[EAI Fake News Conference] Perceptions and Current Status of Foreign Electoral Interference

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vK6ZSQPERjo

Editor's Note

Based on survey data on fake news perceptions, Professor Lim Seong-hak of the University of Seoul analyzes the current awareness of foreign electoral interference among Koreans and derives implications for developing countermeasures against electoral interference. Professor Lim explains that when asked to name up to two countries believed to be interfering with or obstructing South Korean elections, China, North Korea, and the United States were the most frequently cited, while Russia was mentioned very infrequently. Furthermore, he points out that political polarization significantly influences the recognition and discernment of such foreign electoral interference, and that conservative respondents, in particular, experience greater difficulty in distinguishing election-related disinformation and misinformation.

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Lim Seong-hak (Professor, University of Seoul): My presentation will focus on the challenges posed by fake news and how foreign actors, rather than domestic ones, creating fake news can impact Korean democracy. It will discuss the potential effects on Korean democracy.

The background for this research is that 2024 is widely referred to as an election year, with approximately half of the world's population, about 4.2 billion people, participating in elections. Two phenomena are frequently highlighted as significant threats to democracy: first, the creation and dissemination of disinformation using technologies like artificial intelligence; and second, foreign interference in elections. The recent election in Taiwan, the first this year, served as a testing ground for these issues, including election interference and the spread of disinformation via AI.

These problems were also evident in the Taiwanese election. For instance, a deepfake video circulated claiming that President Lai Ching-te had three mistresses, despite his victory. Regarding foreign electoral interference, a poll result unfavorable to presidential candidate Lai Ching-te was disseminated, and it is currently under investigation with suspicions that Chinese Communist Party officials in Fujian Province manipulated the poll. Therefore, these two forms of fake news, particularly when disseminated by foreign entities, are crucial issues for this election. With the general election approaching in April, I am particularly concerned about neighboring countries, especially China, Russia, and North Korea, which are the primary actors in election interference and intervention. I believe these countries will engage in election interference, almost certainly, to advance their own foreign policy and national interests. However, when I sought data cooperation for this research on the current situation in South Korea, I was unable to obtain any. South Korea appears to be completely unprepared for foreign electoral interference, lacking data and research on the matter. In this context, a significant objective of my presentation is to raise awareness about this research topic. The presentation will cover the definition of foreign electoral interference, a basic theoretical review, an analysis of public perception of foreign electoral interference based on the EAI survey, and finally, the relationship between electoral interference and political polarization in South Korea, as well as its potential impact on Korean democracy.

Today's presentation will begin with a definition of foreign electoral interference, followed by a basic theoretical review. Then, we will examine the public's perception of foreign electoral interference based on the EAI survey. Finally, we will briefly discuss the relationship between electoral interference activities and political polarization in South Korea, and its potential impact on Korean democracy.

First, the terminology surrounding foreign electoral interference is not well-defined. Just as defining fake news is difficult, defining foreign electoral interference is also challenging because various terms are used, such as 'election influence,' 'election interference,' and 'election intervention.' Election intervention generally takes two forms: partisan and procedural. The latter, procedural intervention, is sometimes undertaken by election commissions in countries with underdeveloped electoral infrastructure or systems, particularly authoritarian states. When foreign actors intervene to promote freer and fairer elections in such contexts, it is typically referred to as election intervention. Therefore, my presentation will exclude procedural intervention and focus on interventions intended to exert a negative influence. To avoid confusion with the term 'intervention,' I will use the term 'election obstruction' consistently.

This section reviews the theory of election obstruction. Fundamentally, election obstruction primarily utilizes disinformation and misinformation because this method is the cheapest and yields the highest returns. Countries seeking to interfere in elections typically support candidates favorable to their national interests or denigrate unfavorable candidates, thus exhibiting a partisan nature. Furthermore, countries engaging in such interference often seek to exploit the political polarization within the target country.

Secondly, the manipulation of disinformation by foreign actors is studied in a similar vein to fake news. Research has explored how political polarization influences the extent to which individuals accept, transmit, and share disinformation manipulated by foreign entities.

Let's examine the situation in South Korea. First, based on the survey, we briefly looked at the current perception of foreign electoral interference among the general public. The survey asked whether electoral interference had occurred. Currently, 37.4% of respondents believe foreign electoral interference exists, while 62.6% believe it does not. Personally, I consider the percentage of those who believe it exists to be quite high, especially since there have been no major controversies or publicized incidents of foreign electoral interference. However, the fact that 61.0% of respondents indicated that it had occurred in the past suggests that people anticipate foreign electoral interference in the upcoming general election.

The second aspect is the channels of foreign electoral interference. These channels largely mirror those of fake news dissemination. Electoral interference predominantly occurs through internet portals, Facebook, and KakaoTalk, with disinformation also circulating widely through these channels. The internet accounts for an overwhelming majority of election obstruction activities.

Next, we examine the types of interference and associated concerns. The types of interference include hacking of voting machines, fake news and disinformation campaigns, creating public opinion for or against specific candidates, and providing financial support to candidates. Most respondents expressed significant concern (over 50%) about these issues. While hacking of voting machines garnered less than 50% concern, campaigns based on fake news or shaping public opinion for/against candidates were concerning to over 70% of respondents, indicating widespread public anxiety about foreign electoral interference.

The next topic is the actors involved in election obstruction. As mentioned earlier, the typical countries identified as engaging in election obstruction include Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea. In our survey, when asked about neighboring countries and major interfering states, China was cited most frequently, followed by North Korea. Russia accounted for a relatively small proportion. Surprisingly, the United States ranked third, indicating a perception that even democratic nations may interfere in other countries' elections.

We also examined the ability to identify disinformation related to foreign electoral interference. This is perhaps the most controversial aspect and a limitation of my research. I intended to include examples of foreign electoral interference and manipulated disinformation in the survey to assess identification capabilities. However, as previously mentioned, there have been no significant controversies surrounding foreign electoral interference activities. Therefore, I used the National Election Commission's announcement that there was no hacking of North Korea's election systems as a reference point. To further explore political polarization, I included two questions related to potential US interference in politics, which is considered a plausible scenario. Regarding these two questions, 54% correctly identified the North Korean election system hacking as false. For the US classified documents leak, where most of the content was indeed fabricated, 46% responded correctly.

The level of awareness regarding foreign disinformation and foreign electoral interference is quite low, with only about half of respondents demonstrating accurate recognition.

Next, I will discuss election obstruction and political polarization. The survey included a question asking which political party would benefit from election obstruction. We analyzed this by categorizing respondents into those who believed obstruction would favor a particular party and those who supported or had a slight preference for a party. The cross-analysis revealed a starkly polarized phenomenon. Among those supporting the Democratic Party, 74% believed that foreign electoral obstruction would benefit the People Power Party. Conversely, supporters of the People Power Party believed that foreign electoral obstruction would benefit the Democratic Party.

The following analysis, which I found personally surprising, involved a cross-tabulation of the primary interfering countries (as mentioned earlier) with preferred political parties. Respondents could select up to two countries for interference, allowing for multiple responses. The analysis showed that the Democratic Party's supporters most frequently identified the United States (62.5%) as the primary interfering country, followed by China and then North Korea. Japan was ranked similarly to North Korea. Supporters of the People Power Party predominantly identified North Korea (82.2%), followed closely by China (80.5%). Supporters of the Justice Party showed similar responses to Democratic Party supporters, identifying the United States as the top interfering country, followed by China and North Korea at similar levels. This cross-tabulation clearly illustrates the political polarization surrounding perceptions of foreign electoral interference.

To further investigate this, a multinomial logistic regression analysis was conducted. The dependent variables were based on the accuracy of identifying two pieces of information: the North Korean hacking issue and the US presidential office wiretapping issue. Participants were categorized as correctly identifying both, correctly identifying only the North Korean hacking, correctly identifying only the US wiretapping, or incorrectly identifying both. Independent variables included general demographic factors (gender, age, region, education), political variables (party affiliation, ideology, evaluations of the Yoon Suk-yeol and Moon Jae-in administrations, political knowledge), and a communication variable (political YouTube viewership). The detailed results are presented later. Overall, compared to the reference category of incorrectly identifying both pieces of information, the other three cases showed that political variables, particularly those indicating political orientation and polarization, were largely significant.

Party affiliation was significant in all three cases. Evaluations of President Yoon and former President Moon's administrations were significant variables for both overall identification and the North Korean hacking issue, suggesting that political polarization influences the perception and discernment of foreign electoral interference. Notably, this survey indicated that individuals with conservative political leanings were more likely to misidentify these issues.

Professor Yoon Sung-hee noted that progressive respondents had lower identification rates for domestic fake news. The difference in my findings might be attributed to the inclusion of North Korea as a variable. I acknowledge the limitations due to the sample size.

In conclusion, foreign electoral interference is perceived as a serious threat by the general public, and its activities are significantly influenced by political polarization, posing a high risk to Korean democracy. Therefore, comprehensive preparations are necessary. Professor Lee Sook-jong will likely elaborate further on this. Briefly, legislative action is required. Taiwan, for example, enacted the 'Anti-Infiltration Act' in 2019, establishing a legal framework to prevent foreign electoral interference. South Korea should also move swiftly in this regard. Furthermore, since social media platforms, which control the dissemination of fake news and foreign electoral interference content, are operated by private companies, a collaborative system between the private sector and government is essential. To raise public awareness about election obstruction, it is crucial to disseminate information on this topic. Currently, agencies like the National Intelligence Service, the Korea Internet & Security Agency, and the National Election Commission are not releasing such information. Making this information public and raising awareness among the public is vital. Finally, institutionalizing international cooperation among democratic nations is necessary. ■

■ Lim Seong-hak, Professor, Department of International Relations, University of Seoul.

■ Managed and Edited by: Kim Sun-hee, Senior Researcher, EAI, Park Ji-soo, Researcher, EAI

    Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | jspark@eai.or.kr

Video Transcript

My presentation will focus on the challenges of fake news and its impact on Korean democracy, specifically examining the phenomena that can arise when foreign actors, rather than domestic ones, create fake news. It will discuss the potential effects on Korean democracy. The background for this topic is that 2024 is widely considered an election year, with approximately half of the world's population, about 4.2 billion people, participating in elections. Two phenomena are frequently highlighted as significant threats to democracy: first, the creation and dissemination of disinformation using technologies like artificial intelligence; and second, foreign interference in elections.

The recent election in Taiwan, the first this year, served as a testing ground for issues such as election interference and the spread of disinformation via AI. These problems were also evident in the Taiwanese election. For instance, a deepfake video circulated claiming that President Lai Ching-te had three mistresses, despite his victory. Regarding foreign electoral interference, a poll result unfavorable to presidential candidate Lai Ching-te was disseminated, and it is currently under investigation with suspicions that Chinese Communist Party officials in Fujian Province manipulated the poll. Therefore, these two forms of fake news, particularly when disseminated by foreign entities, are crucial issues for this election. With the general election approaching in April, I am particularly concerned about neighboring countries, especially China, Russia, and North Korea, which are the primary actors in election interference and intervention.

I believe these countries will engage in election interference, almost certainly, to advance their own foreign policy and national interests. However, when I sought data cooperation for this research on the current situation in South Korea, I was unable to obtain any. South Korea appears to be completely unprepared for foreign electoral interference, lacking data and research on the matter. In this context, a significant objective of my presentation is to raise awareness about this research topic. The presentation will cover the definition of foreign electoral interference, a basic theoretical review, an analysis of public perception of foreign electoral interference based on the EAI survey, and finally, the relationship between electoral interference activities and political polarization in South Korea, and its potential impact on Korean democracy. First, regarding terminology, as several speakers have mentioned, the definitions are not well-established. Just as defining fake news is difficult, defining foreign electoral interference is also challenging because various terms are used, such as 'election influence,' 'election interference,' and 'election intervention.' Election intervention generally takes two forms: partisan and procedural. The latter, procedural intervention, is sometimes undertaken by election commissions in countries with underdeveloped electoral infrastructure or systems, particularly authoritarian states. When foreign actors intervene to promote freer and fairer elections in such contexts, it is typically referred to as election intervention. Therefore, my presentation will exclude procedural intervention and focus on interventions intended to exert a negative influence. To avoid confusion with the term 'intervention,' I will use the term 'election obstruction' consistently. Please note this distinction. Next, a theoretical review of election obstruction: Fundamentally, election obstruction primarily utilizes disinformation and misinformation because this method is the cheapest and yields the highest returns. Countries seeking to interfere in elections typically support candidates favorable to their national interests or denigrate unfavorable candidates, thus exhibiting a partisan nature. Furthermore, countries engaging in such interference often seek to exploit the political polarization within the target country.

Secondly, the manipulation of disinformation by foreign actors is studied in a similar vein to fake news. Research has explored how political polarization influences the extent to which individuals accept, transmit, and share disinformation manipulated by foreign entities. Let's examine the situation in South Korea. First, based on the survey, we briefly looked at the current perception of foreign electoral interference among the general public. The survey asked whether electoral interference had occurred. Currently, 37.4% of respondents believe foreign electoral interference exists, while 62.6% believe it does not. Personally, I consider the percentage of those who believe it exists to be quite high, especially since there have been no major controversies or publicized incidents of foreign electoral interference.

However, the fact that 61.0% of respondents indicated that it had occurred in the past suggests that people anticipate foreign electoral interference in the upcoming general election. The second aspect is the channels of foreign electoral interference. These channels largely mirror those of fake news dissemination. Electoral interference predominantly occurs through internet portals, Facebook, and KakaoTalk, with disinformation also circulating widely through these channels. The internet accounts for an overwhelming majority of election obstruction activities. Next, we examine the types of interference and associated concerns. The types of interference include hacking of voting machines, fake news and disinformation campaigns, creating public opinion for or against specific candidates, and providing financial support to candidates. Most respondents expressed significant concern (over 50%) about these issues. While hacking of voting machines garnered less than 50% concern, campaigns based on fake news or shaping public opinion for/against candidates were concerning to over 70% of respondents, indicating widespread public anxiety about foreign electoral interference.

The next topic is the actors involved in election obstruction. As mentioned earlier, the typical countries identified as engaging in election obstruction include Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea. In our survey, when asked about neighboring countries and major interfering states, China was cited most frequently, followed by North Korea. Russia accounted for a relatively small proportion. Surprisingly, the United States ranked third, indicating a perception that even democratic nations may interfere in other countries' elections. We also examined the ability to identify disinformation related to foreign electoral interference. This is perhaps the most controversial aspect and a limitation of my research. I intended to include examples of foreign electoral interference and manipulated disinformation in the survey to assess identification capabilities. However, as previously mentioned, there have been no significant controversies surrounding foreign electoral interference activities.

Therefore, I used the National Election Commission's announcement that there was no hacking of North Korea's election systems as a reference point. To further explore political polarization, I included two questions related to potential US interference in politics, which is considered a plausible scenario. Regarding these two questions, 54% correctly identified the North Korean election system hacking as false. For the US classified documents leak, where most of the content was indeed fabricated, 46% responded correctly. The level of awareness regarding foreign disinformation and foreign electoral interference is quite low, with only about half of respondents demonstrating accurate recognition.

Next, I will discuss election obstruction and political polarization. The survey included a question asking which political party would benefit from election obstruction. We analyzed this by categorizing respondents into those who believed obstruction would favor a particular party and those who supported or had a slight preference for a party. The cross-analysis revealed a starkly polarized phenomenon. Among those supporting the Democratic Party, 74% believed that foreign electoral obstruction would benefit the People Power Party. Conversely, supporters of the People Power Party believed that foreign electoral obstruction would benefit the Democratic Party.

The following analysis, which I found personally surprising, involved a cross-tabulation of the primary interfering countries (as mentioned earlier) with preferred political parties. Respondents could select up to two countries for interference, allowing for multiple responses. The analysis showed that the Democratic Party's supporters most frequently identified the United States (62.5%) as the primary interfering country, followed by China and then North Korea. Japan was ranked similarly to North Korea. Supporters of the People Power Party predominantly identified North Korea (82.2%), followed closely by China (80.5%). Supporters of the Justice Party showed similar responses to Democratic Party supporters, identifying the United States as the top interfering country, followed by China and North Korea at similar levels. This cross-tabulation clearly illustrates the political polarization surrounding perceptions of foreign electoral interference. To further investigate this, a multinomial logistic regression analysis was conducted. The dependent variables were based on the accuracy of identifying two pieces of information: the North Korean hacking issue and the US presidential office wiretapping issue. Participants were categorized as correctly identifying both, correctly identifying only the North Korean hacking, correctly identifying only the US wiretapping, or incorrectly identifying both. Independent variables included general demographic factors (gender, age, region, education), political variables (party affiliation, ideology, evaluations of the Yoon Suk-yeol and Moon Jae-in administrations, political knowledge), and a communication variable (political YouTube viewership).

The detailed results are presented later. Overall, compared to the reference category of incorrectly identifying both pieces of information, the other three cases showed that political variables, particularly those indicating political orientation and polarization, were largely significant. Party affiliation was significant in all three cases. Evaluations of President Yoon and former President Moon's administrations were significant variables for both overall identification and the North Korean hacking issue, suggesting that political polarization influences the perception and discernment of foreign electoral interference. Notably, this survey indicated that individuals with conservative political leanings were more likely to misidentify these issues.

Therefore, individuals with conservative political leanings appear to be more vulnerable to foreign electoral interference. Professor Yoon Sung-hee noted that progressive respondents had lower identification rates for domestic fake news. The difference in my findings might be attributed to the inclusion of North Korea as a variable. I acknowledge the limitations due to the sample size. In conclusion, foreign electoral interference is perceived as a serious threat by the general public, and its activities are significantly influenced by political polarization, posing a high risk to Korean democracy. Therefore, comprehensive preparations are necessary. Professor Lee Sook-jong will likely elaborate further on this. Briefly, legislative action is required. Taiwan, for example, enacted the 'Anti-Infiltration Act' in 2019, establishing a legal framework to prevent foreign electoral interference. South Korea should also move swiftly in this regard. Furthermore, since social media platforms, which control the dissemination of fake news and foreign electoral interference content, are operated by private companies, a collaborative system between the private sector and government is essential. To raise public awareness about election obstruction, it is crucial to disseminate information on this topic. Currently, agencies like the National Intelligence Service, the Korea Internet & Security Agency, and the National Election Commission are not releasing such information. Making this information public and raising awareness among the public is vital. Finally, institutionalizing international cooperation among democratic nations is necessary. I apologize for the rushed presentation due to time constraints; it may have lacked coherence.

I will conclude my presentation here.

I will conclude my presentation here.

I will conclude my presentation here.

I will conclude my presentation here.

I will conclude my presentation here.

I apologize for the rushed presentation due to time constraints; it may have lacked coherence. I will conclude my presentation here.