many reports suggesting that the Yongbyon nuclear complex has a certain level of radioactive contamination. While precise judgment is difficult, this might limit visits by North Korea's supreme leader, Kim Jong Un. Of course, high-enrichment uranium facilities, unlike plutonium facilities, have a very low risk of radioactive leakage, so protective gear might not be necessary. Nevertheless, considering various safety concerns, I cautiously propose Kangson as a more likely location than Yongbyon.

This facility has been mentioned in some reports, but North Korea has never disclosed it before. The only time a uranium enrichment facility was shown was in the Yongbyon nuclear complex in 2010 when seven or eight nuclear experts, including US expert Dr. Siegfried Hecker, visited North Korea. Since then, it has never been disclosed. However, South Korean and US intelligence agencies have discussed the possibility of facilities in multiple locations. It is understood that the facility shown this time is likely one of several. To confirm, the facility visited by Dr. Siegfried Hecker was in Yongbyon, and the facility shown this time could be Kangson, near Pyongyang. Of course, government authorities would have a definitive assessment. However, as a civilian researcher, I cautiously suggest the possibility that it may not be Yongbyon for two reasons. First, the facility appears very new. The Yongbyon facilities are over 30 years old and quite dilapidated, whereas the facility revealed this time appears to be brand new. Second, there are many reports suggesting that the Yongbyon nuclear complex has a certain level of radioactive contamination. While precise judgment is difficult, if this is the case, it might pose limitations for Kim Jong Un, North Korea's supreme leader, to visit in person. Of course, unlike plutonium facilities, high-enriched uranium facilities have a very low probability of radioactive leakage, so protective gear might not be necessary. Nevertheless, considering various safety concerns, I cautiously propose the possibility that it is Kangson rather than Yongbyon.

Dr. Siegfried Hecker visited Yongbyon, and it is speculated that the facility shown this time might be Kangson, near Pyongyang. Of course, I believe government authorities have a definitive judgment, but as a civilian researcher, I cautiously suggest that it might not be Yongbyon. Firstly, the facility is very new. As you know, Yongbyon's facilities are over 30 years old and quite dated. In contrast, this facility has been confirmed to be very new. Secondly, there are many reports suggesting that the Yongbyon nuclear complex has a certain level of radioactive contamination. It is difficult for us to make a precise judgment, but if that is the case, it would be highly restricted for Kim Jong Un, North Korea's supreme leader, to personally visit and provide on-site guidance. Of course, high-enrichment uranium facilities, unlike plutonium facilities, have a very low risk of radioactive leakage. Therefore, protective gear might not be necessary. Nevertheless, considering various safety and security concerns, I cautiously suggest Kangson as a possibility rather than Yongbyon. The important point regarding these high-enrichment uranium facilities is that nuclear weapons require fissile material. There are two methods for producing fissile material. One is reprocessing plutonium from reactors. Since we also engage in nuclear power generation, plutonium can be produced in weapons-grade quantities during the reprocessing of spent fuel rods. The other method, as North Korea disclosed this time, is uranium. Uranium is present in very small quantities in its natural state. It is a minuscule amount. Therefore, it is highly enriched to produce the necessary materials for weapons-grade purposes. This constitutes the two forms. When a nuclear crisis occurred, North Korea naturally spoke of reprocessing plutonium from the Yongbyon reactor. However, it is known that they have been operating high-enrichment uranium facilities even before and after Dr. Hecker's visit in 2010.

Attempting Nuclear Disarmament Negotiations and Recognition as a Nuclear State

The existence of highly enriched uranium became the most critical factor in the breakdown of the Agreed Framework between the United States and North Korea in 1994. To that extent, it is confirmed that North Korea operates facilities for producing two types of weapons-grade nuclear materials. Let's examine the reasons North Korea has provided for this announcement. North Korea itself has stated its objectives through these facilities. The first is, naturally, to increase its stockpile of nuclear materials. Increasing nuclear materials means increasing the number of nuclear weapons. This is clearly stated in North Korea's announcement. There were reports that Kim Jong Un ordered a full-scale focus on producing the nuclear materials necessary for tactical nuclear weapons. It is also reported that he ordered an increase in the number of centrifuges, an enhancement of the individual separation capacity of centrifuges, and the introduction of new centrifuges. Therefore, I believe North Korea has clearly expressed its intention to expand its high-enrichment uranium facilities and produce more nuclear materials. The second is North Korea's consistent narrative of responding to and deterring the United States, emphasizing the unique nature of their revolution. North Korea claims that one of the reasons for its nuclear development is that the United States threatens them with its nuclear arsenal. Thus, they have themselves stated the motive for further advancing, diversifying, and scaling up their nuclear materials and capabilities as a response to the United States. So, why did North Korea make such an announcement at this time? Beyond what North Korea has officially stated, I will present my analysis. First, North Korea is essentially seeking recognition as a nuclear-weapon state and aiming for nuclear disarmament negotiations with the United States and the international community. This is no longer a secret, and North Korea has expressed its intentions and goals in various forms. Therefore, I believe they revealed their high-enrichment uranium facilities this time to move in that direction. North Korea has been consistently pursuing two objectives this year.

Implications of the Uranium Enrichment Facility Disclosure

One is to demonstrate to South Korea, from beginning to end, all capabilities for nuclear attack. I have mentioned this several times on this broadcast. In April, they established a volcanic alert line and prepared for nuclear defense. Kim Jong Un personally directed the testing of all operational plans and capabilities for nuclear attacks against South Korea, as well as the locations and capabilities of actual nuclear delivery units. They conducted such training for two consecutive months, April and May. Through that training, they conveyed the political message: "We possess a definite capability to launch a nuclear attack against South Korea, and this has already been incorporated into our operational plans, making it irreversible." The disclosure of the uranium enrichment facility this time is intended to signal that they will continue to produce nuclear materials to bolster, strengthen, and expand their nuclear attack capabilities against South Korea. To put it somewhat crudely, this is a message to the United States: "If you do not stop us, we will continue down this path. If you do not stop us, our stockpile of nuclear materials and warheads will increase, and our attack capability against South Korea will be significantly enhanced. In a way, it's a message saying, 'Stop us.'" The method to stop us, in essence, is to recognize us as a nuclear-weapon state and proceed with nuclear disarmament. This is the message conveyed. Now, why did Kim Jong Un personally show the uranium enrichment facility? There are significant implications to be found there as well. First, uranium enrichment facilities are easy to conceal. This means that large-scale facilities are not required. In the case of the plutonium facilities in Yongbyon, they require reactors and cooling towers, making concealment virtually impossible. "

Conversely, high-enrichment uranium facilities can be operated with very small-scale installations. South Africa previously pursued nuclear development using highly enriched uranium. Later, during their disarmament and inspection process, it was reported that they had built such facilities under animal pens. Therefore, concealment is possible. By deliberately revealing facilities that can be concealed, they are demonstrating that nuclear weapons cannot be eliminated. Besides Kangson in North Korea, intelligence reports indicate the existence of about four or five other such locations. It is heard that the United States is already aware of these. The message is that since North Korea has many such concealable facilities, they cannot all be eliminated, and therefore, the path forward must be nuclear disarmament. Complete denuclearization of North Korea is unrealistic. This message is conveyed. Another point is that the old high-enrichment uranium facilities represent a kind of trauma for Kim Jong Un. In February 2019, a summit was held in Hanoi between the US and North Korea. At that time, President Trump, during negotiations, set a condition for Kim Jong Un to disclose and declare all these nuclear material production facilities and allow inspections. However, Kim Jong Un did not provide a response. He mentioned the Yongbyon facilities, but not precisely, which led President Trump to break off negotiations and leave. At that time, they sent Vice Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui to agree to declare and allow inspections of the entire Yongbyon nuclear facility, including IAEA and US inspectors. However, they still refused to disclose the high-enrichment uranium facilities. The fact that Kim Jong Un, who refused disclosure until now, has personally come forward to reveal them suggests significant implications. It means: "Negotiate with the US again. We have no intention of abandoning these high-enrichment uranium facilities. You demanded them from us in 2019, and they are clearly there. However, we have no intention of abandoning them in the future." This message is conveyed. In a way, if we consider it a counterattack from Kim Jong Un's perspective at that time, it carries a political symbolic meaning of returning the favor. The third point, and this is the most uncomfortable one, is that Kim Jong Un may believe he has seized a "moment of stars." What does this mean? There are ongoing discussions in the US that complete denuclearization of North Korea is unrealistic. What this implies is that during the Republican and Democratic National Conventions in July and August, their party platforms were released. The complete denuclearization of North Korea or denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula was omitted from both party platforms. In the 2020 and 2016 presidential elections, denuclearization of North Korea was explicitly included, but it has been omitted this time. Various interpretations were raised at the time. For example, the Democratic Party clearly explained why it was omitted. Colin Kahl, former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and a participant in the Democratic Party's platform development, stated during a briefing in response to a question about the omission of North Korean denuclearization: "It is due to a realistic recognition that it is difficult to achieve in the immediate future."

The US Election Cycle and North Korea's Strategic Calculations

This implies that within the core strategic circles of both the Democratic and Republican parties in Washington, there is a perception that complete denuclearization of North Korea is difficult and unrealistic. This perception is even reflected in their party platforms. Of course, this does not mean they will recognize North Korea's nuclear weapons. Listening to Colin Kahl's entire briefing, he explained that because complete denuclearization of North Korea is unrealistic, the focus should currently be on deterring North Korea's nuclear capabilities, which should be strengthened through extended deterrence by South Korea and the US. He also suggested that as these capabilities grow, North Korea may be more likely to come to the negotiating table for nuclear talks. Nevertheless, at the very least, from their starting point of perception, they have acknowledged that North Korea's denuclearization is realistically very difficult. The reason I referred to it as a "moment of stars" is precisely because this is what Kim Jong Un desires. Kim Jong Un, while continuously developing nuclear weapons, consistently argues for nuclear arms reduction instead of North Korean denuclearization. In fact, the concept of nuclear arms reduction, strictly speaking, in an academic sense, means the complete elimination of nuclear weapons as its final stage. However, this has not been realistically achieved. The commonly accepted meaning of nuclear arms reduction is to reduce nuclear weapons after acknowledging the other party's possession of a certain level of nuclear arsenal. Since this is the generally accepted concept, discussing nuclear arms reduction effectively amounts to acknowledging North Korea's possession of nuclear weapons. Therefore, from the perspective that we should not use the term "nuclear arms reduction," Kim Jong Un is naturally inclined to pursue nuclear arms reduction, which implies de facto recognition of North Korea's nuclear possession. There is a possibility, and perhaps even an increased likelihood, that North Korea perceives this. Therefore, in this context, by revealing its high-enrichment uranium facilities, the message sent to the United States is: "We possess facilities like these. Now that these facilities are being revealed, it signifies we have sufficient capabilities, and therefore, the complete denuclearization of North Korea, as desired by the US, is nonsensical." I will add one more point in connection with this. The US presidential election is just a few months away in November. Will North Korea conduct its seventh test by then? Based on the logic I have just presented, I believe the possibility is actually decreasing. Kim Jong Un, since the beginning of this year, has been cautiously, I believe, employing a so-called "divide-and-conquer" strategy. What this means is that North Korea is clearly pursuing a "combined warfare" approach towards South Korea. As explained in detail in the previous video, "combined warfare" literally means combining conventional warfare with nuclear warfare.

Possibility of a Seventh Nuclear Test and the China Variable

Therefore, if a war breaks out on the Korean Peninsula, their intention is to escalate directly to nuclear war even from a conventional warfare state. This indicates they are engaging in actions that raise the level of tension. However, they continuously escalate the level of threat towards South Korea. They are not currently escalating the level of threat towards the United States. For example, after test-firing the Hwasong-18 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) in December last year, they have not done so this year. The Hwasong-18 has a range capable of striking the US mainland, and importantly, it uses solid fuel, unlike liquid fuel, which was a first for North Korea's ICBMs. Solid fuel offers greater mobility and allows for rapid launch, making it a more challenging weapon system to detect and identify. Furthermore, although this is not 100% confirmed, analyses suggest the possibility of developing multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs). However, this year, North Korea has not conducted test launches of ICBMs capable of directly striking and attacking the US mainland. This suggests that their focus is on demonstrating their latent capabilities rather than directly showcasing their ability to strike the US mainland. High-enrichment uranium is a prime example. While possessing it increases their warhead count, it does not directly demonstrate a means of striking the US mainland. Another point I would like to make is that on September 8th, during Kim Jong Un's on-site guidance, he inspected a launch vehicle for ICBMs at a defense industry enterprise. The vehicle displayed had 12 axles, whereas the previous maximum for ICBMs was 8 axles. A 12-axle vehicle is a launcher for a missile that has not yet been shown. This implies the existence of a new missile. I suspect, cautiously, that they may have developed a larger version of the Hwasong-18 solid-fuel ICBM. However, even without directly revealing it, by showcasing the launch vehicle, they are demonstrating their continued development of ICBM capabilities to strike the US mainland. To summarize: the "divide-and-conquer" strategy involves overtly and explicitly demonstrating direct strike threats against South Korea, while showcasing potential capabilities against the United States. This suggests that Kim Jong Un is controlling the level of threat towards the US to some extent. If my analysis is correct, North Korea is acting very shrewdly. They may be intentionally assessing the current internal US public opinion and concluding that further escalating tensions could be disadvantageous to them. If they were to conduct a seventh nuclear test or an ICBM launch test, the Democratic Party would be attacked by Trump during the US election campaign. "How can you talk about friendship with a leader who directly threatens the US mainland?" This could put Trump on the defensive and increase criticism of Kim Jong Un. Consequently, the argument that the US should accept some level of North Korean denuclearization, recognizing its impracticality, might weaken, leading to a tougher policy and stronger sanctions against North Korea. Therefore, in the current situation, they appear to be cautiously observing developments. Of course, North Korea might still conduct an ICBM launch test, but if they do, I believe it would be a strategic misstep for the reasons mentioned earlier. If they do not, as I have stated, they are approaching the situation with sophistication. Another factor that makes North Korea hesitant about a seventh nuclear test is likely China. Since last year, when US and South Korean intelligence agencies assessed the possibility of a seventh nuclear test, North Korea has refrained from conducting it for various reasons. One of these reasons is likely the China variable. There are undeniable signs of unusual interactions between North Korea and China, to the point where they can no longer be hidden. Furthermore, with the 75th anniversary of North Korea's founding in the first half of the year and September having passed, the possibility of a summit between Xi Jinping and Kim Jong Un, or Kim Jong Un and Xi Jinping, seems unlikely. It is highly probable that it will not happen. With the Supreme People's Assembly scheduled for October, and November approaching, it is questionable whether they could meet amidst North Korea's internal reviews. Regardless, if there are no significant events between North Korea and China this time, it will undoubtedly serve as evidence that their bilateral relations are not smooth. In that sense, if North Korea were to conduct a seventh nuclear test, its relationship with China would further deteriorate. Following the Xi-Biden summit in November last year, China, like the US, agreed to manage US-China relations to some extent during this election year in the US. China is also facing numerous internal challenges, with its economy in a very difficult situation.

There are various reasons, but one of them is likely the China variable. There are undeniable signs of unusual interactions between North Korea and China, to the point where they can no longer be hidden. Furthermore, with the 75th anniversary of North Korea's founding in the first half of the year and September having passed, the possibility of a summit between Xi Jinping and Kim Jong Un, or Kim Jong Un and Xi Jinping, seems unlikely. It is highly probable that it will not happen. With the Supreme People's Assembly scheduled for October, and November approaching, it is questionable whether they could meet amidst North Korea's internal reviews. Regardless, if there are no significant events between North Korea and China this time, it will undoubtedly serve as evidence that their bilateral relations are not smooth. In that sense, if North Korea were to conduct a seventh nuclear test, its relationship with China would further deteriorate. Following the Xi-Biden summit in November last year, China, like the US, agreed to manage US-China relations to some extent during this election year in the US. China is also facing numerous internal challenges, with its economy in a very difficult situation.

There are various reasons, but one of them is likely the China variable. There are undeniable signs of unusual interactions between North Korea and China, to the point where they can no longer be hidden. Furthermore, with the 75th anniversary of North Korea's founding in the first half of the year and September having passed, the possibility of a summit between Xi Jinping and Kim Jong Un, or Kim Jong Un and Xi Jinping, seems unlikely. It is highly probable that it will not happen. With the Supreme People's Assembly scheduled for October, and November approaching, it is questionable whether they could meet amidst North Korea's internal reviews. Regardless, if there are no significant events between North Korea and China this time, it will undoubtedly serve as evidence that their bilateral relations are not smooth. In that sense, if North Korea were to conduct a seventh nuclear test, its relationship with China would further deteriorate. Following the Xi-Biden summit in November last year, China, like the US, agreed to manage US-China relations to some extent during this election year in the US. China is also facing numerous internal challenges, with its economy in a very difficult situation.

Realistic Difficulties of North Korean Denuclearization and Nuclear Arms Reduction Discussions

This implies that within the core strategic circles of both the Democratic and Republican parties in Washington, there is a perception that complete denuclearization of North Korea is difficult and unrealistic. This perception is even reflected in their party platforms. Of course, this does not mean they will recognize North Korea's nuclear weapons. Listening to Colin Kahl's entire briefing, he explained that because complete denuclearization of North Korea is unrealistic, the focus should currently be on deterring North Korea's nuclear capabilities, which should be strengthened through extended deterrence by South Korea and the US. He also suggested that as these capabilities grow, North Korea may be more likely to come to the negotiating table for nuclear talks. Nevertheless, at the very least, from their starting point of perception, they have acknowledged that North Korea's denuclearization is realistically very difficult. The reason I referred to it as a "moment of stars" is precisely because this is what Kim Jong Un desires. Kim Jong Un, while continuously developing nuclear weapons, consistently argues for nuclear arms reduction instead of North Korean denuclearization. In fact, the concept of nuclear arms reduction, strictly speaking, in an academic sense, means the complete elimination of nuclear weapons as its final stage. However, this has not been realistically achieved. The commonly accepted meaning of nuclear arms reduction is to reduce nuclear weapons after acknowledging the other party's possession of a certain level of nuclear arsenal. Since this is the generally accepted concept, discussing nuclear arms reduction effectively amounts to acknowledging North Korea's possession of nuclear weapons. Therefore, from the perspective that we should not use the term "nuclear arms reduction," Kim Jong Un is naturally inclined to pursue nuclear arms reduction, which implies de facto recognition of North Korea's nuclear possession. There is a possibility, and perhaps even an increased likelihood, that North Korea perceives this. Therefore, in this context, by revealing its high-enrichment uranium facilities, the message sent to the United States is: "We possess facilities like these. Now that these facilities are being revealed, it signifies we have sufficient capabilities, and therefore, the complete denuclearization of North Korea, as desired by the US, is nonsensical." I will add one more point in connection with this. The US presidential election is just a few months away in November.

The meaning is that within the core strategic circles of both the Democratic and Republican parties in Washington, there is a perception that complete denuclearization of North Korea is difficult and unrealistic. This perception is even reflected in their party platforms. Of course, this does not mean they will recognize North Korea's nuclear weapons. Listening to Colin Kahl's entire briefing, he explained that because complete denuclearization of North Korea is unrealistic, the focus should currently be on deterring North Korea's nuclear capabilities, which should be strengthened through extended deterrence by South Korea and the US. He also suggested that as these capabilities grow, North Korea may be more likely to come to the negotiating table for nuclear talks. Nevertheless, at the very least, from their starting point of perception, they have acknowledged that North Korea's denuclearization is realistically very difficult. The reason I referred to it as a "moment of stars" is precisely because this is what Kim Jong Un desires. Kim Jong Un, while continuously developing nuclear weapons, consistently argues for nuclear arms reduction instead of North Korean denuclearization. In fact, the concept of nuclear arms reduction, strictly speaking, in an academic sense, means the complete elimination of nuclear weapons as its final stage. However, this has not been realistically achieved. The commonly accepted meaning of nuclear arms reduction is to reduce nuclear weapons after acknowledging the other party's possession of a certain level of nuclear arsenal. Since this is the generally accepted concept, discussing nuclear arms reduction effectively amounts to acknowledging North Korea's possession of nuclear weapons. Therefore, from the perspective that we should not use the term "nuclear arms reduction," Kim Jong Un is naturally inclined to pursue nuclear arms reduction, which implies de facto recognition of North Korea's nuclear possession. There is a possibility, and perhaps even an increased likelihood, that North Korea perceives this. Therefore, in this context, by revealing its high-enrichment uranium facilities, the message sent to the United States is: "We possess facilities like these. Now that these facilities are being revealed, it signifies we have sufficient capabilities, and therefore, the complete denuclearization of North Korea, as desired by the US, is nonsensical." I will add one more point in connection with this. The US presidential election is just a few months away in November.

Divide-and-Conquer Strategy: Differentiated Approach Towards South Korea and the United States

With the US presidential election just a few months away in November, the question arises whether North Korea will conduct its seventh nuclear test by then. Based on the logic I've previously presented, I believe the possibility is actually decreasing. Kim Jong Un, since the beginning of this year, has been cautiously, I believe, employing a so-called "divide-and-conquer" strategy. What this means is that North Korea is clearly pursuing a "combined warfare" approach towards South Korea.

As explained in detail in the previous video, "combined warfare" literally means combining conventional warfare with nuclear warfare. Therefore, if a war breaks out on the Korean Peninsula, their intention is to escalate directly to nuclear war even from a conventional warfare state. This indicates they are engaging in actions that raise the level of tension. However, they continuously escalate the level of threat towards South Korea. In contrast, they are not currently escalating the level of threat towards the United States. For example, after test-firing the Hwasong-18 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) in December last year, they have not done so this year. The Hwasong-18 has a range capable of striking the US mainland, and importantly, it uses solid fuel, unlike liquid fuel, which was a first for North Korea's ICBMs. Solid fuel offers greater mobility and allows for rapid launch, making it a more challenging weapon system to detect and identify. Furthermore, although this is not 100% confirmed, analyses suggest the possibility of developing multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs). However, this year, North Korea has not conducted test launches of ICBMs capable of directly striking and attacking the US mainland. This suggests that their focus is on demonstrating their latent capabilities rather than directly showcasing their ability to strike the US mainland. High-enrichment uranium is a prime example. While possessing it increases their warhead count, it does not directly demonstrate a means of striking the US mainland. Another point I would like to make is that on September 8th, during Kim Jong Un's on-site guidance, he inspected a launch vehicle for ICBMs at a defense industry enterprise. The vehicle displayed had 12 axles, whereas the previous maximum for ICBMs was 8 axles. A 12-axle vehicle is a launcher for a missile that has not yet been shown. This implies the existence of a new missile. I suspect, cautiously, that they may have developed a larger version of the Hwasong-18 solid-fuel ICBM. However, even without directly revealing it, by showcasing the launch vehicle, they are demonstrating their continued development of ICBM capabilities to strike the US mainland.

To summarize: the "divide-and-conquer" strategy involves overtly and explicitly demonstrating direct strike threats against South Korea, while showcasing potential capabilities against the United States. This suggests that Kim Jong Un is controlling the level of threat towards the US to some extent. If my analysis is correct, North Korea is acting very shrewdly. They may be intentionally assessing the current internal US public opinion and concluding that further escalating tensions could be disadvantageous to them.

The Strategic Miscalculation and Nuclear Use Risk for North Korea

If they were to conduct a seventh nuclear test or an ICBM launch test, the Democratic Party would be attacked by Trump during the US election campaign. "How can you talk about friendship with a leader who directly threatens the US mainland?" This could put Trump on the defensive and increase criticism of Kim Jong Un. Consequently, the argument that the US should accept some level of North Korean denuclearization, recognizing its impracticality, might weaken, leading to a tougher policy and stronger sanctions against North Korea. Therefore, in the current situation, they appear to be cautiously observing developments. Of course, North Korea might still conduct an ICBM launch test, but if they do, I believe it would be a strategic misstep for the reasons mentioned earlier. If they do not, as I have stated, they are approaching the situation with sophistication. Another factor that makes North Korea hesitant about a seventh nuclear test is likely China. Since last year, when US and South Korean intelligence agencies assessed the possibility of a seventh nuclear test, North Korea has refrained from conducting it for various reasons. One of these reasons is likely the China variable. There are undeniable signs of unusual interactions between North Korea and China, to the point where they can no longer be hidden. Furthermore, with the 75th anniversary of North Korea's founding in the first half of the year and September having passed, the possibility of a summit between Xi Jinping and Kim Jong Un, or Kim Jong Un and Xi Jinping, seems unlikely. It is highly probable that it will not happen. With the Supreme People's Assembly scheduled for October, and November approaching, it is questionable whether they could meet amidst North Korea's internal reviews. Regardless, if there are no significant events between North Korea and China this time, it will undoubtedly serve as evidence that their bilateral relations are not smooth. In that sense, if North Korea were to conduct a seventh nuclear test, its relationship with China would further deteriorate. Following the Xi-Biden summit in November last year, China, like the US, agreed to manage US-China relations to some extent during this election year in the US. China is also facing numerous internal challenges, with its economy in a very difficult situation.

There are various reasons, but one of them is likely the China variable. There are undeniable signs of unusual interactions between North Korea and China, to the point where they can no longer be hidden. Furthermore, with the 75th anniversary of North Korea's founding in the first half of the year and September having passed, the possibility of a summit between Xi Jinping and Kim Jong Un, or Kim Jong Un and Xi Jinping, seems unlikely. It is highly probable that it will not happen. With the Supreme People's Assembly scheduled for October, and November approaching, it is questionable whether they could meet amidst North Korea's internal reviews. Regardless, if there are no significant events between North Korea and China this time, it will undoubtedly serve as evidence that their bilateral relations are not smooth. In that sense, if North Korea were to conduct a seventh nuclear test, its relationship with China would further deteriorate. Following the Xi-Biden summit in November last year, China, like the US, agreed to manage US-China relations to some extent during this election year in the US. China is also facing numerous internal challenges, with its economy in a very difficult situation.

There are likely several reasons, one of which is undoubtedly the China variable. Anomalies in North Korea-China relations have been observed to a degree that they can no longer be concealed. Moreover, with the first half of the year, the 75th anniversary, and September having passed, it is questionable whether a summit between Xi Jinping and Kim Jong Un, or Kim Jong Un and Xi Jinping, is possible. The likelihood is low. The Supreme People's Assembly is scheduled for October, and as November approaches, North Korea will be conducting its year-end reviews. It is uncertain if a meeting could occur during this period. Regardless, if there is no significant event between North Korea and China this time, it definitively demonstrates that the bilateral relations are not favorable. In this sense, if North Korea proceeds with a seventh test, its relations with China will deteriorate further. China, following the Xi-Biden summit in November of last year, agreed, as did the U.S., to manage U.S.-China relations to some extent during this year, which includes the U.S. presidential election. China also faces numerous domestic challenges, with its economy in a very difficult state.

There are likely several reasons, one of which is undoubtedly the China variable. Anomalies in North Korea-China relations have been observed to a degree that they can no longer be concealed. Moreover, with the first half of the year, the 75th anniversary, and September having passed, it is questionable whether a summit between Xi Jinping and Kim Jong Un, or Kim Jong Un and Xi Jinping, is possible. The likelihood is low. The Supreme People's Assembly is scheduled for October, and as November approaches, North Korea will be conducting its year-end reviews. It is uncertain if a meeting could occur during this period. Regardless, if there is no significant event between North Korea and China this time, it definitively demonstrates that the bilateral relations are not favorable. In this sense, if North Korea proceeds with a seventh test, its relations with China will deteriorate further. China, following the Xi-Biden summit in November of last year, agreed, as did the U.S., to manage U.S.-China relations to some extent during this year, which includes the U.S. presidential election. China also faces numerous domestic challenges, with its economy in a very difficult state.

There are likely several reasons, one of which is undoubtedly the China variable. Anomalies in North Korea-China relations have been observed to a degree that they can no longer be concealed. Moreover, with the first half of the year, the 75th anniversary, and September having passed, it is questionable whether a summit between Xi Jinping and Kim Jong Un, or Kim Jong Un and Xi Jinping, is possible. The likelihood is low. The Supreme People's Assembly is scheduled for October, and as November approaches, North Korea will be conducting its year-end reviews. It is uncertain if a meeting could occur during this period. Regardless, if there is no significant event between North Korea and China this time, it definitively demonstrates that the bilateral relations are not favorable. In this sense, if North Korea proceeds with a seventh test, its relations with China will deteriorate further. China, following the Xi-Biden summit in November of last year, agreed, as did the U.S., to manage U.S.-China relations to some extent during this year, which includes the U.S. presidential election. China also faces numerous domestic challenges, with its economy in a very difficult state.

US-China Relations and China's Responsibility for the Seventh Nuclear Test

Because engaging in all-out war with the United States in economic or strategic competition is burdensome, there is a stance to manage it stably. For this reason, we are seeing mutual visits between high-ranking officials and the reconfiguration of communication lines. If North Korea were to conduct its seventh nuclear test, the United States would still point to China as the cause of North Korea's nuclear issue. In other words, the responsibility would fall on China. The logic that North Korea conducted its seventh nuclear test because China, despite possessing sufficient influence over North Korea, did not exercise it or prevent it, could be used by both the Democratic and Republican parties in the U.S. presidential election campaign to criticize China.

North Korea's Nuclear Coercive Diplomacy and ROK-US Deterrence Capabilities

Although there are differences and varying degrees in the platforms of the two parties, both have already announced very strong policies toward China. In this context, if the responsibility for a nuclear test were attributed to China, it could lead to even tougher policies against China. As this is an outcome China would not desire, the possibility of a seventh nuclear test is judged to be low. If so, is North Korea's current behavior intended to lead the situation in a direction favorable to itself? I do not believe North Korea's 'moment of glory' will come. Rather, I believe it is more likely to be a misjudgment on North Korea's part. If North Korea were to use nuclear weapons, it would mean the 'end of the regime,' as repeatedly warned by South Korea and the United States. Therefore, Kim Jong Un cannot use nuclear weapons against South Korea. Nor can he use them against the United States. Furthermore, coercive diplomacy through nuclear weapons also has its limits, as South Korea and the United States possess the capabilities to sufficiently deter North Korea. The 'end of the regime' mentioned here is not mere rhetoric.

As I have explained in detail on several occasions in my videos, South Korea and the United States possess the capability for a decisive strike against Kim Jong Un. Of course, calling this 'decapitation strike' is a very inaccurate term. In any modern warfare, when conflict erupts, the enemy's key leadership is targeted. In English, this is referred to as a 'High-Value Target' operation, meaning an operation to eliminate key leadership. Kim Jong Un is acutely aware, more than anyone else, that South Korea and the United States excel in such operations. Therefore, I have considerable doubt about the effectiveness of North Korea's nuclear coercion. Furthermore, I also believe there are significant limitations to whether the United States, regardless of whether it is led by Republicans or Democrats, will pursue nuclear disarmament, as some argue. The moment nuclear disarmament proceeds, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime, established in 1968, will be shaken. This regime guarantees the nuclear monopoly of the five major nuclear powers, including the United States, China, and Russia. It is questionable whether they would make such a choice. Although Trump and his associates say various things,

Trump is not an isolationist but a nationalist ('America First'). This means that he does not intend to negate all aspects of the current international order that are favorable to the United States. The crucial point is that the situation will never unfold as North Korea desires. This is my final remark. Thank you for watching.

■ Park Won Gon: Director of the North Korea Research Center at the East Asia Institute (EAI), Professor of North Korean Studies at Ewha Womans University.

■ Responsible and Edited by: Park Han-soo, EAI Research Fellow

Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | hspark@eai.or.kr