North Korea and the World: North Korea's Decision to Part Ways, Decision to Wage War

YouTube link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lrMcNPeveFM

Park Won-gon, Director of EAI's North Korea Research Center (Professor at Ewha Womans University), analyzes why North Korea had to abandon the concepts of peaceful unification and the Korean nation, which it had upheld for 80 years, and discusses North Korea's policy direction following this shift in its approach toward South Korea. Director Park explains that Kim Jong Un, facing internal and external difficulties due to strengthened ROK-US-Japan cooperation and institutionalized extended deterrence, as well as ideological erosion and economic problems within North Korea, may be compelled to choose 'preparation for a great catastrophe (war)' to justify his nuclear attacks, regain initiative on the Korean Peninsula, and consolidate internal unity. Nevertheless, Director Park argues that South Korea must maintain the concept of the Korean nation and continue to pursue a policy of peaceful unification to protect national security and the human rights of North Korean defectors.

■ Park Won-gon_Director of EAI's North Korea Research Center. Professor of North Korean Studies at Ewha Womans University.

■ Editor: Park Ji-soo, EAI Research Fellow

    Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | jspark@eai.or.kr

Video Transcript

If we were to check Kim Jong Un's MBTI, it would likely reveal a personality that is simply unmanageable. Hello, and thank you to everyone who is listening and watching "North Korea and the World." Today, there is much to discuss. At the end of last year, in December 2023, and at the beginning of this year, in January, Kim Jong Un made a variety of statements. Much has already been discussed in various media and newspapers, and today, I intend to summarize those points. Two serious issues have emerged, leading to numerous interpretations. First, has Kim Jong Un truly decided to wage war against South Korea? This debate began with a clear statement made by Kim Jong Un at the 8th Central Committee's 9th Plenary Meeting in December of last year, which can be summarized as: "We must prepare for a great catastrophe to pacify the entire territory of South Korea."

A great catastrophe refers to South Korea. Therefore, at the 8th Central Committee's 9th Plenary Meeting, Kim Jong Un stated that preparations for war to occupy all of South Korea must be accelerated. Since then, a debate has intensified over whether Kim Jong Un has decided on war. At the center of this debate are three American experts on North Korea. While I will not go into detail, their assertion is that Kim Jong Un, for the first time since the Korean War, has truly decided to attack South Korea. These three individuals are scholars and have been involved in diplomacy. I do not believe they represent the mainstream view; there are diverse opinions within academia. This is just one opinion, but it has been amplified and reproduced by the media in South Korea, leading to questions about whether war will break out on the Korean Peninsula imminently. In the past month or two, I have been asked this question far too often: "Will war truly break out in Korea?"

This raises a very serious issue. The second point is that Kim Jong Un also stated, and this expression is used frequently these days: "Has North Korea finally decided to part ways with South Korea?" Some even suggest that North Korea has declared the abandonment of unification. As many of you may know, Kim Jong Un made a statement at the 10th Supreme People's Assembly in January of this year: "The relationship between the North and South has completely shifted to that of two separate states." Previously, North Korea consistently spoke of the Korean people as one nation and one state, with the goal of peaceful unification. However, all of that has now been discarded. Since the latter half of last year, North Korea has used the term "Republic of Korea" in a dual-state context, a practice that began in 2020 but intensified last year. Kim Yo Jong even stated at the time, "Please, let us live without interfering in each other's affairs." This has led to discussions of a declaration of abandoning unification or a declaration of North Korean independence. What does this truly mean for North Korea? These two issues are being discussed and are considered very important. Today,

I will offer my own analysis on this matter. Why is North Korea doing this? Why is it attributing such significance to these actions? I believe there are many reasons. First and foremost, I believe it is an attempt to justify the use of nuclear weapons against South Korea. One of the long-standing debates among North Korea scholars has been the reason for North Korea's nuclear development. North Korea has consistently claimed that it is developing and possessing nuclear weapons out of self-defense against the threat posed by the U.S. imperialists to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. North Korean scholars in South Korea have been divided on this issue. Some accept this explanation, arguing that the nuclear weapons are for self-defense. Others contend that North Korea's ultimate goal is to possess nuclear weapons, and these weapons could be used against South Korea. I have argued for the latter position.

Kim Yo Jong, Kim Jong Un's sister, has precisely clarified this point. Through her statement on April 5, 2022, she clearly stated that their nuclear weapons are intended for use against South Korea, particularly to seize the initiative in the early stages of a war on the Korean Peninsula. This single statement resolved the ongoing debate. A few days later, on April 30, Kim Jong Un himself stated, "We must preemptively and thoroughly suppress any dangerous attempts and threatening actions that pose a growing nuclear threat." In other words, he indicated the possibility of preemptively using nuclear weapons against South Korea, an enemy state. As you know, in North Korea, there is the Constitution, the Workers' Party Charter, and above them, the pronouncements of the supreme leader hold the most critical and significant meaning. These are followed by various supporting measures. For example, in June 2022, North Korea announced the deployment of low-yield nuclear weapons to the front lines, referred to as the "Seoul Fire" units. These artillery units, which have long possessed long-range cannons, are positioned to target the Seoul metropolitan area. Under Kim Jong Un's directive, these units were equipped with artillery and missiles capable of delivering low-yield nuclear warheads, openly targeting Seoul. Furthermore, as you are well aware, in September 2022, North Korea enacted its nuclear weapons law. While there has been extensive analysis and discussion, the law outlines five conditions for nuclear use. Although the term "South Korea" is not explicitly mentioned, it includes provisions such as: "Nuclear weapons may be used if non-nuclear states collude with nuclear-weapon states to engage in acts of aggression or attack against North Korea."

I will read the exact wording used by North Korea: "Nuclear weapons may be used if non-nuclear states collude with nuclear-weapon states to engage in acts of aggression or attack against North Korea." The meaning of this is quite clear. "Non-nuclear states colluding with nuclear-weapon states" clearly refers to the ROK-US alliance, where nuclear-armed the United States colludes with non-nuclear South Korea. It is my judgment that this provision has been included in the nuclear law to explicitly target South Korea. Subsequently, as many of you will recall, last year, Kim Jong Un appeared in person, pointing to maps showing key targets in South Korea, and instructed his top commanders on where to conduct nuclear strikes. These scenes were revealed on multiple occasions.

Given this, many researchers, including myself, have questioned the fate of the concept of the Korean nation, which North Korea has so consistently emphasized. Is it not a logical contradiction to target with nuclear weapons the very nation that is supposed to be the object of peaceful unification? One of the primary reasons for clearly defining South Korea as an enemy state is to justify the use of nuclear weapons against it. North Korea is clearly establishing its right to use nuclear weapons against an independent South Korea, an adversary. Furthermore, South Korea receives extended deterrence from the United States. Therefore, as stated in the law, North Korea frames the ROK-US alliance as a single entity and uses this narrative to justify its nuclear freedom and for propaganda purposes.

Any measures taken by the ROK, US, and Japan to strengthen deterrence against North Korea's nuclear capabilities will be designated as actions by an enemy state, allowing North Korea to claim its response is a matter of self-defense. Secondly, I believe this is a defensive measure acknowledging the disparity in national strength between North and South Korea. North Korea's recent announcement includes the abandonment of the Confederal Republic of Koryo proposal. The Confederal Republic of Koryo envisioned two systems coexisting, but with the ultimate goal of absorbing South Korea by forming a coalition with pro-North Korean or pro-Workers' Party elements in the South. Abandoning this proposal signifies an admission of failure in its competition with South Korea. This is my interpretation.

This is because, as I just mentioned, pro-North Korean and pro-Workers' Party elements no longer exist in South Korea to the extent that they once did. Furthermore, there are no longer forces that could serve as a basis for North Korean-style unification. While there are still individuals in South Korea who are favorable to North Korea, it is virtually impossible for them to accept the North Korean system itself. Recent opinion polls, such as the monthly survey on favorability towards North Korea conducted by Korea Research, show a trend where 80% of South Koreans view North Korea unfavorably. In such circumstances, the goal of unification through the Confederal Republic of Koryo is impossible. Moreover, if the Confederal Republic of Koryo were to be realized, it would likely lead to a crisis for the North Korean system itself.

This is because, as I just mentioned, there are no longer pro-North Korean or pro-labor forces within South Korea. Furthermore, there are no forces that could serve as a foundation for North Korean-style unification. Of course, there are still forces in South Korea that are favorable to North Korea, but it is almost impossible for them to accept the North Korean system itself. Survey results continue to emerge. A monthly survey conducted by Korea Research on the favorability of major countries shows that, recently, 80% of South Korean citizens view North Korea unfavorably. In this situation, North Korea's goal of achieving unification through the Goryeo Confederation is impossible. Rather, if the Goryeo Confederation were to be realized, the likelihood of facing a systemic crisis would increase.

The Confederal Republic of Koryo, despite having two systems, would necessitate cooperation and exchange between them. From North Korea's perspective, even rhetorically, realizing this would require exchange with South Korea. This would inevitably lead to the spread of what they call "decadent culture" into North Korea, which poses a serious threat to the foundations of the North Korean system. Therefore, by abandoning this unrealistic unification plan based on the concept of a single nation, they have opted for a two-state theory. Thirdly, there is the intention to regain initiative in inter-Korean relations and on the Korean Peninsula. Kim Jong Un is most burdened by the strengthening of extended deterrence, including ROK-US-Japan cooperation. The strengthening of extended deterrence means enhancing deterrence against North Korea's nuclear capabilities.

North Korea has raised numerous objections to this, and Kim Jong Un enumerated them at official events late last year and early this year. Specifically, North Korea is concerned about the "end of regime" scenario, which poses a significant burden. Kim Jong Un directly mentioned the "end of regime," as well as strategic nuclear assets, ROK-US combined exercises, ROK-US-Japan military exercises, and South Korea's military capabilities. The fact that he is detailing these issues indicates the extent of the burden from North Korea's perspective. When deterrence is applied, the reaction of the target of deterrence is the most crucial factor. Therefore,

when the ROK, US, and Japan strengthen deterrence against North Korea's nuclear capabilities, North Korea's reaction signifies that the deterrence is working. The fact that this is being discussed at the highest levels of leadership, by the supreme leader himself, lends credibility to this assessment. Another point is North Korea's reaction to the September 19 Military Agreement. The Yoon Suk Yeol administration suspended the effect of certain provisions of Article 1, Section 1 of the September 19 Military Agreement. As expected, North Korea immediately declared it null and void. While Kim Jong Un's statement in December was somewhat ambiguous, it was made at the Supreme People's Assembly. Prior to this, throughout this entire process, North Korea felt it was losing the initiative. For example, on November 22nd, the South Korean government made its announcement, and on the 23rd, North Korea declared it invalid. If this were the case, based on North Korea's past behavior, they should have immediately restored military measures, such as naval artillery fire near the Northern Limit Line (NLL) in the West Sea and East Sea. However, actual military provocations did not occur until January, with December passing without incident. All of this suggests that from Kim Jong Un's perspective, he has always sought to maintain the initiative in inter-Korean relations, but this initiative has begun to slip away due to ROK-US-Japan cooperation. Even with the September 19 Military Agreement, which they should have abrogated themselves, South Korea only suspended certain provisions.

If you were to check Kim Jong Un's MBTI, you would likely find extreme results. He is a personality who cannot tolerate losing what he perceives as his own. This is also characteristic of the North Korean system. Therefore, his intention to change this situation has manifested as a decision to wage war and a decision to part ways. Fourth, there is the intention to enhance its presence by creating tension on the Korean Peninsula. As I mentioned earlier, the word "war" repeatedly appears in Kim Jong Un's statements in December and January, related to the decision to wage war. He stated, "The word 'war' is no longer an abstract concept for us but a tangible reality."

If we were to check Kim Jong-un's MBTI, it would likely show extreme introversion. He has a personality that cannot tolerate losing what he has to others, and this is also characteristic of the North Korean system. Therefore, the intention to change this situation has manifested as a decision for war. Fourth, there is the idea of highlighting one's presence by creating tension on the Korean Peninsula. This relates to the decision for war I mentioned earlier; in December and January, the word 'war' repeatedly appeared in Kim Jong-un's remarks. There is a saying: 'War is no longer an abstract concept for us, but a tangible reality.'

"A great catastrophe has a second mission for North Korean nuclear weapons." This is a famous statement made by Kim Jong Un at a military parade on April 25, 2022. Some researchers even refer to this as the "Saiho Doctrine." The second mission of North Korean nuclear weapons is to be used if fundamental interests that threaten the North Korean regime are infringed upon. The "fundamental interests" as defined by North Korea constitute a very long list, including issues related to human rights, sanctions against North Korea, and ROK-US combined exercises and strategic asset deployments. All of these are considered infringements on North Korea's fundamental interests. In other words, North Korea is reiterating that it can use nuclear weapons at any time. By creating a sense of crisis that it will attack South Korea with nuclear weapons, North Korea aims to assert its presence. I believe the goal is to prepare for a decisive negotiation with the United States after the US presidential election in November, and to maximize tension and its own visibility throughout this year. Fifth,

is a choice for high-intensity internal consolidation. North Korea is facing difficulties. Paradoxically, although Kim Jong Un spoke at length about inter-Korean relations and military issues at the plenary meetings and the Supreme People's Assembly, economic issues occupied a much larger portion of the discussion, approximately 80% economic issues to 20% other topics. Interpreting the economic discussions in detail reveals that while North Korea claims to have performed well in 2023, exceeding its targets by over 100%, this is not the case. Kim Jong Un's primary concern is the economic development plan he announced at the 8th Party Congress in 2021, which aims to increase North Korea's economy by 1.4 times by the end of 2025. This requires an annual economic growth rate of at least 4%. However, according to estimates by the Bank of Korea, North Korea experienced negative growth of -0.1% in 2021 and -0.2% in 2022. While growth is expected for last year, it is unlikely to reach the target of 1.4 times by the end of 2025 without double-digit growth, which is improbable. I believe this is Kim Jong Un's greatest challenge. Additionally, as I have mentioned several times on YouTube, North Korea has enacted three major laws since 2020 as part of its campaign to eradicate anti-socialist elements and strengthen ideological struggle. These include the Law on Rejecting Reactionary Ideology and Culture, the Law on Youth Education Guarantee, and the Pyongyang Cultural Law. These laws impose draconian regulations and serve as clear evidence that North Korea is unable to prevent ideological erosion. Therefore, considering these factors, the internal situation is dire: both ideology and the economy are in distress. In such circumstances, Kim Jong Un needs a clear enemy concept to consolidate the regime. That enemy is South Korea – or rather, the Republic of Korea, as they no longer use the term "South Korea." The narrative is that "those in the Republic of Korea are constantly trying to attack us." By designating a clear enemy state, they aim to foster a sense of being besieged, a familiar tactic North Korea employs to consolidate internal unity by emphasizing the constant threat from surrounding countries. This behavior is evident.

Sixth, and as I have discussed on YouTube several times, is North Korea's vision of a new Cold War and multipolar world. Kim Jong Un stated at a meeting in December 2022 that the international relations structure has clearly shifted to a new Cold War system, and the trend toward multipolarization is accelerating. He made similar remarks at the Supreme People's Assembly in September of last year, stating that a global new Cold War structure is becoming a reality due to imperialist reactionary forces. To my understanding, Kim Jong Un is likely the only national leader to explicitly advocate for a new Cold War. Even China and Russia do not speak of a new Cold War so openly. The important point is that North Korea desires a new Cold War. A new Cold War would allow North Korea, China, and Russia to form a single bloc, enabling them to counter not only the ROK-US alliance but also the entire free democratic world, including NATO allies and European nations, similar to a Cold War-era bloc. While I believe this is unlikely to materialize, as the term "create" suggests, it is in North Korea's interest to pursue this vision. In this context, clearly defining South Korea as an enemy and pushing it toward that bloc, while forming their own bloc on the opposing side, is a crucial endeavor. I believe these efforts are underway.

I have analyzed the implications. Now, I will discuss the limitations of Kim Jong Un's efforts. As I have mentioned at various points, North Korea's capabilities are limited, and ROK-US extended deterrence is in effect. Therefore, North Korea's envisioned scenarios are unlikely to unfold as planned. This is linked to Kim Jong Un's frustration and what can be seen as a declaration of defeat. The problem is that while North Korea aims to coerce South Korea and the United States through nuclear weapons, regain initiative in inter-Korean relations, and enhance its presence, these objectives are significantly constrained by the ROK-US alliance and ROK-US cooperation. ROK-US extended deterrence is operational.

The Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG) is active. Two meetings were held last year, and specific details were discussed. While these matters are highly sensitive militarily and not fully disclosed, even the publicly available information indicates that the United States has never offered such a high level of institutionalized extended deterrence to its non-nuclear allies. For instance, the ROK and the US will share information necessary for nuclear planning. The US does not typically share its nuclear information. However, they are sharing it with South Korea. Furthermore, they will strengthen consultations to reflect South Korea's position in the nuclear operational process. The US does not consult with its non-nuclear allies in this manner. However, they are doing so with South Korea. Another key aspect is the joint planning to develop extended deterrence plans within conventional combined operations plans. While the extent to which this will extend to operational plans remains to be seen, joint planning to prepare for North Korean nuclear threats through exercises signifies the highest level of institutionalization of a combined ROK-US military response.

The President mentioned this: "We will complete this institutionalization in the first half of the year and conduct exercises in the second half based on nuclear operational scenarios that assume North Korean nuclear weapons." Consider this: to conduct exercises, there must be planning, and beyond joint planning, there must be operational planning. This implies that the ROK and the US will proceed to exercises based on such plans. This represents a very high level of commitment. Beyond this, the ROK and the US have implemented a tailored deterrence strategy, revised for the first time in ten years. This strategy specifically considers North Korea's nuclear attack plans and outlines how the US and South Korea will respond, creating a tailored response plan. Furthermore, there is the concept of CNI, or Conventional-Nuclear Integration, which is frequently discussed these days. South Korea does not possess nuclear capabilities, but it does possess conventional forces. Therefore, South Korea's conventional forces and the US nuclear forces are integrated to counter North Korean nuclear threats. Given this explanation, I believe that North Korea's

Kim Jong Un is likely aware of these detailed contents and understands their implications. Regardless of how much North Korea advances its nuclear capabilities, deterrence against it is becoming more sophisticated. If North Korea were to provoke, maximum deterrence would be applied, making it virtually impossible for North Korea to gain the initiative in war. I reiterate that there is no possibility of North Korea attempting war against South Korea, unless Kim Jong Un makes a suicidal decision, encompassing his own safety. The "end of regime" that the ROK and US consistently mention implies that regardless of the type of nuclear weapon North Korea uses, the US possesses overwhelming nuclear power to target Kim Jong Un, thus preventing him from making such a choice. In such a situation, all efforts to coerce through their nuclear capabilities and establish the significance of nuclear weapons are being undermined by deterrence, weakening their effectiveness. I believe this significantly increases Kim Jong Un's frustration. Another limitation is the scope for localized provocations.

I believe there is a possibility of a seventh nuclear test. If Kim Jong Un truly intends to support Trump in the November US presidential election, there is a possibility of a seventh nuclear test before November. This would allow Trump to claim that Biden's North Korea policy has completely failed. It is reasonable to consider this possibility. However, beyond such high-intensity provocations, what about localized provocations like the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island or the sinking of the Cheonan in 2010? I believe this is unlikely. It is not that North Korea is unwilling, but rather that the ROK and US have thoroughly prepared their response. After the incidents in 2010, the ROK and US established a joint plan for responding to localized provocations. While this falls under the jurisdiction of the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff during peacetime, the sharing of detection and identification information with US assets enhances our response capabilities, enabling a joint response. The ROK and US have been thoroughly preparing for this for the past decade.

Therefore, it is difficult for North Korea to carry out such localized provocations as seen in 2010. Another aspect is the so-called gray zone provocations, where the origin of the attack is concealed. If the origin is known, South Korea and the United States will respond immediately. Therefore, North Korea attempts to make it difficult to identify the origin of such provocations. However, we have been discussing and preparing for such gray zone provocations for a considerable time. The ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff have developed response plans and conducted drills for various scenarios.

Therefore, it is my judgment that North Korea will find it difficult to exploit these vulnerabilities. This is why North Korea is resorting to more severe verbal threats. In particular, Kim Jong Un recently stated that if the Republic of Korea infringes upon our territory by even 0.001 millimeters, it will be considered an act of war. This refers to the NLL. This is essentially a declaration of war, as North Korea does not recognize our territorial waters, and any infringement would be considered a violation. While some US scholars suggest this increases tension, please verify whether Kim Jong Un's use of such language is unprecedented. This is common parlance for North Korea.

I believe there is a possibility of a seventh nuclear test. If North Korea's Kim Jong-un truly intends to support Trump in the US presidential election in November, he might conduct a seventh nuclear test before November. If he conducts the seventh nuclear test, it would allow Trump to propagandize that Biden's North Korea policy has completely failed. While we must consider this possibility open, how should we view the likelihood of other high-intensity provocations, such as the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island or the sinking of the Cheonan in 2010? I believe this is unlikely. It's not that North Korea doesn't want to, but rather that South Korea and the US have a thorough response plan. After being attacked by North Korea in 2010, South Korea and the US created a joint plan for responding to limited provocations. While this falls under the authority of the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff during peacetime, if the US military also shares information through detection and identification, our response capabilities increase, allowing South Korea and the US to respond jointly. Last

For over a decade, we have thoroughly prepared for this. Therefore, it is not easy for North Korea to carry out limited provocations of the 2010 type. Another possibility is what is often discussed these days: gray zone provocations, where the origin of the attack is unknown. If the origin is known, South Korea and the US will respond immediately. Therefore, North Korea attempts to make it difficult to identify the origin. However, we have been discussing and preparing for such gray zone provocations for a long time. The ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff have developed response plans and conducted drills based on various scenarios.

This phrase was used even before the Kim Jong Un era, and Kim Jong Un himself has used it. At the 70th-anniversary military parade in 2018, Kim Jong Un stated that their dignity and sovereignty must not be violated or challenged by even 0.001 millimeters. This is typical North Korean rhetoric. Finally, I would like to mention one more point that concerns me, although it may not be a cause for alarm. Kim Jong Un's statements indicate that peaceful unification is no longer an option, and I am concerned about how they will establish the legitimacy of their regime going forward. Since the Kim Il Sung era, the very reason for the existence of the Workers' Party of Korea has been the liberation of the colonized South and the concept of a unified nation. Based on this, the Workers' Party of Korea was formed, and North Korea was established. The liberation of colonized South Korea and the unification of the Korean Peninsula are fundamental tenets of the Workers' Party Charter. Although the Party Charter was revised at the 8th Party Congress in January 2021, the word "unification" was removed. I will read the relevant section: "The ultimate goal is to build a communist society where the ideals of the people are fully realized on a nationwide scale."

This is the Party Charter revised at the 8th Party Congress in January 2021. "On a nationwide scale" naturally includes the South, and the construction of a communist society represents their form of unification. This is one example. By abandoning the concepts of unification, peace, and the Korean nation, which have been emphasized for 80 years, North Korea faces a significant challenge in determining its future path. To elaborate, during the "Arduous March" in the late 1990s, North Korea experienced immense suffering. At that time, Kim Jong Il explained to the North Korean people that this suffering was due to the division of the nation and that unification would alleviate these hardships. They have consistently attributed numerous problems to the division of the nation and sought solutions in unification. Concepts like self-reliance and national solidarity have been perpetual slogans for North Korea. By abandoning all of this,

what new vision can North Korea create to replace the hope for unification? The very basis of the North Korean regime's existence is being undermined. How can they overcome this and establish a new vision? I believe this is a grave issue. Furthermore, if they continue to define each other as adversarial states, military confrontation will intensify, forcing them to allocate their limited resources to military buildup. Given the already difficult economic situation, how will the populace react to such mobilization? While organized resistance against the North Korean regime is unlikely in the immediate future, how will North Korean citizens, who have been taught and deeply internalized the concepts of national solidarity and unification for 80 years, react to the erosion of these values? And what will replace them? Even within South Korea, those involved in the unification movement are calling this decision anti-unification and anti-national. Extremely negative sentiments towards Kim Jong Un are beginning to emerge. In conclusion, the two-state theory has emerged. The most crucial question is: what should we do? This is a significant debate within South Korea. Some argue that we should view North Korea as an independent state, just as they do. I firmly disagree with this opinion. I believe that the Republic of Korea must never abandon its goal of peaceful unification based on the concept of a single Korean nation. There are several reasons for this. First, if we were to define North Korea as a separate, independent state, similar to their definition, interest in unification would truly disappear. As the concept of the Korean nation becomes increasingly diluted among the younger generation, this would erode our motivation and foundation for pursuing unification. We would inevitably drift further away from unification. More specifically, second, a practical reason: we would be unable to protect North Korean defectors. One of the most serious issues is the forced repatriation of North Korean defectors from China by the Chinese government. Our government consistently raises the issue, citing Article 3 of our Constitution, which clearly states that North Korean residents are citizens of the Republic of Korea and therefore must be protected. However, this would no longer be possible. If we consider them a separate state, what would we do with North Korean residents? Would we regard them as foreigners? This is a serious problem. Third, if a crisis occurs in North Korea, South Korea is obligated to intervene, as stipulated in our operational plans and various other plans. This is based on the clear provisions of Article 3 of our Constitution. However, if we consider them a separate, independent state, we would be unable to intervene. North Korea would be a sovereign state, and entering its territory would constitute an invasion of a sovereign state's territory. How would we resolve this issue? Fourth, neighboring countries would likely welcome the emergence of two independent states. China, in particular, would be pleased. China has consistently stated that it would never tolerate the ROK or US forces crossing the 38th parallel. With North Korea existing as an independent sovereign state in the northern half of the Korean Peninsula, it would serve as a perfect buffer state from China's perspective. This would be a welcome development for them. However, we must consider the significant burden this would impose on us. Therefore, maintaining the concept of the Korean nation and pursuing peaceful unification is extremely important. In such circumstances, it is imperative that we refine our unification plan, present the South Korean government's position to North Korea and the world, and publicize it globally. I have spoken at length, but I believe this topic is of utmost importance.

abolish it. My concern is not for them, but rather, can North Korea create a new vision for unification in the future? The very basis of the North Korean regime's existence is undermined; how can they overcome this and establish a new vision? I believe this is a very serious problem. Furthermore, as long as such a confrontational relationship is established, military confrontation will intensify, and they will be forced to allocate their limited resources to military power. The economy is already struggling; if they further mobilize the populace, how will the people react? Of course, this does not mean that organized resistance against the North Korean regime will occur immediately. However, North Korean residents, having been taught for 80 years since childhood about the concept of national liberation and unification, deeply ingrained in their hearts, will experience a shock when this concept disappears. What will replace it? Even those involved in the unification movement within South Korea are saying this is an anti-unification, anti-national decision directed at Kim Jong-un.

extremely unscientific statements have begun to emerge. To conclude, the two-state theory has appeared. So, what is most important is what we should do? This is a major point of contention domestically. Some in South Korea argue that we should simply view North Korea as an independent state. I firmly oppose this view. I believe that the Republic of Korea must never abandon its goal of peaceful unification based on a shared nation. I will provide a few reasons. First, if we were to define North Korea as an independent state, just like North Korea itself, then interest in unification would truly disappear. As the concept of the nation already weakens among the younger generation, if this happens, we will lose the foundation for unification. We will inevitably move further away from unification. More specifically, the second practical reason is that we cannot protect defectors. One of the most serious issues is that the Chinese government forcibly repatriates defectors in China. Our government continuously raises this issue.

Thank you.

Thank you.

Thank you.