[North Korea and the World] North Korea's 'Selection and Concentration' in 2023 and Outlook for 2024

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pncy9Yidx64

Park Won-gon, Director of the EAI Center for North Korean Studies (Professor at Ewha Womans University), assesses that North Korea set 2023 as a year of 'selection and concentration,' focusing on strengthening its intercontinental ballistic missile and reconnaissance satellite capabilities to strike the U.S. mainland. He predicts that despite economic difficulties, the trend of focusing on nuclear capability development will continue next year. Director Park emphasizes that South Korea, the U.S., and Japan are consistently sending the message that any use of nuclear weapons by North Korea would result in the end of the regime. He points out that no matter how much North Korea advances its nuclear capabilities, it will not be able to achieve symmetrical nuclear power with the U.S. Furthermore, he suggests that North Korea may attempt to engage in a 'nuclear showdown' with the U.S. around the U.S. presidential election, maintaining its existing 'frontal breakthrough' strategy in 2024. He recommends that the South Korean and U.S. authorities speak with a unified voice to achieve the ultimate goal of North Korea's 'complete denuclearization.'

■ Park Won-gon_Director of the Center for North Korean Studies, East Asia Institute. Professor of North Korean Studies at Ewha Womans University.

■ In charge and editing: Park Ji-soo, EAI Researcher

    Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | jspark@eai.or.kr

Video Script

What is clear is that no matter how much North Korea advances its nuclear capabilities from now on, it will never be able to achieve them. In fact, this has the greatest deterrent effect on North Korea. Our intelligence agencies once released intelligence that Kim Jong Un cannot sleep at night; I understand why. Hello, this is 'North Korea and the World' from Gangwon Province. It's been a while since I've greeted you all. I used to upload twice a week, but I haven't been able to lately. I started this with great ambition, but I've realized quite a few limitations in the process. However, since I've started, I'm discussing with many of you who have given us valuable input on how to develop it further. Therefore, I don't think I'll be able to upload very often for the time being; I plan to upload at least once a month and, if we start with a new format, there will be more opportunities to meet you. I ask for your understanding. Yes, as it's the end of the year, I plan to look back on this year in line with the year-end situation. There were so many things that happened in 2023. What were North Korea's thoughts throughout this year, and what is their outlook for the Korean Peninsula situation and actions in 2024? I will also offer some cautious predictions. First, I believe that North Korea pursued the 'frontal breakthrough' strategy, which was announced at the 7th Plenary Meeting of the 5th Central Committee, throughout this year. This 'frontal breakthrough' strategy has four basic principles. The first is self-reliance, which, of course, aims to overcome challenges internally by minimizing direct contact with the outside world, especially in economic terms. This was presented as a core principle at the time, and we continue to see this approach this year. The second is ideological armament. Throughout the year, we have seen numerous diverse events aimed at strengthening North Korea's ideological armament. Most recently, Kim Jong Un reappeared at an 'Assembly of Mothers,' attending its opening and closing ceremonies.

The core message is this: as I've mentioned before, North Korea has been trying to reinforce its ideology over the past three years by enacting laws such as the Prohibition of Anti-ideological Thought and Culture, and the Pyongyang Dialect Protection Law. However, this is not working well. I've also stated that the very passage of such laws is evidence that North Korea is ideologically wavering. Therefore, at this Assembly of Mothers, Kim Jong Un's message was: mothers, take responsibility. North Korea still emphasizes a mother-centered approach to child-rearing, so mothers must control their children's ideology and teach them properly. He stressed that they must also adhere to proper clothing and speech.

He even shed tears at the event. Through these actions, we saw the core principle of ideological struggle within the 'frontal breakthrough' strategy in 2023. The third is nuclear capability. This year, North Korea focused on two key aspects of its nuclear capabilities. As we've seen throughout the year, they have significantly advanced their nuclear capabilities through two weapon systems: the Hwasong-18, representing the capability to strike the U.S. mainland with an intercontinental ballistic missile, and the successful launch of their reconnaissance satellite on the third attempt after two failures. Compared to the previous year, North Korea's provocations have relatively decreased in frequency. This is because 2022 was recorded as a year of unprecedented provocations for North Korea.

However, although the frequency of provocations decreased this year, the intensity of provocations remained high, particularly with five actual launches of intercontinental ballistic missiles. Therefore, I believe the level of offensive action was clearly high this year as well. Let me highlight a few characteristics compared to last year. This year, North Korea explicitly targeted South Korea and the United States with all its military actions. As you are well aware, in April, a South Korea-U.S. summit led to the announcement of the Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG) to institutionalize extended deterrence, and two meetings have been held. Subsequently, a South Korea-U.S. summit was held at Camp David, and various joint South Korea-U.S. and South Korea-U.S.-Japan military exercises have been continuously conducted. Each time, North Korea strongly criticized and condemned these actions. While Kim Yo Jong initially stated at the beginning of the year that they would respond to all actions by South Korea, the U.S., and Japan, such actions were not observed this year. They likely determined that engaging in a war of attrition, as they did last year, would incur too high a cost.

Secondly, compared to last year, North Korea still conducted provocations during combined exercises. This is a cause for considerable concern. Last year, North Korea crossed a threshold for the first time in the latter half of the year. Prior to that, when South Korea and the U.S. conducted combined exercises, North Korea did not provoke, likely due to the deployment of powerful U.S. strategic assets and the heightened alert and readiness posture. However, this precedent was broken in the latter half of last year, and provocations continued this year during the combined exercises conducted by South Korea and the U.S. in both the first and second halves of the year. This is likely a reflection of their confidence in their nuclear capabilities, and it indicates that North Korea is operating a distinctly aggressive military strategy and tactics compared to the past. Another point is that North Korea focused on 'selection and concentration' this year.

In terms of weapons development, this was the Hwasong-18, an ICBM. It was launched three times on April 13, July 12, and November 18, and all three launches were essentially successful. The Hwasong-18 intercontinental ballistic missile holds significant meaning. Firstly, it is a solid-fuel missile. As widely reported in the media, solid-fuel ICBMs are on a different level from liquid-fuel based ones. Nuclear-armed nations like the U.S. primarily use solid-fuel based systems, and solid-fuel missiles can be launched rapidly, making them very difficult to detect and identify with South Korean and U.S. assets. Furthermore, the Hwasong-18 can be launched directly from its launch platform, offering the advantage of rapid launch and difficult detection from North Korea's perspective. Additionally, it is equipped to carry multiple warheads. Therefore, if North Korea begins actual deployment of the Hwasong-18, it is likely to happen next year. The reason I say this is that North Korea's weapons development differs from other countries. When a new missile system is developed in other countries, it undergoes at least ten, or even more, tests to ensure complete reliability before deployment. However, North Korea sometimes proceeds with actual deployment even without sufficient test launches, developing it through subsequent launches. Therefore, it is entirely possible that North Korea will claim the actual deployment of the Hwasong-18 next year. This signifies a new stage in their nuclear capabilities development, effectively enabling them to strike the U.S. mainland. Prior to the Hwasong series of ICBMs, North Korea had been developing what are known as tactical nuclear weapons or low-yield nuclear weapons since May 2019, capable of striking South Korea, Japan, and even further afield.

Representative examples include the KN-23, KN-24, and KN-25. Notably, the KN-23 and KN-24 are known to be capable of carrying nuclear warheads. These have essentially been deployed. From North Korea's perspective, they have completed the development of nuclear capabilities that place South Korea and Japan within range, as mentioned earlier regarding the advancement of nuclear capabilities in the 'frontal breakthrough' strategy. Now, they are focusing on intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of striking the U.S. mainland as the final piece of the puzzle.

Furthermore, they successfully launched a satellite on the third attempt after two failures. Our government has announced that Russia provided technical assistance. This satellite is also very significant. Naturally, for North Korea, having a satellite will undoubtedly enhance the accuracy of their attacks, not only on South Korea but also on the U.S. mainland. As North Korea has already stated, the satellite successfully launched this time is the Malligyong-1. The designation '1' implies that there can be subsequent launches of '2', '3', '4', and so on. Another concern is the possibility of future cooperation between Russia and North Korea, particularly the integration of Russian satellite technology into North Korea, which we cannot entirely rule out. Therefore, in summary, North Korea's nuclear capabilities have been significantly advanced this year, and this trend is likely to continue next year. Another aspect that North Korea has consistently emphasized this year is the pressure they are under, both internally and externally, which is evidenced by their claims of being surrounded by South Korea, the U.S., and Japan. As I've mentioned before, whether it's a siege mentality or not, they use this to constantly push the North Korean populace. This is because they feel a significant security threat, leading them to call for unity among the North Korean people. Of course, this is one of the core driving forces of the North Korean regime, so it's not entirely new. However, compared to 2022, it is clear that such rhetoric has increased significantly in 2023.

So, let me evaluate the overall situation in North Korea. What is the internal situation in North Korea really like? As mentioned, their nuclear capabilities are highly advanced, but what lies behind this? I believe that the Kim Jong Un regime's stability depends on two pillars. The first is, naturally, military achievements, including nuclear capabilities. As you know, Kim Jong Un is not the eldest son, so he likely feels challenged regarding his regime's legitimacy. As the North Korean regime has undergone three generations of succession, the new leader, regardless of the legitimacy inherited from previous generations, must demonstrate their own achievements. This is a well-established historical and theoretical fact. Therefore, as Kim Jong Un enters his second decade in power, he clearly needs to showcase his achievements, particularly in nuclear capabilities, something his predecessors, Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il, did not accomplish. In a way, he has successfully demonstrated this. I use the term 'politics of display' here. He has achieved what his predecessors could not: the development of the Hwasong-18, an ICBM, and the successful satellite launch. Thus, military achievements are considered substantial. The five-year plan for economic construction announced at the 8th Party Congress in January 2021 is also considered substantially fulfilled. The problem lies in the other pillar: the economy. At the 8th Party Congress in 2021, North Korea announced two plans: the five-year plan for economic construction and the five-year plan for economic development. Even without going into detail about the North Korean economy, it is self-evident that the North Korean economy is in dire straits.

This is because North Korea has maintained a lockdown for nearly four years, and even though the lockdown has recently been eased, economic activities in border areas are still significantly restricted. Some argue that sanctions are ineffective, but this is not the case. North Korea's trade statistics clearly show the impact of sanctions. Even with support from China and Russia, overt violations of sanctions by these countries would be self-defeating, as they are bound by UN Security Council resolutions they agreed to. In this context, sanctions remain effective. To provide figures, North Korea's economic growth rate was -0.1% in 2021 and -0.2% in 2022, according to the Bank of Korea. The fact that it continues to experience negative growth indicates economic hardship in North Korea. As I mentioned earlier,

North Korea itself is clearly acknowledging this by continuously emphasizing self-reliance and mobilization of efforts in 2024. This indicates that North Korea is facing economic difficulties. In essence, they are politicizing the failed self-reliant economic policy. In this regard, Kim Jong Un's concerns are bound to deepen. He must simultaneously pursue military strength and economic development, but in 2023, there was a highly asymmetrical situation, and I do not expect this to change significantly in 2024.

Furthermore, as I briefly mentioned earlier, regarding North Korea's claim of possessing nuclear capabilities targeting the U.S., we need to seriously consider the extent to which this provides a deterrent effect and whether it meets North Korea's desired level. What is clear is that no matter how much North Korea advances its nuclear capabilities, it will never achieve symmetrical nuclear power with the U.S. This year, the consistent message sent by South Korea and the U.S. through their thorough cooperation is clear: any type of nuclear use by North Korea will result in the end of the North Korean regime. The end of the North Korean regime is, in fact, the greatest deterrent for North Korea. Given the nature of North Korea's authoritarian regime, the regime itself would not flinch even if millions of its citizens died. President Biden stated this during the South Korea-U.S. summit in April, and this message has been repeatedly conveyed in various documents and meetings. This signifies a clear message to North Korea in terms of deterrence.

However, can North Korea truly possess the capability to overcome and offset this? It is impossible. To put it more directly, even if North Korea significantly advances its nuclear capabilities to strike the U.S. mainland, South Korea, or Japan, could North Korea actually use those nuclear weapons? The moment North Korea uses nuclear weapons, its regime will end. The U.S. possesses far superior nuclear capabilities. For instance, U.S. nuclear-powered submarines, and recently, strategic nuclear-powered submarines, are different. A single strategic nuclear-powered submarine equipped with nuclear-armed SLBMs can completely devastate Pyongyang. Given such capabilities of the U.S., could Kim Jong Un actually launch such an attack? Therefore, while the possibility of North Korea's nuclear armament and coercive diplomacy through nuclear weapons exists, we need to reconsider from a fundamental perspective whether they can actually use nuclear weapons. North Korea's concerns are bound to deepen. You might ask, will the U.S. protect South Korea? Extended deterrence has been institutionalized at an unprecedentedly high level, far beyond previous arrangements, and this level of assurance provided by the U.S. to its non-nuclear allies is unparalleled. While specific details are sensitive and classified, the U.S. has demonstrated a clear commitment and institutionalization of extended deterrence. Therefore, the use of nuclear weapons would essentially be an act of self-destruction. Recently, our intelligence agencies released information that Kim Jong Un cannot sleep at night, which I find understandable. While they are strengthening only one aspect asymmetrically, it remains questionable whether they can achieve what they truly desire.

Finally, let me offer some predictions for next year. Predicting the future is always the most challenging part. However, based on the overall trend, North Korea is likely to continue its 'frontal breakthrough' strategy in 2024. Of course, to continue this strategy, North Korea needs resilience; it must avoid situations of extreme economic hardship. However, North Korea has already undergone marketization. According to research, North Korea's economy relies on market mechanisms, and if we consider the rationality of the market, the possibility of a return to the extreme economic difficulties of the late 1990s is unlikely.

Therefore, North Korea will likely endure through hardship, continuing its strategy. The primary target timeframe for this long-term strategy is likely the U.S. presidential election next year, in November. North Korea may wait for the election results and then attempt a 'nuclear showdown' with the U.S. in the first half of 2025. Currently, a rematch between Trump and Biden appears likely. Regardless of who wins, North Korea would likely prefer Trump. However, even if Biden wins, the possibility of a showdown in 2025 remains. This is because North Korea's ultimate goal in its 'frontal breakthrough' strategy is to be recognized as a nuclear-armed state and have sanctions lifted. To achieve this ultimate goal, which is essentially recognition as a nuclear power, they cannot remain isolated indefinitely. They will likely seek a direct negotiation with the U.S., aiming to create a narrative that their advanced capabilities have forced the U.S. to concede. The possibility of further nuclear tests cannot be ruled out. Therefore, throughout next year, North Korea may continue to develop the Hwasong-18, reconnaissance satellites, and recently revived medium- and long-range solid-fuel missiles. The mention of SLBMs is less likely, as the operational capability of the submarines themselves remains questionable. The problem is that the two pillars supporting the Kim Jong Un regime—military strength and economic development—continue to be unbalanced. The economy is unlikely to improve next year. Therefore, the question of how long North Korea can endure in such a situation remains. I believe our government should prepare for two main scenarios. First, North Korea may attempt to change the situation and emerge. In this process, North Korea will likely exclude South Korea and, taking advantage of the potential chaos surrounding the U.S. election next year, directly target the U.S. Therefore, strengthening cooperation between South Korea and the U.S. is crucial.

And as I briefly mentioned earlier, North Korea claims to possess nuclear capabilities aimed at the United States. However, we need to seriously consider to what extent this would actually provide a deterrent effect or reach the level North Korea desires. What is clear is that even if North Korea significantly advances its nuclear capabilities from now on, it can never possess symmetrical nuclear capabilities with the United States. Throughout this year, the consistent message sent by South Korea and the United States through thorough cooperation to North Korea is as follows:

That is, regardless of the type of nuclear weapon North Korea uses, it will mean the end of the North Korean regime. The end of the North Korean regime is, in fact, the greatest deterrent effect for North Korea. Given the characteristics of North Korea's authoritarian regime, the regime and its government would not flinch even if millions of North Korean citizens were to die. This has been reiterated since last April, during the summit between the South Korean and U.S. presidents, with President Biden's remarks, and in various documents and bilateral meetings. This signifies that a clear message is being sent to North Korea in terms of deterrence.

However, can North Korea acquire the capability to overcome and offset this? It is impossible. To put it more directly, even if North Korea were to significantly advance its nuclear capabilities to the point of being able to strike the U.S. mainland, South Korea, or Japan, would North Korea actually be able to launch such a nuclear weapon? The moment North Korea launches a nuclear weapon, its regime will face its end. The United States possesses far superior nuclear capabilities. For instance, its nuclear-powered submarines, and more recently, its strategic nuclear-powered submarines – these are different. Strategic nuclear-powered submarines carry nuclear-armed SLBMs. A single such submarine can completely devastate Pyongyang. Given such capabilities of the United States, would Kim Jong Un truly be able to launch such an attack? Therefore, while the possibility of North Korea's nuclear armament and its use for coercive diplomacy remains, the question of whether they can actually use nuclear weapons needs to be fundamentally re-examined.

North Korea's dilemma must be profound. At this point, some might ask: Will the United States truly protect South Korea? The extended deterrence has been institutionalized to an exceptionally high level, distinctly different from the past. This level of assurance provided by the United States to its non-nuclear allies is unprecedented. While some details were discussed in the last meeting, they are sensitive and classified, making detailed explanations difficult. Nevertheless, the United States currently demonstrates a firm resolve and has institutionalized extended deterrence. Consequently, the use of nuclear weapons would essentially be an act of self-destruction. Recently, our intelligence agencies released information suggesting that Kim Jong Un is unable to sleep soundly, which is understandable. North Korea is disproportionately strengthening one aspect, but whether it can achieve what it truly desires remains highly questionable. Lastly, what exactly will happen next year?

Let us attempt to predict what might occur next year. Predicting the future is always the most challenging aspect. However, based on the overall trend, as I briefly mentioned, North Korea is likely to continue its strategy of

frontal assault

It is thought that they have created a justification for their actions, and the possibility of human experimentation cannot be entirely ruled out. Therefore, throughout next year, North Korea may continue to develop the Hwasong-18, especially its satellite capabilities, and the medium- and long-range solid-fuel missiles that North Korea has recently begun developing again. There is some talk about SLBMs, but that is not easy. It is highly questionable whether submarine fleets themselves possess actual combat capabilities. However, the issue is that the economy, one of the two pillars supporting the Kim Jong-un regime, is unlikely to improve next year. Under these circumstances, the question remains as to how much longer North Korea can endure. I believe our government should prepare for one or two scenarios. As mentioned, there is a possibility that North Korea will attempt to change the situation. In the process of this change, North Korea will naturally exclude South Korea and, especially by taking advantage of the confusion surrounding the US presidential election next year, may directly target the United States. Therefore, it is crucial to strengthen US-ROK cooperation.

Regardless of whether Trump or Biden wins the election next year, it is essential to approach North Korea with common goals and thorough cooperation with the U.S. administration. Second, North Korea is likely to continue provocations next year, and there is still a possibility of escalating tensions on the Northern Limit Line (NLL). We must be well-prepared for this. In the short term, South Korea will hold general elections in April next year. The likelihood of North Korea provoking before the elections, as in the past, is relatively low. They may judge that it would not be beneficial to them. However, North Korea has effectively nullified the September 19 Military Agreement and may initiate provocations at the NLL based on their own needs. The issue is that the military communication lines are currently severed, and since North Korea is not responding through these lines, there is a possibility of conflict escalating at the NLL. South Korea and the U.S. must respond thoroughly to this. One way to do this is for South Korea and the U.S. to firmly defend the NLL region and be thoroughly prepared to prevent any accidental clashes from escalating, while effectively deterring North Korean provocations. One more point: the possibility of 'gray zone' provocations exists. If North Korea openly initiates conflict, they know they are at a disadvantage due to South Korea's superior military strength. Therefore, North Korea's choice may be 'gray zone' provocations, where the perpetrator is difficult to identify despite the act of provocation.

A prime example is the sinking of the Cheonan in 2010. There is a possibility of provocations of this nature. While I understand that our military authorities are preparing for various scenarios, thorough preparation throughout next year is essential. Lastly, I would like to emphasize that, as reported in some media outlets, voices within the U.S. are increasingly suggesting that North Korea's complete denuclearization is unrealistic. This is unacceptable. If such a situation arises, it would effectively mean recognition of North Korea as a nuclear-armed state. Therefore, it is crucial that the South Korean and U.S. governments cooperate thoroughly and never abandon the goal of 'complete denuclearization of North Korea,' not just the Korean Peninsula. Pursuing this goal, developing a roadmap, and implementing it require a unified voice from both governments at the official level. Thank you to everyone who has watched 'Park Won-gon's North Korea and the World' since its inception in 2023. Please have a good end of the year, and I look forward to seeing you again next year.

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