Commentary: Taiwan's Presidential Election Results and Future

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D_maAkRKhzk

On January 13, EAI China Center Director Lee Dong-ryul (Professor, Dongduk Women's University) and Professor Emeritus Moon Heung-ho of Hanyang University analyze the variables that influenced the results of Taiwan's presidential election and present prospects for future cross-strait relations, US-China relations, and South Korea's response strategies. Director Lee points out that the Taiwan issue is not escalating US-China conflict but rather becoming more prominent amidst the expansion of US-China strategic competition. He predicts that Taiwan will reach a compromise of 'maintaining the status quo,' bolstered by the trend of dialogue and management between the US and China to prevent conflict or clashes. Professor Emeritus Moon suggests that while the possibility of full-scale conflict is low due to reciprocal relations such as cross-strait economic cooperation, the potential for minor conflicts remains. Therefore, he advises preparing for scenarios involving the intervention of US Forces Korea and suggests a balanced approach in relations with China and Taiwan to carefully convey our position on cross-strait issues.

Full Transcript

Lee Dong-ryul, Director of the EAI China Center (hereafter Lee Dong-ryul): Hello, this is Lee Dong-ryul. We will now begin the first commentary of the year from the East Asia Institute. As you know, Taiwan held its 16th presidential election on January 13, and Lai Ching-te of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) was elected president. This year is known as a global 'super election year,' with elections in as many as 76 countries. Among these, not only is the Taiwanese presidential election the first election of the year, but it is also arguably the election that has garnered the most attention from the international community and South Korea in the history of Taiwanese presidential elections. I believe there are reasons for this, and today we have invited Professor Emeritus Moon Heung-ho, the foremost expert on Taiwan in Korea, to join me for a discussion.

The discussion will primarily focus on the meaning and impact of the Taiwanese presidential election results. We plan to divide the discussion into roughly four parts: first, the characteristics and significance of the Taiwanese presidential election; second, the repercussions of the election results on cross-strait relations; third, the impact of changes in cross-strait relations on US-China relations and East Asia, including the Korean Peninsula; and finally, fourth, what choices South Korea should consider in such a situation.

1. Characteristics and Significance of Taiwan's Presidential Election

Lee Dong-ryul: First, regarding the characteristics and significance of Taiwan's presidential election, as mentioned earlier, DPP candidate Lai Ching-te was elected president. In response to this result, some have described it as the emergence of a government with strong pro-US and independence leanings.

However, I feel that the emphasis on pro-US and independence leanings might be leading to an overgeneralization of the election results. There are other significant aspects to consider. For instance, the fact that the DPP president's approval rating did not exceed a majority is noteworthy. Furthermore, the significant gains made by the Taiwan People's Party (TPP), a new third party, represent a remarkable shift.

Therefore, Professor Moon, I would like to ask you to briefly outline the specific circumstances of Taiwan's electoral landscape, focusing on the reasons behind the Taiwanese people's unique choices.

Moon Heung-ho, Professor Emeritus at Hanyang University (hereafter Moon Heung-ho): Thank you. As you mentioned, this presidential election garnered significant attention. This is partly because many important elections are scheduled for 2024, and also because the Taiwan issue has become a factor with considerable influence not only on Taiwan and China but also on East Asia, the Indo-Pacific, and the Korean Peninsula. Thus, there was substantial domestic and international interest. The first characteristic is the immense fervor surrounding Taiwan's presidential elections.

The reason for this is that, as you know, after the retreat of Chiang Kai-shek's government to Taiwan in 1949, Taiwan lived under martial law for nearly 40 years. The idea of electing one's own leader was unimaginable. Then, in 1992, a constitutional amendment introduced direct presidential elections, and since 1996, with the implementation of direct elections, many people have experienced the excitement and joy of electing their own leader, something they had never had before. This has contributed to the heightened fervor, and as an extension of this, the election, being a crucial one for selecting a leader, naturally generated significant enthusiasm.

The second characteristic is Taiwan's unique social structure. Taiwanese society is composed of two main voter groups: those who are native to Taiwan and those who came from mainland China after 1949, often referred to as 'mainlanders' and 'native Taiwanese.' These groups are also geographically divided. These groups have historically debated Taiwan's identity, specifically the inclination towards self-determination and independence versus an identity tied to the mainland. However, these distinctions seem to be gradually blurring.

The issue is no longer about unification or independence. Rather, the most crucial factor that led to Lai Ching-te's victory this time was his successful framing of the agenda. Instead of the past debates of 'We will be independent' or 'We will unify,' the relationship between China and Taiwan was framed as a choice between 'dictatorship and democracy.' As everyone knows, this highlights the difference between the communist dictatorship in mainland China and Taiwan's liberal democratic system, asserting their identity without excessively provoking China by avoiding the term 'independence.'

Consequently, this approach allowed him to appeal to a significant portion of the centrist voters. A prime example is Lai Ching-te's victory speech, where he stated, 'We began with democracy and ended with democracy.' He emphasized the victory in the struggle between democracy and dictatorship, and between war and peace. He also declared that they would further develop democracy and strengthen solidarity with democracies worldwide. This was a very clever and wise choice, strategically highlighting China's dictatorship while implicitly showcasing their own democracy and signaling to the world their commitment to the democratic camp.

The third characteristic, as you mentioned, is the rise of the third party. Previously, the political landscape was dominated by the Kuomintang (KMT) and the DPP. The DPP advocated for independence, while the KMT, though not explicitly advocating for unification with the mainland, leaned towards a pro-China stance. Now, many voters are frustrated with the unrealistic rhetoric surrounding unification and independence, given the difficulties involved. They feel a need to set a new direction for the future. This sentiment was tapped into by the Taiwan People's Party (TPP).

Initially, the TPP pursued unification with the KMT. During the final negotiations, there were expectations that a breakthrough might occur. However, the TPP's centrist stance proved difficult to reconcile with the KMT. The TPP felt deeply wounded by the unification negotiations with the KMT. Later accounts suggest that the TPP's leader and candidate, along with their close associates, felt pressured by the KMT. The KMT offered the position of vice president, but the role of vice president holds little significance in Taiwan. Therefore, being offered the position of vice president as a running mate for the presidential candidate was not meaningful. Subsequently, realizing this, the KMT, in the final stages of the election, even proposed cabinet participation, forming a coalition government. They suggested that if they won, they would include TPP members in the cabinet and form a coalition government, urging voters to support them. However, the TPP harbored significant resentment, and seeing the election dynamics, they realized they could gain considerable influence. In a situation where neither the KMT nor the DPP had a decisive advantage, they understood they could hold the casting vote. Under these circumstances, they could not agree to the unification negotiations. As a result, the TPP significantly expanded its influence in the legislative election, securing eight seats.

Another important issue, though not widely highlighted in this election, is the legislative election for the 113 legislative seats. Previously, under the DPP's Tsai Ing-wen administration, DPP legislators held a majority in the Legislative Yuan, enabling significant policy support. However, this time, the KMT secured one more seat with 52, the DPP with 51, and the TPP with 8 seats. While minor parties have little significance, the TPP's eight seats are highly meaningful. With these eight seats, the TPP can align with either the KMT or the DPP to form a majority. This gives them the power to influence policy decisions on specific issues, controlling both the KMT and the DPP.

Therefore, although the TPP candidate lost the presidential election, their expression is the brightest these days. This is because, despite Lai Ching-te's victory, he faces a multitude of tasks ahead, and the challenges he will confront are likely to feel burdensome even within a day or two of his win. This time, the TPP has strategically positioned itself as the casting vote in a situation where both the KMT and the DPP fall short of a majority.

Finally, the last point I want to make about this election is that Lai Ching-te wisely sidestepped the issues of unification and independence, emphasizing democracy instead. As I briefly mentioned earlier, this was a winning election strategy. The KMT's rhetoric on unification and independence, to put it bluntly, was as follows: 'If the DPP takes power, war will break out, and if war breaks out, young people will have to go to the battlefield. Therefore, you young people must vote for the KMT. If you vote for the KMT, there will be peace across the strait and no war.' This was a rather disrespectful and somewhat threatening statement. It implied that young people living abroad would be sent to the battlefield if they did not vote for the KMT. This was highly unrealistic. I thought to myself, 'The conservative KMT seems to lack a sense of the current political climate, the perceptions of young people and the center, and the realities of cross-strait relations.' If they had interpreted these factors correctly, they would not have been so vulnerable to counterattacks.

Another decisive blow came when former President Ma Ying-jeou, a senior figure in the KMT, made a misstatement. He said, 'We must trust Xi Jinping.' This statement, widely publicized as 'Trust Xi Theory' (信習論), was fiercely attacked by the DPP, who argued, 'They are telling us to trust Xi Jinping, whom even the Chinese people do not trust.' While I do not know the exact percentage of points lost by the KMT and gained by the DPP due to this, it undoubtedly delivered a significant shock just a day or two before the election. Therefore, I believe the KMT's outdated agenda setting, coupled with the misjudgment and tactless remarks of its senior members, led to their defeat against the agile DPP.

Lee Dong-ryul: The results of this election have often been interpreted through a dichotomous lens of pro-US versus pro-China, or independence versus unification. However, Professor Moon Heung-ho has eloquently explained how the complex and diverse opinions within Taiwan were skillfully expressed through the electoral process. I largely agree with his analysis. The choices made by the Taiwanese people in this election were undoubtedly complex, but ultimately, they made a shrewd decision based on the fundamental democratic principle of checks and balances. I believe this nuanced choice will be reflected in Taiwan's domestic politics and cross-strait relations in some form. Therefore, rather than the dichotomy of independence versus unification, the Taiwanese public's desire for a focus on domestic livelihood and economic issues, reflecting a more complex sentiment, seems to have been incorporated into the election outcome.

2. Cross-Strait Relations After the Election

Lee Dong-ryul:Secondly, I would like to discuss cross-strait relations. The general expectation is that with the emergence of a DPP administration, perceived as pro-US and leaning towards independence, cross-strait relations are likely to worsen, characterized by increased conflict and tension. However, as we discussed earlier, a closer examination of the election results suggests a more nuanced public sentiment. On the other hand, as you mentioned, Lai Ching-te's framing of the election as a choice between democracy and dictatorship was highly effective in securing his victory. This implies that a clash of values between Taiwan and mainland China in this context might be inevitable. Taiwan is rapidly 'Taiwanizing,' as we know. However, on the other hand, there are concerns about whether complete 'de-Sinicization,' particularly in the economic sphere, is feasible. Therefore, the interaction between Taiwan's choices and China's reactions, and the subsequent development of cross-strait relations, could unfold in diverse and complex ways.

Moon Heung-ho: Indeed. Cross-strait relations are the most critical issue in both the presidential and legislative elections. The issue of cross-strait relations is no longer a matter of a particular party or a specific demographic. Taiwan has a population of 23.5 million, with over a million people involved in business activities with the mainland. A significant number of them are based in the mainland, and there are officially over 110,000 spouses from mainland China. If these individuals form families and have two children, nearly 500,000 people are connected by blood ties to the mainland.

Furthermore, comparing economic exchanges between the mainland and Taiwan to inter-Korean relations can be misleading. While inter-Korean relations can fluctuate dramatically, with periods of apparent improvement followed by complete severance, cross-strait relations are fundamentally different. Even during the COVID-19 pandemic, when people-to-people exchanges were largely cut off, trade and commerce expanded significantly.

Therefore, in the future, if the DPP takes power, China, being displeased with this outcome and the party's inclination towards independence, might seek to impose disadvantages and curb the independence movement. While this is a possibility, as I mentioned, cross-strait relations are no longer in a state where such actions are easily feasible.

Economic cooperation between Taiwan and China is not a one-sided benefit for Taiwan. Many companies in China's economic engine, particularly in the coastal regions, would suffer significant losses in terms of employment and profits if relations with Taiwan were severed. Therefore, cross-strait economic cooperation is bound to continue, regardless of the ruling party's stance on independence or unification, or whether it is pro-China or pro-US. In fact, both China and Taiwan are pursuing what is termed 'integrated development,' and there appears to be no alternative to this approach.

Due to COVID-19, people-to-people exchanges between the two sides have decreased, but they are gradually increasing. Following the presidential election, a significant increase is expected. However, a persistent issue in cross-strait relations is the political framing of the relationship between China and Taiwan, which can be considered an eternal challenge. While complete unification or independence may be difficult, a middle ground, neither unification nor independence, is sought. Despite the internationally recognized principle of 'One China,' which China upholds and the UN acknowledges as Taiwan being an inalienable part of China, its full realization remains elusive. In this context, Taiwan and China have established the '1992 Consensus.'

The core of the 1992 Consensus is the affirmation: 'There is only one China. Do you agree?' The second key element is that if you agree to this, then the expression of 'One China' can differ between China and Taiwan, acknowledging the existence of both the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China.

While this consensus exists formally, in practice, the Taiwanese side places over 90% of the emphasis on 'One China,' rendering the second key element, the differing expressions, largely defunct. In essence, 'One China' has become synonymous with the People's Republic of China, with the Republic of China becoming nominal. This is Taiwan's position, and the Tsai Ing-wen administration refused to accept it. Furthermore, recent Chinese attempts to interpret the 1992 Consensus as 'One Country, Two Systems' have met with resistance. Agreeing to the 1992 Consensus, in this interpretation, would imply agreement to 'One Country, Two Systems.' This has sparked opposition.

From Taiwan's perspective, the 1992 Consensus was rejected by the DPP administration. The Lai Ching-te administration will also find it difficult to navigate this issue, but it may adopt a slightly more conciliatory stance towards the 1992 Consensus than the Tsai Ing-wen administration. That is, while conditionally agreeing to 'One China,' Lai Ching-te strongly emphasizes the Republic of China in its expression. In the past, DPP figures advocated for the establishment of a 'Republic of Taiwan,' which drew significant criticism and anxiety. However, the current framing has shifted towards making the Republic of China more independent and autonomous. Therefore, if 'One China' encompasses both the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China, and if China shows considerable deference to Taiwan's position, the 1992 Consensus might be accepted, and consequently, 'One Country, Two Systems' might be viewed somewhat positively.

However, from Taiwan's perspective, accepting 'One Country, Two Systems' is difficult because the implementation of 'One Country, Two Systems' in Hong Kong can be seen as having failed. Hong Kong no longer operates under two distinct systems. Observing Hong Kong, Taiwanese people perceive it as a potential future for themselves, making the immediate acceptance of 'One Country, Two Systems' highly improbable. Nevertheless, from the DPP's perspective, and for the new Lai Ching-te administration, the approach to defining relations with China will inevitably involve remodeling the 1992 Consensus or 'One Country, Two Systems' into an intermediate form, rather than pursuing unification or independence.

Many people suggest that dialogue or exchange between Lai Ching-te and Xi Jinping is unimaginable. However, I believe we should exercise some imagination. It might be challenging for China to completely isolate and sever ties with a regime that could potentially last for eight years. While some might argue that the Tsai Ing-wen administration also did nothing for four years, I believe the current situation is different. The Tsai Ing-wen administration had the 'COVID-19 factor' as an excuse and faced genuinely difficult circumstances.

However, the current situation is somewhat different. Many assess Lai Ching-te as being more pro-independence and a hardliner than Tsai Ing-wen. While this may be true emotionally, his approach to policy implementation and strategic execution is likely to be more astute than Tsai Ing-wen's. Therefore, the notion that a DPP administration inevitably leads to a severance of cross-strait relations, as claimed by the KMT, is flawed. The KMT argued that a DPP administration would halt cross-strait exchanges and cooperation, while their administration would hold talks with President Xi Jinping within a week to expand exchanges and cooperation.

However, Taiwanese voters are generally skeptical of such claims. They understand that meeting with President Xi Jinping will not resolve issues easily, nor will a Lai Ching-te presidency lead to a complete severance of cross-strait relations. They perceive cross-strait relations not as an issue between the DPP and the Chinese Communist Party, but rather as a matter between the United States and China that determines whether relations will stagnate, be maintained, or become peaceful.

Therefore, regardless of how the KMT attacks the DPP on cross-strait relations, the DPP has been able to counter these attacks because voters believe that cross-strait relations, economic cooperation, and particularly the semiconductor and technology supply chains, are not solely the responsibility of the DPP or the KMT. Instead, they are seen as being intrinsically linked to the US's policy direction, and thus, they are inevitably a secondary variable within the broader context of US-China relations.

Lee Dong-ryul: This year marks the 75th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China. Therefore, the history of cross-strait relations can also be seen as spanning 75 years. As you mentioned, understanding not only the current situation but also the historical context and structural particularities of cross-strait relations is crucial. Your explanation has been very insightful. One point you have frequently emphasized, Professor Moon, is that cross-strait relations should not be viewed as a binary choice between unification and independence. Instead, it is about expanding Taiwan's space for international engagement and China's efforts to isolate Taiwan internationally due to concerns about the erosion of the 'One China' principle. This dynamic is likely to become a significant issue going forward. In this context, the idea that cross-strait exchanges and cooperation, which have proven difficult over the past 75 years, cannot be dismissed is a very important point.

In line with this, the spokesperson for China's Taiwan Affairs Office recently stated that the election results do not represent the mainstream public opinion in Taiwan. While this statement aims to downplay the DPP's victory, it also suggests that China cannot ignore the sentiments of the remaining 60% of the Taiwanese population when formulating its cross-strait policy. This implies that China may find it difficult to pursue a path of excessive coercion or suppression in cross-strait relations, considering this segment of the population.

As you mentioned, Professor Moon, the current situation, with the DPP in power for eight consecutive years and now another four years, is unprecedented in cross-strait relations. Therefore, both the Chinese and Taiwanese governments are likely to experience a period of trial and error, involving both pressure and dialogue, as they navigate the establishment of cross-strait relations in this new four-year term. In this process, your concluding remark that 'ultimately, it comes down to US-China relations' and that 'US-China relations and the US variable can have a more significant impact on cross-strait relations' is particularly striking.

3. Prospects for US-China Relations Amidst the Taiwan Strait

Lee Dong-ryul: As you mentioned, the emergence of a pro-US administration is a key focus. This year marks the 45th anniversary of diplomatic relations between the US and China. The Taiwan issue has been a long-standing and familiar challenge in US-China relations, and perhaps one that is perpetually difficult to resolve. Both the US and China have experienced conflict and confrontation over the Taiwan issue, as well as sought compromises. Therefore, one could argue that they are relatively familiar with how to handle this issue.

The recent intensification and prominence of this issue can be attributed to the escalating US-China competition. It is not that the Taiwan issue has heightened US-China conflict, but rather that the Taiwan issue has become more prominent amidst the expansion and reproduction of US-China competition in the form of strategic competition. You may recall that immediately after Donald Trump's election victory in 2016, he made a historic phone call with Taiwan's President Tsai Ing-wen in his capacity as president-elect. This event can be seen as a catalyst for the expansion of the Taiwan issue within US-China competition. However, President Biden's initial statement this time was somewhat unexpected. His declaration that he does not support Taiwan's independence is likely to carry significant meaning. Please elaborate on how US-China relations will influence cross-strait relations and the Taiwan issue, and how the results of this election will be reflected.

Moon Heung-ho: Many observers have described this Taiwanese election as a 'proxy war between the US and China.' However, I hold a somewhat different view. The reason why the Taiwanese election is unlikely to become a proxy war is twofold. First, there is a significant difference in the scope of intervention available to China and the US. China has limited effective means of intervention. For example, encouraging Taiwanese tourists to visit, urging mainland businesspeople to vote, or launching balloons are unlikely to be effective and could easily backfire. In fact, I believe Xi Jinping was the most significant factor contributing to President Tsai Ing-wen's re-election in 2020. Without his actions, the DPP might not have secured another four-year term. This illustrates the difficulty of Chinese intervention.

In contrast, the US has more leverage. While the US does not overtly intervene, a significant portion of Taiwanese voters emotionally rely on the US. There are security ties, arms sales to Taiwan, and a deep-seated psychological dependence and network of connections with the US across generations that cannot be ignored. Therefore, it cannot be a proxy war between the US and China. For instance, Hsiao Bi-khim, the former representative of the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office (TECRO) in North America and Lai Ching-te's running mate, was elected vice president, which I believe had a significant impact.

During her campaign, many people heard the KMT attacking Lai Ching-te, saying, 'Lai Ching-te brought in a vice presidential candidate dictated by the US.' However, this attack did not resonate effectively. Taiwanese voters pay close attention to which candidate the US favors and which candidate receives its attention. In this regard, even without overt US intervention, Taiwanese voters anticipate US intentions, indicating the significant influence of US-China relations on Taiwan.

As you mentioned, President Biden's statement after the election results were announced, 'I do not support Taiwan's independence,' carries two messages. Approximately 70% of it is directed at President Xi Jinping, and about 30% serves as a reminder to Lai Ching-te that the US does not support Taiwan's independence, although this is already well-known. Perhaps Xi Jinping himself is uncertain about this. From the US perspective, this statement, while preserving Xi Jinping's dignity, also serves as a warning. The message that the US does not support Taiwan's independence is not solely for Taiwan but also for the US itself. The US has consistently maintained this stance and has never altered it. Therefore, it can be said that China and the US are aware of the clear limitations each other faces regarding the Taiwan issue.

From the US perspective, while deeply involved in the Taiwan issue, they understand the boundaries they cannot cross. Similarly, China understands the US's position. Consequently, both sides will continue to exercise caution to avoid excessive provocation. I believe that what Xi Jinping needs to be cautious about is any overt expression of Taiwan's independence, which he would find unbearable. As long as this is respected, the use or threat of force across the Taiwan Strait is unlikely. Furthermore, Xi Jinping, despite discussions of potential military actions, is perhaps the only individual among Chinese leaders and experts who has served for 17 years in Fujian Province, directly across from Taiwan. In this sense, Xi Jinping is arguably the most knowledgeable expert on the Taiwan issue and cross-strait relations within China. Therefore, he is unlikely to act rashly.

Currently, the person directly overseeing cross-strait relations and the Taiwan issue under Xi Jinping is Wang Huning, the Chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). As Wang Huning directly manages this portfolio, and given his extensive network in Taiwan and his familiarity with Taiwan issues, it is likely that he clearly understands what can and cannot be done, and the potential repercussions of hasty actions. Ultimately, cross-strait relations and the Taiwan issue are not determined by China and Taiwan alone, but rather by the US and China, who set the scope, content, and intensity. Therefore, I believe the US and China will manage this issue effectively.

However, what I am thinking about these days is the concern that the Japanese factor may increase in the future. Japan has a strong nostalgia for Taiwan and has effectively utilized the Taiwan issue to expand its diplomatic and security role, and will continue to strive to do so, anticipating significant changes. From China's perspective, even if the same action is taken, there is a significant difference in the backlash and sensitivity between actions by the US and actions by Japan. If the US does something, China might react with 50 units of anger, but if Japan does it, it might react with 500. There is a part that can create tension so sensitively, but Japan will not act recklessly in this regard. However, in the medium to long term, I believe the Japanese factor will be as important as the US factor.

Lee Dong-ryul: As you mentioned, Biden's first reaction to the presidential election results is very interesting. That is, the message that he does not support Taiwan's independence is intended to check the Lai Ching-te government in Taiwan. On the other hand, I fully agree that there is an intention to stabilize China. As I mentioned earlier, the Taiwan issue is a long-standing and familiar issue in bilateral relations, but ultimately it is difficult to resolve, so perhaps a compromise of maintaining the status quo has been reached. Although US-China competition is intensifying, the recent trend shows that both the US and China are trying to manage issues that could escalate from competition or conflict to clashes, such as the Taiwan issue, by establishing guardrails and engaging in dialogue. Such discussions took place at the summit in San Francisco last November, and most recently, before the Taiwanese presidential election, Liu Jianchao, head of the International Liaison Department of the Communist Party of China, visited the US and seems to have reached a similar agreement in his talks with Blinken.

Therefore, I believe it is necessary to pay some attention to the domestic situations and domestic issues of both the US and China. China is prioritizing economic recovery and is continuously raising the issue of securing development rights, while the US is facing two wars, the Israel-Hamas war and the Ukraine war, with an election approaching. In this context, it seems there is a will to manage the escalation of tensions over the Taiwan issue.

4. The Taiwan Issue and the Korean Peninsula

Lee Dong-ryul: Ultimately, as you mentioned, the Taiwan issue has been fluctuating according to the relationship setting between the US and China. Therefore, from the perspective of the Korean Peninsula and South Korea, which are very sensitive and vulnerable to US-China competition or conflict, I believe we need to look more coolly and meticulously at the reality that the Taiwan issue is fluidly changing according to changes in US-China relations. Then, the Taiwan issue could lead to conflict or confrontation between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, which in turn connects to the current intensified US-China competition, and this will have significant implications and effects on the Korean Peninsula and South Korea, which are most vulnerable to US-China competition.

In particular, the Korean Peninsula is experiencing continuous provocations from North Korea, and we are facing great difficulties in finding a solution to the North Korean nuclear issue. In the worst-case scenario, the most concerning aspect is the potential linkage between the escalation of the Taiwan issue and security instability on the Korean Peninsula. Another concern is that although South Korea and China have established diplomatic relations for over 30 years, the relationship remains stagnant. If the Taiwan issue re-emerges as a contentious issue in South Korea-China relations, it could have a very negative impact on the South Korea-China relationship, which has not yet recovered. What are your thoughts on the Korean Peninsula issue and South Korea-China relations?

Moon Heung-ho: The security interrelationship between the Taiwan issue and the Korean Peninsula cannot be denied. Since the Korean War, the security of the Taiwan Strait and the security of the Korean Peninsula have been largely linked. Why has it been quiet until now? It is because the relationship between the US and China has been quite friendly, allowing them to coexist without saying things that the other dislikes. However, as that stage has passed, the Taiwan issue is increasingly highlighted, and mistrust regarding unresolved issues from the past is exposed, naturally leading to conflict over the Taiwan issue, which then links to security conflicts on the Korean Peninsula.

The first point I have always raised regarding this issue is that as soon as the US began to focus on the Taiwan issue, China's policy toward North Korea immediately changed. In June 2019, President Xi Jinping made a very sudden visit to North Korea. Despite his very busy schedule that included visiting Japan, he only visited Pyongyang and stayed for one night. At that time, the situation was such that the North Korean issue needed to be settled. In other words, the US views Taiwan as China's North Korea. While this is not a pleasant situation for us, it is an unavoidable circumstance.

Therefore, in the future, the more China is displeased with the Taiwan issue, and the greater the confrontation with the US, the more it will try to harass South Korea and the US by using the North Korean issue. I believe this situation is ongoing, and there is not much we can do about it. This dynamic is likely to continue for the time being. Therefore, I suggest that unless the US makes a significant concession on the Taiwan issue, China is unlikely to make a significant concession on the North Korean issue.

Beyond the strategic framework, on a technical level, there could be military conflicts in the Taiwan Strait and cross-strait relations, ranging from minor skirmishes to larger confrontations. However, I do not believe that a full-scale war is highly probable. But if we cannot completely rule out the possibility of minor skirmishes, how should we position ourselves? Many people ask what should be done with the US Forces Korea if a problem arises in the Taiwan Strait, but that is not something we can control.

They will never move the US Forces Korea without our asking and agreement. It is difficult to agree with this, as we cannot assume that the US Forces Korea are stationed solely to respond to North Korea. Therefore, even with a very small possibility, in the event of a minor military conflict in Taiwan, we must have response plans for various scenarios regarding the extent to which the US Forces Korea, US Forces Japan, and we ourselves must and can intervene, whether voluntarily or involuntarily. We cannot simply dismiss it by saying, 'That's impossible.' Ideally, if inter-Korean relations stabilize to some extent, we would have the capacity to absorb minor repercussions.

However, consider the current situation. If South Korea-China relations are strained, South Korea-Russia relations are strained, and inter-Korean relations are strained, we are bound to experience considerable confusion even from minor external shocks. Therefore, I believe that stabilizing inter-Korean relations in the medium to long term is the best way to protect peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula when external security factors arise. Of course, this is an ideal scenario, but that is my thought.

Lee Dong-ryul: It is clear that South Korea's diplomatic sphere is expanding with the announcement of its Indo-Pacific strategy. As the diplomatic sphere expands, the number of sensitive issues that South Korea must consider and address also increases. As you mentioned, in the event of a Taiwan crisis, I believe prior communication with the US, China, and Taiwan is crucial regarding the extent of South Korea's involvement and engagement.

As I mentioned earlier, the US and China are engaging in dialogue while establishing guardrails to prevent the Taiwan issue from escalating into economic conflict. Meanwhile, both the US and China are continuously competing for influence due to Taiwan's strong geopolitical and geo-economic value. Within this context, I believe in-depth dialogue with the US, China, and Taiwan is necessary regarding the role and stance South Korea will take on the Taiwan issue, and I fully agree with your point.

Recently, the South Korean government has been gradually expanding the scope and intensity of its expressions regarding the Taiwan issue. Ultimately, this issue is also related to how diplomatic messages are conveyed. If the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) government emerges and the relationship between Taiwan and the US becomes closer, the US may demand more active expressions from South Korea. I believe it is time to consider internal preparations and strategies for how South Korea will convey its messages and at what level.

5. South Korea's Response Strategy

Lee Dong-ryul: In conclusion, you have provided a comprehensive summary of the changes in cross-strait relations, US-China relations, and their impact on the Korean Peninsula following the Taiwanese presidential election. Based on this, I believe we need to consider what aspects South Korea should focus on while employing strategies in this newly changing situation.

Moon Heung-ho: First, regarding the relationship between South Korea and Taiwan, I believe our capabilities in diplomacy, security, and military affairs are extremely limited. However, regarding the Taiwan issue, as you mentioned, to what extent and with what intensity can we officially comment? From the President to ministers, and in recent remarks at the Indo-Pacific Dialogue in Washington, we have stated that we hope for the peaceful maintenance of the status quo in cross-strait relations, the Taiwan Strait, and the South China Sea. We also hope for peaceful exchange and cooperation between Taiwan and China, as issues there affect Northeast Asia and the Korean Peninsula. This seems to be the maximum extent of our statements. South Korea can only express hope for the peaceful maintenance of the Taiwan Strait and the peaceful status quo across the Strait, because any disruption to peace there would affect the Korean Peninsula.

However, what we need to be cautious about is that while we do not necessarily have to be cautious simply because China dislikes it, many have spoken about a 'change by force.' This phrase, 'change by force by one side,' was directed at China with considerable intensity, leading to strong backlash and displeasure from China. In reality, there is no need to speak too strongly about the Taiwan issue and cross-strait relations from a diplomatic, security, or military perspective, as our words have little possibility of influencing the situation there.

Therefore, as candidate Lai Ching-te mentioned in his acceptance speech, we will firmly stand with the democratic camp. In the process of extending this, we need to consider what stance we should take regarding Taiwan's inclusion in the democratic alliance in Northeast Asia, East Asia, and the Asia-Pacific. I believe the current government's approach to China and its relationship with China has changed significantly compared to when it was inaugurated. I believe there is a need to adjust our approach to China and our bilateral relations.

I believe this is a desirable direction. Lastly, regarding the relationship between South Korea and Taiwan, if we do not engage in diplomacy, security, and military cooperation, is there nothing else we can do? I do not think so. There is much we can do with Taiwan. This is due to technical, social, and cultural aspects. Taiwan is our sixth-largest trading partner, fluctuating between fifth and sixth place. Therefore, we can certainly deepen our cooperation in these areas.

What is the area where China and the DPP government under Lai Ching-te will clash the most, and where Lai Ching-te must work hard and China must actively block? It is Taiwan's quasi-official stage of activity in the international community, its 'International Survival Space.' Currently, Taiwan has just over 10 formal diplomatic allies, and this space may be rapidly diminishing. From China's perspective, a military attack on Taiwan would significantly impact international sentiment and its image. Therefore, China seems to be trying to minimize military actions while pressuring Taiwan, which can be described as a 'silent killing of Taiwan.' This means suffocating Taiwan in the international community. This pressure is exerted not by mobilizing military forces, but by pressuring Taiwan in the international arena, and this is likely to increase globally. South Korea could also be affected by this.

In other words, in the past, China has excessively protested certain actions by South Korea in its relations with Taiwan. For example, they protested when a Taiwanese idol singer held up a Taiwanese flag, which was quite baffling from our perspective. Therefore, while we will defend what we must, China will undoubtedly begin to block the space it has gradually opened for Taiwan in the international community to pressure Taiwan. We are not exempt from this. Therefore, I hope we can anticipate and prepare for such situations. The most crucial element in this process is to uphold our image, our position, and our principles.

Furthermore, what I believe requires caution these days is the increasing negative sentiment towards China and the South Korea-China relationship. As an alternative, the relationship between South Korea and Taiwan seems to be emerging, with the perception that if we dislike China, we can simply befriend Taiwan. This is an entirely different matter. I am concerned that there might be misunderstandings in civil society or other sectors, as the relationship between South Korea and China and the relationship between South Korea and Taiwan are fundamentally different. Expanding our relationship with Taiwan does not negate the importance of the South Korea-China relationship. Attempts to expand relations with Taiwan simply because the South Korea-China relationship is currently strained and unfavorable are bound to face limitations.

Therefore, I believe it is crucial for all relevant ministries, research institutions, and researchers to consider these aspects in a more complex and balanced manner, including the Taiwan issue, cross-strait relations, and US-China relations. Professor Ha Young-sun of EAI's emphasis on complex thinking and strategic planning is highly relevant here.

Lee Dong-ryul: It is time for South Korea to voice a rational and legitimate opinion on the Taiwan issue. To minimize the risks associated with such a voice, as you mentioned, the prerequisite is the restoration of South Korea-China relations.

If a certain level of strategic understanding and communication is established between South Korea and China, the possibility of unnecessary misunderstandings or distortions being amplified can be reduced. To minimize and dispel China's concern that our desire for peace and stability in Taiwan might undermine the One China principle that has been shared between South Korea and China, it is crucial to restore strategic communication in South Korea-China relations as soon as possible. While the US and China are competing, and the US is increasing its involvement in the Taiwan issue, the US is consistently conveying its adherence to the One China principle and its opposition to Taiwan's independence, thereby preventing the US-China relationship from reaching a worst-case scenario over the Taiwan issue. This is also something that our diplomacy should consider.

Today, we have had an extensive discussion with Professor Moon Heung-ho about the cross-strait relations, US-China relations, and the Korean Peninsula issue following the Taiwanese presidential election. I was particularly impressed by the in-depth discussion of specific details, moving beyond overly polarized grand narratives, and focusing on Taiwan's internal considerations and the direction of public sentiment in Taiwan.

Thank you for your time today. We will conclude here. Thank you.

Moon Heung-ho: Thank you. ■

■ Moon Heung-hoProfessor Emeritus, Department of Chinese Studies, Hanyang University.

■ Lee Dong-ryulDirector, China Research Center, East Asia Institute; Professor, Department of Chinese Language and Literature, Dongduk Women's University.

■ Editor: Park Han-soo EAI Researcher

Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | hspark@eai.or.kr

Video Transcript

Hello, this is Lee Dong. As you know, the 16th presidential election was held in Taiwan on January 13th, and Lai Ching-te of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) was elected president. This year is, as you know, a global super election year, with elections in as many as 76 countries. Among these, not only is the Taiwanese presidential election the first election of the year, but it is also arguably the election that has garnered the most attention from the international community and South Korea among all past Taiwanese presidential elections. I believe there are reasons for this, and today we have invited Professor Moon Heung-ho, a leading expert on Taiwan from Hanyang University, to have a discussion with me. The discussion will primarily focus on the meaning and impact of the Taiwanese presidential election results. We plan to divide the discussion into about four main points: first, the characteristics and meaning of the Taiwanese presidential election results; second, the repercussions it has caused; third, how cross-strait relations will change based on the election results and their impact on US-China relations and East Asia, including the Korean Peninsula; and finally, what choices and considerations South Korea should make in such a situation. First, regarding the characteristics and meaning of the Taiwanese presidential election results, as mentioned, Lai Ching-te of the DPP was elected president. In response to this result, some have described it as the emergence of a government with strong pro-US and independence leanings. However, I believe this description, with its excessive emphasis on pro-US and independence sentiments, may be overgeneralizing the results of the Taiwanese presidential election. Beyond this, I believe there are other significant implications of the election results. For example, the fact that the support rate for the DPP presidential candidate did not exceed 50% is noteworthy.

Also, the emergence of the Taiwan People's Party (TPP), a new third party, is a significant change. Therefore, Professor Moon Heung-ho, I would like to ask you about the reasons behind the Taiwanese people's unique choices and the specific circumstances of the election, focusing on the underlying public sentiment.

Yes, thank you. As you mentioned, the Taiwanese presidential election garnered significant attention this time. This is partly because there are many important elections in 2024, and also because the Taiwan issue has become a factor with considerable influence not only between Taiwan and China but also across East Asia, the Indo-Pacific, and the Korean Peninsula, attracting widespread domestic and international interest. Firstly, the presidential election in Taiwan itself generated considerable enthusiasm.

The reason for this enthusiasm is twofold. Firstly, as you know, after the retreat of the Chiang Kai-shek government to Taiwan in 1949, Taiwan lived under martial law for nearly 40 years. Therefore, the idea of electing their own leader was unimaginable. Then, in 2002, a constitutional amendment was passed for the direct election of the president, and since 1996, direct elections have been implemented. Many people have shown great interest, anticipation, and excitement in electing their own leader, something they had not experienced before, which has fueled considerable enthusiasm. This is one characteristic. Secondly, Taiwan has unique social characteristics.

Taiwanese society is composed of two main voter groups: those originally from Taiwan and the so-called 'mainlanders' who arrived from the mainland after 1949. These groups are generally divided geographically as well: southern Taiwan and northern Taiwan. These groups have always clashed over Taiwan's identity, specifically regarding Taiwanese independence and identity versus mainland identity. However, these two aspects seem to be gradually diluting. The issue is no longer about unification or independence, but rather, as seen in this election, the most crucial factor that led to Lai Ching-te's victory was the framing of the agenda. Instead of the past discourse of 'We will be independent' or 'We will unify,' the relationship between China and Taiwan was framed as a choice between 'dictatorship and democracy.' This approach highlighted the difference between the communist dictatorship in mainland China and Taiwan's free democratic system, allowing individuals to assert their identity without excessively provoking China by avoiding the word 'independence.'

In this context, they were able to appeal to a large segment of the centrist voters. As a concrete example, Lai Ching-te, in his victory speech, stated, 'We started with democracy and ended with democracy.' I interpret this as a victory in the battle between democracy and dictatorship, between peace and war. He declared that they would further develop democracy and strengthen solidarity with democracies. This was a very clever and wise strategy, emphasizing China's dictatorship while implicitly highlighting their own democracy, and signaling to the world their future orientation: 'We will stand with democracy.' Therefore, as you mentioned earlier, the third characteristic of this election is the rise of the third party. Previously, the KMT and the DPP dominated the political landscape, with the DPP advocating for independence and the KMT leaning towards China, though not explicitly advocating for unification. However, many voters are now frustrated with the constant focus on unification or independence, which seem difficult to achieve, and believe that a new approach is needed to set Taiwan's future direction. The TPP, the third party, initially pursued unification with the KMT. However, during the final negotiations, there were predictions that they might cause a major upset. Ultimately, the KMT's and TPP's differing views on the TPP's moderate stance made harmonization difficult. The TPP was deeply wounded during the unification negotiations with the KMT. Looking back, the TPP's leader and candidate, as well as their close associates, felt that the KMT had pressured them too much. The position of vice president is not very significant in Taiwan, so offering a spot as a running mate for the presidential candidate was not meaningful. Then, realizing their mistake, the KMT proposed a coalition government at the last minute, offering cabinet positions.

They proposed forming a coalition government with TPP members if they came to power and asked for votes in support. However, the TPP had already gained significant public support and, seeing the election results, realized they could play a pivotal role as a swing vote, especially since the KMT was not overwhelmingly dominant over the DPP. Under these circumstances, they could not agree to the unification negotiations. Consequently, the TPP significantly expanded its influence in the legislative election, securing eight seats. Another important issue, though not widely discussed in this presidential election, is the legislative election.

In this election, 113 legislators were elected. Previously, the DPP government under Tsai Ing-wen had a majority in the legislature, allowing for significant policy support. However, this time, the KMT secured 52 seats, the DPP 51 seats, and the TPP 8 seats, with some independents. While minor parties have little influence, the eight seats held by the TPP are highly significant. Whether the TPP aligns with the KMT or the DPP, they hold the balance of power, enabling them to control both parties on specific policy issues and legislative matters. Therefore, the TPP candidate, despite losing the presidential election, appears to be the happiest, as President-elect Lai Ching-te faces numerous challenges ahead. The pressure of governing will be immense. Thus, the TPP has skillfully positioned itself as the kingmaker in this election, with both the KMT and DPP falling just short of a majority.

The final point I want to make about this election is that Lai Ching-te skillfully navigated the issues of unification and independence, emphasizing democracy. As I briefly mentioned earlier, this was a highly effective election strategy. The KMT's stance on unification and independence, to put it bluntly, was that if the DPP came to power, war would break out, and young people would have to go to war. Therefore, they urged young people to vote for the KMT. They claimed that voting for the KMT would ensure peace across the Taiwan Strait and prevent war. This was a rather disrespectful and threatening statement. Telling young people living abroad to return and vote for the KMT to avoid war was highly unrealistic. Therefore, I believe the KMT misjudged the situation, failing to interpret the changing electoral landscape, the perceptions of young and centrist voters, and the reality of cross-strait relations. They were thus counterattacked.

Another decisive factor in the counterattack was when former President Ma Ying-jeou made a controversial statement, suggesting that 'we should trust Xi Jinping,' promoting a 'trust-based diplomacy.' The DPP seized on this, arguing, 'Even Chinese people don't trust Xi Jinping, yet you're telling us to trust him?' This led to a significant counteroffensive. While I don't know the exact percentage of votes gained or lost due to this, it undoubtedly had a tremendous impact in the final days before the election. Therefore, I believe the KMT's outdated agenda setting and the former president's misjudgment and insensitive remarks were exploited by the agile and shrewd DPP. Yes, the election results have often been interpreted in a dichotomous manner, as a choice between pro-US and pro-China, or independence and unification.

The KMT's argument was that if the DPP took power, war would break out, and young people would have to fight. They urged young people to vote for the KMT to ensure peace across the Taiwan Strait. This was a rather disrespectful and threatening statement, telling young people abroad to return and vote KMT to avoid war, which was highly unrealistic. I believe the KMT misjudged the situation, failing to interpret the changing electoral landscape, the perceptions of young and centrist voters, and the reality of cross-strait relations. They were thus counterattacked.

Another decisive factor in the counterattack was when former President Ma Ying-jeou made a controversial statement, suggesting that 'we should trust Xi Jinping,' promoting a 'trust-based diplomacy.' The DPP seized on this, arguing, 'Even Chinese people don't trust Xi Jinping, yet you're telling us to trust him?' This led to a significant counteroffensive. While I don't know the exact percentage of votes gained or lost due to this, it undoubtedly had a tremendous impact in the final days before the election. Therefore, I believe the KMT's outdated agenda setting and the former president's misjudgment and insensitive remarks were exploited by the agile and shrewd DPP. Yes, the election results have often been interpreted in a dichotomous manner, as a choice between pro-US and pro-China, or independence and unification.

However, Professor Moon Heung-ho has eloquently explained how the complex and diverse opinions within Taiwan were skillfully expressed through the election process, and I largely agree with his analysis. Taiwan's choices in this election must have been very complex, but ultimately, they made a delicate decision based on the fundamental democratic principle of checks and balances. Therefore, I believe this delicate choice of public sentiment will be reflected in Taiwan's domestic politics and cross-strait relations in some form. While we might have previously considered the extremes of independence or unification, the Taiwanese public sentiment seems to be more complex, with a desire to focus on domestic livelihood and economic issues.

Secondly, I would like to discuss cross-strait relations. Generally, it is expected that if the DPP, with its pro-US and independence-leaning stance, comes to power, cross-strait relations would likely worsen due to increased conflict and tension. However, as I mentioned earlier, a closer look at the election results suggests that public sentiment is not necessarily aligned with this expectation. Furthermore, as Professor Moon mentioned, the agenda of 'democracy versus authoritarianism' presented by candidate Lai Ching-te was effectively utilized to win the election, suggesting that a clash of values between Taiwan and China is inevitable. As you know, Taiwan is rapidly becoming more 'Taiwanized'.

However, on the other hand, there are concerns about whether complete economic decoupling from China is possible. Therefore, Taiwan's choices, China's reactions, and the subsequent cross-strait relations could become very diverse and complex. Yes, cross-strait relations are currently the most important issue in both the presidential and legislative elections. In fact, cross-strait relations are not a matter of a particular party or a specific social class. Taiwan has a population of 23.5 million, and more than one million people are involved in business activities with the mainland. A significant portion of them are in the mainland, and there are officially over 110,000 spouses from mainland China.

If these individuals form families and have two children, it means nearly 500,000 people are connected by blood ties to the mainland. I often compare economic exchanges between the mainland and Taiwan to inter-Korean relations. This comparison can be misleading. Inter-Korean relations can seem very good one day and completely severed the next. However, cross-strait relations cannot afford to be like that. Even when human exchange was almost completely cut off due to COVID-19, trade and commerce expanded significantly.

Therefore, I believe that even if the DPP takes power, and China is displeased and the party leans towards independence, China might try to impose disadvantages on cross-strait relations and suppress the independence movement. While this is a possibility, as I've said, the situation is no longer conducive to such actions. Cross-strait economic cooperation is not a one-sided benefit for Taiwan. China's economy, particularly the engine of its growth in the southeastern coastal region, would suffer immense losses in terms of employment and corporate profits if relations with Taiwan were severed. Therefore, cross-strait economic relations must continue regardless of the ruling party's stance on independence or unification, or its pro-China or pro-US orientation. In fact, both China and Taiwan are pursuing what is called 'integration'.

There seems to be no alternative to the idea of integrated development between Taiwan and China. Furthermore, regarding cross-strait relations, human exchanges were significantly reduced due to COVID-19, but they are gradually increasing. I expect them to rise considerably after the presidential election. However, a significant issue in cross-strait relations is the political definition of the relationship between China and Taiwan, which is almost an eternal challenge. While unification and independence are difficult, even an intermediate form, neither unification nor independence, presents its own challenges. Internationally, the 'One China' principle, which China insists upon and the international community acknowledges, states that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China. However, this is not being fully realized in practice. Therefore, China and Taiwan established the so-called '1992 Consensus.' The core of the 1992 Consensus is the agreement that there is only one China, and both sides acknowledge this. The second point is that if you agree to this, then each side can express its interpretation of 'one China' – Taiwan's interpretation and China's interpretation. This acknowledges the existence of the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China.

Formally, this means that while the Republic of China exists, the People's Republic of China holds almost 90% of the weight, and the second key element of the 1992 Consensus, the understanding of each side's interpretation, has been effectively sidelined. In essence, 'one China' has become almost synonymous with the People's Republic of China, rendering the Republic of China virtually defunct from Taiwan's perspective. Therefore, the current government states it cannot accept this. Moreover, even if Taiwan were to accept the 1992 Consensus with its differing interpretations, China has recently been attempting to conflate the 1992 Consensus with 'one country, two systems,' which is a misrepresentation. Agreeing to the 1992 Consensus is being presented as agreeing to 'one country, two systems.' This is precisely what has drawn opposition.

From Taiwan's perspective, the DPP government rejected the 1992 Consensus. The Lai Ching-te administration will also find it very difficult to handle this issue, but I anticipate a slightly more conciliatory stance towards the 1992 Consensus compared to the Tsai Ing-wen administration. This would involve conditionally agreeing to 'one China' while emphasizing the expression of 'Republic of China' under Lai Ching-te. In the past, DPP figures advocated for building a 'Republic of Taiwan' if independence were declared, which led to much criticism and anxiety. However, this has been reframed as making the Republic of China more independent and autonomous. Therefore, if the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China are both included under the umbrella of 'one China,' and China shows considerable respect for Taiwan's position, the 1992 Consensus might be accepted. Extending this, there might be a degree of positive consideration for 'one country, two systems.' However, 'one country, two systems' is currently difficult for Taiwan to accept.

because the 'one country, two systems' applied to Hong Kong has essentially collapsed. Hong Kong is no longer operating under a 'two systems' framework. Therefore, seeing Hong Kong's situation, Taiwanese people view their own future, making it very difficult to readily accept 'one country, two systems.' However, from the DPP's perspective, the Lai Ching-te administration will have no choice but to approach the establishment of relations with China by remodeling the '1992 Consensus' or 'one country, two systems' into an intermediate form, rather than pursuing unification or independence. Many people say that dialogue or exchange between Lai Ching-te and Xi Jinping is unimaginable. However, I believe that if we exercise some imagination, it might be difficult for China to completely isolate and sever ties for an eight-year administration. One might argue that the Tsai Ing-wen administration also did nothing for four years, but I believe the situation is different. The Tsai Ing-wen administration's four years were largely overshadowed by the COVID-19 pandemic, providing a degree of leeway, and the situation was indeed very challenging. The current situation is somewhat different. Many evaluate Lai Ching-te as being more pro-independence and a hardliner than Tsai Ing-wen. While this may be true emotionally, I believe he will handle policy implementation and strategic execution much more wisely than Tsai Ing-wen. Therefore, the notion that the DPP's rule inevitably leads to a severance of cross-strait relations, as the KMT has claimed, is not necessarily accurate. The KMT claimed that if the DPP came to power, cross-strait exchanges would be severed, but if they came to power, they would expand exchanges and cooperation with President Xi Jinping within a week. However, Taiwanese voters do not easily believe such statements. The issue will not be resolved simply by meeting President Xi Jinping, nor will cross-strait relations be severed if Lai Ching-te becomes president. In the minds of Taiwanese voters, cross-strait relations are not a matter of the DPP or the CCP, but rather a matter of the US and China determining whether relations will be strained or peaceful. Therefore, no matter how much the KMT attacks the DPP on cross-strait relations, the DPP can evade criticism because voters believe that cross-strait relations, and particularly economic cooperation, supply chains, and technology, are not issues solely for the DPP or KMT, but are inherently linked to US policy direction and the US-China relationship. Therefore, these issues are bound to exist as secondary variables within the US-China relationship.

What does this mean? It means that the 'One Country, Two Systems' for Hong Kong has already been broken. Hong Kong is no longer a system within these two systems. Therefore, by looking at Hong Kong, Taiwanese people see their own future, making it very difficult to readily accept 'One Country, Two Systems.' However, from the perspective of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the new government of Lai Ching-te, the approach to setting relations with China will inevitably be a middle ground between unification and independence, perhaps by remodeling the '1992 Consensus' or 'One Country, Two Systems.' Many people say that dialogue or exchange between Lai Ching-te and Xi Jinping is unimaginable. However, I believe that if we use a little imagination, China might be more flexible and adaptable. It seems unlikely that they would build walls and sever all ties for an entire eight-year term. One might argue that the Tsai Ing-wen administration also did nothing for four years, but I believe that is somewhat different. The Tsai Ing-wen administration's four years were largely overshadowed by the COVID-19 pandemic, which provided a significant escape route, and the situation was indeed very difficult. However, the current situation is somewhat different. Many people assess Lai Ching-te and Tsai Ing-wen as more pro-independence and hardline independence advocates. While this may be true emotionally, I believe Lai Ching-te is likely to handle policy implementation and strategic approaches much more wisely than Tsai Ing-wen. Therefore, the notion that the DPP's rule equates to a severance of cross-strait relations, as advocated by the Kuomintang, is not necessarily accurate.

I believe they are different because the four years of Tsai Ing-wen's government were largely dominated by COVID-19, which provided considerable room for maneuver and actual difficulty. However, the current situation is somewhat different. Many people assess Lai Ching-te and Tsai Ing-wen as more independence-leaning and hardline independence supporters. While this may be true sentimentally, I believe Lai Ching-te is considerably more likely to act with greater wisdom in policy implementation and strategic execution compared to Tsai Ing-wen. Therefore, the notion that the DPP's continued rule signifies a severance of cross-strait relations, as advocated by the KMT, is a perspective that needs careful consideration.

The KMT claimed that if the DPP came to power, cross-strait exchanges and cooperation would be severed, and if they came to power, they would expand exchanges and cooperation with President Xi Jinping within a week. However, Taiwanese voters do not easily believe such statements. The issue will not be resolved simply by meeting President Xi Jinping, nor will cross-strait relations be severed if Lai Ching-te becomes president. In the minds of Taiwanese voters, cross-strait relations are not a matter of the DPP or the CCP, but rather a matter of the US and China determining whether relations will be strained or peaceful. Therefore, no matter how much the KMT attacks the DPP on cross-strait relations, the DPP can evade criticism because voters believe that cross-strait relations, and particularly economic cooperation, supply chains, and technology, are not issues solely for the DPP or KMT, but are inherently linked to US policy direction and the US-China relationship. Therefore, these issues are bound to exist as secondary variables within the US-China relationship.

This year marks the 75th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China. Therefore, cross-strait relations can also be seen as having a 75-year history. As Professor Moon mentioned, understanding not only the current situation but also the historical context and structural specificities of cross-strait relations is crucial. One point that Professor Moon has often emphasized is that cross-strait relations should not be viewed solely through the lens of unification or independence as extreme options. Instead, it is becoming increasingly important to consider Taiwan's efforts to expand its space on the international stage and China's concerns about the potential erosion of the 'One China' principle, leading to efforts to isolate Taiwan. This dynamic is likely to be a significant issue going forward. In this context, the idea of pursuing exchanges and cooperation between Taiwan and China in the intermediate zone, which has proven difficult over the past 75 years, is something we cannot exclude. This is a very important point. Extending this, China recently issued a response through its Taiwan Affairs Office spokesperson, stating that the election results do not represent the mainstream public sentiment in Taiwan. While this may partly reflect a desire to prevent the DPP from taking power, it also suggests that China, when setting relations with Taiwan, cannot ignore the remaining 60% of public sentiment. This implies that, contrary to expectations, China may find it difficult to lead cross-strait relations through coercion or oppression, considering the remaining 60% of the population. This is also being signaled within China. As Professor Moon mentioned, the current situation, where one administration is followed by another of the same party for eight years, is a new experience in cross-strait relations. Therefore, both the Chinese and Taiwanese governments, at the start of this new four-year term, will likely go through a period of trial and error, involving both pressure and dialogue. This phase is likely to continue for some time. In this process, Professor Moon's final point that the US-China relationship is ultimately the key variable influencing cross-strait relations is very impressive. As you mentioned, the emergence of a pro-US administration is a focal point. This year marks the 45th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the US and China. Taiwan has been a long-standing and familiar issue in US-China relations, and it is an issue that is perpetually difficult to resolve. Both countries have experienced conflict and confrontation over the Taiwan issue and have also sought compromise. Therefore, they are relatively familiar with how to handle this issue. The fact that this issue has become more prominent recently is fundamentally due to the escalating US-China competition. It is not that the US-China conflict has intensified due to the Taiwan issue, but rather that the Taiwan issue has emerged within the process of US-China strategic competition expanding and regenerating. You may recall that in 2016, immediately after Donald Trump's election victory, he had a historic phone call with then-Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen. This event served as a catalyst for the Taiwan issue becoming a focal point in the US-China competition. However, President Biden's initial statement was somewhat unexpected. His declaration that he does not support Taiwan's independence carries significant meaning. How the future US-China relationship will influence cross-strait relations and the Taiwan issue, and how the results of this election will be reflected, is a key question. Many people, as the Taiwanese presidential election garnered attention, suggested that it was a proxy war between the US and China. I, however, hold a different view. It is difficult for the Taiwanese election to become a proxy war between the US and China for two main reasons. First, the scope of intervention available to China and the US is vastly different. China has few effective means. For example, restricting Taiwanese tourism or urging mainland businesses to vote in a certain way, or flying balloons, are unlikely to be effective and could even backfire. I believe that Xi Jinping was the biggest factor in Tsai Ing-wen's re-election in 2020. Without him, the DPP government might not have secured another four years. It was that difficult. China's options are limited. In contrast, the US has more leverage. It's not that the US overtly intervenes, but Taiwanese voters, emotionally, rely heavily on the US. They are linked in terms of security, the US sells weapons to Taiwan, and across generations, the psychological dependence on the US, actual networks, and other factors cannot be ignored. Therefore, it cannot be a proxy war between the US and China. For instance, the fact that the representative of the American Institute in Taiwan, the de facto US ambassador, was chosen as Lai Ching-te's running mate for vice president had a significant impact. Many people attacked this, saying, 'The US told them to do it, so they did it,' or 'Lai Ching-te just brought him in because the US told him to.' However, these attacks were not very effective. Taiwanese voters pay close attention to which candidate the US favors and which candidate it supports. In this regard, even without overt US intervention, Taiwanese voters can anticipate US intentions. This indicates that the US-China relationship has a significant impact on Taiwan. As mentioned earlier, President Biden's statement after the election results, 'I do not support Taiwan's independence,' carries two messages. Approximately 70% is a message to President Xi Jinping, and about 30% is a message to Lai Ching-te, acknowledging his victory but reminding him of the US stance on independence. Lai Ching-te is likely well aware of this, and perhaps Xi Jinping is the one who is uncertain or suspicious. From the US perspective, it is a message that saves face for Xi Jinping while also serving as a warning. The statement 'I do not support Taiwan's independence' is not just for Taiwan but also for the US. The US will likely continue to officially state this. They have never changed their stance on not supporting independence. Therefore, China and the US, in a way, understand the clear limitations they face regarding the Taiwan issue. The US understands how far it can go regarding Taiwan and where its limits lie, and China also understands the US perspective. Therefore, both sides will continue to exercise caution to avoid excessive provocation. I believe that what the US must be careful about regarding Xi Jinping is not to cause him humiliation or push him beyond his limits. I see this as an explicit expression of Taiwan's independence, and as long as this is respected, it will be difficult to resort to force or military action. President Xi Jinping, while known for his potential military actions, has served for 17 years in Fujian Province, directly across from Taiwan. He is arguably one of the few, if not the only, expert within China on the Taiwan issue and cross-strait relations. Therefore, he is unlikely to act rashly. Furthermore, Wang Yi, the Director of the Taiwan Affairs Office under Xi Jinping, directly oversees cross-strait relations. Wang Yi has extensive networks in Taiwan and has visited Taiwan, and he is well aware of the Taiwan issue. Therefore, they clearly understand what they can and cannot do, and the potential losses from hasty actions. Ultimately, cross-strait relations and the Taiwan issue are not solely determined by China and Taiwan, but by the US and China setting the scope, content, and intensity. I believe the US and China will manage this effectively. However, I am increasingly concerned about the growing influence of Japan in recent times. Japan has a strong sense of nostalgia for Taiwan and has effectively utilized the Taiwan issue to expand its diplomatic and security role, and it will likely continue to do so. China reacts with significantly different levels of sensitivity to actions by the US versus Japan. If the US takes an action, China might react with 50 units of anger, but if Japan takes the same action, it might react with 500 units of anger. This indicates a potential for tension creation. However, Japan will likely not act recklessly. Nevertheless, in the long term, the Japanese factor may become as significant as the US factor. As you mentioned, Biden's first reaction to the election results was very interesting. The message 'I do not support Taiwan's independence' serves to check the Lai Ching-te administration and, on the other hand, to calm China. I fully agree with this. As mentioned earlier, the Taiwan issue is a long-standing and familiar problem in US-China relations, but due to the ultimate difficulty of resolution, a compromise of maintaining the status quo has been reached. While US-China competition is intensifying, the recent trend shows both sides creating guardedly managing potential conflicts, such as the Taiwan issue, through dialogue. This was evident in the San Francisco summit in November and more recently in the discussions between Blinken and Liu Jianchao before the Taiwanese presidential election. Ultimately, we must also consider the domestic situations of both China and the US. China's priority is economic recovery and securing development rights, while the US, facing elections, is dealing with the wars in Israel-Hamas and Ukraine. In this context, the US has expressed a desire to manage tensions, including the Taiwan issue, rather than allowing them to escalate. Therefore, as you mentioned, the Taiwan issue, like US-China relations, is experiencing fluctuations. For South Korea, which is highly sensitive and vulnerable to US-China competition and conflict, it is crucial to observe the evolving Taiwan issue in light of these changes with a more objective and detailed perspective. The Taiwan issue, by extension, is linked to cross-strait conflict and confrontation, which in turn connects to the current intensified US-China competition, thereby having significant implications for the Korean Peninsula and South Korea. Currently, as you know, North Korea is engaging in continuous provocations, and finding a solution to the North Korean nuclear issue is proving very difficult. In the worst-case scenario, the escalation of conflict over the Taiwan issue could be linked to security instability on the Korean Peninsula, which is our greatest concern. Furthermore, the current South Korea-China relationship, despite being over 30 years since normalization, remains stagnant. If the Taiwan issue re-emerges as a contentious issue in South Korea-China relations, it could have a significantly negative impact on the relationship, which has not yet recovered. What are your thoughts on cross-strait relations, the Korean Peninsula issue, and South Korea-China relations? The interconnectedness and security implications between the Taiwan issue and the Korean Peninsula are undeniable. Since the Korean War, the security of the Taiwan Strait and the Korean Peninsula have been largely linked. Why has it been quiet until now? It is because the relationship between the US and China was relatively friendly, allowing them to coexist without expressing their dislikes. However, that phase has passed. As issues of dialogue become more prominent and mistrust over unresolved past issues surfaces, conflicts naturally arise over the Taiwan issue, which then extends to the Korean Peninsula. I have always pointed out that as soon as the US raises the Taiwan issue, China's policy towards North Korea immediately changes. In June 2019, President Xi Jinping made a sudden visit to North Korea, deviating from his busy schedule that included a visit to Japan, spending only one night in Pyongyang. At that time, the situation suggested a need to address North Korea. The US perspective is that Taiwan is China's North Korea. While this is an unpleasant reality for us, it is an unavoidable situation. Therefore, the more China is displeased with the Taiwan issue and the greater its confrontation with the US, the more it will try to trouble the US, South Korea, and Japan over the North Korean issue. This situation continues. There is not much we can do about it, but this dynamic is likely to persist for some time. I believe that unless the US makes significant concessions on the Taiwan issue, China will not make significant concessions on the North Korean issue. Beyond this overall strategic framework, there are also technical issues. The scope of potential military conflict in the Taiwan Strait and cross-strait relations is vast, ranging from minor skirmishes to larger confrontations. However, I believe the possibility of a full-scale war is not high. But if we cannot completely rule out the possibility of small-scale conflicts or skirmishes, how should we position ourselves? Many people ask what should be done with the US Forces Korea if a problem arises in the Taiwan Strait. We cannot control that. They will not move without our consent. However, I find this difficult to accept, as the role of the US Forces Korea is not solely limited to responding to North Korea. Recent developments suggest otherwise. Therefore, we must have scenario-based response plans, regardless of the scale, for situations like a minor military conflict in Taiwan, and determine the extent to which we, the US Forces Korea, and the US Forces Japan can and must intervene. We cannot simply do nothing and say it won't happen. Therefore, personally, I believe that if inter-Korean relations stabilize to some extent, we will have a buffer zone to absorb minor shocks. However, look at the current situation: South Korea-China relations are strained, South Korea-Russia relations are strained, and inter-Korean relations are strained. Even minor shocks can cause significant confusion. Therefore, I believe that stabilizing inter-Korean relations in the medium to long term is the best way to protect peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula when external security factors arise. This may be idealistic, but I hold this view. Yes, with the announcement of South Korea's Indo-Pacific strategy, South Korea's diplomatic scope is clearly expanding. As diplomacy expands, so do the sensitive issues that South Korea must consider and address. In the case of the Taiwan issue, if a crisis occurs, the extent of South Korea's involvement and the degree of its participation require very important prior communication with the US, China, and Taiwan. As mentioned earlier, the US and China are creating guardrails and engaging in dialogue to prevent the Taiwan issue from escalating from competition to conflict. However, on the other hand, both the US and China, due to Taiwan's strong geopolitical and geoeconomic value, will inevitably continue to compete for influence. Therefore, regarding South Korea's role and stance on the Taiwan issue, deeper dialogue with the US, China, and Taiwan is necessary. I fully agree with this. Recently, the South Korean government has been gradually broadening the scope and intensity of its expressions regarding the Taiwan issue. Ultimately, this is also related to how diplomatic messages are conveyed. As the DPP government takes office and relations between Taiwan and the US become closer, the US may demand more active expressions of opinion from South Korea on dialogue issues. Therefore, it is time to consider how, to what extent, and at what level South Korea will convey its messages, and to prepare internal strategies accordingly. Finally, after the Taiwanese presidential election, the developments in cross-strait relations, US-China relations, and their impact on the Korean Peninsula have been well summarized. Based on this, we should also consider what aspects South Korea should focus on when formulating its strategies in this evolving situation. Firstly, regarding South Korea-Taiwan relations, our capabilities in diplomacy, security, and military affairs are extremely limited. However, as you mentioned, regarding the Taiwan issue, to what extent and with what intensity can we officially speak? Looking at statements from the presidential office, ministries, and recent remarks at the Indo-Pacific Dialogue in Washington, we express a desire for the peaceful maintenance of the status quo in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, and hope for peaceful exchanges and cooperation between Taiwan and China, as any issues there could affect East Asia and the Korean Peninsula. In my opinion, the maximum we can say is that we hope for the peaceful maintenance of the status quo in the Taiwan Strait and peaceful exchanges and cooperation between Taiwan and China, because any disruption there would impact the Korean Peninsula. We must be cautious, not because China dislikes it, but because many have spoken of a 'change by force.' The phrase 'unilateral change by force' is directed at China, which naturally provokes strong opposition. However, our statements on the Taiwan issue in terms of diplomacy, security, and military affairs do not need to be overly strong. In reality, our words have little chance of influencing the situation there. Therefore, as President-elect Lai Ching-te mentioned in his acceptance speech, we will firmly stand with the democratic camp. As this continues, we need to consider our stance within the East Asian and Asia-Pacific democratic alliance. I believe that relevant stakeholders need to consider this. Personally, I feel that the current government's approach to its role and relationship with China has changed significantly compared to the early days of its term. I believe there is a need for some adjustment in our approach to China and our relationship with it, and I see this as a positive direction. Lastly, regarding South Korea-Taiwan relations, are there no other areas besides diplomacy, security, and military affairs? I don't think so. There are many areas where Taiwan and we can cooperate, such as in technology and socio-cultural exchanges. Taiwan is our sixth-largest trading partner, consistently ranking fifth or sixth. Therefore, we can certainly strengthen our relationship in these areas. Extending this point, a key area of potential friction between China and the Lai Ching-te administration is in international space, where Taiwan strives for greater recognition and China actively works to limit it. Taiwan currently has diplomatic relations with just over a dozen countries, and this number may decline rapidly. From China's perspective, a military attack on Taiwan would significantly damage its image internationally and increase anti-China sentiment. Therefore, China is likely to minimize military actions while increasing pressure on Taiwan through other means. This 'silent killing of Taiwan' aims to suffocate Taiwan in the international arena, not through military force but through international pressure. This is likely to increase globally, and South Korea could also be affected. In the past, when we engaged with Taiwan, China has reacted nervously and excessively, such as protesting when a Taiwanese idol singer wore a Taiwanese flag. From our perspective, these reactions were often baffling. Therefore, while we must defend our positions, China will undoubtedly begin to close off spaces that were previously open to Taiwan to exert pressure. We are not exempt from this. Therefore, we should anticipate and prepare for such scenarios. The most crucial element in this process is to uphold our image, our position, and our principles. Additionally, I believe we need to be cautious about the increasing negative perceptions of China and the South Korea-China relationship. While the relationship with Taiwan is being presented as an alternative, suggesting 'if you dislike China, engage with Taiwan,' this is a completely different matter. I am concerned that there might be misunderstandings in public perception or other sectors. The relationship with South Korea-China and the relationship with Taiwan are fundamentally different. Strengthening our relationship with Taiwan does not negate the importance of the South Korea-China relationship. If we are currently dissatisfied with the South Korea-China relationship, it does not mean we should simply shift our focus to Taiwan. This approach will inevitably hit a limit. Therefore, a balanced perspective is needed. Regarding the Taiwan issue, cross-strait relations, and US-China relations, I believe it is crucial for all relevant ministries, research institutions, and researchers to adopt a complex and balanced approach, as Professor Lee Ha-young-sun always emphasizes the need for complex thinking and strategic planning. Today, we have had an extensive discussion with Professor Moon Hong on cross-strait relations, US-China relations, and the Korean Peninsula issue following the Taiwanese presidential election. I was particularly impressed by the in-depth analysis of the specific content and direction of Taiwanese public sentiment, moving beyond the overly polarized grand narratives that have dominated discussions since the election. Thank you for your time today. We will conclude here. Thank you. Yes, thank you.

Furthermore, China's recent response through its Taiwan Affairs Office spokesperson, stating that the election results do not represent the mainstream public sentiment in Taiwan, is noteworthy. While this may partly reflect a desire to prevent the DPP from taking power, it also suggests that China, when setting relations with Taiwan, cannot ignore the remaining 60% of public sentiment. This implies that, contrary to expectations, China may find it difficult to lead cross-strait relations through coercion or oppression, considering the remaining 60% of the population. This is also being signaled within China. As Professor Moon mentioned, the current situation, where one administration is followed by another of the same party for eight years, is a new experience in cross-strait relations. Therefore, both the Chinese and Taiwanese governments, at the start of this new four-year term, will likely go through a period of trial and error, involving both pressure and dialogue. This phase is likely to continue for some time.

In this process, Professor Moon's final point that the US-China relationship is ultimately the key variable influencing cross-strait relations is very impressive. As you mentioned, the emergence of a pro-US administration is a focal point. This year marks the 45th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the US and China. Taiwan has been a long-standing and familiar issue in US-China relations, and it is an issue that is perpetually difficult to resolve. Both countries have experienced conflict and confrontation over the Taiwan issue and have also sought compromise. Therefore, they are relatively familiar with how to handle this issue. The fact that this issue has become more prominent recently is fundamentally due to the escalating US-China competition. It is not that the US-China conflict has intensified due to the Taiwan issue, but rather that the Taiwan issue has emerged within the process of US-China strategic competition expanding and regenerating. You may recall that in 2016, immediately after Donald Trump's election victory, he had a historic phone call with then-Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen. This event served as a catalyst for the Taiwan issue becoming a focal point in the US-China competition. However, President Biden's initial statement was somewhat unexpected. His declaration that he does not support Taiwan's independence carries significant meaning.

How the future US-China relationship will influence cross-strait relations and the Taiwan issue, and how the results of this election will be reflected, is a key question. Many people, as the Taiwanese presidential election garnered attention, suggested that it was a proxy war between the US and China. I, however, hold a different view. It is difficult for the Taiwanese election to become a proxy war between the US and China for two main reasons. First, the scope of intervention available to China and the US is vastly different. China has few effective means. For example, restricting Taiwanese tourism or urging mainland businesses to vote in a certain way, or flying balloons, are unlikely to be effective and could even backfire. I believe that Xi Jinping was the biggest factor in Tsai Ing-wen's re-election in 2020. Without him, the DPP government might not have secured another four years. It was that difficult. China's options are limited. In contrast, the US has more leverage. It's not that the US overtly intervenes, but Taiwanese voters, emotionally, rely heavily on the US. They are linked in terms of security, the US sells weapons to Taiwan, and across generations, the psychological dependence on the US, actual networks, and other factors cannot be ignored. Therefore, it cannot be a proxy war between the US and China. For instance, the representative of the American Institute in Taiwan, the de facto US ambassador, was chosen as Lai Ching-te's running mate for vice president had a significant impact. Many people attacked this, saying, 'The US told them to do it, so they did it,' or 'Lai Ching-te just brought him in because the US told him to.' However, these attacks were not very effective. Taiwanese voters pay close attention to which candidate the US favors and which candidate it supports. In this regard, even without overt US intervention, Taiwanese voters can anticipate US intentions. This indicates that the US-China relationship has a significant impact on Taiwan. As mentioned earlier, President Biden's statement after the election results, 'I do not support Taiwan's independence,' carries two messages. Approximately 70% is a message to President Xi Jinping, and about 30% is a message to Lai Ching-te, acknowledging his victory but reminding him of the US stance on independence. Lai Ching-te is likely well aware of this, and perhaps Xi Jinping is the one who is uncertain or suspicious. From the US perspective, it is a message that saves face for Xi Jinping while also serving as a warning. The statement 'I do not support Taiwan's independence' is not just for Taiwan but also for the US. The US will likely continue to officially state this. They have never changed their stance on not supporting independence. Therefore, China and the US, in a way, understand the clear limitations they face regarding the Taiwan issue. The US understands how far it can go regarding Taiwan and where its limits lie, and China also understands the US perspective. Therefore, both sides will continue to exercise caution to avoid excessive provocation. I believe that what the US must be careful about regarding Xi Jinping is not to cause him humiliation or push him beyond his limits. I see this as an explicit expression of Taiwan's independence, and as long as this is respected, it will be difficult to resort to force or military action. President Xi Jinping, while known for his potential military actions, has served for 17 years in Fujian Province, directly across from Taiwan. He is arguably one of the few, if not the only, expert within China on the Taiwan issue and cross-strait relations. Therefore, he is unlikely to act rashly. Furthermore, Wang Yi, the Director of the Taiwan Affairs Office under Xi Jinping, directly oversees cross-strait relations. Wang Yi has extensive networks in Taiwan and has visited Taiwan, and he is well aware of the Taiwan issue. Therefore, they clearly understand what they can and cannot do, and the potential losses from hasty actions. Ultimately, cross-strait relations and the Taiwan issue are not solely determined by China and Taiwan, but by the US and China setting the scope, content, and intensity. I believe the US and China will manage this effectively. However, I am increasingly concerned about the growing influence of Japan in recent times. Japan has a strong sense of nostalgia for Taiwan and has effectively utilized the Taiwan issue to expand its diplomatic and security role, and it will likely continue to do so. China reacts with significantly different levels of sensitivity to actions by the US versus Japan. If the US takes an action, China might react with 50 units of anger, but if Japan takes the same action, it might react with 500 units of anger. This indicates a potential for tension creation. However, Japan will likely not act recklessly. Nevertheless, in the long term, the Japanese factor may become as significant as the US factor.

As you mentioned, Biden's first reaction to the election results was very interesting. The message 'I do not support Taiwan's independence' serves to check the Lai Ching-te administration and, on the other hand, to calm China. I fully agree with this. As mentioned earlier, the Taiwan issue is a long-standing and familiar problem in US-China relations, but due to the ultimate difficulty of resolution, a compromise of maintaining the status quo has been reached. While US-China competition is intensifying, the recent trend shows both sides guardedly managing potential conflicts, such as the Taiwan issue, through dialogue. This was evident in the San Francisco summit in November and more recently in the discussions between Blinken and Liu Jianchao before the Taiwanese presidential election. Ultimately, we must also consider the domestic situations of both China and the US. China's priority is economic recovery and securing development rights, while the US, facing elections, is dealing with the wars in Israel-Hamas and Ukraine. In this context, the US has expressed a desire to manage tensions, including the Taiwan issue, rather than allowing them to escalate. Therefore, as you mentioned, the Taiwan issue, like US-China relations, is experiencing fluctuations. For South Korea, which is highly sensitive and vulnerable to US-China competition and conflict, it is crucial to observe the evolving Taiwan issue in light of these changes with a more objective and detailed perspective. The Taiwan issue, by extension, is linked to cross-strait conflict and confrontation, which in turn connects to the current intensified US-China competition, thereby having significant implications for the Korean Peninsula and South Korea. Currently, as you know, North Korea is engaging in continuous provocations, and finding a solution to the North Korean nuclear issue is proving very difficult. In the worst-case scenario, the escalation of conflict over the Taiwan issue could be linked to security instability on the Korean Peninsula, which is our greatest concern. Furthermore, the current South Korea-China relationship, despite being over 30 years since normalization, remains stagnant. If the Taiwan issue re-emerges as a contentious issue in South Korea-China relations, it could have a significantly negative impact on the relationship, which has not yet recovered. What are your thoughts on cross-strait relations, the Korean Peninsula issue, and South Korea-China relations?

The interconnectedness and security implications between the Taiwan issue and the Korean Peninsula are undeniable. Since the Korean War, the security of the Taiwan Strait and the Korean Peninsula have been largely linked. Why has it been quiet until now? It is because the relationship between the US and China was relatively friendly, allowing them to coexist without expressing their dislikes. However, that phase has passed. As issues of dialogue become more prominent and mistrust over unresolved past issues surfaces, conflicts naturally arise over the Taiwan issue, which then extends to the Korean Peninsula. I have always pointed out that as soon as the US raises the Taiwan issue, China's policy towards North Korea immediately changes. In June 2019, President Xi Jinping made a sudden visit to North Korea, deviating from his busy schedule that included a visit to Japan, spending only one night in Pyongyang. At that time, the situation suggested a need to address North Korea. The US perspective is that Taiwan is China's North Korea. While this is an unpleasant reality for us, it is an unavoidable situation. Therefore, the more China is displeased with the Taiwan issue and the greater its confrontation with the US, the more it will try to trouble the US, South Korea, and Japan over the North Korean issue. This situation continues. There is not much we can do about it, but this dynamic is likely to persist for some time. I believe that unless the US makes significant concessions on the Taiwan issue, China will not make significant concessions on the North Korean issue. Beyond this overall strategic framework, there are also technical issues. The scope of potential military conflict in the Taiwan Strait and cross-strait relations is vast, ranging from minor skirmishes to larger confrontations. However, I believe the possibility of a full-scale war is not high. But if we cannot completely rule out the possibility of small-scale conflicts or skirmishes, how should we position ourselves? Many people ask what should be done with the US Forces Korea if a problem arises in the Taiwan Strait. We cannot control that. They will not move without our consent. However, I find this difficult to accept, as the role of the US Forces Korea is not solely limited to responding to North Korea. Recent developments suggest otherwise. Therefore, we must have scenario-based response plans, regardless of the scale, for situations like a minor military conflict in Taiwan, and determine the extent to which we, the US Forces Korea, and the US Forces Japan can and must intervene. We cannot simply do nothing and say it won't happen. Therefore, personally, I believe that if inter-Korean relations stabilize to some extent, we will have a buffer zone to absorb minor shocks. However, look at the current situation: South Korea-China relations are strained, South Korea-Russia relations are strained, and inter-Korean relations are strained. Even minor shocks can cause significant confusion. Therefore, I believe that stabilizing inter-Korean relations in the medium to long term is the best way to protect peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula when external security factors arise. This may be idealistic, but I hold this view.

Yes, with the announcement of South Korea's Indo-Pacific strategy, South Korea's diplomatic scope is clearly expanding. As diplomacy expands, so do the sensitive issues that South Korea must consider and address. In the case of the Taiwan issue, if a crisis occurs, the extent of South Korea's involvement and the degree of its participation require very important prior communication with the US, China, and Taiwan. As mentioned earlier, the US and China are creating guardrails and engaging in dialogue to prevent the Taiwan issue from escalating from competition to conflict. However, on the other hand, both the US and China, due to Taiwan's strong geopolitical and geoeconomic value, will inevitably continue to compete for influence. Therefore, regarding South Korea's role and stance on the Taiwan issue, deeper dialogue with the US, China, and Taiwan is necessary. I fully agree with this. Recently, the South Korean government has been gradually broadening the scope and intensity of its expressions regarding the Taiwan issue. Ultimately, this is also related to how diplomatic messages are conveyed. As the DPP government takes office and relations between Taiwan and the US become closer, the US may demand more active expressions of opinion from South Korea on dialogue issues. Therefore, it is time to consider how, to what extent, and at what level South Korea will convey its messages, and to prepare internal strategies accordingly. Finally, after the Taiwanese presidential election, the developments in cross-strait relations, US-China relations, and their impact on the Korean Peninsula have been well summarized. Based on this, we should also consider what aspects South Korea should focus on when formulating its strategies in this evolving situation. Firstly, regarding South Korea-Taiwan relations, our capabilities in diplomacy, security, and military affairs are extremely limited. However, as you mentioned, regarding the Taiwan issue, to what extent and with what intensity can we officially speak? Looking at statements from the presidential office, ministries, and recent remarks at the Indo-Pacific Dialogue in Washington, we express a desire for the peaceful maintenance of the status quo in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, and hope for peaceful exchanges and cooperation between Taiwan and China, as any issues there could affect East Asia and the Korean Peninsula. In my opinion, the maximum we can say is that we hope for the peaceful maintenance of the status quo in the Taiwan Strait and peaceful exchanges and cooperation between Taiwan and China, because any disruption there would impact the Korean Peninsula. We must be cautious, not because China dislikes it, but because many have spoken of a 'change by force.' The phrase 'unilateral change by force' is directed at China, which naturally provokes strong opposition. However, our statements on the Taiwan issue in terms of diplomacy, security, and military affairs do not need to be overly strong. In reality, our words have little chance of influencing the situation there. Therefore, as President-elect Lai Ching-te mentioned in his acceptance speech, we will firmly stand with the democratic camp. As this continues, we need to consider our stance within the East Asian and Asia-Pacific democratic alliance. I believe that relevant stakeholders need to consider this. Personally, I feel that the current government's approach to its role and relationship with China has changed significantly compared to the early days of its term. I believe there is a need for some adjustment in our approach to China and our relationship with it, and I see this as a positive direction. Lastly, regarding South Korea-Taiwan relations, are there no other areas besides diplomacy, security, and military affairs? I don't think so. There are many areas where Taiwan and we can cooperate, such as in technology and socio-cultural exchanges. Taiwan is our sixth-largest trading partner, consistently ranking fifth or sixth. Therefore, we can certainly strengthen our relationship in these areas. Extending this point, a key area of potential friction between China and the Lai Ching-te administration is in international space, where Taiwan strives for greater recognition and China actively works to limit it. Taiwan currently has diplomatic relations with just over a dozen countries, and this number may decline rapidly. From China's perspective, a military attack on Taiwan would significantly damage its image internationally and increase anti-China sentiment. Therefore, China is likely to minimize military actions while increasing pressure on Taiwan through other means. This 'silent killing of Taiwan' aims to suffocate Taiwan in the international arena, not through military force but through international pressure. This is likely to increase globally, and South Korea could also be affected. In the past, when we engaged with Taiwan, China has reacted nervously and excessively, such as protesting when a Taiwanese idol singer wore a Taiwanese flag. From our perspective, these reactions were often baffling. Therefore, while we must defend our positions, China will undoubtedly begin to close off spaces that were previously open to Taiwan to exert pressure. We are not exempt from this. Therefore, we should anticipate and prepare for such scenarios. The most crucial element in this process is to uphold our image, our position, and our principles. Additionally, I believe we need to be cautious about the increasing negative perceptions of China and the South Korea-China relationship. While the relationship with Taiwan is being presented as an alternative, suggesting 'if you dislike China, engage with Taiwan,' this is a completely different matter. I am concerned that there might be misunderstandings in public perception or other sectors. The relationship with South Korea-China and the relationship with Taiwan are fundamentally different. Strengthening our relationship with Taiwan does not negate the importance of the South Korea-China relationship. If we are currently dissatisfied with the South Korea-China relationship, it does not mean we should simply shift our focus to Taiwan. This approach will inevitably hit a limit. Therefore, a balanced perspective is needed. Regarding the Taiwan issue, cross-strait relations, and US-China relations, I believe it is crucial for all relevant ministries, research institutions, and researchers to adopt a complex and balanced approach, as Professor Lee Ha-young-sun always emphasizes the need for complex thinking and strategic planning. Today, we have had an extensive discussion with Professor Moon Hong on cross-strait relations, US-China relations, and the Korean Peninsula issue following the Taiwanese presidential election. I was particularly impressed by the in-depth analysis of the specific content and direction of Taiwanese public sentiment, moving beyond the overly polarized grand narratives that have dominated discussions since the election. Thank you for your time today. We will conclude here. Thank you. Yes, thank you.

In that sense, even without overt US intervention, Taiwanese voters can anticipate US intentions. This indicates that the US-China relationship has a significant impact on Taiwan. As mentioned earlier, President Biden's statement after the election results, 'I do not support Taiwan's independence,' carries two messages. Approximately 70% is a message to President Xi Jinping, and about 30% is a message to Lai Ching-te, acknowledging his victory but reminding him of the US stance on independence. Lai Ching-te is likely well aware of this, and perhaps Xi Jinping is the one who is uncertain or suspicious. From the US perspective, it is a message that saves face for Xi Jinping while also serving as a warning. The statement 'I do not support Taiwan's independence' is not just for Taiwan but also for the US. The US will likely continue to officially state this. They have never changed their stance on not supporting independence. Therefore, China and the US, in a way, understand the clear limitations they face regarding the Taiwan issue. The US understands how far it can go regarding Taiwan and where its limits lie, and China also understands the US perspective. Therefore, both sides will continue to exercise caution to avoid excessive provocation. I believe that what the US must be careful about regarding Xi Jinping is not to cause him humiliation or push him beyond his limits. I see this as an explicit expression of Taiwan's independence, and as long as this is respected, it will be difficult to resort to force or military action. President Xi Jinping, while known for his potential military actions, has served for 17 years in Fujian Province, directly across from Taiwan. He is arguably one of the few, if not the only, expert within China on the Taiwan issue and cross-strait relations. Therefore, he is unlikely to act rashly. Furthermore, Wang Yi, the Director of the Taiwan Affairs Office under Xi Jinping, directly oversees cross-strait relations. Wang Yi has extensive networks in Taiwan and has visited Taiwan, and he is well aware of the Taiwan issue. Therefore, they clearly understand what they can and cannot do, and the potential losses from hasty actions. Ultimately, cross-strait relations and the Taiwan issue are not solely determined by China and Taiwan, but by the US and China setting the scope, content, and intensity. I believe the US and China will manage this effectively. However, I am increasingly concerned about the growing influence of Japan in recent times. Japan has a strong sense of nostalgia for Taiwan and has effectively utilized the Taiwan issue to expand its diplomatic and security role, and it will likely continue to do so. China reacts with significantly different levels of sensitivity to actions by the US versus Japan. If the US takes an action, China might react with 50 units of anger, but if Japan takes the same action, it might react with 500 units of anger. This indicates a potential for tension creation. However, Japan will likely not act recklessly. Nevertheless, in the long term, the Japanese factor may become as significant as the US factor.

As you mentioned, Biden's first reaction to the election results was very interesting. The message 'I do not support Taiwan's independence' serves to check the Lai Ching-te administration and, on the other hand, to calm China. I fully agree with this. As mentioned earlier, the Taiwan issue is a long-standing and familiar problem in US-China relations, but due to the ultimate difficulty of resolution, a compromise of maintaining the status quo has been reached. While US-China competition is intensifying, the recent trend shows both sides guardedly managing potential conflicts, such as the Taiwan issue, through dialogue. This was evident in the San Francisco summit in November and more recently in the discussions between Blinken and Liu Jianchao before the Taiwanese presidential election. Ultimately, we must also consider the domestic situations of both China and the US. China's priority is economic recovery and securing development rights, while the US, facing elections, is dealing with the wars in Israel-Hamas and Ukraine. In this context, the US has expressed a desire to manage tensions, including the Taiwan issue, rather than allowing them to escalate. Therefore, as you mentioned, the Taiwan issue, like US-China relations, is experiencing fluctuations. For South Korea, which is highly sensitive and vulnerable to US-China competition and conflict, it is crucial to observe the evolving Taiwan issue in light of these changes with a more objective and detailed perspective. The Taiwan issue, by extension, is linked to cross-strait conflict and confrontation, which in turn connects to the current intensified US-China competition, thereby having significant implications for the Korean Peninsula and South Korea. Currently, as you know, North Korea is engaging in continuous provocations, and finding a solution to the North Korean nuclear issue is proving very difficult. In the worst-case scenario, the escalation of conflict over the Taiwan issue could be linked to security instability on the Korean Peninsula, which is our greatest concern. Furthermore, the current South Korea-China relationship, despite being over 30 years since normalization, remains stagnant. If the Taiwan issue re-emerges as a contentious issue in South Korea-China relations, it could have a significantly negative impact on the relationship, which has not yet recovered. What are your thoughts on cross-strait relations, the Korean Peninsula issue, and South Korea-China relations?

The interconnectedness and security implications between the Taiwan issue and the Korean Peninsula are undeniable. Since the Korean War, the security of the Taiwan Strait and the Korean Peninsula have been largely linked. Why has it been quiet until now? It is because the relationship between the US and China was relatively friendly, allowing them to coexist without expressing their dislikes. However, that phase has passed. As issues of dialogue become more prominent and mistrust over unresolved past issues surfaces, conflicts naturally arise over the Taiwan issue, which then extends to the Korean Peninsula. I have always pointed out that as soon as the US raises the Taiwan issue, China's policy towards North Korea immediately changes. In June 2019, President Xi Jinping made a sudden visit to North Korea, deviating from his busy schedule that included a visit to Japan, spending only one night in Pyongyang. At that time, the situation suggested a need to address North Korea. The US perspective is that Taiwan is China's North Korea. While this is an unpleasant reality for us, it is an unavoidable situation. Therefore, the more China is displeased with the Taiwan issue and the greater its confrontation with the US, the more it will try to trouble the US, South Korea, and Japan over the North Korean issue. This situation continues. There is not much we can do about it, but this dynamic is likely to persist for some time. I believe that unless the US makes significant concessions on the Taiwan issue, China will not make significant concessions on the North Korean issue. Beyond this overall strategic framework, there are also technical issues. The scope of potential military conflict in the Taiwan Strait and cross-strait relations is vast, ranging from minor skirmishes to larger confrontations. However, I believe the possibility of a full-scale war is not high. But if we cannot completely rule out the possibility of small-scale conflicts or skirmishes, how should we position ourselves? Many people ask what should be done with the US Forces Korea if a problem arises in the Taiwan Strait. We cannot control that. They will not move without our consent. However, I find this difficult to accept, as the role of the US Forces Korea is not solely limited to responding to North Korea. Recent developments suggest otherwise. Therefore, we must have scenario-based response plans, regardless of the scale, for situations like a minor military conflict in Taiwan, and determine the extent to which we, the US Forces Korea, and the US Forces Japan can and must intervene. We cannot simply do nothing and say it won't happen. Therefore, personally, I believe that if inter-Korean relations stabilize to some extent, we will have a buffer zone to absorb minor shocks. However, look at the current situation: South Korea-China relations are strained, South Korea-Russia relations are strained, and inter-Korean relations are strained. Even minor shocks can cause significant confusion. Therefore, I believe that stabilizing inter-Korean relations in the medium to long term is the best way to protect peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula when external security factors arise. This may be idealistic, but I hold this view.

Yes, with the announcement of South Korea's Indo-Pacific strategy, South Korea's diplomatic scope is clearly expanding. As diplomacy expands, so do the sensitive issues that South Korea must consider and address. In the case of the Taiwan issue, if a crisis occurs, the extent of South Korea's involvement and the degree of its participation require very important prior communication with the US, China, and Taiwan. As mentioned earlier, the US and China are creating guardrails and engaging in dialogue to prevent the Taiwan issue from escalating from competition to conflict. However, on the other hand, both the US and China, due to Taiwan's strong geopolitical and geoeconomic value, will inevitably continue to compete for influence. Therefore, regarding South Korea's role and stance on the Taiwan issue, deeper dialogue with the US, China, and Taiwan is necessary. I fully agree with this. Recently, the South Korean government has been gradually broadening the scope and intensity of its expressions regarding the Taiwan issue. Ultimately, this is also related to how diplomatic messages are conveyed. As the DPP government takes office and relations between Taiwan and the US become closer, the US may demand more active expressions of opinion from South Korea on dialogue issues. Therefore, it is time to consider how, to what extent, and at what level South Korea will convey its messages, and to prepare internal strategies accordingly. Finally, after the Taiwanese presidential election, the developments in cross-strait relations, US-China relations, and their impact on the Korean Peninsula have been well summarized. Based on this, we should also consider what aspects South Korea should focus on when formulating its strategies in this evolving situation. Firstly, regarding South Korea-Taiwan relations, our capabilities in diplomacy, security, and military affairs are extremely limited. However, as you mentioned, regarding the Taiwan issue, to what extent and with what intensity can we officially speak? Looking at statements from the presidential office, ministries, and recent remarks at the Indo-Pacific Dialogue in Washington, we express a desire for the peaceful maintenance of the status quo in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, and hope for peaceful exchanges and cooperation between Taiwan and China, as any issues there could affect East Asia and the Korean Peninsula. In my opinion, the maximum we can say is that we hope for the peaceful maintenance of the status quo in the Taiwan Strait and peaceful exchanges and cooperation between Taiwan and China, because any disruption there would impact the Korean Peninsula. We must be cautious, not because China dislikes it, but because many have spoken of a 'change by force.' The phrase 'unilateral change by force' is directed at China, which naturally provokes strong opposition. However, our statements on the Taiwan issue in terms of diplomacy, security, and military affairs do not need to be overly strong. In reality, our words have little chance of influencing the situation there. Therefore, as President-elect Lai Ching-te mentioned in his acceptance speech, we will firmly stand with the democratic camp. As this continues, we need to consider our stance within the East Asian and Asia-Pacific democratic alliance. I believe that relevant stakeholders need to consider this. Personally, I feel that the current government's approach to its role and relationship with China has changed significantly compared to the early days of its term. I believe there is a need for some adjustment in our approach to China and our relationship with it, and I see this as a positive direction. Lastly, regarding South Korea-Taiwan relations, are there no other areas besides diplomacy, security, and military affairs? I don't think so. There are many areas where Taiwan and we can cooperate, such as in technology and socio-cultural exchanges. Taiwan is our sixth-largest trading partner, consistently ranking fifth or sixth. Therefore, we can certainly strengthen our relationship in these areas. Extending this point, a key area of potential friction between China and the Lai Ching-te administration is in international space, where Taiwan strives for greater recognition and China actively works to limit it. Taiwan currently has diplomatic relations with just over a dozen countries, and this number may decline rapidly. From China's perspective, a military attack on Taiwan would significantly damage its image internationally and increase anti-China sentiment. Therefore, China is likely to minimize military actions while increasing pressure on Taiwan through other means. This 'silent killing of Taiwan' aims to suffocate Taiwan in the international arena, not through military force but through international pressure. This is likely to increase globally, and South Korea could also be affected. In the past, when we engaged with Taiwan, China has reacted nervously and excessively, such as protesting when a Taiwanese idol singer wore a Taiwanese flag. From our perspective, these reactions were often baffling. Therefore, while we must defend our positions, China will undoubtedly begin to close off spaces that were previously open to Taiwan to exert pressure. We are not exempt from this. Therefore, we should anticipate and prepare for such scenarios. The most crucial element in this process is to uphold our image, our position, and our principles. Additionally, I believe we need to be cautious about the increasing negative perceptions of China and the South Korea-China relationship. While the relationship with Taiwan is being presented as an alternative, suggesting 'if you dislike China, engage with Taiwan,' this is a completely different matter. I am concerned that there might be misunderstandings in public perception or other sectors. The relationship with South Korea-China and the relationship with Taiwan are fundamentally different. Strengthening our relationship with Taiwan does not negate the importance of the South Korea-China relationship. If we are currently dissatisfied with the South Korea-China relationship, it does not mean we should simply shift our focus to Taiwan. This approach will inevitably hit a limit. Therefore, a balanced perspective is needed. Regarding the Taiwan issue, cross-strait relations, and US-China relations, I believe it is crucial for all relevant ministries, research institutions, and researchers to adopt a complex and balanced approach, as Professor Lee Ha-young-sun always emphasizes the need for complex thinking and strategic planning. Today, we have had an extensive discussion with Professor Moon Hong on cross-strait relations, US-China relations, and the Korean Peninsula issue following the Taiwanese presidential election. I was particularly impressed by the in-depth analysis of the specific content and direction of Taiwanese public sentiment, moving beyond the overly polarized grand narratives that have dominated discussions since the election. Thank you for your time today. We will conclude here. Thank you. Yes, thank you.

As you mentioned, Biden's first reaction to the election results was very interesting. The message 'I do not support Taiwan's independence' serves to check the Lai Ching-te administration and, on the other hand, to calm China. I fully agree with this. As mentioned earlier, the Taiwan issue is a long-standing and familiar problem in US-China relations, but due to the ultimate difficulty of resolution, a compromise of maintaining the status quo has been reached. While US-China competition is intensifying, the recent trend shows both sides guardedly managing potential conflicts, such as the Taiwan issue, through dialogue. This was evident in the San Francisco summit in November and more recently in the discussions between Blinken and Liu Jianchao before the Taiwanese presidential election. Ultimately, we must also consider the domestic situations of both China and the US. China's priority is economic recovery and securing development rights, while the US, facing elections, is dealing with the wars in Israel-Hamas and Ukraine. In this context, the US has expressed a desire to manage tensions, including the Taiwan issue, rather than allowing them to escalate. Therefore, as you mentioned, the Taiwan issue, like US-China relations, is experiencing fluctuations. For South Korea, which is highly sensitive and vulnerable to US-China competition and conflict, it is crucial to observe the evolving Taiwan issue in light of these changes with a more objective and detailed perspective. The Taiwan issue, by extension, is linked to cross-strait conflict and confrontation, which in turn connects to the current intensified US-China competition, thereby having significant implications for the Korean Peninsula and South Korea. Currently, as you know, North Korea is engaging in continuous provocations, and finding a solution to the North Korean nuclear issue is proving very difficult. In the worst-case scenario, the escalation of conflict over the Taiwan issue could be linked to security instability on the Korean Peninsula, which is our greatest concern. Furthermore, the current South Korea-China relationship, despite being over 30 years since normalization, remains stagnant. If the Taiwan issue re-emerges as a contentious issue in South Korea-China relations, it could have a significantly negative impact on the relationship, which has not yet recovered. What are your thoughts on cross-strait relations, the Korean Peninsula issue, and South Korea-China relations?

The interconnectedness and security implications between the Taiwan issue and the Korean Peninsula are undeniable. Since the Korean War, the security of the Taiwan Strait and the Korean Peninsula have been largely linked. Why has it been quiet until now? It is because the relationship between the US and China was relatively friendly, allowing them to coexist without expressing their dislikes. However, that phase has passed. As issues of dialogue become more prominent and mistrust over unresolved past issues surfaces, conflicts naturally arise over the Taiwan issue, which then extends to the Korean Peninsula. I have always pointed out that as soon as the US raises the Taiwan issue, China's policy towards North Korea immediately changes. In June 2019, President Xi Jinping made a sudden visit to North Korea, deviating from his busy schedule that included a visit to Japan, spending only one night in Pyongyang. At that time, the situation suggested a need to address North Korea. The US perspective is that Taiwan is China's North Korea. While this is an unpleasant reality for us, it is an unavoidable situation. Therefore, the more China is displeased with the Taiwan issue and the greater its confrontation with the US, the more it will try to trouble the US, South Korea, and Japan over the North Korean issue. This situation continues. There is not much we can do about it, but this dynamic is likely to persist for some time. I believe that unless the US makes significant concessions on the Taiwan issue, China will not make significant concessions on the North Korean issue. Beyond this overall strategic framework, there are also technical issues. The scope of potential military conflict in the Taiwan Strait and cross-strait relations is vast, ranging from minor skirmishes to larger confrontations. However, I believe the possibility of a full-scale war is not high. But if we cannot completely rule out the possibility of small-scale conflicts or skirmishes, how should we position ourselves? Many people ask what should be done with the US Forces Korea if a problem arises in the Taiwan Strait. We cannot control that. They will not move without our consent. However, I find this difficult to accept, as the role of the US Forces Korea is not solely limited to responding to North Korea. Recent developments suggest otherwise. Therefore, we must have scenario-based response plans, regardless of the scale, for situations like a minor military conflict in Taiwan, and determine the extent to which we, the US Forces Korea, and the US Forces Japan can and must intervene. We cannot simply do nothing and say it won't happen. Therefore, personally, I believe that if inter-Korean relations stabilize to some extent, we will have a buffer zone to absorb minor shocks. However, look at the current situation: South Korea-China relations are strained, South Korea-Russia relations are strained, and inter-Korean relations are strained. Even minor shocks can cause significant confusion. Therefore, I believe that stabilizing inter-Korean relations in the medium to long term is the best way to protect peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula when external security factors arise. This may be idealistic, but I hold this view.

Yes, with the announcement of South Korea's Indo-Pacific strategy, South Korea's diplomatic scope is clearly expanding. As diplomacy expands, so do the sensitive issues that South Korea must consider and address. In the case of the Taiwan issue, if a crisis occurs, the extent of South Korea's involvement and the degree of its participation require very important prior communication with the US, China, and Taiwan. As mentioned earlier, the US and China are creating guardrails and engaging in dialogue to prevent the Taiwan issue from escalating from competition to conflict. However, on the other hand, both the US and China, due to Taiwan's strong geopolitical and geoeconomic value, will inevitably continue to compete for influence. Therefore, regarding South Korea's role and stance on the Taiwan issue, deeper dialogue with the US, China, and Taiwan is necessary. I fully agree with this. Recently, the South Korean government has been gradually broadening the scope and intensity of its expressions regarding the Taiwan issue. Ultimately, this is also related to how diplomatic messages are conveyed. As the DPP government takes office and relations between Taiwan and the US become closer, the US may demand more active expressions of opinion from South Korea on dialogue issues. Therefore, it is time to consider how, to what extent, and at what level South Korea will convey its messages, and to prepare internal strategies accordingly. Finally, after the Taiwanese presidential election, the developments in cross-strait relations, US-China relations, and their impact on the Korean Peninsula have been well summarized. Based on this, we should also consider what aspects South Korea should focus on when formulating its strategies in this evolving situation. Firstly, regarding South Korea-Taiwan relations, our capabilities in diplomacy, security, and military affairs are extremely limited. However, as you mentioned, regarding the Taiwan issue, to what extent and with what intensity can we officially speak? Looking at statements from the presidential office, ministries, and recent remarks at the Indo-Pacific Dialogue in Washington, we express a desire for the peaceful maintenance of the status quo in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, and hope for peaceful exchanges and cooperation between Taiwan and China, as any issues there could affect East Asia and the Korean Peninsula. In my opinion, the maximum we can say is that we hope for the peaceful maintenance of the status quo in the Taiwan Strait and peaceful exchanges and cooperation between Taiwan and China, because any disruption there would impact the Korean Peninsula. We must be cautious, not because China dislikes it, but because many have spoken of a 'change by force.' The phrase 'unilateral change by force' is directed at China, which naturally provokes strong opposition. However, our statements on the Taiwan issue in terms of diplomacy, security, and military affairs do not need to be overly strong. In reality, our words have little chance of influencing the situation there. Therefore, as President-elect Lai Ching-te mentioned in his acceptance speech, we will firmly stand with the democratic camp. As this continues, we need to consider our stance within the East Asian and Asia-Pacific democratic alliance. I believe that relevant stakeholders need to consider this. Personally, I feel that the current government's approach to its role and relationship with China has changed significantly compared to the early days of its term. I believe there is a need for some adjustment in our approach to China and our relationship with it, and I see this as a positive direction. Lastly, regarding South Korea-Taiwan relations, are there no other areas besides diplomacy, security, and military affairs? I don't think so. There are many areas where Taiwan and we can cooperate, such as in technology and socio-cultural exchanges. Taiwan is our sixth-largest trading partner, consistently ranking fifth or sixth. Therefore, we can certainly strengthen our relationship in these areas. Extending this point, a key area of potential friction between China and the Lai Ching-te administration is in international space, where Taiwan strives for greater recognition and China actively works to limit it. Taiwan currently has diplomatic relations with just over a dozen countries, and this number may decline rapidly. From China's perspective, a military attack on Taiwan would significantly damage its image internationally and increase anti-China sentiment. Therefore, China is likely to minimize military actions while increasing pressure on Taiwan through other means. This 'silent killing of Taiwan' aims to suffocate Taiwan in the international arena, not through military force but through international pressure. This is likely to increase globally, and South Korea could also be affected. In the past, when we engaged with Taiwan, China has reacted nervously and excessively, such as protesting when a Taiwanese idol singer wore a Taiwanese flag. From our perspective, these reactions were often baffling. Therefore, while we must defend our positions, China will undoubtedly begin to close off spaces that were previously open to Taiwan to exert pressure. We are not exempt from this. Therefore, we should anticipate and prepare for such scenarios. The most crucial element in this process is to uphold our image, our position, and our principles. Additionally, I believe we need to be cautious about the increasing negative perceptions of China and the South Korea-China relationship. While the relationship with Taiwan is being presented as an alternative, suggesting 'if you dislike China, engage with Taiwan,' this is a completely different matter. I am concerned that there might be misunderstandings in public perception or other sectors. The relationship with South Korea-China and the relationship with Taiwan are fundamentally different. Strengthening our relationship with Taiwan does not negate the importance of the South Korea-China relationship. If we are currently dissatisfied with the South Korea-China relationship, it does not mean we should simply shift our focus to Taiwan. This approach will inevitably hit a limit. Therefore, a balanced perspective is needed. Regarding the Taiwan issue, cross-strait relations, and US-China relations, I believe it is crucial for all relevant ministries, research institutions, and researchers to adopt a complex and balanced approach, as Professor Lee Ha-young-sun always emphasizes the need for complex thinking and strategic planning. Today, we have had an extensive discussion with Professor Moon Hong on cross-strait relations, US-China relations, and the Korean Peninsula issue following the Taiwanese presidential election. I was particularly impressed by the in-depth analysis of the specific content and direction of Taiwanese public sentiment, moving beyond the overly polarized grand narratives that have dominated discussions since the election. Thank you for your time today. We will conclude here. Thank you. Yes, thank you.

The interconnectedness and security implications between the Taiwan issue and the Korean Peninsula are undeniable. Since the Korean War, the security of the Taiwan Strait and the Korean Peninsula have been largely linked. Why has it been quiet until now? It is because the relationship between the US and China was relatively friendly, allowing them to coexist without expressing their dislikes. However, that phase has passed. As issues of dialogue become more prominent and mistrust over unresolved past issues surfaces, conflicts naturally arise over the Taiwan issue, which then extends to the Korean Peninsula. I have always pointed out that as soon as the US raises the Taiwan issue, China's policy towards North Korea immediately changes. In June 2019, President Xi Jinping made a sudden visit to North Korea, deviating from his busy schedule that included a visit to Japan, spending only one night in Pyongyang. At that time, the situation suggested a need to address North Korea. The US perspective is that Taiwan is China's North Korea. While this is an unpleasant reality for us, it is an unavoidable situation. Therefore, the more China is displeased with the Taiwan issue and the greater its confrontation with the US, the more it will try to trouble the US, South Korea, and Japan over the North Korean issue. This situation continues. There is not much we can do about it, but this dynamic is likely to persist for some time. I believe that unless the US makes significant concessions on the Taiwan issue, China will not make significant concessions on the North Korean issue. Beyond this overall strategic framework, there are also technical issues. The scope of potential military conflict in the Taiwan Strait and cross-strait relations is vast, ranging from minor skirmishes to larger confrontations. However, I believe the possibility of a full-scale war is not high. But if we cannot completely rule out the possibility of small-scale conflicts or skirmishes, how should we position ourselves? Many people ask what should be done with the US Forces Korea if a problem arises in the Taiwan Strait. We cannot control that. They will not move without our consent. However, I find this difficult to accept, as the role of the US Forces Korea is not solely limited to responding to North Korea. Recent developments suggest otherwise. Therefore, we must have scenario-based response plans, regardless of the scale, for situations like a minor military conflict in Taiwan, and determine the extent to which we, the US Forces Korea, and the US Forces Japan can and must intervene. We cannot simply do nothing and say it won't happen. Therefore, personally, I believe that if inter-Korean relations stabilize to some extent, we will have a buffer zone to absorb minor shocks. However, look at the current situation: South Korea-China relations are strained, South Korea-Russia relations are strained, and inter-Korean relations are strained. Even minor shocks can cause significant confusion. Therefore, I believe that stabilizing inter-Korean relations in the medium to long term is the best way to protect peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula when external security factors arise. This may be idealistic, but I hold this view.

Yes, with the announcement of South Korea's Indo-Pacific strategy, South Korea's diplomatic scope is clearly expanding. As diplomacy expands, so do the sensitive issues that South Korea must consider and address. In the case of the Taiwan issue, if a crisis occurs, the extent of South Korea's involvement and the degree of its participation require very important prior communication with the US, China, and Taiwan. As mentioned earlier, the US and China are creating guardrails and engaging in dialogue to prevent the Taiwan issue from escalating from competition to conflict. However, on the other hand, both the US and China, due to Taiwan's strong geopolitical and geoeconomic value, will inevitably continue to compete for influence. Therefore, regarding South Korea's role and stance on the Taiwan issue, deeper dialogue with the US, China, and Taiwan is necessary. I fully agree with this. Recently, the South Korean government has been gradually broadening the scope and intensity of its expressions regarding the Taiwan issue. Ultimately, this is also related to how diplomatic messages are conveyed. As the DPP government takes office and relations between Taiwan and the US become closer, the US may demand more active expressions of opinion from South Korea on dialogue issues. Therefore, it is time to consider how, to what extent, and at what level South Korea will convey its messages, and to prepare internal strategies accordingly. Finally, after the Taiwanese presidential election, the developments in cross-strait relations, US-China relations, and their impact on the Korean Peninsula have been well summarized. Based on this, we should also consider what aspects South Korea should focus on when formulating its strategies in this evolving situation. Firstly, regarding South Korea-Taiwan relations, our capabilities in diplomacy, security, and military affairs are extremely limited. However, as you mentioned, regarding the Taiwan issue, to what extent and with what intensity can we officially speak? Looking at statements from the presidential office, ministries, and recent remarks at the Indo-Pacific Dialogue in Washington, we express a desire for the peaceful maintenance of the status quo in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, and hope for peaceful exchanges and cooperation between Taiwan and China, as any issues there could affect East Asia and the Korean Peninsula. In my opinion, the maximum we can say is that we hope for the peaceful maintenance of the status quo in the Taiwan Strait and peaceful exchanges and cooperation between Taiwan and China, because any disruption there would impact the Korean Peninsula. We must be cautious, not because China dislikes it, but because many have spoken of a 'change by force.' The phrase 'unilateral change by force' is directed at China, which naturally provokes strong opposition. However, our statements on the Taiwan issue in terms of diplomacy, security, and military affairs do not need to be overly strong. In reality, our words have little chance of influencing the situation there. Therefore, as President-elect Lai Ching-te mentioned in his acceptance speech, we will firmly stand with the democratic camp. As this continues, we need to consider our stance within the East Asian and Asia-Pacific democratic alliance. I believe that relevant stakeholders need to consider this. Personally, I feel that the current government's approach to its role and relationship with China has changed significantly compared to the early days of its term. I believe there is a need for some adjustment in our approach to China and our relationship with it, and I see this as a positive direction. Lastly, regarding South Korea-Taiwan relations, are there no other areas besides diplomacy, security, and military affairs? I don't think so. There are many areas where Taiwan and we can cooperate, such as in technology and socio-cultural exchanges. Taiwan is our sixth-largest trading partner, consistently ranking fifth or sixth. Therefore, we can certainly strengthen our relationship in these areas. Extending this point, a key area of potential friction between China and the Lai Ching-te administration is in international space, where Taiwan strives for greater recognition and China actively works to limit it. Taiwan currently has diplomatic relations with just over a dozen countries, and this number may decline rapidly. From China's perspective, a military attack on Taiwan would significantly damage its image internationally and increase anti-China sentiment. Therefore, China is likely to minimize military actions while increasing pressure on Taiwan through other means. This 'silent killing of Taiwan' aims to suffocate Taiwan in the international arena, not through military force but through international pressure. This is likely to increase globally, and South Korea could also be affected. In the past, when we engaged with Taiwan, China has reacted nervously and excessively, such as protesting when a Taiwanese idol singer wore a Taiwanese flag. From our perspective, these reactions were often baffling. Therefore, while we must defend our positions, China will undoubtedly begin to close off spaces that were previously open to Taiwan to exert pressure. We are not exempt from this. Therefore, we should anticipate and prepare for such scenarios. The most crucial element in this process is to uphold our image, our position, and our principles. Additionally, I believe we need to be cautious about the increasing negative perceptions of China and the South Korea-China relationship. While the relationship with Taiwan is being presented as an alternative, suggesting 'if you dislike China, engage with Taiwan,' this is a completely different matter. I am concerned that there might be misunderstandings in public perception or other sectors. The relationship with South Korea-China and the relationship with Taiwan are fundamentally different. Strengthening our relationship with Taiwan does not negate the importance of the South Korea-China relationship. If we are currently dissatisfied with the South Korea-China relationship, it does not mean we should simply shift our focus to Taiwan. This approach will inevitably hit a limit. Therefore, a balanced perspective is needed. Regarding the Taiwan issue, cross-strait relations, and US-China relations, I believe it is crucial for all relevant ministries, research institutions, and researchers to adopt a complex and balanced approach, as Professor Lee Ha-young-sun always emphasizes the need for complex thinking and strategic planning. Today, we have had an extensive discussion with Professor Moon Hong on cross-strait relations, US-China relations, and the Korean Peninsula issue following the Taiwanese presidential election. I was particularly impressed by the in-depth analysis of the specific content and direction of Taiwanese public sentiment, moving beyond the overly polarized grand narratives that have dominated discussions since the election. Thank you for your time today. We will conclude here. Thank you. Yes, thank you.

The interconnectedness and security implications between the Taiwan issue and the Korean Peninsula are undeniable. Since the Korean War, the security of the Taiwan Strait and the Korean Peninsula have been largely linked. Why has it been quiet until now? It is because the relationship between the US and China was relatively friendly, allowing them to coexist without expressing their dislikes. However, that phase has passed. As issues of dialogue become more prominent and mistrust over unresolved past issues surfaces, conflicts naturally arise over the Taiwan issue, which then extends to the Korean Peninsula. I have always pointed out that as soon as the US raises the Taiwan issue, China's policy towards North Korea immediately changes. In June 2019, President Xi Jinping made a sudden visit to North Korea, deviating from his busy schedule that included a visit to Japan, spending only one night in Pyongyang. At that time, the situation suggested a need to address North Korea. The US perspective is that Taiwan is China's North Korea. While this is an unpleasant reality for us, it is an unavoidable situation. Therefore, the more China is displeased with the Taiwan issue and the greater its confrontation with the US, the more it will try to trouble the US, South Korea, and Japan over the North Korean issue. This situation continues. There is not much we can do about it, but this dynamic is likely to persist for some time. I believe that unless the US makes significant concessions on the Taiwan issue, China will not make significant concessions on the North Korean issue. Beyond this overall strategic framework, there are also technical issues. The scope of potential military conflict in the Taiwan Strait and cross-strait relations is vast, ranging from minor skirmishes to larger confrontations. However, I believe the possibility of a full-scale war is not high. But if we cannot completely rule out the possibility of small-scale conflicts or skirmishes, how should we position ourselves? Many people ask what should be done with the US Forces Korea if a problem arises in the Taiwan Strait. We cannot control that. They will not move without our consent. However, I find this difficult to accept, as the role of the US Forces Korea is not solely limited to responding to North Korea. Recent developments suggest otherwise. Therefore, we must have scenario-based response plans, regardless of the scale, for situations like a minor military conflict in Taiwan, and determine the extent to which we, the US Forces Korea, and the US Forces Japan can and must intervene. We cannot simply do nothing and say it won't happen. Therefore, personally, I believe that if inter-Korean relations stabilize to some extent, we will have a buffer zone to absorb minor shocks. However, look at the current situation: South Korea-China relations are strained, South Korea-Russia relations are strained, and inter-Korean relations are strained. Even minor shocks can cause significant confusion. Therefore, I believe that stabilizing inter-Korean relations in the medium to long term is the best way to protect peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula when external security factors arise. This may be idealistic, but I hold this view.

Yes, with the announcement of South Korea's Indo-Pacific strategy, South Korea's diplomatic scope is clearly expanding. As diplomacy expands, so do the sensitive issues that South Korea must consider and address. In the case of the Taiwan issue, if a crisis occurs, the extent of South Korea's involvement and the degree of its participation require very important prior communication with the US, China, and Taiwan. As mentioned earlier, the US and China are creating guardrails and engaging in dialogue to prevent the Taiwan issue from escalating from competition to conflict. However, on the other hand, both the US and China, due to Taiwan's strong geopolitical and geoeconomic value, will inevitably continue to compete for influence. Therefore, regarding South Korea's role and stance on the Taiwan issue, deeper dialogue with the US, China, and Taiwan is necessary. I fully agree with this. Recently, the South Korean government has been gradually broadening the scope and intensity of its expressions regarding the Taiwan issue. Ultimately, this is also related to how diplomatic messages are conveyed. As the DPP government takes office and relations between Taiwan and the US become closer, the US may demand more active expressions of opinion from South Korea on dialogue issues. Therefore, it is time to consider how, to what extent, and at what level South Korea will convey its messages, and to prepare internal strategies accordingly. Finally, after the Taiwanese presidential election, the developments in cross-strait relations, US-China relations, and their impact on the Korean Peninsula have been well summarized. Based on this, we should also consider what aspects South Korea should focus on when formulating its strategies in this evolving situation. Firstly, regarding South Korea-Taiwan relations, our capabilities in diplomacy, security, and military affairs are extremely limited. However, as you mentioned, regarding the Taiwan issue, to what extent and with what intensity can we officially speak? Looking at statements from the presidential office, ministries, and recent remarks at the Indo-Pacific Dialogue in Washington, we express a desire for the peaceful maintenance of the status quo in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, and hope for peaceful exchanges and cooperation between Taiwan and China, as any issues there could affect East Asia and the Korean Peninsula. In my opinion, the maximum we can say is that we hope for the peaceful maintenance of the status quo in the Taiwan Strait and peaceful exchanges and cooperation between Taiwan and China, because any disruption there would impact the Korean Peninsula. We must be cautious, not because China dislikes it, but because many have spoken of a 'change by force.' The phrase 'unilateral change by force' is directed at China, which naturally provokes strong opposition. However, our statements on the Taiwan issue in terms of diplomacy, security, and military affairs do not need to be overly strong. In reality, our words have little chance of influencing the situation there. Therefore, as President-elect Lai Ching-te mentioned in his acceptance speech, we will firmly stand with the democratic camp. As this continues, we need to consider our stance within the East Asian and Asia-Pacific democratic alliance. I believe that relevant stakeholders need to consider this. Personally, I feel that the current government's approach to its role and relationship with China has changed significantly compared to the early days of its term. I believe there is a need for some adjustment in our approach to China and our relationship with it, and I see this as a positive direction. Lastly, regarding South Korea-Taiwan relations, are there no other areas besides diplomacy, security, and military affairs? I don't think so. There are many areas where Taiwan and we can cooperate, such as in technology and socio-cultural exchanges. Taiwan is our sixth-largest trading partner, consistently ranking fifth or sixth. Therefore, we can certainly strengthen our relationship in these areas. Extending this point, a key area of potential friction between China and the Lai Ching-te administration is in international space, where Taiwan strives for greater recognition and China actively works to limit it. Taiwan currently has diplomatic relations with just over a dozen countries, and this number may decline rapidly. From China's perspective, a military attack on Taiwan would significantly damage its image internationally and increase anti-China sentiment. Therefore, China is likely to minimize military actions while increasing pressure on Taiwan through other means. This 'silent killing of Taiwan' aims to suffocate Taiwan in the international arena, not through military force but through international pressure. This is likely to increase globally, and South Korea could also be affected. In the past, when we engaged with Taiwan, China has reacted nervously and excessively, such as protesting when a Taiwanese idol singer wore a Taiwanese flag. From our perspective, these reactions were often baffling. Therefore, while we must defend our positions, China will undoubtedly begin to close off spaces that were previously open to Taiwan to exert pressure. We are not exempt from this. Therefore, we should anticipate and prepare for such scenarios. The most crucial element in this process is to uphold our image, our position, and our principles. Additionally, I believe we need to be cautious about the increasing negative perceptions of China and the South Korea-China relationship. While the relationship with Taiwan is being presented as an alternative, suggesting 'if you dislike China, engage with Taiwan,' this is a completely different matter. I am concerned that there might be misunderstandings in public perception or other sectors. The relationship with South Korea-China and the relationship with Taiwan are fundamentally different. Strengthening our relationship with Taiwan does not negate the importance of the South Korea-China relationship. If we are currently dissatisfied with the South Korea-China relationship, it does not mean we should simply shift our focus to Taiwan. This approach will inevitably hit a limit. Therefore, a balanced perspective is needed. Regarding the Taiwan issue, cross-strait relations, and US-China relations, I believe it is crucial for all relevant ministries, research institutions, and researchers to adopt a complex and balanced approach, as Professor Lee Ha-young-sun always emphasizes the need for complex thinking and strategic planning. Today, we have had an extensive discussion with Professor Moon Hong on cross-strait relations, US-China relations, and the Korean Peninsula issue following the Taiwanese presidential election. I was particularly impressed by the in-depth analysis of the specific content and direction of Taiwanese public sentiment, moving beyond the overly polarized grand narratives that have dominated discussions since the election. Thank you for your time today. We will conclude here. Thank you. Yes, thank you.

Therefore, personally, I believe that if inter-Korean relations stabilize to some extent, we will have a buffer zone to absorb minor shocks. However, look at the current situation: South Korea-China relations are strained, South Korea-Russia relations are strained, and inter-Korean relations are strained. Even minor shocks can cause significant confusion. Therefore, I believe that stabilizing inter-Korean relations in the medium to long term is the best way to protect peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula when external security factors arise. This may be idealistic, but I hold this view. Yes, with the announcement of South Korea's Indo-Pacific strategy, South Korea's diplomatic scope is clearly expanding. As diplomacy expands, so do the sensitive issues that South Korea must consider and address. In the case of the Taiwan issue, if a crisis occurs, the extent of South Korea's involvement and the degree of its participation require very important prior communication with the US, China, and Taiwan. As mentioned earlier, the US and China are creating guardrails and engaging in dialogue to prevent the Taiwan issue from escalating from competition to conflict. However, on the other hand, both the US and China, due to Taiwan's strong geopolitical and geoeconomic value, will inevitably continue to compete for influence. Therefore, regarding South Korea's role and stance on the Taiwan issue, deeper dialogue with the US, China, and Taiwan is necessary. I fully agree with this. Recently, the South Korean government has been gradually broadening the scope and intensity of its expressions regarding the Taiwan issue. Ultimately, this is also related to how diplomatic messages are conveyed. As the DPP government takes office and relations between Taiwan and the US become closer, the US may demand more active expressions of opinion from South Korea on dialogue issues. Therefore, it is time to consider how, to what extent, and at what level South Korea will convey its messages, and to prepare internal strategies accordingly. Finally, after the Taiwanese presidential election, the developments in cross-strait relations, US-China relations, and their impact on the Korean Peninsula have been well summarized. Based on this, we should also consider what aspects South Korea should focus on when formulating its strategies in this evolving situation. Firstly, regarding South Korea-Taiwan relations, our capabilities in diplomacy, security, and military affairs are extremely limited. However, as you mentioned, regarding the Taiwan issue, to what extent and with what intensity can we officially speak? Looking at statements from the presidential office, ministries, and recent remarks at the Indo-Pacific Dialogue in Washington, we express a desire for the peaceful maintenance of the status quo in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, and hope for peaceful exchanges and cooperation between Taiwan and China, as any issues there could affect East Asia and the Korean Peninsula. In my opinion, the maximum we can say is that we hope for the peaceful maintenance of the status quo in the Taiwan Strait and peaceful exchanges and cooperation between Taiwan and China, because any disruption there would impact the Korean Peninsula. We must be cautious, not because China dislikes it, but because many have spoken of a 'change by force.' The phrase 'unilateral change by force' is directed at China, which naturally provokes strong opposition. However, our statements on the Taiwan issue in terms of diplomacy, security, and military affairs do not need to be overly strong. In reality, our words have little chance of influencing the situation there. Therefore, as President-elect Lai Ching-te mentioned in his acceptance speech, we will firmly stand with the democratic camp. As this continues, we need to consider our stance within the East Asian and Asia-Pacific democratic alliance. I believe that relevant stakeholders need to consider this. Personally, I feel that the current government's approach to its role and relationship with China has changed significantly compared to the early days of its term. I believe there is a need for some adjustment in our approach to China and our relationship with it, and I see this as a positive direction. Lastly, regarding South Korea-Taiwan relations, are there no other areas besides diplomacy, security, and military affairs? I don't think so. There are many areas where Taiwan and we can cooperate, such as in technology and socio-cultural exchanges. Taiwan is our sixth-largest trading partner, consistently ranking fifth or sixth. Therefore, we can certainly strengthen our relationship in these areas. Extending this point, a key area of potential friction between China and the Lai Ching-te administration is in international space, where Taiwan strives for greater recognition and China actively works to limit it. Taiwan currently has diplomatic relations with just over a dozen countries, and this number may decline rapidly. From China's perspective, a military attack on Taiwan would significantly damage its image internationally and increase anti-China sentiment. Therefore, China is likely to minimize military actions while increasing pressure on Taiwan through other means. This 'silent killing of Taiwan' aims to suffocate Taiwan in the international arena, not through military force but through international pressure. This is likely to increase globally, and South Korea could also be affected. In the past, when we engaged with Taiwan, China has reacted nervously and excessively, such as protesting when a Taiwanese idol singer wore a Taiwanese flag. From our perspective, these reactions were often baffling. Therefore, while we must defend our positions, China will undoubtedly begin to close off spaces that were previously open to Taiwan to exert pressure. We are not exempt from this. Therefore, we should anticipate and prepare for such scenarios. The most crucial element in this process is to uphold our image, our position, and our principles. Additionally, I believe we need to be cautious about the increasing negative perceptions of China and the South Korea-China relationship. While the relationship with Taiwan is being presented as an alternative, suggesting 'if you dislike China, engage with Taiwan,' this is a completely different matter. I am concerned that there might be misunderstandings in public perception or other sectors. The relationship with South Korea-China and the relationship with Taiwan are fundamentally different. Strengthening our relationship with Taiwan does not negate the importance of the South Korea-China relationship. If we are currently dissatisfied with the South Korea-China relationship, it does not mean we should simply shift our focus to Taiwan. This approach will inevitably hit a limit. Therefore, a balanced perspective is needed. Regarding the Taiwan issue, cross-strait relations, and US-China relations, I believe it is crucial for all relevant ministries, research institutions, and researchers to adopt a complex and balanced approach, as Professor Lee Ha-young-sun always emphasizes the need for complex thinking and strategic planning. Today, we have had an extensive discussion with Professor Moon Hong on cross-strait relations, US-China relations, and the Korean Peninsula issue following the Taiwanese presidential election. I was particularly impressed by the in-depth analysis of the specific content and direction of Taiwanese public sentiment, moving beyond the overly polarized grand narratives that have dominated discussions since the election. Thank you for your time today. We will conclude here. Thank you. Yes, thank you.

As mentioned earlier, the US and China are creating guardrails and engaging in dialogue to prevent the Taiwan issue from escalating from competition to conflict. However, on the other hand, both the US and China, due to Taiwan's strong geopolitical and geoeconomic value, will inevitably continue to compete for influence. Therefore, regarding South Korea's role and stance on the Taiwan issue, deeper dialogue with the US, China, and Taiwan is necessary. I fully agree with this. Recently, the South Korean government has been gradually broadening the scope and intensity of its expressions regarding the Taiwan issue. Ultimately, this is also related to how diplomatic messages are conveyed. As the DPP government takes office and relations between Taiwan and the US become closer, the US may demand more active expressions of opinion from South Korea on dialogue issues. Therefore, it is time to consider how, to what extent, and at what level South Korea will convey its messages, and to prepare internal strategies accordingly. Finally, after the Taiwanese presidential election, the developments in cross-strait relations, US-China relations, and their impact on the Korean Peninsula have been well summarized. Based on this, we should also consider what aspects South Korea should focus on when formulating its strategies in this evolving situation. Firstly, regarding South Korea-Taiwan relations, our capabilities in diplomacy, security, and military affairs are extremely limited. However, as you mentioned, regarding the Taiwan issue, to what extent and with what intensity can we officially speak? Looking at statements from the presidential office, ministries, and recent remarks at the Indo-Pacific Dialogue in Washington, we express a desire for the peaceful maintenance of the status quo in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, and hope for peaceful exchanges and cooperation between Taiwan and China, as any issues there could affect East Asia and the Korean Peninsula. In my opinion, the maximum we can say is that we hope for the peaceful maintenance of the status quo in the Taiwan Strait and peaceful exchanges and cooperation between Taiwan and China, because any disruption there would impact the Korean Peninsula. We must be cautious, not because China dislikes it, but because many have spoken of a 'change by force.' The phrase 'unilateral change by force' is directed at China, which naturally provokes strong opposition. However, our statements on the Taiwan issue in terms of diplomacy, security, and military affairs do not need to be overly strong. In reality, our words have little chance of influencing the situation there. Therefore, as President-elect Lai Ching-te mentioned in his acceptance speech, we will firmly stand with the democratic camp. As this continues, we need to consider our stance within the East Asian and Asia-Pacific democratic alliance. I believe that relevant stakeholders need to consider this. Personally, I feel that the current government's approach to its role and relationship with China has changed significantly compared to the early days of its term. I believe there is a need for some adjustment in our approach to China and our relationship with it, and I see this as a positive direction. Lastly, regarding South Korea-Taiwan relations, are there no other areas besides diplomacy, security, and military affairs? I don't think so. There are many areas where Taiwan and we can cooperate, such as in technology and socio-cultural exchanges. Taiwan is our sixth-largest trading partner, consistently ranking fifth or sixth. Therefore, we can certainly strengthen our relationship in these areas. Extending this point, a key area of potential friction between China and the Lai Ching-te administration is in international space, where Taiwan strives for greater recognition and China actively works to limit it. Taiwan currently has diplomatic relations with just over a dozen countries, and this number may decline rapidly. From China's perspective, a military attack on Taiwan would significantly damage its image internationally and increase anti-China sentiment. Therefore, China is likely to minimize military actions while increasing pressure on Taiwan through other means. This 'silent killing of Taiwan' aims to suffocate Taiwan in the international arena, not through military force but through international pressure. This is likely to increase globally, and South Korea could also be affected. In the past, when we engaged with Taiwan, China has reacted nervously and excessively, such as protesting when a Taiwanese idol singer wore a Taiwanese flag. From our perspective, these reactions were often baffling. Therefore, while we must defend our positions, China will undoubtedly begin to close off spaces that were previously open to Taiwan to exert pressure. We are not exempt from this. Therefore, we should anticipate and prepare for such scenarios. The most crucial element in this process is to uphold our image, our position, and our principles. Additionally, I believe we need to be cautious about the increasing negative perceptions of China and the South Korea-China relationship. While the relationship with Taiwan is being presented as an alternative, suggesting 'if you dislike China, engage with Taiwan,' this is a completely different matter. I am concerned that there might be misunderstandings in public perception or other sectors. The relationship with South Korea-China and the relationship with Taiwan are fundamentally different. Strengthening our relationship with Taiwan does not negate the importance of the South Korea-China relationship. If we are currently dissatisfied with the South Korea-China relationship, it does not mean we should simply shift our focus to Taiwan. This approach will inevitably hit a limit. Therefore, a balanced perspective is needed. Regarding the Taiwan issue, cross-strait relations, and US-China relations, I believe it is crucial for all relevant ministries, research institutions, and researchers to adopt a complex and balanced approach, as Professor Lee Ha-young-sun always emphasizes the need for complex thinking and strategic planning. Today, we have had an extensive discussion with Professor Moon Hong on cross-strait relations, US-China relations, and the Korean Peninsula issue following the Taiwanese presidential election. I was particularly impressed by the in-depth analysis of the specific content and direction of Taiwanese public sentiment, moving beyond the overly polarized grand narratives that have dominated discussions since the election. Thank you for your time today. We will conclude here. Thank you. Yes, thank you.

As the DPP government takes office and relations between Taiwan and the US become closer, the US may demand more active expressions of opinion from South Korea on dialogue issues. Therefore, it is time to consider how, to what extent, and at what level South Korea will convey its messages, and to prepare internal strategies accordingly. Finally, after the Taiwanese presidential election, the developments in cross-strait relations, US-China relations, and their impact on the Korean Peninsula have been well summarized. Based on this, we should also consider what aspects South Korea should focus on when formulating its strategies in this evolving situation.

Firstly, regarding South Korea-Taiwan relations, our capabilities in diplomacy, security, and military affairs are extremely limited. However, as you mentioned, regarding the Taiwan issue, to what extent and with what intensity can we officially speak? Looking at statements from the presidential office, ministries, and recent remarks at the Indo-Pacific Dialogue in Washington, we express a desire for the peaceful maintenance of the status quo in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, and hope for peaceful exchanges and cooperation between Taiwan and China, as any issues there could affect East Asia and the Korean Peninsula. In my opinion, the maximum we can say is that we hope for the peaceful maintenance of the status quo in the Taiwan Strait and peaceful exchanges and cooperation between Taiwan and China, because any disruption there would impact the Korean Peninsula. We must be cautious, not because China dislikes it, but because many have spoken of a 'change by force.' The phrase 'unilateral change by force' is directed at China, which naturally provokes strong opposition. However, our statements on the Taiwan issue in terms of diplomacy, security, and military affairs do not need to be overly strong. In reality, our words have little chance of influencing the situation there. Therefore, as President-elect Lai Ching-te mentioned in his acceptance speech, we will firmly stand with the democratic camp. As this continues, we need to consider our stance within the East Asian and Asia-Pacific democratic alliance. I believe that relevant stakeholders need to consider this. Personally, I feel that the current government's approach to its role and relationship with China has changed significantly compared to the early days of its term. I believe there is a need for some adjustment in our approach to China and our relationship with it, and I see this as a positive direction.

Lastly, regarding South Korea-Taiwan relations, are there no other areas besides diplomacy, security, and military affairs? I don't think so. There are many areas where Taiwan and we can cooperate, such as in technology and socio-cultural exchanges. Taiwan is our sixth-largest trading partner, consistently ranking fifth or sixth. Therefore, we can certainly strengthen our relationship in these areas. Extending this point, a key area of potential friction between China and the Lai Ching-te administration is in international space, where Taiwan strives for greater recognition and China actively works to limit it. Taiwan currently has diplomatic relations with just over a dozen countries, and this number may decline rapidly. From China's perspective, a military attack on Taiwan would significantly damage its image internationally and increase anti-China sentiment. Therefore, China is likely to minimize military actions while increasing pressure on Taiwan through other means. This 'silent killing of Taiwan' aims to suffocate Taiwan in the international arena, not through military force but through international pressure. This is likely to increase globally, and South Korea could also be affected. In the past, when we engaged with Taiwan, China has reacted nervously and excessively, such as protesting when a Taiwanese idol singer wore a Taiwanese flag. From our perspective, these reactions were often baffling. Therefore, while we must defend our positions, China will undoubtedly begin to close off spaces that were previously open to Taiwan to exert pressure. We are not exempt from this. Therefore, we should anticipate and prepare for such scenarios. The most crucial element in this process is to uphold our image, our position, and our principles. Additionally, I believe we need to be cautious about the increasing negative perceptions of China and the South Korea-China relationship. While the relationship with Taiwan is being presented as an alternative, suggesting 'if you dislike China, engage with Taiwan,' this is a completely different matter. I am concerned that there might be misunderstandings in public perception or other sectors. The relationship with South Korea-China and the relationship with Taiwan are fundamentally different. Strengthening our relationship with Taiwan does not negate the importance of the South Korea-China relationship. If we are currently dissatisfied with the South Korea-China relationship, it does not mean we should simply shift our focus to Taiwan. This approach will inevitably hit a limit. Therefore, a balanced perspective is needed. Regarding the Taiwan issue, cross-strait relations, and US-China relations, I believe it is crucial for all relevant ministries, research institutions, and researchers to adopt a complex and balanced approach, as Professor Lee Ha-young-sun always emphasizes the need for complex thinking and strategic planning. Today, we have had an extensive discussion with Professor Moon Hong on cross-strait relations, US-China relations, and the Korean Peninsula issue following the Taiwanese presidential election. I was particularly impressed by the in-depth analysis of the specific content and direction of Taiwanese public sentiment, moving beyond the overly polarized grand narratives that have dominated discussions since the election. Thank you for your time today. We will conclude here. Thank you. Yes, thank you.

Lastly, regarding South Korea-Taiwan relations, are there no other areas besides diplomacy, security, and military affairs? I don't think so. There are many areas where Taiwan and we can cooperate, such as in technology and socio-cultural exchanges. Taiwan is our sixth-largest trading partner, consistently ranking fifth or sixth. Therefore, we can certainly strengthen our relationship in these areas. Extending this point, a key area of potential friction between China and the Lai Ching-te administration is in international space, where Taiwan strives for greater recognition and China actively works to limit it. Taiwan currently has diplomatic relations with just over a dozen countries, and this number may decline rapidly. From China's perspective, a military attack on Taiwan would significantly damage its image internationally and increase anti-China sentiment. Therefore, China is likely to minimize military actions while increasing pressure on Taiwan through other means. This 'silent killing of Taiwan' aims to suffocate Taiwan in the international arena, not through military force but through international pressure. This is likely to increase globally, and South Korea could also be affected. In the past, when we engaged with Taiwan, China has reacted nervously and excessively, such as protesting when a Taiwanese idol singer wore a Taiwanese flag. From our perspective, these reactions were often baffling. Therefore, while we must defend our positions, China will undoubtedly begin to close off spaces that were previously open to Taiwan to exert pressure. We are not exempt from this. Therefore, we should anticipate and prepare for such scenarios. The most crucial element in this process is to uphold our image, our position, and our principles. Additionally, I believe we need to be cautious about the increasing negative perceptions of China and the South Korea-China relationship. While the relationship with Taiwan is being presented as an alternative, suggesting 'if you dislike China, engage with Taiwan,' this is a completely different matter. I am concerned that there might be misunderstandings in public perception or other sectors. The relationship with South Korea-China and the relationship with Taiwan are fundamentally different. Strengthening our relationship with Taiwan does not negate the importance of the South Korea-China relationship. If we are currently dissatisfied with the South Korea-China relationship, it does not mean we should simply shift our focus to Taiwan. This approach will inevitably hit a limit. Therefore, a balanced perspective is needed. Regarding the Taiwan issue, cross-strait relations, and US-China relations, I believe it is crucial for all relevant ministries, research institutions, and researchers to adopt a complex and balanced approach, as Professor Lee Ha-young-sun always emphasizes the need for complex thinking and strategic planning. Today, we have had an extensive discussion with Professor Moon Hong on cross-strait relations, US-China relations, and the Korean Peninsula issue following the Taiwanese presidential election. I was particularly impressed by the in-depth analysis of the specific content and direction of Taiwanese public sentiment, moving beyond the overly polarized grand narratives that have dominated discussions since the election. Thank you for your time today. We will conclude here. Thank you. Yes, thank you.

Extending this point, a key area of potential friction between China and the Lai Ching-te administration is in international space, where Taiwan strives for greater recognition and China actively works to limit it. Taiwan currently has diplomatic relations with just over a dozen countries, and this number may decline rapidly. From China's perspective, a military attack on Taiwan would significantly damage its image internationally and increase anti-China sentiment. Therefore, China is likely to minimize military actions while increasing pressure on Taiwan through other means. This 'silent killing of Taiwan' aims to suffocate Taiwan in the international arena, not through military force but through international pressure. This is likely to increase globally, and South Korea could also be affected. In the past, when we engaged with Taiwan, China has reacted nervously and excessively, such as protesting when a Taiwanese idol singer wore a Taiwanese flag. From our perspective, these reactions were often baffling. Therefore, while we must defend our positions, China will undoubtedly begin to close off spaces that were previously open to Taiwan to exert pressure. We are not exempt from this. Therefore, we should anticipate and prepare for such scenarios. The most crucial element in this process is to uphold our image, our position, and our principles. Additionally, I believe we need to be cautious about the increasing negative perceptions of China and the South Korea-China relationship. While the relationship with Taiwan is being presented as an alternative, suggesting 'if you dislike China, engage with Taiwan,' this is a completely different matter. I am concerned that there might be misunderstandings in public perception or other sectors. The relationship with South Korea-China and the relationship with Taiwan are fundamentally different. Strengthening our relationship with Taiwan does not negate the importance of the South Korea-China relationship. If we are currently dissatisfied with the South Korea-China relationship, it does not mean we should simply shift our focus to Taiwan. This approach will inevitably hit a limit. Therefore, a balanced perspective is needed. Regarding the Taiwan issue, cross-strait relations, and US-China relations, I believe it is crucial for all relevant ministries, research institutions, and researchers to adopt a complex and balanced approach, as Professor Lee Ha-young-sun always emphasizes the need for complex thinking and strategic planning. Today, we have had an extensive discussion with Professor Moon Hong on cross-strait relations, US-China relations, and the Korean Peninsula issue following the Taiwanese presidential election. I was particularly impressed by the in-depth analysis of the specific content and direction of Taiwanese public sentiment, moving beyond the overly polarized grand narratives that have dominated discussions since the election. Thank you for your time today. We will conclude here. Thank you. Yes, thank you.

From China's perspective, a military attack on Taiwan would significantly damage its image internationally and increase anti-China sentiment. Therefore, China is likely to minimize military actions while increasing pressure on Taiwan through other means. This 'silent killing of Taiwan' aims to suffocate Taiwan in the international arena, not through military force but through international pressure. This is likely to increase globally, and South Korea could also be affected. In the past, when we engaged with Taiwan, China has reacted nervously and excessively, such as protesting when a Taiwanese idol singer wore a Taiwanese flag. From our perspective, these reactions were often baffling. Therefore, while we must defend our positions, China will undoubtedly begin to close off spaces that were previously open to Taiwan to exert pressure. We are not exempt from this. Therefore, we should anticipate and prepare for such scenarios. The most crucial element in this process is to uphold our image, our position, and our principles. Additionally, I believe we need to be cautious about the increasing negative perceptions of China and the South Korea-China relationship. While the relationship with Taiwan is being presented as an alternative, suggesting 'if you dislike China, engage with Taiwan,' this is a completely different matter. I am concerned that there might be misunderstandings in public perception or other sectors. The relationship with South Korea-China and the relationship with Taiwan are fundamentally different. Strengthening our relationship with Taiwan does not negate the importance of the South Korea-China relationship. If we are currently dissatisfied with the South Korea-China relationship, it does not mean we should simply shift our focus to Taiwan. This approach will inevitably hit a limit. Therefore, a balanced perspective is needed. Regarding the Taiwan issue, cross-strait relations, and US-China relations, I believe it is crucial for all relevant ministries, research institutions, and researchers to adopt a complex and balanced approach, as Professor Lee Ha-young-sun always emphasizes the need for complex thinking and strategic planning. Today, we have had an extensive discussion with Professor Moon Hong on cross-strait relations, US-China relations, and the Korean Peninsula issue following the Taiwanese presidential election. I was particularly impressed by the in-depth analysis of the specific content and direction of Taiwanese public sentiment, moving beyond the overly polarized grand narratives that have dominated discussions since the election. Thank you for your time today. We will conclude here. Thank you. Yes, thank you.

The relationship with South Korea-China and the relationship with Taiwan are fundamentally different. Strengthening our relationship with Taiwan does not negate the importance of the South Korea-China relationship. If we are currently dissatisfied with the South Korea-China relationship, it does not mean we should simply shift our focus to Taiwan. This approach will inevitably hit a limit. Therefore, a balanced perspective is needed. Regarding the Taiwan issue, cross-strait relations, and US-China relations, I believe it is crucial for all relevant ministries, research institutions, and researchers to adopt a complex and balanced approach, as Professor Lee Ha-young-sun always emphasizes the need for complex thinking and strategic planning. Today, we have had an extensive discussion with Professor Moon Hong on cross-strait relations, US-China relations, and the Korean Peninsula issue following the Taiwanese presidential election. I was particularly impressed by the in-depth analysis of the specific content and direction of Taiwanese public sentiment, moving beyond the overly polarized grand narratives that have dominated discussions since the election. Thank you for your time today. We will conclude here. Thank you. Yes, thank you.

Today, we have had an extensive discussion with Professor Moon Hong on cross-strait relations, US-China relations, and the Korean Peninsula issue following the Taiwanese presidential election. I was particularly impressed by the in-depth analysis of the specific content and direction of Taiwanese public sentiment, moving beyond the overly polarized grand narratives that have dominated discussions since the election. Thank you for your time today. We will conclude here. Thank you. Yes, thank you.

Following the Taiwanese presidential election, we have moved beyond overly polarized grand narratives and delved into the internal considerations of Taiwan and the direction of Taiwanese public sentiment, providing in-depth analysis of specific details. This was very impressive. Thank you for joining us for this extended discussion. We will conclude here today. Thank you. Yes, thank you.