[EAI国際カンファレンス]

YouTubeリンク：https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I44uOWz2UXA

東アジア研究所（EAI）は、12月11日と12日に「コロナ19以降の安全保障上の課題と対応：気候変動、感染症、経済安全保障及びサイバーセキュリティ」と題する国際カンファレンスを開催しました。「米中戦略競争と経済安全保障」セッションでは、米中競争に対応する東南アジア各国のヘッジ（hedging）戦略を紹介したクイック・チェンチー（Kuik Cheng-Chwee）教授の発表、韓国が直面する経済安全保障上の課題と戦略を模索したイ・スンジュEAI貿易・技術・変革研究センター所長（中央大学教授）の発表、中国のTHAAD報復及び日本の半導体素材輸出規制事例の比較を通じて経済的強圧の含意を提示したキム・ヨンシン仁荷大学教授の発表が行われました。各発表に対し、イ・ワンフィ亜洲大学教授、イ・ヨンウク高麗大学教授、サハシ・リョウ東京大学教授による討論が続きました。

■担当・編集：パク・ハンスEAI研究員

問い合わせ：02 2277 1683 (内線 204) | hspark@eai.or.kr

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ありがとうございました。本カンファレンスの最後のセッションです。時間が非常に限られていることは皆承知の通りですので、本日の3名の発表者による素晴らしい発表に直接移らせていただきます。まず、3名の発表者を簡単に紹介させていただきます。まず、マレーシア国立大学のチェンチー・クイック教授です。マレーシア国際学研究所のアジア研究センター長を務めておられます。昨日到着され、明日出発されるとのことですので、今回のカンファレンスのためだけの短い訪問となります。お越しいただき、本当に感謝しております。

本日のカンファレンスにご参加いただき、ありがとうございます。次に、紹介するまでもない、中央大学教授でEAIの貿易・技術・変革研究センターにも所属されているソン教授です。最後に、仁荷大学の非常に有名なキム・ヨンシン教授です。この3名の発表者は、経済安全保障問題に関連する米中戦略競争の問題を取り上げます。ハイテク競争、そして李教授は韓国の視点から、我々がどのようにすればより良い経済安全保障戦略を構築できるかについて論じます。また、キム教授は、韓国が中国と日本からの経済的強圧によってどのように苦しんだかの事例研究を行います。これらの3つの発表により、今日の経済的強圧が東南アジア諸国や韓国にとっても問題を引き起こしている状況について、非常に良い組み合わせで理解できると思います。

それではまず、クイック博士にご招待します。ありがとうございます。司会者、そして私の友人である李教授、親切なご紹介ありがとうございます。皆様、こんにちは。主催者であるEAI、特にソン教授とそのチームの皆様に感謝申し上げます。数週間前、私の友人であるソン・ジュが私に連絡してきた際、今日の私のタスクに関する指示は非常に明確でした。それは、米中間の非常に大きな問題について、マレーシアの視点を提供してほしいというものでした。

えー、それではまず、クィック博士にご招待したいと思います。ご紹介いただき、ありがとうございます。司会者であり、私の親友でもあるT教授、そして親切なご紹介をありがとうございます。皆様、こんにちは。まず、主催者であるEAI、特にソン教授と同僚、チームの皆様に、ここにお招きいただいたことに感謝したいと思います。数週間前、私の親友であるSJUから連絡を受けたとき、今日の私のタスクに関する指示は非常に明確でした。それは、米中という非常に大きな問題について、ASEANの視点を提供してほしいということでした。

技術競争についてですが、私は主に5G問題に焦点を当てることにしました。ご存知の通り、技術競争は非常に広範ですが、私がこれを選んだもう一つの理由は、ソン・ジュ教授が過去1〜2年間主導してきたより大きなプロジェクトの一部であり、また、そのワークショップの過程で、ヨンシン氏が討論者として参加し、建設的なフィードバックを数多く提供してくれたからです。それらのほとんどに対処したと思いますが、明らかにまだいくつかのギャップがあると考えており、このカンファレンス、このパネルで発表し、後ほどさらにフィードバックを得られる機会になればと思います。そういったことを念頭に、3つのタスクを行います。3つのことについて話します。どのように、なぜ、そして「だから何」という問題についてです。つまり、東南アジア諸国が米中間の5G競争にどのように対応したか、なぜ各国が異なる対応をしているのか、そして「だから何」という問題についてです。通常、「だから何」という問題は最後に話しますが、このパネル、この聴衆のために、最初に「だから何」という問題について話します。それは、東南アジア諸国の対応に焦点を当てていますが、実際には、中間国家の対応に関する重要な事例であるということです。中間国家とは、一方では米国、他方では中国に挟まれた国々を指します。

両大国の競争に挟まれた国々です。東南アジアはその一つですが、明らかに他の多くの国々も同様です。したがって、東南アジア諸国がどのように、そしてなぜそのように対応しているのかは、単に東南アジアの問題ではなく、他の国々にも同様の観察結果を提供するでしょう。そういったことを念頭に、どのように、そしてなぜという問題について簡単に話します。どのようにという問題は非常に単純です。ASEAN 10カ国のうち、すべての国が対応しており、重複する部分もありますが、違いもあります。このパネル、そして時間の制約のため、2つの非常に広範な対応があることを述べることは非常に重要です。一方では、ベトナムとシンガポールが5G展開においてファーウェイを排除したと言えますが、ASEAN地域の他の8カ国は、ファーウェイや中国のテクノロジー企業を排除するのではなく、むしろオープンかつ受容的に関与し、協力してきました。

ファーウェイや中国のプラットフォームを5G展開から排除するというベトナムとシンガポールの対応を説明するために、「ヘビー・ヘッジング」という言葉を使います。そして、その反対の意味で、残りのアジア諸国を説明するために「ライト・ヘッジング」という言葉を使います。マレーシア、インドネシア、タイ、フィリピンなどはライト・ヘッジングを採用しています。なぜ私がヘビー・ヘッジングとライト・ヘッジングという言葉を使うのか不思議に思うかもしれません。学術的な理由だけでなく、政治的な理由もあります。主流の解説では、ベトナムとシンガポールがファーウェイを排除することを選択したため、反中国で親米と見なすのは簡単だと考える人もいるかもしれません。これはおそらく理解しやすいですが、間違った見方です。東南アジアでは、ベトナムやシンガポールの市民でなくてもわかることですが、ベトナムとシンガポールがファーウェイを排除するという選択をしたとき、それは彼らの独自の利益計算に基づいて行っているのであり、反中国だからでも、この競争で米国側に立っているからでもありません。これが、ヘビー・ヘッジングがより有用である最初の理由です。ファーウェイを排除するというベトナムとシンガポールの決定は、いわゆる真の勢力均衡、中国の力を拒否し、反対勢力である米国に味方することとは関係ありません。それはあまりにも単純化しすぎでしょう。

ヘビー・ヘッジングとは何か、そしてヘビー・ヘッジングとライト・ヘッジングの違いを説明します。どちらのヘッジングも中国からのリスクを見ていますが、パワーダイナミクスも見ています。ヘビー・ヘッジャーは、中国からのより重く、より暗いリスクの影を見ている人々です。ベトナムとシンガポールは、中国に関連するセキュリティリスクをより高く見ています。そして、ヘビー・ヘッジャーは、それらのリスクを軽減するためのリスク軽減策をより積極的に採用する人々でもあります。ヘビー・ヘッジャーはまた、中国に対して「ノー」と言う準備ができている人々でもありますが、それは選択的に行います。そして、彼らは選択的に行うヘッジャーです。ベトナムとシンガポールが中国を5Gから排除したことを強調する一方で、文脈を理解することも重要です。ベトナムとシンガポールは、選択的にこれを行っているだけです。彼らはファーウェイを禁止しているわけでも、中国のテクノロジー企業を全面的に禁止しているわけでもありません。実際、彼らは依然として許可しています。5G展開からのファーウェイ排除という特定の排除にもかかわらず、それはその特定の側面に限定されています。他の側面では、ビッグデータやデータセンターを含む技術競争でさえ、中国、そしてファーウェイの事業を許可しています。良い証拠として、数ヶ月前のニュースをフォローしていれば、シンガポールでデータセンターの入札があり、結果は米国企業2社が落札しましたが、驚くことではありません。しかし、中国企業も2社が落札しました。もしシンガポールが本当に静かなアプローチを取っていたなら、それはしなかったでしょう。

いくつかの違いもあります。このパネルにとって、時間的制約があるため、ASEAN諸国には2つの非常に広範な対応、2つのアプローチがあることを改めて述べることは非常に重要です。一方では、ベトナムとシンガポールが5Gの展開においてHuaweiを排除していると言えますが、ASEAN地域の他の8カ国は、むしろ異なるアプローチを採用しています。Huaweiや中国のテクノロジー企業を排除する代わりに、非常にオープンに、受容的に関与し、協力しています。

Huaweiとの5Gやその他の多くの問題について。それでは、より理論的に説明しましょう。ASEAN諸国間のこのような違いをどのように最もよく説明できるでしょうか。ベトナムとシンガポールがHuaweiと中国のプラットフォームを5G展開から排除するというアプローチを説明するために、私は「ヘビー・ヘイジング」という言葉を使います。そして、ASEAN諸国の残りの国々を説明するために、この意味での「ヘビー・ヘイジング」の反対の言葉である「ライト・ヘイジング」を使います。つまり、マレーシア、インドネシア、タイ、フィリピンなどはライト・ヘイジングを採用しています。したがって、あなたは

私がヘビー・ヘイジングとライト・ヘイジングという言葉を使った理由を不思議に思うでしょう。学術的な理由だけでなく、政治的な理由もあります。なぜなら、一部の人は、主流の解説では、ベトナムとシンガポールがHuaweiを排除することを選択したため、私たちはそれらを簡単に、迅速に反中国で親米と見なすことができると言っているからです。これはおそらく理解しやすい方法ですが、間違っています。東南アジアでは、ベトナムとシンガポールに市民である必要はありません。ベトナムとシンガポールがHuaweiを5Gから排除するという選択をするとき、彼らはそれを行っています。彼らは、中国に反しているからでも、この競争で米国に味方しているからでもなく、独自の利益計算に基づいてその決定を下しています。したがって、ヘビー・ヘイジングがより役立つ最初の理由は、ベトナムとシンガポールの一部によるHuaweiの排除の決定が、いわゆる真の勢力均衡、中国の力を拒否し、米国の反対の力に味方することに関するものではないことを明確にすることです。それはあまりにも単純化されすぎるでしょう。

ヘビー・ヘイジングとは、ヘビー・ヘイジングとライト・ヘイジングを区別するものです。ヘビー・ヘイジングもライト・ヘイジングも、中国からのリスクを見ていますが、力のダイナミクスも見ています。ヘビー・ヘイジャーとは、中国に関して、より重く、より暗いリスクの形を見る人々です。ベトナムとシンガポールは、中国に関連するセキュリティリスクからより高いリスクを見ています。そして、ヘビー・ヘイジャーとは、それらのリスクを軽減するために、リスク軽減策を採用することに最も決意している人々です。

リスク。ヘビー・ヘイジャーとは、中国に対して「ノー」と言うことをより強く決意している人々でもありますが、それは選択的に行われます。そして、彼らは選択的に行動するため、ヘイジャーなのです。ベトナムとシンガポールが中国を5Gから排除していることについて強調する一方で、文脈の中で物事を置くべきです。ベトナムとシンガポールは、選択的にこれを行っているだけです。彼らはHuaweiを禁止したり、中国のテクノロジー企業をすべて禁止したりしているわけではありません。実際、5G展開からのHuaweiの排除という特定の排除にもかかわらず、彼らはまだ許可しています。

R heavy hes also those who are more ready to defy to say no to China but doing that selectively and uh they are haers because of they do things selectively while emphasizing about Vietnam and Singapore are excluded a China from a f from a 5G we should also put things in context in the sense that Vietnam and Singapore only do this selectively they are not like Banning a Huawei they are not Banning Chinese Tech firms all out in fact they still allow despite the specific exclusion of excluding Huawei from 5G rad outs is

only limited to that particular aspect on other aspects even on technology compet competition including Big Data data centers they have actually allowed China and including Huawei to operate one good evidence and quick evidence was that if you follow the news just a few months ago Singapore had a tender of data centers in Singapore so the results two went to us back companies not surprising there but also two went to uh China if Singapore is really uh kind of like taking a taking a Sit approach Singapore would not have done that which

だからこそ、彼らは選択的に行っているのです。例は数え切れません。さて、残りの時間で、なぜという問題に移りたいと思います。なぜ、10カ国間で、シンガポールとベトナムがヘビー・ヘッジングのアプローチを選択し、他の国々がライト・ヘッジングのアプローチを採用しているのかという違いがあるのか。そして、なぜという理由や問題点を詳しく説明する前に、いくつか強調できる点があると思います。興味のある方は、主催者に共有したテキストを参照してください。ライト・ヘッジングとヘビー・ヘッジングを比較する良い方法は、3つの指標を念頭に置くことです。3つの指標は、国際関係におけるヘッジング行動の指標です。最初の指標は、積極的な中立性です。我々はどちらの側にも立っていないことを積極的にシグナルすることです。ベトナムとシンガポールは、ファーウェイを5Gから排除するという決定を下す際に、これは我々自身の決定であり、我々自身の計算であり、一方の国に味方することではないと強調し続けています。受動的に中立について話すだけでなく、積極的に中立を行っているのです。2番目の指標は、包括的な多様化です。すべての国、特に弱く小さい国は、パートナーシップ、デジタルパートナーシップを含む多様化を望んでいます。そして、それらを包括的に行います。ベトナムとシンガポールは排他的ですが、前述のように、選択的に排他的です。彼らは5G、デジタルセキュリティ問題においてのみ排他的です。他のことでは、電子商取引、データセンター、その他の多くの戦略的および開発的な問題で、依然として中国を包括的に受け入れています。3番目、そして最後のヘッジングの指標、これはヘビー・ヘッジングとライト・ヘッジングの両方に当てはまりますが、それはフォールバックポジションです。不確実性の下では、リスクは複数かつ予測不可能であることを知っているため、万が一の場合に備えたフォールバックポジションが必要です。計画B、緊急時の対応策を持っている必要があります。

したがって、ヘビー・ヘッジャーもライト・ヘッジャーもこれらの3つのことを行っていますが、ヘビー・ヘッジャーは選択的な基盤で多様化を追求しています。ミクロレベルの5G固有の問題では、中国を排除しますが、他のすべての問題では、ベトナムとシンガポールはヘビー・ヘッジャーであるにもかかわらず、依然として何らかの形で中国を取り込もうとしています。そして、これは経済分野だけでなく、安全保障分野でも同様です。したがって、地上では、そして過去数週間、数ヶ月にわたり、シンガポールとベトナムは、他の多くの地域諸国と同様に、米国と安全保障問題で協力していますが、同時に中国とも協力しています。ある意味では、安全保障協力の源泉である中国とも同様です。そして最後に、残りの時間で、なぜという問題について話します。なぜヘッジングのアプローチを説明するのか、なぜヘッジングのアプローチを説明するのか、なぜヘビー・ヘッジャーとライト・ヘッジャーの区別があるのか、なぜ10カ国の中でベトナムとシンガポールだけがファーウェイを5G展開から排除するというヘビー・ヘッジングのアプローチを追求しているのか。理由は複数あります。長話を短くするために、最初の理由は、もちろん全体的な脅威認識です。中国に対する懸念が、安全保障上の脅威であれ、政治的な脅威であれ、大きいほど、ヘビー・ヘッジングを採用する理由が多くなります。リスクを軽視したくないからです。しかし、あなたの主な脅威認識が中国だけではない場合、中国を問題の一部と見なすと同時に、他の多くの重要なことに対する解決策の一部と見なす場合、脅威の源泉を軽視し、二重にする意欲が高まります。したがって、これは最初の要因です。脅威認識は異なります。ベトナムとシンガポールは、デジタルだけでなく、その他の面でも中国に対する脅威をより高く認識していますが、他の国々はよりリラックスした、楽観的な脅威認識を持っています。要因1。国内要因、例えば官僚機構の能力、省庁間の競争の有無、安全保障機関の評価が外交政策やその他の管理と一致し、重複するかどうかなど、他の要因もあります。それは非常に重要です。また、技術レベルにおける各国の国内能力も重要です。ベトナムとシンガポールは他の国々よりも技術的に進んでおり、独自の国内ソリューションを開発する選択肢がありますが、他の多くの国々は外部に依存しなければなりません。しかし、この2つが主な要因であり、国内要因は二次的な要因です。

decision our own calculation it's not about siding with one power over the other active neutrality not just passively talking about they neutral but actively are doing so and the second indicator is about the inclusive diversification all countries especially weaker and small countries want to diversify their Partnerships including digital Partnerships and they do so inclusively Vietnam and Singapore are the one that exclusive but as I said only selective they only are exclusive in selectively 5G digital insecurity

issue on other things they still inclusively engage China in e-commerce in a data center in many other strategic and also developmental issues the third and also a final indicator of haing and this is so true for heavy haing and light Hing is that fallback position fallback position of we know that under uncertainty risk are multiple and also unpredictable so you need to have a for back position of just in case if things go wrong you do have some plans B you have contingency at the hold on to so

all heavy hges and light hes are doing these three things but heavy hings are the one that pursue diversification on selective basis as a indicator uh micro level 5G specific issue they exclude the China but on all other issues Vietnam and Singapore despite the fact that there are heavy hes they are still uh try to include the China in one way or another and this is so not just on econom iic sectors it is also a true even for security sector and hence you are seeing that on ground and over the last few weeks and few few months while

Singapore and Vietnam just like many other Regional countries collaborating with uh us on security issue but they are also doing the same some say the opposite with uh China the very source of security cooporation yeah uh and uh finally the remaining time let me as I said talk about the why so why uh explain the Hing approach why I explain uh what are the reasons they explain why uh there was a distinction between heavy haes and also light haer why only out of 10, countries only Vietnam and Singapore

第一の要因は第三の要因であり、私が共有する最後のポイントは、エリート層の国内正当性です。これは、シンガポールとベトナムが、安全保障を最大化するために、経済的利益の一部を犠牲にする用意があるというトレードオフを決定した理由を説明する、最も重要な独立変数または主な要因です。一方、他のライト・ヘッジャーは、経済的利益を犠牲にすることはできません。なぜなら、経済的利益は国内正当性の中心的な要素だからです。東南アジアのすべての国にとって、パフォーマンス正当性は、経済成長が経済問題ではなく、政治問題である程度、どのくらいの間問題ではないということです。なぜなら、民主主義国であれ権威主義国であれ、すべての支配エリートにとって、経済的にどのようにパフォーマンスを発揮するかは、彼らの政治的権威と権力の源泉にとって重要であり、彼らが統治を続けることができるかどうかにかかっています。したがって、彼らは開発、経済成長、雇用創出、そしてデジタル接続性に注意を払っており、それは彼らの優先事項です。そして、外部の代替手段があまりない場合、彼らは中国、そしてファーウェイ、そしてデジタルシルクロードが、政治的支援の源泉となる経済発展と見通しを提供するので、それを受け入れ、協力したいと望むでしょう。そして、ベトナムとシンガポールは、国内の懸念がベトナムとシンガポールの支配エリートに安全保障を真剣に受け止めさせるため、最終的にそれを行うことができませんでした。ベトナムの場合、反中国感情が非常に高いため、アイデンティティと正当性は、ハノイの支配エリートにいかなる安全保障評価も緩和することを許しません。シンガポールは最も興味深いケースです。なぜなら、シンガポールは民族的に中国系多数の国であるため、中国の台頭についてよりリラックスしているはずだと考える人もいますが、実際には、地政学的な文脈、そしてより重要な国内文脈のため、シンガポールは中国の台頭を安全保障上の脅威や経済的脅威としてそれほど見ていませんが、むしろ政治的な懸念の原因として見ています。なぜなら、シンガポールのエリート層は、中国の政治的影響力工作を、シンガポールの多民族社会の政治的構造に影響を与える政治的課題の源泉と見なしているからです。したがって、シンガポールは中国に関連する安全保障上の意味合いを軽視することはできません。それゆえ、ヘビー・ヘッジングのアプローチなのです。ここで終わりにします。ありがとうございました。ありがとうございました。ご覧の通り、この発表には非常に深く、発展したヘッジング理論があります。クイック教授は非常に良いヘッジング理論を開発しました。韓国では、ヘッジングを非常に受動的な大国間の対立への反応と見なす傾向がありますが、彼はヘッジングを政策立案者の視点からの非常に積極的な政策と繊細なバランスと解釈しています。したがって、東南アジアの事例から学ぶべき教訓はたくさんあります。私の質問の一つは、東南アジア諸国間に異なる種類のヘッジングがある場合、中国はその違いを利用して、これらの国々の間にくさびを打ち込み、ASEANの中央性を損なうことができるでしょうか？もし時間があれば教えてください。そして、李教授を韓国の事例のために招待します。ありがとうございます、ジョン教授。はい、見回してみると、このパネルに女性スピーカーがいないことに気づきました。セッション3までは、ほぼジェンダー平等なセッションでした。このカンファレンスの組織委員会のメンバーとして、このパネルに女性スピーカーを含めなかったことに対して罪悪感を感じています。しかし、EAIはジェンダー平等を尊重し、支持していることをお伝えしたいと思います。そして、次回はこのセッションに女性スピーカーを含めるよう努めます。実際、ある意味で私の論文はチェン教授の論文を補完するものです。チェンチーは主に東南アジア諸国の経済安全保障戦略の違いに焦点を当てていますが、私の論文は、韓国の経済安全保障における時間を通じた類似点と違いに焦点を当てています。その点で、私たちの論文は互いに補完し合っていると思います。そうは言っても、経済安全保障は過去数年間、バズワードになっています。経済安全保障の出現に寄与した要因がいくつかあります。まず、米中戦略競争は、米国だけでなく、中国や他の国々が経済安全保障戦略を推進する上で、決定的な要因の一つです。特にトランプ政権は、中国の不公正な貿易慣行を特定し、それを米国の国家安全保障を脅かす経済的侵略と定義しようとしました。したがって、国家安全保障と経済安全保障の間には関連性があります。また、COVID-19の世界的な蔓延も、世界的な経済の不確実性を高めた要因の一つです。過去数年間、世界経済の不確実性が急速に高まりました。また、ナショナリズムと保護主義の蔓延も促しました。したがって、多くの国が他国を犠牲にして自国の国益を推進することに非常に熱心でした。また、COVID-19の余波で、多くの国がサプライチェーンの混乱を経験しました。企業レベルでも国家レベルでも、多くの国や企業が、サプライチェーンの混乱の安全保障上の意味合いを強調する「ジャストインタイム」パラダイムから離れ、「ジャストインケース」パラダイムを採用しようとしています。このような背景に対して、多くの国が自国の国益を守るために、独自の経済安全保障戦略を作成しようと試みていると言えます。その点で、韓国も例外ではありません。しかし、詳しく見ると、韓国の経済安全保障戦略への移行は、最近の現象とはほど遠いことがわかります。むしろ、長期的な視点で見ると、韓国の経済安全保障戦略の起源は1960年代初頭に遡ります。その点で、韓国の経済安全保障戦略の進化において、類似点と相違点の両方を見つけることができます。それでは、韓国の経済安全保障戦略における類似点または継続性について説明します。継続性における最初の顕著な特徴は、韓国の経済安全保障戦略の受動性です。伝統的な経済安全保障戦略において、韓国は経済制裁に対して非常に慎重なアプローチを取りました。もちろん、韓国は経済制裁に参加しましたが、主に多国間レベルでした。その点で、経済制裁が韓国の経済安全保障戦略の中心的な役割を果たすことはありませんでした。その点で、この特徴は今日まで続いており、韓国は中国や日本のような大国からの経済的強圧的措置に対応することに、より関心を持っています。その点で、韓国の経済安全保障戦略の受動的な性質は、過去50〜60年間の韓国の経済安全保障戦略の顕著な特徴でした。もう一つの顕著な特徴は、その混合的な性質です。当初から、1960年代に韓国政府は野心的に独自の産業化戦略を開始しました。輸出志向型産業化によって実証されたように、その点で、韓国の産業化戦略はかなり自由主義的な性質を持っていると主張する人もいるかもしれませんが、韓国は積極的に世界経済に統合しようとし、貿易政策を自由化しようとしました。しかし同時に、韓国の産業化戦略と貿易政策は、非常に混合的な性質を持っていました。なぜなら、それは先進国に追いつくという目標を具体的に設定していたからです。そして、韓国は貿易を自由化しようとしましたが、同時に、輸出志向型産業を育成・奨励するために、選択的な基盤でのみ自由化しました。その点で、混合的な性質は韓国の経済安全保障戦略に組み込まれており、その性質は今日まで続いています。韓国の経済安全保障戦略の3番目の特徴は、地政経済的および地政学的な対応の組み合わせです。再び1960年代に遡ると、韓国の産業化戦略は、基本的に地政経済的な課題への地政経済的な対応でした。当時、韓国政府は、韓国が後発開発途上国として先進国に追いつくために、増大する圧力にさらされていると概念化しました。一方、韓国は、後発開発途上国が安価な労働コストに基づいて韓国に追いつこうとしている、挟まれた状況にありました。その点で、韓国は先進国と後発開発途上国の間に挟まれた状況にありました。その点で、韓国は地政学的な対応で地政経済的な課題に対応しようとしました。同時に、韓国は地政学的な課題に対応するために、いわゆる産業高度化戦略を打ち出す必要がありました。しかし一方で、それは地政学的なリスクへの対応でもありました。特に1970年代に入ると、韓国は北朝鮮からの増大する安全保障上の圧力にさらされていました。その点で、韓国は国防関連産業を育成するために、独自の産業構造を高度化しようとしました。したがって、一方では産業深化戦略であり、地政学的な対応でした。他方では、地政学的なリスクに対応するために設計された国家安全保障戦略でした。そうは言っても、韓国の経済安全保障戦略の変化する性質も強調したいと思います。この点で、韓国の経済安全保障戦略における技術、特にハイテクの可視性が大幅に増加したと言えます。そして、ハイテクは韓国の経済安全保障戦略において中心的な舞台となりました。なぜでしょうか？それは、米中戦略競争の影響によるものだと思います。よく知られているように、米中戦略競争は2018年に両国間の貿易戦争として始まり、両国はすぐに競争の舞台をハイテク分野に移しました。その点で、韓国は、そのような戦略的課題に対処するための手段として、ハイテクを採用せざるを得ませんでした。その点で、過去数年間、韓国の経済安全保障戦略におけるハイテクの可視性が大幅に高まりました。また、韓国は経済と安全保障のネクサスとしてハイテクに注目しました。多くの専門家や学者は、経済と安全保障の関連性について話しますが、両者を効果的に結びつけるためにはネクサスが必要です。そして、ハイテクはそのようなネクサスの一つです。しかし、ご存知のように、韓国はハイテク能力を持つ世界でも数少ない国の一つです。したがって、韓国政府の視点から見ると、ハイテク能力を活用し、それらの能力を韓国の経済安全保障戦略に組み込むことは、自然な結論です。したがって、それは韓国の経済安全保障戦略の新しい特徴と言えるでしょう。そして3番目は、韓国がいわゆる技術主権を高めるために多大な努力をしてきたことです。よく知られているように、韓国は部品、素材、装備品の競争力を高めようとしてきました。ある意味で、韓国はこの点で過去数年間、経済安全保障戦略の移行期にありました。一方、部品、素材、装備品の競争力を高めることは、中国や日本からの経済的強圧的措置に対処するために設計された受動的な措置の一種です。しかし、他方では、それは同時に、特にサプライチェーンにおける韓国のハイテク産業の構造的な脆弱性を是正するための先制的な措置でもあります。そして、それは中国や日本のような他国からの経済的強圧的措置の再発を防ぐのに役立つかもしれません。そして、韓国の新しい経済安全保障戦略の最後の新しい特徴は、韓国が高技術を国際協力を誘発するための交渉レバレッジとして活用しようとしていることです。私のプレゼンテーションの冒頭で述べたように、これはナショナリズムと保護主義の時代です。したがって、多くの国が他国を犠牲にして自国の利益を追求することに非常に熱心です。したがって、この時代には、国際協力のために国際協力を追求することに興味のある国は多くありません。したがって、他国からの国際協力を誘発するためには、ハイテク能力のような資産が必要です。韓国はそのような能力を持つ国の一つです。したがって、韓国が米国、日本、英国、オランダのような他国からの国際協力を誘発するための手段として、ハイテク競争力を活用しようとする理由の一つです。それは、韓国の新しい経済安全保障戦略のもう一つの新しい特徴です。

important for Rolling Elites you will be uh more willing to uh kind of uh uh deemphasize and also uh dou the kind of sources of threat so that's uh the first Factor threat perception vary Vietnam and Singapore see higher threat about China uh digital but also otherwise but other countries have a more relaxed and sangen threat perception Factor number one there are also other factor that have to do with a domestic for example the bureaucracy uh uh kind of a competency whether or not there is a inter agency competition

whether or not security uh establishments a gencies assessment it's Echo and overlap with foreign policy and also other management it matters a lot so and also internal capacity of uh uh uh other different countries at technological level Vietnam and Singapore are technologically more develop than others they have options of developing their own homegrown solution many other countries have to rely on external but this two are the main uh threat perception and also domestic factors are the secondary factors the

primary factor is the third factor and that be the final point I will share is about Elite ruling Elites domestic legitimation that is a single most important uh uh independent variable or the main factor that explain why Singapore and Vietnam have decided to make the trade off that in order to uh ensure maximize security they are willing to uh forgo some e economic benefits and on the other hand the other light hes they cannot forego the economic benefits because economic benefits Cent are Central elements to

their domestic legitimation for all countries in Southeast Asia performance legitimation to what extent for how long economic growth is not an issue of economic issue it's a political issue why is that because of all ruling Elites whether Democratic countries or authoritarian countri how they perform economically matters for their sources of political Authority and also a power whether or not they can continue to rule and therefore they are pay attention to developmental economic growth job creation and digital

connectivity is their priority and where in the case of they do not have much other external alternative they would want to embrace and collaborate with China because it does China and also Huawei and also digital SE road to provide the kind of a Economic Development and also a prospect that that to rely on that will translate into a political sources of support and Vietnam and and Singapore finally cannot do that because of uh domestic concerns push the ruling Elites in Vietnam and the Singapore that to take security

seriously in the case of Vietnam because of anti-china sentiment is very high and therefore the identity and legitimation do not allow any ruling Elites in Hanoi to relax the security assessment Singapore is the most interesting one because some say that because of uh CH Singapore being an ethic Chinese majority country should have more relaxed about the China factor or the rise of China but in reality because of the JW play context and more importantly domestic context we do know that uh Singapore do not see a rise of China so

much as a security threat or economic threat but more about political uh uh cause of concern why is that Singapore Elites see China's political or influence operation as a source of political challenges that will affect Singapore's multiat sociopolitical Fabric and therefore Singapore cannot take the security implication associated with China too lightly and hence the heavy Hing approach I will stop here thank you very much than thank you very much uh as you can uh see there is a very profound and

developed theory of a hatching in uh this presentation because Professor quick has developed a very good theory of a hatching so far uh in South Korea there is a tendency to uh view hatching as hesitating as a very passive uh reaction to great power is rivalry but he interprets hatching as a very active policy with delicate balance from policy makers perspective so uh there are a lot of lessons that we can learn from Southeast Asian cases uh one of my question is if there is a different kinds of hatching among the South Asian

countries can uh China uh exploit its differences among these countries uh such as you driving wedge between these countries harm erode thean Central quity so if you have time please let me know and then I will invite Prof Lee for South cus yeah thank you professor John uh yeah looking around actually I find that uh there's no female speaker in this panel actually like up to the session 3 we had pretty much like a gender equal sessions so I as a member of the organizing committee for this conference I have a kind of the guilty

feeling uh for not having a female speaker in this panel but uh I'll have to tell you that the uh eii does respect and support gender equality and then maybe next time we will try to include uh recruit uh the female speakers for this session uh actually in a sense my paper is kind of complimentary to Chen's paper actually cheni is mostly uh interested in uh looking into the differences between South Southeast Asian countries in terms of Economic Security strategy but my paper is more about the similarities and differences

across time in terms of South Korea's Economic Security so in that regard I think is our papers are quite complimentary to each other having said that uh I would say that the economic security has become a buzzword for the last several years and couple of factors that contributed to the emergence of the economic security uh in uh major countries uh I can name a few uh factors like first all first of all the US China strategic competition is uh one of the defining factors that the prompted uh the not just the United States but also

China and other countries to Russia to the economic security strategy particularly the Trump Administration actually Tred to identify the China's unfair trading practices and Define them as economic aggression which they believe will pose a threat to the US National Security so there is a linkage between National Security and economic security and also Global spread of the covid-19 is another factor that prompted the emergence of Economic Security worldwide actually because of the spread of the covid-19 the uh uncertainty in

World economic water has rapidly increased for the last several years and also Al prompted the proliferation of the nationalism and protectionism so the great deal number of countries were very much interested in promoting and pursuing their own National interest active at the expense of others and also in the wake of the covid-19 actually the number of countries actually experienced the so-called supply chain disruptions and then uh at the company level as well as the national level a lot of uh

countries and companies try to embrace the so-called just in case Paradigm departing away from the just in time Paradigm which highlights the security implication of the supply chain disruptions so against this backdrop uh I would say that many countries try to attempt to create their own Economic Security strategy to safeguard their own national uh interest so in that regard I would say Korea is not an exception at all but however look looking closely so actual uh Korea's move to the economic security strategy

is far from a recent phenomena rather I would say from a long-term perspective the origin of South Korea's Economic Security strategy dates back to the early 1960s I in that regard I can find the both similarities on the one hand and the uh differences on the other hand in terms of the evolution of South Korea's Economic Security strategy so let me move on to the uh similarities or continuity in uh South Korea's Economic Security strategy the first feature predominant feature in terms of continuity is the reactiveness

of the South Korea's uh Economic Security strategy uh in the traditional uh Economic Security strategy actually South Korea took a very cautious approach to economic sanctions of course South Korea joined forces in participating the economic sanctions but primarily at the multilateral level and in that regard the economic sanctions has never taken a central role in ter in the South Korea's Economic Security strategy in that regard I think this kind of feature has continued to exist in the nowadays as South Korea is more

about is more interested in responding or reacting to the economic cive measures from great Powers such as China and Japan so in that regard the reactive nature of the South Korea Economic Security uh strategy has been a predominant feature of the South Korea's Economic Security strategy for the five to six decades another predominant feature is that the Mist nature actually from the outset I mean the in the 1960s South Korean government ambitiously launched its own industrialization strategy as demon demonstrated by the uh

export oriented industrialization actually in that regard actually one may argue that the South Korea's industrial industrialization strategy has the kind of the pretty much liberal nature but at because South Korea actively triy to integrate itself into the world economy and try to liberalize trade policies but at the same time I would say uh the South Korea's industrialization strategy as well as trade policy do does have a very Mist nature because it specifically set the goal of catching up catching up

with other Advanced countries and also South Korea tried to liberalize its trade but at the same time it tried to liberalize only on a selective basis to promote and nurture the export oriented industri industrial Industries in that regard the Mist nature of is kind of built in into the South Korea's Economic Security strategy and then that nature still continues nowadays and the third feature of the South Korea's economy IC security strategy is that the combination of geoeconomic as well as geopolitical

responses uh again the dating back to the 1960s South Korea's industrial industrialization strategy was a basically geoeconomic responses to geoeconomic challenges actually at that time the Korean government conceptualized that South Korea is under mounting pressure as a late developer to catch up with the advanced countries and on on the other hand South Korea is also sandwiched where uh late late developer try to catch up with South Korea on the basis of the cheap labor uh cost in that regard South Korea was in a kind of

sandwich position between Advanced and late developing countries in that regard South Korea tries to meet with uh geopolitical challenges with the geopolitical responses at the same time South Korea in order to meet the GE political uh challenges had to come up with the so-called industrial upgrading strategy but on the other hand it is also a response to the geopolitical risks particularly given that in coming into the 1970s South Korea was under mounting security pressure from North Korea in that regard South Korea tried

to upgrade its own industrial uh structure to nurture defense related Industries so on the one hand it was industrial deepening strategy which is geopolitical responses on the other hand it was the uh National Security strategy which is which is designed to meet the geopolitical risks so having said that I also would like to highlight the changing nature of the South Korea's Economic Security strategy uh in this regard I would say the visibility of Technology particularly high technology uh has substantially increased in South Korea's

Economic Security strategy and then sou actually high technology took the central stage in terms of the South Korea's Economic Security strategy why the it I think first has to do with the impact of the US China strategic competition as is well known the US China strategic competition started out as a trade war between the two countries in N uh in 2018 and quickly both countries try to move the stage of the competition to high technology areas right so in that regard South Korea was forced to adopt the high technology as a

means to deal with the kind that kind of strategic challenges in that regard uh the visibility of high technology has become substantially uh increased for the last several years in terms of the South Korea's Economic Security strategy and and also South Korea paid attention to the high technology as a Nexus between the economy and security actually a lot of experts and Scholars talk about the linkages between the economy and security but in order to effectively link the two I mean the the economy and the security you need a

Nexus right and the high technology is one of the Nexus that can link effectively the economy and security but as you as you know South Korea is one of the few countries in the world with the capacity of the high technology so it is kind of the natural conclusion from the perspective of the South Korean government to take advantage of Hightech capability and incorporate those capability into the South Korea's Economic Security strategy so I would say that is the kind of the new future of the South Korea's Economic Security

strategy and the third one is that South Korea has made a lot of efforts to boost so-called Tex sovereignty as is well known in the cases of the South Koreans attempt to increase uh the competitiveness of the materials Parts and Equipment actually in a sense South Korea in that regard uh has been in transition for the last couple of years in terms of the uh Economic Security strategy on the one hand like boosting the uh competiveness of the parts materials and equipment is a kind of reactive measure

designed to deal with the economic cive measures from China and Japan but on the hand on the other hand I would say it is at the same time of preemptive measure in order to remedy the structural vulnerabilities of the South Korean uh high-tech Industries particularly Supply chains and then uh it may be useful to prevent the another occurrence of the economic cive measures from other countries such as China and and Japan and the last feature new feature of the uh South Korea's New Economic Security

strategy is that the South Korea tried to take advantage of high technology as a bargaining leverage to induce International cooperation as I told you in the beginning of the my presentation this is the age of the nationalism and the protectionism so many countries are actually so much interested in pursue in their own interest at the expense of other countries right so in this age actually not many countries are interested in pursuing International coroporation for the sake of international cooporation right so in

order to induce International cooperation from other countries you need to have some assets such as high technology capability so South Korea is one of the countries that has that kind of capability so that's one of the reasons why why South Korea tries to take advantage of high technology competitiv buiness as a means to induce International cooperation from other countries such as the United States the Japan and the United Kingdom as Netherland so that is another new emerging feature of the South Korea's

Economic Security strategy so let me stop there thank you thank you very much he gave us a very uh good picture of the evolution of South Korea's Economic Security strateg uh last week there was a Korea Japan I mean Korea China trade conference right uh and then there was a discussion about supply chain cooperation I think it's very hard in the area of Hightech so can we adopt hedging strategy as Chun said to offset the risk because USA is pursuing very strict high-tech export control probably with uh South Kore so do you see any

possibility that we can pursue to a harmonious uh policy toward China and then let me invite Professor Kim please all right um first of all I'd like to thank to the uh the president son uh of the the president uh which invite uh me to uh this wonderful conference and Professor uh chanes also thanks for the moderating this uh great session uh first of all this paper is about uh it's kind of like the initial case study on the uh the South korean's experiences of economic Cor from uh China and Japan uh right now the

at the G7 level or EU level uh the me at the or the Milat level the many countries try to uh to the make kind of like the the effective ways or try to find the effective ways to prevent or the deter the China's economic cors so uh by uh taking care of by uh the seeing the uh the Korean case seriously uh I hope that uh I can uh contribute a little bit about uh the the developing the effective ways of the the the to deter the the the the the the economic cors so first of all like actually the China has been the the

recipient of economic sanctions by Western countries until the the China's open up and reform uh in 1978 but uh recently China started to use the economic corion more frequently to achieve uh its political and diplomatic goals diplomatic gos and the according to the different studies the number of the economic cor has been changed but uh the mer which is the the Chinese the German uh Institute identified about like 123 cive cases between 2010 and 20 2022 and the Australian organization also uh the identified the the similar

numbers of the uh The Happening of the Chinese economic cors then uh uh even though actually there is the uh no consensus about the uh the definition of the economic corion but at least we can say that um economic corion is the using economic means to achieve political goals and economic means include the exploiting the economic vulnerabilities and dependencies through trade investment and foreign a measures so uh in terms of the uh the counter measures from the other Target uh countries actually the Victor cha recently

identified for different types of the count measures the first one was the kind of like a prioritizing Economic Security and developing capabilities to detect disruptions in advance and the second counter measures might be uh the um adopting the trade diversification uh along with the strengthening domestic capabilities or like localization if possible and the third target the third C measures is uh the relocating their core sourcing and production chains uh by using the re shuring or the FR shuring and finally uh

the target countries can also use the kind of like uh the mitigation uh tools uh which can advocately uh support the or which can advocately grant the monetary Assistance or monetary assistance with who to the uh the the fs or the entities who are uh sanctioned by the economic cors so uh in table one actually I try to uh make the kind of like the comparison between the economic corion from China and Japan towards South Korea and by identifying that kind of uh the differences uh I'd like to trace the what kind of factors or I'd

like to uh answer that why do Target countries like such as South Korea use different tools as the as a counter measures to economic corion so uh the first factor is we can say that the the formality so in terms of the formality uh the Chinese uh economic sanction has been very informal but in in Japanese case it has been much more formal ways so Chinese uh the Japanese government uh actually um the the imposed the export control on the three uh the critical materials and also excluded the South Korea from the uh the

white list and uh in terms of the the scope of sanctions uh the Chinese cotion was more much more comprehensive so it started from the uh the Banning of the K culture products or k culture performances uh in in in Chinese territory and uh it's kind of like controversial but uh the EV baries which is produced in Chinese territory uh by the Korean companies were not eligible to getting the subties from the the Chinese government and it uh expanded to the uh the the the retail sections such as the lot Mart and the lot department

stores and it also expanded to the like the tourism but uh in terms of the the scope of sanctions the Japanese the economic corion was much more uh kept kept in their very small yard so it has been mainly targeting the the three important materials which directly related to the semiconductor and display uh uh display sectors and uh in terms of the strategy importance of targeted interest in Industries uh the the Chinese targeting targeted industry has been uh has the much lower uh the importances or

strategic importance compared to the the the Japanese targeted Industries which is the directory related to semiconductor and the display sectors and in terms of the scope of the targeted Firs actually um the the Chinese uh Corf case shows that uh it is mainly targeted one form the lot in the retail uh industry and the many small and medium Enterprises in the tourism Industries and but uh in in Japanese cases actually the entire value chain of semiconductor and display sector was the targeted by the the Japanese uh the the

economic uh corations so uh uh if I summarize the uh the the reg of the uh the economic coration from China and Japan actually we can say that the Chinese economic sanction or the economic cor has been in former and it was more like kind of like a comprehensive the carpet bombing coration against the uh relatively low strategic sanctions and even though actually it caused a huge loss of the uh the economic uh huge loss of the about like estimated 0.5% of the Korea's GDP so it made the huge scars in terms of

economic uh economic ways but uh but uh but the Korea's accounter measures are mainly uh uh it was mainly about the the mitigation measures so there was no explicit or the prompt compensation to L and so uh but and the the the the Chinese economic uh cor actually did not change the polic trajectory of the deployment of uh th but left the the Deep scars in the batal um the relationship and if I uh if we uh the summarized the the Japanese case study actually it was much more like the clear and uh then the Japanese government took

the kind of like official means of the cor and uh the targeted sanction was the captain IND the more like like the small yard and the targeted sectors was much more highly uh strategic important sectors uh so uh the from the Korean uh the the reaction or the counter measures uh the Korean government uh very prompt ly utilized kind of like centralized response to the centralized response so the the Korean government made the the policy tools to localize the those uh the three materials and try to help the

the the companies to diversify the sourcing targeted materials and actually even the the the the the Japanese uh the economic cor also failed to change the the the Supreme Court's ruling so the the Japanese government could not achieve the its short-term goal but the Japanese demands were reflected when the new president Yun came into Powers so uh by summarizing the this uh two case studies uh I can uh draw kind of like a two um kind of like a theoretical implications so first one is first one is as seen India the two case studies of

economic cor from China and Japan uh it is not easy to achieve their political proposal economic corion in the short term so in situations of economic corosion the target country tend to prepare counter measures appropriate appropriate to the situation and is not willing to easily comprise with the political demand of the cursive country so ultimately uh considering the difficulties in discussing building Collective resilience based on their deterence by punishment amid various discussion on China's economic cor an

approach based on the DET by denial also need to be actively considered so a deterence by denial means actually or this aims to prevent on adversary from taking an uned action not through fear of punishment but rather through a fear of failures so making public China's economic cion has a poor track record uh or the the the the poor p track record and maximizing the reputation and the economic cost of the manable economic corion is not the perfect one but uh it can be kind of like a very lowcost deterr

strategy we can uh used as a collectively and the second uh in the long run actually the policy change in the Target country is only possible usually through the uh operation of internal interest groups so it's kind of like the the harsh manic logic that uh increased economic interdependence can create a new interest group in other country that can exert political pressure on the government and these kind of things can equally applicable to the situation of the weaponization of economic interdependence or the the the

weaponization of the economic cors so from the the long perspective advantages for economic cor to be targeted rather than a carpet bomb to expect interest group to play a role in the Target countries so after all so in order to the win the hearts and minds of interest groups in a Target country the discipline formalized and precise ction can have the some effect or might have better effect in the long run I step in here thank you thank you very much uh he gave us a very good comparative uh case

studies about two corion case I suddenly wonder if there is any case in which China accepted it as a cion is there anyone uh if not why now we have three excellent discussions uh one the first discussion is uh prophecy iwang from a university and Professor iuk from Korea University and Professor sahir from University of Tokyo uh he's now currently a visiting Professor to so National University uh I think you are a designated discussant but you may want to cross comments on other uh papers as well especially if uh Professor s has

something to tell about Japanese case of coion on South Korea think it will be interesting if you want to now uh let me invite Professor wangi uh thank you professor John yeah actually uh as a discussant I am supposed to I mean criticize uh Professor uh Quick's uh uh presentation but Frankly Speaking I do not have a found any major mistake error or Forge actually his analysis is very uh EX excellent H his argument is uh uh clearcut and uh there are many good evidence I mean to support his argument uh this is why I do not I mean

need to uh uh summarize I mean his PR presentation as well uh rather I would raise a couple of questions uh that are related to the uh hatching strategy my first question is uh about the uh Huawei actually uh uh there are many I mean uh controversies about the Huawei uh Telecom equipment but how about Huawei mobile phone is there any difference between Huawei Telecom equipment and uh uh hu mobile phone actually uh uh as far uh as far as not uh huawe and other I mean uh Chinese mobile phone uh from Oppo Vivo and shami is quite

popular in many Southeast Asian uh countries and my second question is the uh uh about the RO of the United States it's a Hing uh strategy is uh uh taken I mean in the context of the US uh China and strategic competition but this analysis is only uh focus on the uh the Chinese perspective but how about the uh the role of United States May uh I think that if America can provide an alternative to Huawei I mean Telecom equipment the Southeast Asian countries would choose a different I mean options of different uh uh

project uh in that sense I think the uh uh ban Road initiative is not the best option I'm a PR perspective the Southeast Asian country but can be a second best option why because America has no alternative to the Chinese initiative and uh my uh third question is about the domestic politics actually in many South Asia country is a democracy and in a normal democracy regim change uh tends to uh policy shift probably I mean in uh in the countries I mean you analyze uh there there'll uh be uh many I mean policy shift I suppose I mean you

mention P options uh is there any country I mean change I mean the shift their policy I mean during the uh 5G project yeah this is my third question and my final question is about the Korean case I think the the Korean government exclude I mean uh Huawei uh Telecom equipment gradually and very quietly not to make a trouble with China if uh this is the case I would I mean classify the Korean case as a light Hing what you think about my assessment but I I think that I mean Professor Sun Also I mean can uh reply

my final question thank you am am I right okay okay I'm youngly and I thank organizer for organizer organizer for inviting me to be a discuss for this wonderful panel and Professor Le paper uh Professor Le paper is really um Pleasant to read and uh indeed paper does uh do I think a great service to those of us who are interested in evolution of South Korea's um Economic Security strategies over the last 60 years in other words uh quite a few walks uh have recently attempt to uh analyze the nature of South Korea's econ

economic uh security policy but none of them seems to be so successful to accomplish the task so in my view uh Professor Le uh paper offers much needed comprehensive and systematic account of it and uh with the case of South Korea's uh high technology policy policies uh the paper does uh that by uh identifying as he mentioned already in his presentation uh four key features of South Korea's economic security policy they are uh countering uh economic Coalition mitigating structural vulnerabilities strengthening Tech

sovereignty and finally inducing International cooperation so as much as I like this paper I was in trouble when I prepare my my comments it is simply because I might have nothing to say so discussion to my embarrassment so last night I squeezed myself I squee the paper to uh say a few things about about so I have three uh comments and suggestions as a result okay so my first comment is on uh supplying some conceptual definitions of um Economic Security and geoeconomics early on in this paper both uh concepts are Central

to uh this paper but our scholary community has not yet reached agreements on what they EX exctly mean and how we operationalize them uh as such offering working definition of these two terms would give readers much easier time to follow the paper's analysis including such an expression as economic security strategy responding to geoeconomic challenges on page three so relatedly the concept of tactical linkages and substantive linkages are usefully suggested early on as two mod of Economic Security linkages but they are

rarely reconnected to a subsequent discussion so I I suggest that the paper might need a tighter linkage between these two concepts and the following empirical analysis that's that that's my uh first comment and second comment is concerned with the question of where the four features of South Korea's Economic Securities are directed at uh in current form countering economic coion mitigating structural vulnerabilities uh strengthening Tech sovereignty and finally inducing International cooperation are all

directed against China so I do understand this formulation in the midst of us China strategy competition but at the same time there are some aspects of South Korean Economic Security Security in critical tension with US policies uh therefore I think some adjustment is needed uh in this regard when the paper is to be revised uh my fin final comment is about organization of the paper uh in the third section of the paper entitled high technology as Nexus between economy and and security uh subsection entitled securing industrial

policy techn Technology Innovation NEX Nexus in my view needs to be moved up into introduction of the paper uh it is simply because a subsection deals mainly with conceptual distinction between traditional industrial policies and economic security strategies so I'm not sure if my comments make any meaningful suggestion to the future of the paper uh but uh I look forward to reading Fuller version of the paper or book shortly thank you I stop here thank you uh thank you uh thank you very much for inviting me eii

uh this is my great pleasure to read all three papers in advance and uh but I'm a designated uh commentator to uh discussion for Professor Kim yonin but before going to my comment to Professor Kim let me just pose just one question to each uh previous speakers first to my friend uh CH uh uh Chen quick uh I really love your paper of course as usual but my just one small question is because as a two speaker today uh you know discuss about economic coion so uh economic coion so I think we understand

your perspective on you know hitching but um if some country especially light hitching countries uh got uh strong economic coion could they really maintain their position this is just a my small question but you know this is a little bit different angle to you know discuss about uh economic I hedging in Economic Security and my uh small question to Professor Lee uh so iide of course as usual enlightened by your papers but uh in the very very last part you discussed high technology as a leverage for international cooperation

and of course you know as my previous discussion say uh this is very excellent point but my question is yes we have to do it we have to seek the uh seek uh try to use uh high technology as a leverage but by what mechanism we can do uh so this is uh just another very small question to you so to Professor Kim uh I love your paper but before going to the detail uh just let me put economic coion in a bigger context context because everybody uh start to discuss Economic Security uh recent years but as

Professor Lee said we don't have any particular definition so I decently pick up what kind of areas we have to discuss in Economic Security and I recently prepared one slide and it has 20s areas uh in Economic Security starting from like critical mineral management infrastructure management supply chain patent management security clearance export control semiconductor policy industrial security cyber security human rights due deligence data security International standardization fighting against disinformation and econic

coion so so I think uh but you know even though you know we have to admit economic coion is one very important part of Economic Security but we uh every countries have to make a preparation for each areas so this is a really big challenge for us now uh especially data security will come up very soon as a very uh can say important areas uh and we have to uh make our domestic role enhance our domestic role and preparation for that but having said that economic coion is again you know very important topics now and G7

countries of course including Korea as invited guest this year uh made a a really big achievement uh this year's hirosima Summit and they discuss how to deter they use the word deter how you how they use uh deter bance against economic coion so G7 countries are now very busy in discussing the new SEC New Economic Co anti-economic coion platform I don't know still what kind of things they really will create deterence by denial deterence by punishment we don't know but maybe uh because some countries actually including Japan

attemp to for temp to include some aspect of punishment so the new mechanism might have some uh you know deterence by uh punishment uh scheme but the main focus might be deterrence by denial but anyway so uh many count start to discuss including G7 but also EU EU recently published a New Economic Security strategy but they discuss uh eu's way uh you know ACI against econic coion Japanese government also is say to publish a new security Economic Security strategy report or something but I don't I don't have any particular information

on that at this moment but you know every country has big interest and uh preparation uh on economic coion and the reason why especially Japan are now very uh how can I say serious about that is we are now having economic coion from China after uh Japan government decision uh to uh uh to uh dispose arpus uh arpus water from fushia uh to uh Pacific Pacific Sea to the Pacific but anyway so uh now it is very important for us to discuss about theion we know that very well so let me just give us some question and comments to

papers and really important papers uh but uh I think first of all we have have to distinguish the Chinese way and Japanese way uh but before going to that even though I said Japanese way we only had one case but unfortunately that was against your country I'm very sorry for that and prime minister AB actually he left before assassination actually after assassination this is published but uh before assassination he left interview and and that book is published already and he admit he wanted to use economic

coion against against Korea because of political reason not you know export control why do you think is just a you know kind of bureaucratic reasoning right so we know that very well now after you know uh his uh B his interview publish but you know don't let don't you know take us long because that was only one very exceptional case right and Japan's case was also very exceptional because Japan's case we use our EX export to Korea as our you know tools but in China's case they normally use import as as the two right of course in

Korea case you know it is more uh more complicated because they also use as methods like you know they even um how can say um uh try to punish a Lotte uh and other companies in China uh by other legal measures but in most cases China triy to use their power to buy from another country in Japan's case we they you know Japan Government tried to use the power to export to you know sell uh important goods so I think this is very important you know for us to take a note right and and in in the future you know

we will see more and more econic coion from China not Japan you know don't take me long again right but I don't I really don't think Japan government will repeat the same mistakes but China will make the same mistakes again and again in the future even though we know economic coion in most cases failed you know to satisfy uh their political and diplomatic uh objectives so uh we really have to distinguish Japan's case and uh Chinese case and for Chinese case you know uh their power to purchase or you know

invest uh is the source of the power we have to take notes of that and and my another comment uh to Professor Kim's paper is even though you pick up four areas or four say four factors uh you know to distinguish Japan's case and Chinese case but I think the another important factor is ambiguity I mean because the success of China and failure of Japan is really up to uh we I mean Korea didn't know how much and by when uh until when uh the sanction would take place right so and they are always very ambiguous in and

also in scope of sanction so ambiguity is ambiguity was very important uh to make a big success in E coion so you know we I mean as a targeted country Target country uh so how can we you know uh make a counter measure against China if they do this strategy very well you know keeping ambiguity right so I think that still I believe you know what we really have to do is to team up over the country like including South Korea Japan United States and Australia and other countries but my final comment is

United States is not very reliable in economic coion they always admit that they always say we cannot let Market access for many times right they try to limit Market access even though their allies are targeted so I think you know we really have to rescue ourselves you know among allies and partners so for that sake I think you know we have to know you know what is China's strategy and but the my you know again my point is China strategy or China use of economic coion is always very ambigious we don't know what is the real

political aims we don't know next to which area they will employ coion so this is my last comment thank you very much thank you very much uh for excellent uh discussion uh we have some time but uh I think uh if you listen to the answers from the presenters we may uh be short of time so let me collect questions from the floor if you have uh so if you have any questions or comments to presenters or discussants one question for the panel um the unpredictability it was mentioned by a couple of you within American

domestic politics and what that does to any sort of strategy hedging light or heavy balancing soft balancing any of these things it all seems to have been based at least normally in most of the work on Asian Security on a degree of stability and predictability in US foreign policy behavior and that's been thrown out the window and I just wonder both in terms of our academic work but also in terms of policymaking what you do with that if you have a solution let me know thank you that's a question that we'll

face after one year from now on so uh chuni please all right um thanks very much I think I have a question or questions from Chung from Professor Lee and my friend real sahashi and then I think I can relate uh to what alen if I may uh uh the very uh I would say spot on issue of unpredictability I think in IR among IR Community among IR literature we do use the word uncertainty a lot and that's uh I guess interchangeably with un predictability so um to uh if I can respond and then also relate to uh all

other questions that were posed to me is that I think that is the mother of everything right uncertainty if uh it's a certainly the most important factor for Hing Behavior because we can say that if things are certain there is no need to hedge make your decision either you want to align with us completely or you I you you align completely with China if you like completely with us we call it as a kind of like a straightforward decision same with bandwagoning with China can be straightforward but at the moment

because of uncertainty about two conditions States especially in Southeast Asia but also Beyond have decided to H until and unless that two conditions become more certain Hing behavior however imperfect impermanent will continue in one way or another and also bear in mind that my favorite saying Hing is often a policy without pronouncement meaning that uh countries H without saying and telling the whole world that hey we are Hing right because they would uh defeat the purpose so with that uh what are the two conditions that

allow me to uh relate uh to respond back so two conditions uh one is about threat perception the other one is about align support if you know exactly uh who is your number one threat across the board across the board black and white if you are in a black white situation no room for Hing you make decision if you see that China across the board threat race in economic insecurity and political and you know for certain you can count on us uh to to land the support that you need no need to hedge you just make the

decision no hedging but you are uncertain about both threat and also both uh the alliance support you will say that uh let's do what we have been saying in in Daily context right let's not put all eggs in one basket that's what Hing in layman term right you are don't burn the bridge keep the options open because you will never know things are uncertain and uh us was mentioned you were referring to the domestic context I think countries uh in Asia particularly I think us airies and partners are even more nervous everybody

is nervous airies and partners are even more nervous because of trump might come back right that is the largest uncertainty uh domestically for us but externally for all of us all countries right so uh something beyond our control but it does affect us because it it does affect that to what extent and for how long we can count on a us or US card to counterbalance whatever a trap assessment right so uh that I think I hope by that I answer uh the very fact that uh uh and that allow me to relate to uh uh real question of whether or not

the Hing WEA light or heavy will last forever right nothing lasts forever right nothing lasts forever since we are in Korea very uh plainly uh and that relate to Professor Lee I think I agree with you uh Coral seems to be light Hing rather than heavy Hing light Hing as I said are those that uh see uh heavy haing are those that who see RIS in a darker shapes very seriously very nervous and are more determined to take actions to counter track mitigate the risk and more ready more open to review that kind of concern right to Define

even the sources so from how we see in Southeast Asia we thought the South Korea's policy has been shifting quite a bit from moon to Yen moon it's a very light Hing y seems to be like much Havier if not already a balancing but much heavier in the sense that earlier for example South China see a South Korea keep distance right uh you you're concerned about that but you don't really want to make it a very open same with the Taiwan but these are all kind of like shifting so on and so forth so I think uh the best way to respond to that

would be to relate to the certainty issue certainty about the Align support and certainty about the threat and perception right so nothing is uh last forever but when conditions change countries evolve accordingly South Korea is one example another example would be uh Vietnam right and also uh uh uh Philippines Philippines from DTE to Cent bong bong you see that it's like Hing to a heavy Hing if not already balancing right and why is that track perception change China's action it is a source of issues and then again us factor is

another issue right the real test will be next year if and when Trump does come back let's see uh to what extent and how many countries policy will be shifting again that will be a real test uh to see whether the so-called Hing theory of saying that the he threat perception and also aect support that will be the primary one so with that uh let me very quickly uh turn to the issue of uh waging right perfect uh Chason is always a spot on right uh in I literature we also say that small states hit big

Powers wtch right so H and W sounds very similar but uh you know it's a very different depending on where you see whether you are small countries or you are big Powers small countries because of you are much more weaker and smaller you are more vulner vable you'll be more affected by uncertainty and also their implications you know that you need to be cautious big Power because of capability superiority you can do a lot of things not everything but a lot of things so it's natural for big powers to

wage whenever possible and China is not the only big Power that have the tendency to do that right but to relate your question to respond to your question I would say that we need to uh U make distinction between two kind of scenarios one scenario China definitely is exploiting the differences across smaller countries in Southeast Asia but there but it's not always the case there are also cases where you do see that uh China might want to wage but cannot do that so what are the two uh type of cases one is uh cases where involve

Collective action as a group Asians as a group the policy decision on South China Sea China does try to W exploiting uh LA and Cambodia for example who do not have direct State on South China Sea to have position that more C Insight collap overlap with China uh so that is the first time I think that's quite natural the second type 5G and uh you know digital connectivity issue this is a decision at the national level bilateral relations not Collective so China might want to wage but you know individual

asan countries individual Southeast Asian states make our own decision so China does not really have the rumor to which but China what is doing it's you can say a counter Hing whatsoever China does try to win over countries who are uh excluding China uh in the earlier rounds and uh never give up try to persuade by many means time because of time I can only very quickly share two examples right one is Malaysia and then the other one is uh Singapore Malaysia despite the light heding approach earlier round under and that's profly a

question whether government Chang policy change or not the answer is yes uh not always but chances are higher so in the case of Malaysia we uh did have few rounds of government changes unfortunately so earlier government moini government made the decision of choosing ericon yeah there was a time we had the workshop early on uh choosing Ericson over Huawei but there was a commercial decision because of uh Aron offer much better uh uh package is not because of politics or job politics and now fast forward to today under

different government an ibraim government an Ibrahim is perceived as someone very close to us right he made the decision recently by allowing the second Network and saying openly that this second Network that is going to open the next year meaning the next month and onwards would allow a Huawei to take part so meaning that we are know Malaysian government is now uh taking uh you know actions political change to allow for so call quote unquote technological neutrality right technological neutrality of trying uh to

make decisions that allow smaller countries Us in Southeast Asia to uh send signal to both competing Powers us and China that when we make decision those are specific not across the board so nothing personal so Malaysian government is one case another example would be the case that the Singapore's decision as I mentioned earlier on uh of choosing uh two from us back company two from Chinese back company for the data center so examples can go on but uh uh fundamentally I think Hing means that it's not permanent we know it has its

own problems but country's governments will adjust accordingly as the level of threat evolve as the level of Ali support evolve we do not have Crystal at all but we do know that if I theory is anything to go by these two conditions will determine whether when and for how long Hing will uh evolve either for digital connectivity or other uh Interstate Corporation issues thank you yeah Chi so your theory of hedging is getting better and better huh yeah so yeah thank you Professor uh lee for your yeah insightful comments

and questions yeah uh Professor Lee always touches upon the fundamental issues rather than detailed one like uh specific issues and then like actually his question and comments always uh push me to think more thoroughly to come up with the more refined ideas and sophisticated uh methods uh but I think his questions are somehow actually related to each other so I would like to lump them together uh to answer in know kind of the wholesale manner the first one is that the conceptual issues the differences between geoeconomics and

economic security actually by the class according to the classic definition uh by geoeconomics you usually mean the country's mobilization of economic means to achieve foreign policy objectives so in that regard actually the basic assumption is that there is a hierarchical relationship between the economy and security security as a goal and the economy or economic as a uh means so but Point here is that in the age of the 21st century and in the age of the hyper uncertainty actually the more important is the uh how to link the

economy and uh Security in that regard the linkage matters more than the just like uh how to mobilize the economic means to achieve the foreign policy objectives in that regard I would say the uh the how to link the economy and security is all the uh fundamental question we have to think about in that regard I in my paper I uh uh addressed some issues related to the differences between the techical linkages and substantial uh substantive linkages actually uh in my presentation I stress that in order to effectively link the

economy and security you need a Nexus right without Nexus it is almost equivalent to the economic cion uh that has to do with the Tactical linkages actually great Powers attempt to link the econom and security without believing that they are really or practically linked together then why do we why do they do that they try to attempt the or uh pursue the Tactical linkages for the goal of the uh eliciting compromise or concession from the weaker countries so in that regard is tactical linkage is more more or less

about the economic C so we have to make a differentiation between the Tactical and sub substantive uh linkages and Professor W Le question about uh South Korea's hedging or light hedging strategy I I have to confess that I'm a big fan of your theory and then uh but one thing I have to tell you is that like in my understanding hatching should not be evaluated or assessed B on the basis of the individual case rather hatching is a more or less a national strategy we have to uh put them together all all the individual cases and then to

evaluate the hedging strategy as a national strategy in that regard many countries try to combine different policies and sometimes uh many countries try to adopt different strategies with counterveiling effects toward each other so like the exclusive focus on one individual case may not enough to explain the nature of the hatching strategy at the national level so correct me if I'm wrong and uh yeah real Point yeah always important like how is right uh yeah in my presentation I stress that South Korea tries to take

advantage of high technology as a means to uh pursue International cooperation with other countries particularly like-minded countries uh I think we have to understand the peculiar nature of the current situation uh because like only one hand every country is is indeed interested in nurturing indous indigenous Industries right but at the same time you have to stay inclusive as much as possible actually in the past actually usually industrial policy uh tends to focus on exclusively focus on the nurturing the domestic companies and

domestic Industries but this is stage of again the hyp uncertainty you have to create the more inclusive ecosystem of high Technologies that's one of the reasons why you need International cooperation on the one hand you have to nurture and strengthen the industrial competitiveness of your own industry at the same time given that no single country can be fully autonomous on their own so that's why you need cooperation so on the one hand like Pursuit Of technological sovereignty on the other hand you have to seek the inclusive

international corporation this is not actually good matches in the normal days but given that this is the hyper uncertain at age of hyper uncertainty you have to combine those two counterveiling or conflicting objectives into one national uh uh strategy or economic uh security strategy in that regard is it's going to be a very challenging task but that's the thing you have to uh address in the coming months and years yeah let me stop this uh thank you so much uh Professor Sashi uh for your very uh constructive and uh

critical comment and I know that uh you have a very uh thorough knowledge about the economic coration and in our like uh the previous Workshop I uh actually got uh many uh good lessons from your presentation so I uh and actually uh at the beginning you mentioned about uh we have to think about economic cion from the the big picture I I totally agree with that and so this is kind of like a the initial uh kind of like how can I say the scratch paper of the uh doing a new project so I will uh thinking about

I will try to embed that kind of a big picture in this paper and you mentioned about the the anti-economic corion mechanism which is uh discussed by at the the G7 level or the EU level and actually the the Victor CH actually arguing that we have to make kind of a collective resilience by taking kind of a deterence by punishment measure but as you know it is very costly and very difficult to uh maneuver collectively so uh for example like uh at the the policy level when I have a chance to talk with the the government

officials uh the probably the very first step to make kind of the anti- corve measure might be kind of information sharing between countries so let's do kind of a the only oneing information information sharing mechanism together but then usually the every the government official said that actually it's not doable yeah we cannot cause the private actors to uh report uh their any kind of information to us and usually the the private sector worrying about the retaliation from the CH the Chinese side so it is very difficult to collect

that kind of information so even making that kind of information sharing is very difficult and impossible than uh how about making kind of a the let everybody knows that that actually the China's uh the economic corion has been shows very bad track record so just let them know then that will be much easier way to uh develop the the the the next step of the the the anti-is mechanism that's the my idea and the third thing is about the the the Japanese case actually uh you mentioned about the ABS interview uh if

you share that interview with me then I will really appreciate that and so you probably know my email address so yeah looking for your reply and uh yeah you me you you're right the the Japanese case is a very uh outlier and exceptional case and that is actually very good candidate for the the the the case study the the qualitative method right so uh this is the kind of like outlier so uh by uh taking care of that kind of outli outlier seriously then uh I think we can develop or we can uh make some of the theore the the

contribution and about the uh the fourth thing about the ambiguity actually yeah uh you mean that uh I know that actually that the ambiguity might be a better uh the phrase to talking about the informality or so in in here actually I did not Define what the how to define the the four factors I I used in in this short paper so uh at least I I thought about that uh the Chinese economic corion is taking kind of a happening in the gry zone and it takes about the informal ways but uh uh probably ambiguous or ambiguity might be a better

uh T to capture the uh the Chinese economic Coury behaviors I will so thinking about seriously in the later and uh finally you mentioned about the uh the US and us is not reliable in dealing with the economic corion and the the the purpose the Carson also mentioned about is there any kind of uh the the ways of dealing with the the the the US domestic uh uncertainty in each countries so uh I think uh yeah the US might be a very uh important factor in dealing with these kind of things and uh even in the the so so yeah uh probably

yeah I do not have uh any specific answer for that but uh in when I U developing the uh the paper in the future then I will also uh thinking about the the implication of the US domestic uncertainty and more seriously and actually the professor J J also mentioned about whether China has been targeted economic corion by other country and uh in my understanding actually the thanks to the uh the asymmetry relations uh the China is more exposed to the uh the economic sanctions rather than uh economic cors so right

now we are witnessing the many different types of the sanctions on the semiconductor sectors to the uh to the to to China and the main difference between the economic cion and sanction might be it's a much more former and the rationals behind the sanction should be legal and Rule based so at least because of the the Chinese U kind of like simet relations and the biggest trade partner with the other countries uh China usually tend to be exposed to the economic sanction rather than the economic cion that's my understanding

right thank you uh thank you very much uh yesterday and today we uh dealt with four important issues and I think Economic Security issues is also very important so we addressed a lot of issues uh had a very rich discussion uh but I think there are a lot of challenges and tasks ahead so uh I think we need to continue uh this uh discussion we have focused on Military security issues so far because we uh face a lot of military challenges from North Korea and uh from surrounding countries but I think this is emerging

issues will be very important so I guess eai and other colleagues will continue to have this kind of discussion so uh please join me thanking this excellent panelist today thank you