[Commentary] The US Presidential Election and the Korean Peninsula: Prospects for North Korea-China-Russia and South Korea-US-Japan Relations

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TR4v9UZzJFw

Victor Cha, Senior Vice President and Korea Chair at CSIS, discusses the prospects for North Korea-China-Russia and South Korea-US-Japan relations in the lead-up to the US presidential election. He predicts that North Korea will increase the frequency of provocations during the US and South Korean election periods, as it has in the past, but these will be highly limited and tactical. He also assesses that the improvement in North Korea-Russia relations has provided an unprecedented opportunity for North Korea's weapons development efforts, and that China will also engage more actively with North Korea to avoid losing relative influence. Finally, Dr. Cha advises the South Korean government to focus more on cooperation with the current Biden administration rather than worrying about a future, not-yet-elected administration.

[View Full Korean Transcript]                [Go to English Transcript]

Full Korean Transcript

Son Yeol: Hello, viewers of the EAI interview. I am Son Yeol, President of the East Asia Institute and Professor at Yonsei University.

Today, I am honored to speak with my long-time friend, Dr. Victor Cha, Senior Vice President and Korea Chair at CSIS. Dr. Cha is also a professor in the Department of Government at Georgetown University. He is one of the foremost experts on Korean affairs and US policy toward the Korean Peninsula.

Thank you once again for agreeing to this interview. I believe we had a similar format about 1 year and 3 or 4 months ago, in October 2022.

I feel we are at a very interesting juncture, with both South Korea and the United States in election campaigns, and North Korea also showing considerable changes in various aspects.

Q1. Outlook for North Korea in 2024

Son Yeol: Let's start with North Korea.

As you know, North Korea has conducted numerous military provocations, missile tests, launched a military reconnaissance satellite, and engaged in artillery drills. We are witnessing heightened military tensions between the two Koreas. Simultaneously, Kim Jong Un has made significant statements regarding the nature of inter-Korean relations. He has explicitly abandoned unification as a goal and, by recently refraining from using the term 'nation,' has redefined inter-Korean relations as those between hostile states.

Considering the situation thus far, how do you interpret North Korea's actions, and what choices do you anticipate North Korea will make this year?

Victor Cha: Yes. First, thank you again for having me. It's a pleasure to be here with EAI and all of you today.

Unfortunately, I believe 2024 will be a difficult year. We are likely to see North Korea engage in more intensified military provocations, missile tests, and perhaps even a seventh nuclear test. There are several reasons for this.

First, as mentioned in a recent CSIS report, North Korea has historically escalated its provocations in years with US presidential or congressional elections. In fact, looking at the US presidential and congressional election periods over the past decade, the average annual number of provocations during the Kim Jong Un era has more than tripled compared to the Kim Jong Il era. Although it is still early in the year, we have already seen a significant number of missile provocations.

Second, as you know, the annual ROK-US combined military exercises are scheduled for the first quarter of 2024. In addition, the first-ever ROK-US-Japan regular military exercises are planned, which will provide North Korea with a pretext to adopt a more belligerent stance. Therefore, both of these factors suggest an increase in North Korean provocations in 2024.

Furthermore, unfortunately, I believe North Korea's declaration that it no longer considers 'unification' a primary goal is an active act of 'decoupling' in inter-Korean relations.

This is not the first time North Korea has taken such actions. You may recall when they blew up the inter-Korean joint liaison office in the DMZ. This was also an attempt to actively decouple from South Korea in all mechanisms for inter-Korean dialogue. While it is true that this is not a good sign, it is not impossible to restore these institutions or mechanisms. The possibility of their restoration is not being ruled out. Therefore, I believe these actions are also within the context of the general trend North Korea is currently exhibiting.

2024 is a year of important elections for both South Korea and the United States. I believe North Korea will act more assertively during this period because they believe they can influence one or both of these elections in some way.

Son Yeol: So, do you not anticipate North Korea attempting serious military provocations that result in casualties?

Victor Cha: I do not believe North Korea has made a strategic decision to wage war. Of course, I certainly believe they will escalate their provocations, similar to past conventional provocations against the South in maritime or border areas. However, I believe these provocations will remain at a very limited and tactical level, in a way that is difficult to interpret as the first signal of war, unlike in the past.

Q2. North Korea-Russia Relations and China

Son Yeol: I recall you previously analyzed that North Korea's successful launch of its military reconnaissance satellite was due to direct Russian support. As you know, Kim Jong Un emphasized strengthening relations with Russia, China, and other socialist countries when explaining Pyongyang's strategy for 2024. How do you think this direction will affect North Korea-Russia or North Korea-China relations?

Victor Cha: When considering North Korea issues over the past few decades, the development of North Korea-Russia relations is perhaps the most significant event. If you think about it, North Korea was in a very difficult situation due to the failure of diplomacy with Trump and three years of COVID-19 lockdowns. Then, suddenly, they have formed a new relationship with Russia.

Historically, North Korea has always been in a position of pleading with the Soviet Union and Russia for food, energy, security guarantees, and debt relief. However, now, due to the war in Ukraine, Russia is requesting a substantial supply of ammunition from North Korea. This places North Korea in a very advantageous position.

What concerns me is that North Korea may not only receive food and energy from Russia but also sensitive military technology. Again, looking back at history, Russia and the Soviet Union were very reluctant to supply military technology to North Korea. But this was during a period when the Soviet Union or Russia did not really need North Korea much. Currently, Putin is fighting a battle for survival, literally fighting for his life in Ukraine.

In my opinion, this situation creates an environment conducive to Russia transferring military technology to North Korea that it would not normally provide. I am very concerned by recent reports that Kim Jong Un has considered initiating a nuclear submarine development project.

This is a clear indication that North Korea is seeking Russian assistance in nuclear submarine technology, military satellite technology, and possibly ICBM technology. Therefore, this is a very significant change.

The strengthening of relations between North Korea and Russia has also had significant repercussions on China's relations. This is because China generally prefers to claim it has little influence over North Korea, but at the same time, it dislikes seeing its relative influence over North Korea diminish. Therefore, China will strive to engage more actively with North Korea in response to the improved relations between North Korea and Russia.

After the failure of the Hanoi summit between Trump and Kim Jong Un, Xi Jinping ceased meeting with Kim Jong Un. However, if Putin visits Pyongyang, which seems to be actively prepared following the visit of North Korean Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui to Russia, and if this materializes, I believe Xi Jinping will resume meetings with Kim Jong Un.

Therefore, this signifies a strengthening of the trilateral relationship between China, North Korea, and Russia, and it will once again be a case of North Korea snatching victory from the brink of defeat. North Korea, which was in a dire situation due to COVID-19 lockdowns after a bold gamble with the United States, has now gained an advantageous position by positioning itself as a pivot between Russia and China.

Q3. Prospects for Confrontation between North Korea-China-Russia and South Korea-US-Japan

Son Yeol: As you mentioned, concerns are growing about the confrontation between the northern triangle and the southern triangle. We lived in such a world during the Cold War.

The competitive dynamic between these two blocs is being revived. If these two camps compete again, the current sanctions against North Korea could be significantly weakened, which would bring about considerable changes.

Victor Cha: I completely agree with your assessment, Director. As you said, the current situation is very similar to the confrontation between North Korea-China-Russia and South Korea-US-Japan during the Cold War.

China once referred to the South Korea-US-Japan alliance as an 'iron triangle' aimed at containing China. Furthermore, the reason why [the revival of the Cold War dynamic] has a significant impact on the international community is, as you mentioned, that China and Russia no longer wish to cooperate with the West in the UN Security Council, which will have a very negative impact on the future of the UN Security Council as a global governance body.

Therefore, what is happening on the Korean Peninsula now does not only affect the United States and South Korea. It also affects global governance itself, as issues that China and Russia oppose can no longer be raised in the UN Security Council.

Q4. The US Presidential Election and the Possibility of Trump's Re-election

Son Yeol: I see. Next, let's move on to the US presidential election.

Many consider the US presidential election to be the most important among the numerous elections taking place this year.

While we cannot predict the outcome, we can anticipate the direction of foreign policy if Trump wins and prepare accordingly. What do you think the US policy toward North Korea will be if Trump is re-elected?

Victor Cha: It is truly remarkable that, despite much discussion about the global decline of democracy, Asian countries will be electing their leaders through votes more than any other region in the world this year.

The outcome of the US presidential election remains uncertain. It is most likely to be a rematch between Donald Trump and the incumbent President Joe Biden. Again, no one can predict the outcome. The election will likely be decided by a few thousand votes in five swing states. It appears to be a very close election.

What will US policy toward North Korea be if Donald Trump is re-elected?

I anticipate that Trump will restart his personal relationship with Kim Jong Un for several reasons.

I think this point is clear enough to be confident about. If Trump is inaugurated, we can expect a situation similar to 2017, when relations with North Korea were very difficult.

As we discussed, 2024 will not be an easy year in terms of relations with North Korea. Therefore, the North Korean issue will become as urgent as it was when Trump took office in 2017, and the US President will be in a situation where they must do something to resolve this issue. If Trump is in office, I believe he will likely respond by attempting to rebuild a personal relationship with Kim Jong Un again.

Also, when discussing denuclearization, there is a possibility of attempting to adjust and control North Korea's belligerent behavior by exchanging a reduction in North Korea's provocation level for some easing of sanctions. The Washington policy community calls this not North Korean 'denuclearization' but 'pursuing threat reduction through arms control'.

I am not saying that Trump will necessarily choose this path. However, considering that he publicly declared the North Korean issue resolved after the Singapore summit, I believe he will announce a similar [resolution] if Kim Jong Un stops provocations, halts long-range missile tests, and pursues an arms control policy based on threat reduction. In this case, although the term is denuclearization, the substance could result in recognizing North Korea as a nuclear-weapon state.

Yul Sohn: That would put the South Korean government in a very difficult position.

Victor Cha: Yes, it would put the South Korean government in a very difficult position. I think it would also put other governments and US allies in a difficult position.

President Trump will likely not maintain the current level of ROK-US-Japan trilateral military exercises. The main reason is that he views these types of military exercises as costly and does not want to spend money in that manner. All measures such as the Washington Declaration and the Nuclear Consultative Group will be re-examined under the Trump administration, and their continuation or suspension will be determined based on the results.

To reiterate, I am not making predictions because it is truly unpredictable, but I am stating my concerns.

Q5. The future of Camp David after Trump's re-election

Yul Sohn: What about Camp David [the agreements reached at the summit]?

Victor Cha: I believe Trump's advisors on Asia would recommend its continuation. It might continue formally.

However, what is important at the Camp David summit is not just the meeting of the leaders themselves, but the substantive implementation of the agreements, such as the information sharing agreement and joint cooperation on ballistic missile defense. This is actually much more important.

I am not sure if Trump, if re-elected, would value these matters as highly as the current Biden administration does. As you know, the Biden administration places great importance on events like the Camp David summit and greatly acknowledges the efforts of South Korea and Japan in making this type of cooperation possible.

Yul Sohn: If Trump is elected, there are two issues.

The first is the issue of cost-sharing for defense, which we have already experienced.

The second is related to trade. Currently, the US is South Korea's largest export market and its top trading surplus country since June last year. However, if Trump becomes president, he will look at these figures, and a major trade dispute will be triggered between the two countries, putting South Korea in a difficult situation. This is because South Korea is in fierce competition with China, its other largest export market, and actually recorded a trade deficit with China for the first time since normalizing relations last year. Therefore, South Korea will face a very difficult situation in its relations with both China and the US.

Victor Cha: Trade policies of the Trump and Biden administrations are expected to remain consistent, especially in areas like supply chain protection.

In fact, many policies, such as Clean Network and Blue Dot Network, were initiated during the Trump administration and expanded during the Biden administration. I believe that even if Trump is elected, he will continue to pursue these policies through legislation such as the Inflation Reduction Act and the CHIPS Act.

At the same time, I do not think the Trump administration will pay as much attention to the complaints of allies as the Biden administration has. For example, with the Inflation Reduction Act, the Biden administration listened to the complaints of South Korea and France and actually made efforts to resolve the issues. It is unclear whether the Trump administration would react in the same way.

Furthermore, looking back at the period of President Trump's term in terms of trade balance, Trump generally disliked countries that ran a surplus in their trade relations with the US. He tended to view even allies as adversaries in trade. It seems he views relations with allies from the perspective of his personal experience starting with the adversarial trade relations with Japan in the 1980s.

In fact, Trump's primary concern regarding China was also largely related to the merchandise trade deficit.

While many people cited various issues related to China in other contexts, the main factor that motivated Trump was the merchandise trade deficit with China, which led to strong measures such as sanctions. Therefore, if a Trump administration returns, there is a possibility that similar sanctions will be imposed again. This will lead to increased uncertainty in the trade sector for allies as well.

As viewers may recall, former President Trump demanded $5 billion, which is five times the agreed-upon cost-sharing amount for defense for South Korea. Fortunately, the current agreement remains valid throughout the Trump administration's term. In fact, if Trump is re-elected, it is scheduled to last until the final year of his term.

Since an agreement has already been reached, it is unlikely to be brought back to the negotiation table. Of course, the possibility of Trump breaking that agreement and starting negotiations again cannot be completely ruled out, but if that were to happen, it would be an extreme measure. Therefore, in terms of [defense cost-sharing negotiations], I believe the US government's policy consistency will be maintained. I expect Trump to demand more defense payments from allies in Asia and Europe, such as NATO, South Korea, and Japan.

Q6. Recommendations for the South Korean government after the election

Yul Sohn: Thank you. Lastly, do you have any recommendations or advice for the South Korean government regarding ROK-US relations after the election?

Victor Cha: I have a few points.

The first, naturally, is that we do not know the election outcome. Therefore, the South Korean government must cooperate with the current US administration, not with a government that has not yet taken office.

In that sense, the South Korean government must cooperate closely with the Biden administration for the next year. The South Korean government should continue its efforts with the current Biden administration to institutionalize all forms of cooperation related to de-risking, whether it be bilateral cooperation such as the Washington Declaration and the NCG, or trilateral cooperation such as the Camp David summit. I believe these efforts should continue.

During the Trump administration, we keenly felt the importance of leader-to-leader relationships. Former President Trump maintained a very good relationship with former Prime Minister Abe. Therefore, it is very important to build a good personal relationship between President Yoon Suk Yeol and former President Trump.

In my personal opinion, I think the two will get along well.

Neither of them is a politician who went through a traditional political training process. As you know, former President Trump comes from a business background, and President Yoon Suk Yeol comes from a prosecution background. Therefore, both entered politics from outside the political sphere and are not typical politicians. Based on these commonalities, they might form a special bond.

However, personal relationships are important to build well from the beginning.

If Biden is re-elected, I believe many people in South Korea will be relieved. I recall that when Biden was elected president, the front pages of all South Korean newspapers expressed relief, proclaiming the normalization of the ROK-US alliance. If Biden is re-elected, I believe that all the work we are currently doing will continue, and the relationship will be characterized by consistency, predictability, and reliability.

However, if Trump is elected, I believe the second term will not be much different from the first term, which felt like a roller coaster ride.

Yul Sohn: Thank you for sharing your insights in this EAI interview.

The discussions today were very insightful and interesting. We will have to see what unfolds in a year's time. If possible, I hope we can meet again in a year to revisit what we have discussed today.

English Transcript

Yul Sohn: Welcome to the EAI interview. My name is Sohn Yul. I am the President of East Asia Institute and Yonsei University professor.

Today's interview features Dr. Victor Cha, my old friend who is a senior Vice President for Asia and Korea Chair at CSIS. He's also a Distinguished University Professor and Professor of Government at Georgetown University.

Thank you very much for coming again.I think we did it in the same format in October 2022. So it's been a year and three, four months.

We are at a very exciting moment as both countries are election campaigning, and North Korea is also making quite big move in several ways.

Q1. North Korea in 2024

Yul Sohn: Let us begin with North Korea.

As you know, North Korea is making lots of military provocations, missile tests and also launched a military recognition satellite and fired artillery shells. So now we are witnessing the increasing level of military tension between the two [Koreas]. And at the same time, Kim Jong Un has made several important remarks, particularly about the nature of the inter-Korean relations. He renounced the term “reunification” as a stated goal and he doesn't use the term “minjok [one nation]” recently, so he transformed the bilateral relations into a more hostile state to state relationship.

So with all this, how do you interpret this move and what do we expect from North Korea this year?

Victor Cha: Yes well, first, thank you for having me again. It's a pleasure to be with EAI and with your viewers.

I think unfortunately that 2024 is going to be a difficult year. I think we'll see heightened North Korean military provocations, missile demonstrations, perhaps even a 7th nuclear test in 2024. I think there are several reasons for that.

First, as we have written in a recent CSIS report, historically, North Korea has increased its level of provocations during US election years—presidential elections and congressional elections. And in fact, if you look at the past 10 presidential elections and US congressional elections, the average annual number of provocations during election years under Kim Jong Un versus Kim Jong Il, it has gone up over three times [under Kim Jong Un]. We've already seen a lot of missile demonstrations thus far still very early on in the year.

Second, as you know, we have annual US-ROK military maneuver exercises in the first quarter of 2024. That will likely also be accompanied with the first unique US-Japan-ROK trilateral military exercise and that will also give a pretext for North Korea to be more belligerent. So I think both of these things mean that we will see more provocations from North Korea in 2024.

Unfortunately, in addition to that, I think what he is doing with South Korea in terms of taking away the goal of reunification is an active decoupling of inter-Korean relations. It's not the first time that North Korea has done this. As you remember, they blew up the Inter-Korean Liaison Office building in the DMZ in the past. This is an active decoupling from South Korea of all the institutions of inter-Korean dialogue. It's not a good sign, [but] doesn't mean it couldn't be reconstituted in the future. It doesn't rule that possibility out. So I think those actions also comport with this general trend.

I think in 2024 where you [South Korea] have elections and the United States has elections, North Korea will tend to be more active in that period because they believe that they can somehow influence either of these or both of these elections.

Yul Sohn: So you don't [expect] that North Korea might attempt a lethal military provocation?

Victor Cha: I do not think North Korea has made a strategic decision to go to war. I certainly believe that they will increase the level of provocations, including potentially more direct conventional provocations with South Korea in the waters or on the border around the Korean Peninsula as they've done in the past. But at the same time, I think that those would be, as North Korea has done in the past, very limited and very tactical rather than being interpreted as the first salvo in a war.

Q2. DPRK-Russia Relations and China

Yul Sohn: Well, I remember you mentioned that the successful launch of a military reconnaissance satellite was a direct result of assistance from Russia. So you know, Kim Jong Un has outlined Pyongyang's strategy for 2024, emphasizing strengthening relationship with Russia, China and [other] socialist countries. Do you see that move will have consequences on bilateral relationships?

Victor Cha: I think this is probably the most significant development when we think about North Korea in recent decades. If you think about it, North Korea was in a very difficult position after the failure of the summit diplomacy with Trump and then going into a three year COVID lockdown. They emerged from that and all of a sudden they have this new relationship with Russia.

Historically, North Korea has always been the one in sort of the supplicant position when it comes to the Soviet Union and Russia asking for food and fuel, asking for security guarantees, asking for debt relief.

We're now in a situation where Russia needs North Korea to provide all of this ammunition for the war in Ukraine. And this actually puts North Korea in a very good position.

They are able to not only get food and fuel from Russia, but I worry that they are getting sensitive military technology as well. Again, historically, Russia and the Soviet Union has been fairly stingy when it comes to providing military technology to North Korea. But that was at a time when the Soviet Union or Russia didn't really need North Korea. Right now, Putin is in the fight of his life. He's fighting for his life literally in Ukraine, and that, I think, makes him much more willing to provide things to North Korea in terms of this military technology that Russia normally might not do.

I am very worried by the fact that Kim Jong Un recently was reported to have reviewed the project to develop a nuclear submarine. This, to me, is a clear indication that they are looking for Russian help in terms of nuclear submarine technology, in terms of military satellite technology, and probably ICBM technology as well. So this is a very significant development.

It has obviously led to a closer tie between the DPRK and Russia but this also has a rebound effect on China in the sense that China is fond of saying they have very little influence on North Korea but at the same time they jealously guard their influence over North Korea. So if they see an improved relationship between DPRK and Russia, you know, China's going to try harder to engage North Korea as well.

After the failure of the summit in Hanoi between Trump and Kim Jong Un, Xi Jinping stopped meeting with Kim Jong Un. I would predict that as soon as Putin goes to Pyongyang, and it looks like after Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui's visit to Moscow, they're setting up a visit by Putin to come to Pyeongyang, I would imagine that Xi Jinping will start meeting with Kim Jong Un again.

So this is both a cohering of the trilateral relationship between China, DPRK and Russia, and it is again another case of North Korea being able to snatch victory from the jaws of defeat. They have been able to take what was a very bad situation after this big gambit with the United States and then the COVID lockdown and to turn that into a position where they occupy now a pivot between Russia and China.

Q3. Future of DPRK-PRC-Russia vs ROK-U.S.-Japan Bloc Confrontation

Yul Sohn: There's an increasing concern [of the] traditional Northern triangle versus Southern triangle. We saw that in the Cold War years.

So it's going to be a revival of those two triangles, competing with each other. And if that happens, then you know, current sanction regimes against North Korea will be significantly loosened and that changes a lot.

Victor Cha: I agree with that entirely and I think, like you said, we have these configurations now very similar to the Cold War where you have China-DPRK-Russia and US-ROK-Japan.

China used to refer to US-ROK-Japan as the “iron triangle” designed to contain China. But in addition to that, this has broader global ramifications because as you say, the fact that China and Russia are no longer willing to work with the West in the UN Security Council to deal with North Korea really reflects negatively on the future of the UN Security Council as a global governance institution.

So what is happening here, I think, is not only impacting the United States and Korea, it's impacting global governance in the sense that we can't go to the UN Security Council anymore for these sorts of issues as long as China and Russia oppose it.

Q4. 2024 U.S. Election and the Potential Return of Donald Trump

Yul Sohn: All right let's move to election, US presidential election.

You know, everybody believes that the US presidential election is the most consequential election among many elections occurring this year.

We can't predict the winner, but we can anticipate and prepare for foreign policy directions if Trump wins. What's your thought if Trump's wins on North Korea policy?

Victor Cha: Sure, well, first, I would agree about the democratic backsliding in the international commuinty today, but this year we'll see more people voting for their leadership in Asia than anywhere else in the world, which is really an astounding fact.

We don't know the outcome of the US election. It is most likely going to be a rematch of Donald Trump versus the incumbent Joe Biden. Again, nobody can predict how that will turn out. It'll probably come down to only thousands of votes in five swing states in the United States. So it's going to be very close.

What does it mean for policy towards North Korea if Donald Trump wins?

I think Trump will be inclined to rekindle his personal relationship with Kim Jong Un. I think that's something that we can count on. I think we can also expect that if he were to win, it will be very similar to 2017 in the sense that it will be coming on the heels of a year of very difficult relations with North Korea. As we talked about, 2024 is not going to be an easy year with North Korea. So it will become a front burner issue for him like it was when he took office in 2017 and he will need to do something to deal with it. I think his response would be again to try to establish the personal relationship with Kim Jong Un.

But I think the other thing is that while he may still talk about denuclearization, there may be an effort to try to reduce the level of provocations in return for some sort of sanctions lifting and effort to try to regulate, modulate belligerent North Korean behavior. So in DC circles, this is what is sometimes known as threat reduction in arms control with North Korea rather than denuclearization.

I'm not saying for certain that's the path he'll choose, but I do think that given the way after the Singapore summit he openly declared the North Korean problem was solved, he will also openly declare the same thing if he manages to get Kim to stop doing the long range missile testing and default to basically a threat reduction in arms control policy, which in name would be denuclearization but de facto might be accepting North Korea as a nuclear weapons state.

Yul Sohn: That will put ROK government in a very difficult position.

Victor Cha: Yes, I think it will put the ROK government in a difficult position. I think it will put other governments and allies of the United States in a difficult position.

Trump would probably not continue the level of military exercising that we're seeing now between the US and the ROK and trilaterally with Japan, largely because he thinks that exercising is very expensive and he doesn't want to spend that kind of money. So all of the work that's been done on the Washington Declaration, on the Nuclear Consultative Group, you know, these things would have to be assessed again under a Trump, whether they would continue those things.

Again, we're not predicting here because we don't really know but these are the things that concern me.

Q5. Trump’s Potential Re-election and the Future of the Spirit of Camp David

Yul Sohn: Now what about the Camp David?

Victor Cha: I would imagine his advisors on Asia would recommend that he continue to do these. He might continue to do them in form.

But of course what is important about Camp David is not the meeting but the exercising, the agreement to intelligence sharing, the agreement to work together on ballistic missile defense. These are the substance that really matters and it's not clear to me that President Trump in a second term would value those things as much as the Biden government values them.

The Biden government, we know, really does value those things and they give a great deal of credit to South Korea and Japan for making those things happen.

Yul Sohn: You know, two of the issues if Trump wins, one is burden sharing issues that we've gone through. The other one is trade relations.

For trade, you know that now United States is the largest export market since June of last year and number one trade surplus country for Korea. But if Trump becomes President, he will look at this number and then you know, it's going to be a big trade issues between the two. Korea will be in a difficult position because your largest export market, China, there is this really competitive relationship with Korea and actually, you know, figuring trade deficit last year for the first time since diplomatic rapprochement. So from China and also from the United States, South Korea, we'll be facing a very difficult situation.

Victor Cha: I think there will be some consistency between Trump and Biden on trade policy, particularly when it comes to things like supply chain protection.

I think many of these things, in fact, actually had their beginning in Trump's first term with things like the Clean Network, the Blue Dot network, these sorts of things. And then of course they were expanded under Biden .

And I think Trump will continue those things on legislation like the IRA, the Chips Act. But at the same time, I think there might be less willingness by Trump to listen to the complaints of allies as Biden tried to do. I think on the IRA, for example, Biden heard the complaints from Korea and France and really did try to address them. It's not clear to me whether Trump would do the same thing.

Also in terms of trade balances, we know from Trump's first term in office that he does not like countries running trade surpluses with the United States and that in general, he views allies on the trade side as more adversarial relationships. Going back to his experiences in the 1980s with adversarial trade with Japan, I think he views the relationship that way.

His main concern with regard to China was really about the merchandise trade deficit. Many other people then brought other issues they disliked about China to the table as well. But the main thing that motivated Trump was the merchandise trade deficit with China, and that is why we saw the sanctions and things of that nature. So I think we could see those sorts of sanctions come back under Trump's second term, which again would make for a very uncertain trade picture for allies.

On defense burden sharing, again, as viewers will remember, Trump demanded $5 billion from Korea, five times what the norm was for Korean burden sharing. Fortunately, an agreement has been made that will last well into Trump's term. In fact, I think if he were to win again, it would last up until the last year of his term. So in that sense, I think that might be off the table because an agreement has already been reached. It's entirely possible that Trump would come in and tear up that agreement and start over again, although that would be a pretty dramatic move.

But yes, I mean, I would expect consistency there. I think Trump would be asking allies in Asia and Europe to bear more of the burden of defense and to pay a higher cost for troops in those countries, whether we're talking about NATO or Korea or Japan.

Q6. Recommendations to ROKG

Yul Sohn: Thank you. Finally, can you give any suggestions and recommendations [regarding bilateral relations] to the ROK government after the election?

Victor Cha: I guess I would say a few things.

The first, of course, is that we don't know how this election is going to turn out. So, you know, the South Korean government has to work with the US government that is there, not the one that is not there yet. So in that sense, they would still have to work very well over the next year with the Biden administration. Do as much as they can to institutionalize the bilateral aspects of the relationship, whether it's the Washington Declaration, the NCG, or trilateral aspects of the relationship including the Camp David Summit and all of the things that have flowed from the Camp David, [and] continue to work with the current government with regards to de-risking. I think these are all things that should be consistent going forward.

One of the things we saw in Trump's first term was the importance of leader-to-leader ties. Trump had a very good relationship with the late Prime Minister Abe.

So being able to establish a good personal relationship between President Yoon and President Trump will be very important. My personal view is I think they would get along. I think Trump and Yoon would get along. Both of them are not politicians by training; Trump was a businessman, President Yoon was a prosecutor. So they come to politics from outside of politics, which makes them both political mavericks, if you will, and they might be able to bond over something like that. But that personal relationship will be important to establish early on.

If Biden were to be re-elected, I think many in this country would be very relieved, as they were when he won the last election. I remember the front pages of every Korean newspaper when Biden was elected president, and they all were breathing sighs of relief, hailing the return to normalcy in the US and the US-ROK alliance. So I think if Biden were to win there, all the things that we're doing now would continue going forward, and there would be a lot of consistency, predictability, and reliability in the relationship.

But if Trump were to win again, you know, it was kind of a rollercoaster ride the first time around, and I don't expect it would be any different the second time around.

Yul Sohn: Thank you, Victor, for sharing time with the EAI.

I think today's discussion was very insightful and very interesting and intriguing. Well, we'll see what happens a year from now. Hopefully, we'll meet again and review what we said before.

■ Victor Cha_Senior Vice President and Korea Chair, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS); Professor of Political Science, Georgetown University.

■ Produced and Edited by: Jisu Park, EAI Research Fellow

Contact: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | jspark@eai.or.kr

Video Transcript

Welcome to EAI Interview. My name is Yul Sohn. I am the President of the East Asia Institute and a Professor at Yonsei University. Today's interview features Dr. Victor Cha, my old friend, who is Senior Vice President for Asia and Korea Chair at CSIS, and he is also a Distinguished University Professor and Professor of Government at Georgetown University. He is a leading expert on Korean affairs and US policy toward the Korean Peninsula. Thank you very much for coming again. I think we did it in the same format in

October 2022. Yes, so it's been a year and three or four months. We are at a very exciting moment, as both countries are election campaigning, and North Korea is also making quite big moves in several ways. So we will discuss all this. Let us begin with North Korea. As you know, North Korea is making lots of military provocations, missile tests, and also launching its military reconnaissance satellite, and artillery shows. So now we are witnessing the

increasing level of military tensions between the two. And at the same time, Kim Jong-un has made several important remarks, particularly about the nature of the inter-Korean relations. He renounced the term reunification as a stated goal and he doesn't use the term "reunification" recently. So he transformed bilateral relations into a more hostile state-to-state relationship. So with all this, how do you interpret this move and what do we expect from North Korea

this year, 2024? Yes. Well, first, thank you for having me again. It's a pleasure to be with you and with your viewers. I think unfortunately that 2024 is going to be a difficult year. I think we'll see heightened North Korean military provocations, missile demonstrations, perhaps even a seventh nuclear test in 2024. I think there are several reasons for that. The first, as we have written in a recent CSIS report, historically North Korea has increased its level of provocations during US election years,

presidential elections and Congressional elections. And in fact, if you look at the past 10 presidential elections and US Congressional elections, the average annual number of provocations during election years under Kim Jong-un versus Kim Jong-il has gone up over three times. We've already seen a lot of missile demonstrations thus far, still very early on in the year. Second, as you know, we have annual US-ROK military maneuver exercises in the first quarter of 2024 that will likely

also be accompanied with the first unique US-Japan-ROK trilateral military exercise. And that will also give a pretext for North Korea to be more belligerent. So I think both of these things mean that we will see more provocations from North Korea in 2024, unfortunately. In addition to that, I think what he is doing with South Korea in terms of taking away the goal of reunification is an active decoupling of inter-Korean relations. It's not the first time that North Korea has done this. As you remember, they

blew up the inter-Korean Family Reunification Center in the DMZ in the past. This is an active decoupling from South Korea of all the institutions of inter-Korean dialogue. It's not a good sign. It doesn't mean it couldn't be reconstituted in the future, right? It doesn't rule that possibility out. So I think those actions also comport with this general trend. I think in 2024, where you have elections, the United States has elections, and North Korea will tend to be more active in that period because they

believe that they can somehow influence either of these or both of these elections. So you don't-- that North Korea might attempt a lethal military provocation? I do not think North Korea has made a strategic decision to go to war. I certainly believe that they will increase the level of provocations, including potentially more direct conventional provocations with South Korea, in the waters or on the border around the Korean Peninsula, as they've done in the past. But, um, I, but at the same time, I think that those would

be, as North Korea has done in the past, very limited and very tactical, rather than being interpreted as the first salvo in a war. Well, I remember you mentioned that the successful launch of the military reconnaissance satellite was a direct result of assistance from Russia. So, Kim Jong-un has outlined Pyongyang's strategy for 2024, emphasizing strengthening the relationship with Russia, China, and socialist countries. Do you see that move will have consequences on bilateral relationships?

I think this is probably the most significant development when we think about North Korea in recent decades. If you think about it, North Korea was in a very difficult position after the failure of the summit diplomacy with Trump and then going into a three-year COVID lockdown. They emerged from that, and all of a sudden they have this new relationship with Russia. Historically, North Korea has always been the one in the supplicant position when it comes to

the Soviet Union and Russia, asking for food and fuel, asking for security guarantees, asking for debt relief. We're now in a situation where Russia needs North Korea to provide all of this ammunition for the war in Ukraine. And this actually puts North Korea in a very good position. They are able to not only get food and fuel from Russia, but I worry that they are getting sensitive military technology as well. Again, historically, Russia and the Soviet Union have been fairly stingy when it comes to

providing military technology to North Korea, but that was at a time when the Soviet Union or Russia didn't really need North Korea. Right now, Putin is in the fight of his life, he's fighting for his life literally in Ukraine, and that I think makes him much more willing to provide things to North Korea in terms of military technology that Russia normally might not do. I am very worried by the fact that Kim Jong-un recently was reported to have reviewed the project to develop a nuclear

submarine. This to me is a clear indication that they are looking for Russian help in terms of nuclear submarine technology, in terms of military satellite technology, and also probably ICBM technology as well. So this is a very significant development. It has obviously led to closer ties between the DPRK and Russia, but this also has a rebound effect on China, in the sense that China is fond of saying they have very little influence on North Korea, but at the same time, they jealously guard their influence over

North Korea. So if they see an improved relationship between the DPRK and Russia, you know, China's going to try harder to engage North Korea as well. After the failure of the summit in Hanoi between Trump and Kim Jong-un, I would predict that as soon as Putin goes to Pyongyang—and it looks like after Foreign Minister Lavrov's visit to Moscow, they're setting up a visit by Putin to Pyongyang—I would imagine that Xi Jinping will start meeting with Kim Jong-un again. So this is both a cohering of the trilateral relationship

between China, DPRK, and Russia, and it is again another case of North Korea being able to snatch victory from the jaws of defeat. They have been able to take what was a very bad situation after this big gambit with the United States and then the COVID lockdown, and to turn that into a position where they occupy now a pivot between Russia and China. There's an increasing concern about the traditional Northern triangle versus Southern triangle. We saw that in the Cold War years, so it's

going to be a revival of those two triangles competing with each other. And if that happens, then, you know, current sanction regimes against North Korea will be significantly loosened, and that changes a lot. I agree. I agree with that entirely. And I think, like you said, we have these configurations now, very similar to the Cold War, where you have China, DPRK, Russia, and US-ROK-Japan. China used to refer to US-ROK-Japan as the Iron Triangle designed to contain China. But in addition to that,

this has broader global ramifications because, as you say, the fact that China and Russia are no longer willing to work with the West in the UN Security Council to deal with North Korea really reflects negatively on the future of the UN Security Council as a global governance institution. So what is happening here, I think, is not only impacting the United States and Korea; it's impacting global governance in the sense that we can't go to the UN Security Council anymore for these sorts of issues, as long

as China and Russia oppose it. Right. Let's move to the election, the US presidential election. You know, everybody believes that the US presidential election is the most consequential election among many elections occurring this year. We can't predict the winner, but we can anticipate and prepare for foreign policy directions. If Trump wins, then what's your thought if Trump wins on North Korea policy? Sure. Well, first, I first agree about democratic backsliding

in the international system today. But this year, we'll see more people voting for their leadership in Asia than anywhere else in the world, which is really an astounding fact. We don't know the outcome of the US election. It is most likely going to be a rematch of Donald Trump versus the incumbent, Joe Biden, again. Nobody can predict how that will turn out. It'll probably come down to only thousands of votes in five swing states in the United States. So it's going to be very close. What does it

mean for policy towards North Korea if Donald Trump wins? I think Trump will be inclined to rekindle his personal relationship with Kim Jong-un. I think that's something that we can count on. I think we can also expect that if he were to win, it would be very similar to 2017, in the sense that it will be coming on the heels of a year of very difficult relations with North Korea, as we talked about. 2024 is not going to be an easy year with North Korea, so it will become a front-burner issue for him

like it was when he took office in 2017, and he will need to do something to deal with it. I think his response would be again to try to establish the personal relationship with Kim Jong-un. But I think the other thing is that, while he may still talk about denuclearization, there may be an effort really to try to reduce the level of provocations in return for some sort of sanctions lifting, and effort to try to regulate or modulate belligerent North Korean behavior. So, in DC circles, this is

what is sometimes known as threat reduction in arms control with North Korea rather than denuclearization. I'm not saying for certain that's the path he'll choose, but I do think that given the way after the Singapore Summit he openly declared the North Korean problem was solved, he will also openly declare the same thing if he manages to get Kim to stop doing the long-range missile testing and default to basically a threat reduction in arms control policy, which in end would be denuclearization, but de facto might be

accepting North Korea as a nuclear weapon state. That will put the ROK government in a very difficult position. Yes, I think it will put the ROK government in a difficult position. I think it will put other governments and allies of the United States in a difficult position. Trump would probably not continue the level of military exercises that we're seeing now between the US and the ROK and trilaterally with Japan, largely because he thinks that exercising is very expensive and he doesn't want to spend

that kind of money. So, all the work that's been done on the Washington Declaration, on the Nuclear Consultative Group, you know, these things would have to be assessed again under a Trump administration, whether they would continue those things again. We're not predicting here because we don't really know. But these are the things that concern. What about the Camp David? I would imagine his advisors on Asia would recommend that he continue to do these. He might continue to do them in

form. But of course, what is important about Camp David is not the meeting, but the exercising, the agreement to intelligence sharing, the agreement to work together on ballistic missile defense. These are the substance that really matters, and it's not clear to me that President Trump in the second term would value those things as much as the Biden administration values them. The Biden administration, we know, really does value those things, and they give a great deal of credit to South Korea and Japan for making those things happen. You know, two of the issues if Trump wins: one is burden sharing issues that we've gone through. The other one is trade relations. For trade, you know, that now the United States is the largest export market since June last year, and the number one trade surplus country for Korea. But if Trump became president, he will look at this number, and then it's going to be a big trade issue between the two, and Korea will be in a difficult position because your largest export market, China, right? That is a really competitive relationship, and Korea actually figured a trade deficit last year for the first time since diplomatic relations. So, from China and also from the United States, Korea, South Korea, is going to be facing a very difficult situation. I think there will be some consistency between Trump and Biden administrations on trade policy, particularly when it comes to things like supply chain

making those things happen, you know, two of the issues. Um, if Trump wins, uh, one is, uh, burden-sharing issues that we've gone through. Uh, the other one is, um, trade relations. Uh, for trade, uh, you know, that, uh, now, uh, the United States is the largest export market since June last year, uh, and, um, you know, number one, uh, trade surplus country for Korea. Uh, but if Trump became president, he will look at this number, um, and then, you know, it's going to be big, uh, trade issues, uh, between the two, and Korea will be in a difficult position.

Administration tried to do. I think on the IRA, for example, the Biden administration heard the complaints from Korea and France and really did try to address them. It's not clear to me whether a Trump administration would do the same thing. Also, in terms of trade balances, we know from Trump's first term in office that he does not like countries running trade surpluses with the United States and that in general, he views allies on the trade side as more adversarial relationships. Going back to his experiences in the 1980s with adversarial

protection, de-risking. I think many of these things, in fact, actually had their beginning in the first Trump administration with things like the Clean Network, the Blue Dot Network. These sorts of things, and then of course, they were expanded under the Biden administration, and I think Trump will continue those things on legislation like the IRA, the CHIPS Act. But at the same time, I think there might be less willingness by a Trump administration to listen to the complaints of allies, as the Biden

Administration tried to do. I think on the IRA, for example, uh, the Biden Administration heard the complaints from Korea and France and really did try to address them. It's not clear to me whether a Trump Administration would do the same thing. Also, in terms of trade balances, we know from Trump's first term in office that he doesn't like countries running trade surpluses with the United States, and that in general, he sees allies on the trade side as more adversarial relationships, going back to his experiences in the 1980s, adversarial.

trade with Japan, and I think he kind of really views the relationship that way. His main concern with regard to China was really about the merchandise trade deficit. Many other people then brought other issues they disliked about China to the table as well. But the main thing that motivated Trump was the merchandise trade deficit with China, and that's why we saw the sanctions and things of that nature. So I think we could see those sorts of sanctions come back under a second Trump administration, which again would

make for a very uncertain trade picture for allies. On defense burden sharing, again, as viewers will remember, Trump demanded $5 billion from Korea, five times what the norm was for Korean burden sharing. Fortunately, an agreement has been made that will last well into the Trump administration. In fact, I think if he were to win again, it would last up until the last year of his administration. So in that sense, I think that might be off the table because an agreement has already been reached. It's

entirely possible that Trump would come in and tear up that agreement to and start over again, although that would be a pretty dramatic move. But yes, I mean, I would expect consistency there. I think Trump would be asking allies in Asia and Europe to bear more of the burden of defense and to pay a higher cost for US troops in those countries, whether we're talking about NATO or Korea or Japan. Thank you. Finally, can you give any suggestions and recommendations to the ROK

government after the election? Well, I guess I would say a few things. The first, of course, is that we don't know how this election is going to turn out. So, you know, the South Korean government has to work with the US government that is there, not the one that is not there yet. So in that sense, they would still have to work very well over the next year with the Biden administration. Do as much as they can to institutionalize bilateral aspects of the relationship, whether it's the Washington Declaration, the NCG, or

trilateral aspects of the relationship, including the Camp David Summits and all of the things that have flowed from the Camp David. Continue to work with the current administration with regards to de-risking. I think these are all things that should be consistent going forward. One of the things we saw in the first Trump administration was the importance of leader-to-leader ties. Trump had a very good relationship with the late Prime Minister Abe.

So being able to establish a good personal relationship between President Yoon and President Trump will be very important. My personal view is I think they would get along. I think Trump and Yoon would get along. Both of them are not politicians by training; Trump was a businessman, President Yoon was a prosecutor. So they come to politics from outside of politics, which makes them both political mavericks, if you will, and they might be able to bond over something like that. But that personal relationship will be important

to establish early on. If Biden were to be re-elected, I think then I think many in this country would be very relieved, as they were when he won the last election. I remember the front pages of every Korean newspaper when Biden was elected president, and they all were breathing sighs of relief, hailing the return to normalcy in the US and the US-ROK alliance. So I think if Biden were to win there, all the things that we're doing now would continue going forward.

lot of consistency, predictability, and reliability in the relationship. But if Trump were to win again, you know, it was it was kind of a roller coaster ride the first time around, and I don't expect it would be any different the second time around. Thank you, Victor, um, for, um, sharing time with the EAI. Um, I think today's discussion is, um, very insightful and very, uh, interesting, intriguing. Uh, we'll see what happened, um, year after. Uh, hopefully, we meet again and review what we said before. We can play back the

tape.