[EAI International Conference]

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I44uOWz2UXA

The East Asia Institute (EAI) held an international conference on "Security Challenges and Responses in the Post-COVID-19 Era: Climate Change, Infectious Diseases, Economic Security, and Cyber Security" on December 11 and 12. The session on "US-China Strategic Competition and Economic Security" featured a presentation by Professor Kuik Cheng-Chwee on the hedging strategies of Southeast Asian countries in response to US-China competition, a presentation by Professor Lee Seung-ju, Director of the EAI Trade, Technology, and Transformation Research Center (and Professor at Chung-Ang University), on the economic security challenges and strategies facing South Korea, and a presentation by Professor Kim Yong-shin of Inha University, who discussed the implications of economic coercion using comparative case studies of China's THAAD retaliation and Japan's export restrictions on semiconductor materials. Discussions followed each presentation by Professor Lee Wang-hui of Ajou University, Professor Lee Yong-wook of Korea University, and Professor Sasa Hitoshi of the University of Tokyo.

■ Contact and Editing: Park Han-soo EAI Researcher

Contact: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | hspark@eai.or.kr

Video Transcript

thank you very much uh this is the last session of this conference uh we all know that the time is really limited so I'll just go directly to the excellent presentation of three presenters today so uh let me very briefly introduce three presenters first uh we have chuni Creek Professor uh from national university of Malaysia uh he's a head of Asian Studies Institute of Malaysia and intentional studies so uh he came yesterday leaving tomorrow so it's a short visit only for this conference I really thank him for coming

to this conference today uh we have Professor sunji who doesn't actually need any introduction he's a professor at chungang University uh he also works for the eai uh there is a one Center which is technology and uh trade technology and transformation Research Center uh at East Asia Institute uh the last third presenter is Yong Shin Kim who is also a very famous Professor from inhi University so uh these three presenters is cover the issue of us China strategic competition related to Economic Security issues how

Southeast Asian countries uh respond to this serious competition meet Hightech uh technology competition uh and also Professor Lee will cover South Korea's perspective how we uh have uh try to have a better uh Economic Security strategy and also Professor Kim will deal with case studies how South Korea has suffered from economic coion from China and Japan so I think with these three presentation will make a very good combination of how the economic qu these days uh making troubles for Southeast Asian countries and South Korea as well

uh so let me first invite uh Dr quick thanks very much uh Professor T Mr moderator and also my good friend for your kind introduction uh very good afternoon uh to everyone um let me Begin by thanking the organizer uh eii particularly Professor son and also his colleagues his team for having me here um when uh sju my good friend uh contacted me a few weeks ago uh his instruction for uh my task today was very clear which is that uh he wants me to provide a cation perspective about the very big issue of uh us China

technological competition and I have chosen to uh focus on a 5G issue mainly because of uh you as we know technology competition is quite broad uh but there is also another reason why I thought I would choose to do that because of this is very much part and parcel of a bigger project that uh sju Professor Le has been uh leading over the last one two years and also because of during uh that uh uh process the workshop process I was very fortunate to have uh Yong Shin uh as a discusson who gave me a a series of

a very good constructive feedback I've addressed uh uh most of that I think but clearly I think that there are still some gaps and I thought uh this conference this panel would be a good opportunity for me to present and hopefully to get more feedback uh later on so with that in mind uh I would do uh three tasks I would talk about three things about how about why and also about the so what issue that is how sou Asian countries responded to a us China 5G competition why country are responding rather differently and also

the soat issue usually we talk about soat towards the end but for this panel for this uh audience uh let me talk about the soat issue so that uh I would put things in perspective the so issue is that although I'm focusing on Southeast Asian States responses I think uh it uh actually is a important case about middle State responses middle States the meaning what those countries who are sandwiched between us on the one hand and China on the other hand middle States refer to those countries who are

sandwich between the two competing Powers southeast Asia is one set but clearly there are many other sets of countries so uh how and why s responses the way might not be just a matter of Southeast Asia it clearly offer some uh kind of parallel observations for other countries as well so with that in mind let me uh quickly talk about the how and also the why issue the how issue is quite uh straightforward uh we can say that uh out of 10 asan countries every single country have respond that uh there are some overlapping but there are

some differences as well I think it is also very important again for this uh uh panel because of the time limit to say that there are two very broad responses among the 10, countries two approaches on the one hand you can say that Vietnam and Singapore have uh excluded Huawei in their 5G uh roll out but the rest of uh Assan region the other eight countries have adopted rather uh different approaches instead of excluding Huawei excluding Chinese Tech firms they have actually very openly receptively engaged and partner with

Huawei in a 5G and many other issues so now uh to make it uh in a more teatical way how best to describe these kind of uh differences across the asan countries I would use the term heavy Hing to describe Vietnam and Singapore's approaches of excluding uh Huawei and Chinese uh Platforms in their 5G R out and I will use the term the opposite of heavy Hing in this sense light haing to describe the rest of Asian countries so uh Malaysia Indonesia Thailand Philippine so on and so forth have adopted like haing so you would be

wonder why I use the word heavy haing and light Hing for very good reason not just academic but polical reasons because of uh some would say that I know mainstream uh uh kind of commentaries out there have say that because of V Vietnam and Singapore have chosen to uh exclude Huawei and therefore we can easily quickly see them as anti-china and pro us this is perhaps the easier way to understand but a wrong one a wrong one that in Southeast Asia and we don't have to be citizens in Vietnam and Singapore to tell us that when Vietnam

and Singapore make the choice of excluding Huawei from 5G they are doing it they're making that decisions based on their owner interest calculation not because of they anti-china not because of they siding with us in this competition so this is the first reason why heavy Hing is more useful to make it clear that the decision of excluding Huawei or part of Vietnam and Singapore is not about the so-called really St balancing rejecting a Chinese power siding with the opposite power of United States that would be too simplistic

heavy Hing means that and uh and that the distinguisher heavy Hing approach with light Hing in the sense that both haes heavy Hing or light Hing they see some risk from China but also are the power dynamics heavy haers are those who see much heavier darker shapes of racek in terms of China Vietnam and Singapore see a higher racek from uh the security race associated with China and heavy hes are also those that who are more determined to adopt risk mitigation efforts to counter to mitigate those per

R heavy hes also those who are more ready to defy to say no to China but doing that selectively and uh they are haers because of they do things selectively while emphasizing about Vietnam and Singapore are excluded a China from a f from a 5G we should also put things in context in the sense that Vietnam and Singapore only do this selectively they are not like Banning a Huawei they are not Banning Chinese Tech firms all out in fact they still allow despite the specific exclusion of excluding Huawei from 5G rad outs is

only limited to that particular aspect on other aspects even on technology compet competition including Big Data data centers they have actually allowed China and including Huawei to operate one good evidence and quick evidence was that if you follow the news just a few months ago Singapore had a tender of data centers in Singapore so the results two went to us back companies not surprising there but also two went to uh China if Singapore is really uh kind of like taking a taking a Sit approach Singapore would not have done that which

is why they are kind of doing it selectively and the examples can go on and on so now with the remaining time let me very quickly uh to move on to um uh the why issue right why uh you know uh there is a distinction between across the 10, countries where Singapore and Vietnam have a chosen heavy haer approach while others like Hing approach yeah and um um before I move on elaborate the why and reasons and issues uh I think there are also a number of points that we can uh highlight and for those of you uh who are interested uh

you're most welcome to go through uh the text that I shared uh with uh the organizers I think the good way to illustrate to measure the light Hing versus heavy hings is to use the three indicators in mind the three indicators are indicators of Hing behavior in Internet ational relations the first one is about the active neutrality actively signaling that we are not taking SS so Vietnam and Singapore while making that decision of excluding Huawei from 5G they keep emphasizing that this is our own

decision our own calculation it's not about siding with one power over the other active neutrality not just passively talking about they neutral but actively are doing so and the second indicator is about the inclusive diversification all countries especially weaker and small countries want to diversify their Partnerships including digital Partnerships and they do so inclusively Vietnam and Singapore are the one that exclusive but as I said only selective they only are exclusive in selectively 5G digital insecurity

issue on other things they still inclusively engage China in e-commerce in a data center in many other strategic and also developmental issues the third and also a final indicator of haing and this is so true for heavy haing and light Hing is that fallback position fallback position of we know that under uncertainty risk are multiple and also unpredictable so you need to have a for back position of just in case if things go wrong you do have some plans B you have contingency at the hold on to so

all heavy hges and light hes are doing these three things but heavy hings are the one that pursue diversification on selective basis as a indicator uh micro level 5G specific issue they exclude the China but on all other issues Vietnam and Singapore despite the fact that there are heavy hes they are still uh try to include the China in one way or another and this is so not just on econom iic sectors it is also a true even for security sector and hence you are seeing that on ground and over the last few weeks and few few months while

Singapore and Vietnam just like many other Regional countries collaborating with uh us on security issue but they are also doing the same some say the opposite with uh China the very source of security cooporation yeah uh and uh finally the remaining time let me as I said talk about the why so why uh explain the Hing approach why I explain uh what are the reasons they explain why uh there was a distinction between heavy haes and also light haer why only out of 10, countries only Vietnam and Singapore

are pursuing heavy approach of excluding Huawei from uh their 5G up there are multiple reasons to cut the long story short I think the first reason of course is the overall trap perception the more you are more concerned about China either security threat or political threat the more reasons that you adopt heavy hes because you won't take the risk very lightly but when your main threat deception is not about just about China you see a China as a part of problems but also part of solution for many other things that are

important for Rolling Elites you will be uh more willing to uh kind of uh uh deemphasize and also uh dou the kind of sources of threat so that's uh the first Factor threat perception vary Vietnam and Singapore see higher threat about China uh digital but also otherwise but other countries have a more relaxed and sangen threat perception Factor number one there are also other factor that have to do with a domestic for example the bureaucracy uh uh kind of a competency whether or not there is a inter agency competition

whether or not security uh establishments a gencies assessment it's Echo and overlap with foreign policy and also other management it matters a lot so and also internal capacity of uh uh uh other different countries at technological level Vietnam and Singapore are technologically more develop than others they have options of developing their own homegrown solution many other countries have to rely on external but this two are the main uh threat perception and also domestic factors are the secondary factors the

primary factor is the third factor and that be the final point I will share is about Elite ruling Elites domestic legitimation that is a single most important uh uh independent variable or the main factor that explain why Singapore and Vietnam have decided to make the trade off that in order to uh ensure maximize security they are willing to uh forgo some e economic benefits and on the other hand the other light hes they cannot forego the economic benefits because economic benefits Cent are Central elements to

their domestic legitimation for all countries in Southeast Asia performance legitimation to what extent for how long economic growth is not an issue of economic issue it's a political issue why is that because of all ruling Elites whether Democratic countries or authoritarian countri how they perform economically matters for their sources of political Authority and also a power whether or not they can continue to rule and therefore they are pay attention to developmental economic growth job creation and digital

connectivity is their priority and where in the case of they do not have much other external alternative they would want to embrace and collaborate with China because it does China and also Huawei and also digital SE road to provide the kind of a Economic Development and also a prospect that that to rely on that will translate into a political sources of support and Vietnam and and Singapore finally cannot do that because of uh domestic concerns push the ruling Elites in Vietnam and the Singapore that to take security

seriously in the case of Vietnam because of anti-china sentiment is very high and therefore the identity and legitimation do not allow any ruling Elites in Hanoi to relax the security assessment Singapore is the most interesting one because some say that because of uh CH Singapore being an ethic Chinese majority country should have more relaxed about the China factor or the rise of China but in reality because of the JW play context and more importantly domestic context we do know that uh Singapore do not see a rise of China so

much as a security threat or economic threat but more about political uh uh cause of concern why is that Singapore Elites see China's political or influence operation as a source of political challenges that will affect Singapore's multiat sociopolitical Fabric and therefore Singapore cannot take the security implication associated with China too lightly and hence the heavy Hing approach I will stop here thank you very much than thank you very much uh as you can uh see there is a very profound and

developed theory of a hatching in uh this presentation because Professor quick has developed a very good theory of a hatching so far uh in South Korea there is a tendency to uh view hatching as hesitating as a very passive uh reaction to great power is rivalry but he interprets hatching as a very active policy with delicate balance from policy makers perspective so uh there are a lot of lessons that we can learn from Southeast Asian cases uh one of my question is if there is a different kinds of hatching among the South Asian

countries can uh China uh exploit its differences among these countries uh such as you driving wedge between these countries harm erode thean Central quity so if you have time please let me know and then I will invite Prof Lee for South cus yeah thank you professor John uh yeah looking around actually I find that uh there's no female speaker in this panel actually like up to the session 3 we had pretty much like a gender equal sessions so I as a member of the organizing committee for this conference I have a kind of the guilty

feeling uh for not having a female speaker in this panel but uh I'll have to tell you that the uh eii does respect and support gender equality and then maybe next time we will try to include uh recruit uh the female speakers for this session uh actually in a sense my paper is kind of complimentary to Chen's paper actually cheni is mostly uh interested in uh looking into the differences between South Southeast Asian countries in terms of Economic Security strategy but my paper is more about the similarities and differences

across time in terms of South Korea's Economic Security so in that regard I think is our papers are quite complimentary to each other having said that uh I would say that the economic security has become a buzzword for the last several years and couple of factors that contributed to the emergence of the economic security uh in uh major countries uh I can name a few uh factors like first all first of all the US China strategic competition is uh one of the defining factors that the prompted uh the not just the United States but also

China and other countries to Russia to the economic security strategy particularly the Trump Administration actually Tred to identify the China's unfair trading practices and Define them as economic aggression which they believe will pose a threat to the US National Security so there is a linkage between National Security and economic security and also Global spread of the covid-19 is another factor that prompted the emergence of Economic Security worldwide actually because of the spread of the covid-19 the uh uncertainty in

World economic water has rapidly increased for the last several years and also Al prompted the proliferation of the nationalism and protectionism so the great deal number of countries were very much interested in promoting and pursuing their own National interest active at the expense of others and also in the wake of the covid-19 actually the number of countries actually experienced the so-called supply chain disruptions and then uh at the company level as well as the national level a lot of uh

countries and companies try to embrace the so-called just in case Paradigm departing away from the just in case just in time Paradigm which highlights the security implication of the supply chain disruptions so against this backdrop uh I would say that many countries try to attempt to create their own Economic Security strategy to safeguard their own national uh interest so in that regard I would say Korea is not an exception at all but however look looking closely so actual uh Korea's move to the economic security strategy

is far from a recent phenomena rather I would say from a long-term perspective the origin of South Korea's Economic Security strategy dates back to the early 1960s I in that regard I can find the both similarities on the one hand and the uh differences on the other hand in terms of the evolution of South Korea's Economic Security strategy so let me move on to the uh similarities or continuity in uh South Korea's Economic Security strategy the first feature predominant feature in terms of continuity is the reactiveness

of the South Korea's uh Economic Security strategy uh in the traditional uh Economic Security strategy actually South Korea took a very cautious approach to economic sanctions of course South Korea joined forces in participating the economic sanctions but primarily at the multilateral level and in that regard the economic sanctions has never taken a central role in ter in the South Korea's Economic Security strategy in that regard I think this kind of feature has continued to exist in the nowadays as South Korea is more

about is more interested in responding or reacting to the economic cive measures from great Powers such as China and Japan so in that regard the reactive nature of the South Korea Economic Security uh strategy has been a predominant feature of the South Korea's Economic Security strategy for the five to six decades another predominant feature is that the Mist nature actually from the outset I mean the in the 1960s South Korean government ambitiously launched its own industrialization strategy as demon demonstrated by the uh

export oriented industrialization actually in that regard actually one may argue that the South Korea's industrial industrialization strategy has the kind of the pretty much liberal nature but at the because South Korea actively triy to integrate itself into the world economy and try to liberalize trade policies but at the same time I would say uh the South Korea's industrialization strategy as well as trade policy do does have a very Mist nature because it specifically set the goal of catching up catching up

with other Advanced countries and also South Korea tried to liberalize its trade but at the same time it tried to liberalize only on a selective basis to promote and nurture the export oriented industri industrial Industries in that regard the Mist nature of is kind of built in into the South Korea's Economic Security strategy and then that nature still continues nowadays and the third feature of the South Korea's economy IC security strategy is that the combination of geoeconomic as well as geopolitical

responses uh again the dating back to the 1960s South Korea's industrial industrialization strategy was a basically geoeconomic responses to geoeconomic challenges actually at that time the Korean government conceptualized that South Korea is under mounting pressure as a late developer to catch up with the advanced countries and on on the other hand South Korea is also sandwiched where uh late late developer try to catch up with South Korea on the basis of the cheap labor uh cost in that regard South Korea was in a kind of

sandwich position between Advanced and late developing countries in that regard South Korea tries to meet with uh geopolitical challenges with the geopolitical responses at the same time South Korea in order to meet the GE political uh challenges had to come up with the so-called industrial upgrading strategy but on the other hand it is also a response to the geopolitical risks particularly given that in coming into the 1970s South Korea was under mounting security pressure from North Korea in that regard South Korea tried

to upgrade its own industrial uh structure to nurture defense related Industries so on the one hand it was industrial deepening strategy which is geopolitical responses on the other hand it was the uh National Security strategy which is which is designed to meet the geopolitical risks so having said that I also would like to highlight the changing nature of the South Korea's Economic Security strategy uh in this regard I would say the visibility of Technology particularly high technology uh has substantially increased in South Korea's

Economic Security strategy and then sou actually high technology took the central stage in terms of the South Korea's Economic Security strategy why the it I think first has to do with the impact of the US China strategic competition as is well known the US China strategic competition started out as a trade war between the two countries in N uh in 2018 and quickly both countries try to move the stage of the competition to high technology areas right so in that regard South Korea was forced to adopt the high technology as a

means to deal with the kind that kind of strategic challenges in that regard uh the visibility of high technology has become substantially uh increased for the last several years in terms of the South Korea's Economic Security strategy and and also South Korea paid attention to the high technology as a Nexus between the economy and security actually a lot of experts and Scholars talk about the linkages between the economy and security but in order to effectively link the two I mean the the economy and the security you need a

Nexus right and the high technology is one of the Nexus that can link effectively the economy and security but as you as you know South Korea is one of the few countries in the world with the capacity of the high technology so it is kind of the natural conclusion from the perspective of the South Korean government to take advantage of Hightech capability and incorporate those capability into the South Korea's Economic Security strategy so I would say that is the kind of the new future of the South Korea's Economic Security

strategy and the third one is that South Korea has made a lot of efforts to boost so-called Tex sovereignty as is well known in the cases of the South Koreans attempt to increase uh the competitiveness of the materials Parts and Equipment actually in a sense South Korea in that regard uh has been in transition for the last couple of years in terms of the uh Economic Security strategy on the one hand like boosting the uh competiveness of the parts materials and equipment is a kind of reactive measure

designed to deal with the economic cive measures from China and Japan but on the hand on the other hand I would say it is at the same time of preemptive measure in order to remedy the structural vulnerabilities of the South Korean uh high-tech Industries particularly Supply chains and then uh it may be useful to prevent the another occurrence of the economic cive measures from other countries such as China and and Japan and the last feature new feature of the uh South Korea's New Economic Security

strategy is that the South Korea tried to take advantage of high technology as a bargaining leverage to induce International cooperation as I told you in the beginning of the my presentation this is the age of the nationalism and the protectionism so many countries are actually so much interested in pursue in their own interest at the expense of other countries right so in this age actually not many countries are interested in pursuing International coroporation for the sake of international cooporation right so in

order to induce International cooperation from other countries you need to have some assets such as high technology capability so South Korea is one of the countries that has that kind of capability so that's one of the reasons why why South Korea tries to take advantage of high technology competitiv buiness as a means to induce International cooperation from other countries such as the United States the Japan and the United Kingdom as Netherland so that is another new emerging feature of the South Korea's

Economic Security strategy so let me stop there thank you thank you very much he gave us a very uh good picture of the evolution of South Korea's Economic Security strateg uh last week there was a Korea Japan I mean Korea China trade conference right uh and then there was a discussion about supply chain cooperation I think it's very hard in the area of Hightech so can we adopt hedging strategy as Chun said to offset the risk because USA is pursuing very strict high-tech export control probably with uh South Kore so do you see any

possibility that we can pursue to a harmonious uh policy toward China and then let me invite Professor Kim please all right um first of all I'd like to thank to the uh the president son uh of the the president uh which invite uh me to uh this wonderful conference and Professor uh chanes also thanks for the moderating this uh great session uh first of all this paper is about uh it's kind of like the initial case study on the uh the South korean's experiences of economic Cor from uh China and Japan uh right now the

at the G7 level or EU level uh the me at the or the Milat level the many countries try to uh to the make kind of like the the effective ways or try to find the effective ways to prevent or the deter the China's economic cors so uh by uh taking care of by uh the seeing the uh the Korean case seriously uh I hope that uh I can uh contribute a little bit about uh the the developing the effective ways of the the the the to deter the the the the the the economic cors so first of all like actually the China has been the the

recipient of economic sanctions by Western countries until the the China's open up and reform uh in 1978 but uh recently China started to use the economic corion more frequently to achieve uh its political and diplomatic goals diplomatic gos and the according to the different studies the number of the economic cor has been changed but uh the mer which is the the Chinese the German uh Institute identified about like 123 cive cases between 2010 and 20 2022 and the Australian organization also uh the identified the the similar

numbers of the uh The Happening of the Chinese economic cors then uh uh even though actually there is the uh no consensus about the uh the definition of the economic corion but at least we can say that um economic corion is the using economic means to achieve political goals and economic means include the exploiting the economic vulnerabilities and dependencies through trade investment and foreign a measures so uh in terms of the uh the counter measures from the other Target uh countries actually the Victor cha recently

identified for different types of the count measures the first one was the kind of like a prioritizing Economic Security and developing capabilities to detect disruptions in advance and the second counter measures might be uh the um adopting the trade diversification uh along with the strengthening domestic capabilities or like localization if possible and the third target the third C measures is uh the relocating their core sourcing and production chains uh by using the re shuring or the FR shuring and finally uh

the target countries can also use the kind of like uh the mitigation uh tools uh which can advocately uh support the or which can advocately grant the monetary Assistance or monetary assistance with who to the uh the the fs or the entities who are uh sanctioned by the economic cors so uh in table one actually I try to uh make the kind of like the comparison between the economic corion from China and Japan towards South Korea and by identifying that kind of uh the differences uh I'd like to trace the what kind of factors or I'd

like to uh answer that why do Target countries like such as South Korea use different tools as the as a counter measures to economic corion so uh the first factor is we can say that the the formality so in terms of the formality uh the Chinese uh economic sanction has been very informal but in in Japanese case it has been much more formal ways so Chinese uh the Japanese government uh actually um the the imposed the export control on the three uh the critical materials and also excluded the South Korea from the uh the

white list and uh in terms of the the scope of sanctions uh the Chinese cotion was more much more comprehensive so it started from the uh the Banning of the K culture products or k culture performances uh in in in Chinese territory and uh it's kind of like controversial but uh the EV baries which is produced in Chinese territory uh by the Korean companies were not eligible to getting the subties from the the Chinese government and it uh expanded to the uh the the the retail sections such as the lot Mart and the lot department

stores and it also expanded to the like the tourism but uh in terms of the the scope of sanctions the Japanese the economic corion was much more uh kept kept in their very small yard so it has been mainly targeting the the three important materials which directly related to the semiconductor and display uh uh display sectors and uh in terms of the strategy importance of targeted interest in Industries uh the the Chinese targeting targeted industry has been uh has the much lower uh the importances or

strategic importance compared to the the the Japanese targeted Industries which is the directory related to semiconductor and the display sectors and in terms of the scope of the targeted Firs actually um the the Chinese uh Corf case shows that uh it is mainly targeted one form the lot in the retail uh industry and the many small and medium Enterprises in the tourism Industries and but uh in in Japanese cases actually the entire value chain of semiconductor and display sector was the targeted by the the Japanese uh the the

economic uh corations so uh uh if I summarize the uh the the reg of the uh the economic coration from China and Japan actually we can say that the Chinese economic sanction or the economic cor has been in former and it was more like kind of like a comprehensive the carpet bombing coration against the uh relatively low strategic sanctions and even though actually it caused a huge loss of the uh the economic uh huge loss of the about like estimated 0.5% of the Korea's GDP so it made the huge scars in terms of

economic uh economic ways but uh but uh but the Korea's accounter measures are mainly uh uh it was mainly about the the mitigation measures so there was no explicit or the prompt compensation to L and so uh but and the the the the Chinese economic uh cor actually did not change the polic trajectory of the deployment of uh th but left the the Deep scars in the batal um the relationship and if I uh if we uh the summarized the the Japanese case study actually it was much more like the clear and uh then the Japanese government took

the kind of like official means of the cor and uh the targeted sanction was the captain IND the more like like the small yard and the targeted sectors was much more highly uh strategic important sectors uh so uh the from the Korean uh the the reaction or the counter measures uh the Korean government uh very prompt ly utilized kind of like centralized response to the centralized response so the the Korean government made the the policy tools to localize the those uh the three materials and try to help the

the the companies to diversify the sourcing targeted materials and actually even the the the the the Japanese uh the economic cor also failed to change the the the Supreme Court's ruling so the the Japanese government could not achieve the its short-term goal but the Japanese demands were reflected when the new president Yun came into Powers so uh by summarizing the this uh two case studies uh I can uh draw kind of like a two um kind of like a theoretical implications so first one is first one is as seen India the two case studies of

economic cor from China and Japan uh it is not easy to achieve their political proposal economic corion in the short term so in situations of economic corosion the target country tend to prepare counter measures appropriate appropriate to the situation and is not willing to easily comprise with the political demand of the cursive country so ultimately uh considering the difficulties in discussing building Collective resilience based on their deterence by punishment amid various discussion on China's economic cor an

approach based on the DET by denial also need to be actively considered so a deterence by denial means actually or this aims to prevent on adversary from taking an uned action not through fear of punishment but rather through a fear of failures so making public China's economic cion has a poor track record uh or the the the the poor p track record and maximizing the reputation and the economic cost of the manable economic corion is not the perfect one but uh it can be kind of like a very lowcost deterr

strategy we can uh used as a collectively and the second uh in the long run actually the policy change in the Target country is only possible usually through the uh operation of internal interest groups so it's kind of like the the harsh manic logic that uh increased economic interdependence can create a new interest group in other country that can exert political pressure on the government and these kind of things can equally applicable to the situation of the weaponization of economic interdependence or the the the

weaponization of the economic cors so from the the long perspective advantages for economic cor to be targeted rather than a carpet bomb to expect interest group to play a role in the Target countries so after all so in order to the win the hearts and minds of interest groups in a Target country the discipline formalized and precise ction can have the some effect or might have better effect in the long run I step in here thank you thank you very much uh he gave us a very good comparative uh case

studies about two corion case I suddenly wonder if there is any case in which China accepted it as a cion is there anyone uh if not why now we have three excellent discussions uh one the first discussion is uh prophecy iwang from a university and Professor iuk from Korea University and Professor sahir from University of Tokyo uh he's now currently a visiting Professor to so National University uh I think you are a designated discussant but you may want to cross comments on other uh papers as well especially if uh Professor s has

something to tell about Japanese case of coion on South Korea think it will be interesting if you want to now uh let me invite Professor wangi uh thank you professor John yeah actually uh as a discussant I am supposed to I mean criticize uh Professor uh Quick's uh uh presentation but Frankly Speaking I do not have a found any major mistake error or Forge actually his analysis is very uh EX excellent H his argument is uh uh clearcut and uh there are many good evidence I mean to support his argument uh this is why I do not I mean

need to uh uh summarize I mean his PR presentation as well uh rather I would raise a couple of questions uh that are related to the uh hatching strategy my first question is uh about the uh Huawei actually uh uh there are many I mean uh controversies about the Huawei uh Telecom equipment but how about Huawei mobile phone is there any difference between Huawei Telecom equipment and uh uh hu mobile phone actually uh uh as far uh as far as not uh huawe and other I mean uh Chinese mobile phone uh from Oppo Vivo and shami is quite

popular in many Southeast Asian uh countries and my second question is the uh uh about the RO of the United States it's a Hing uh strategy is uh uh taken I mean in the context of the US uh China and strategic competition but this analysis is only uh focus on the uh the Chinese perspective but how about the uh the role of United States May uh I think that if America can provide an alternative to Huawei I mean Telecom equipment the Southeast Asian countries would choose a different I mean options of different uh uh

project uh in that sense I think the uh uh ban Road initiative is not the best option I'm a PR perspective the Southeast Asian country but can be a second best option why because America has no alternative to the Chinese initiative and uh my uh third question is about the domestic politics actually in many South Asia country is a democracy and in a normal democracy regim change uh tends to uh policy shift probably I mean in uh in the countries I mean you analyze uh there there'll uh be uh many I mean policy shift I suppose I mean you

mention P options uh is there any country I mean change I mean the shift their policy I mean during the uh 5G project yeah this is my third question and my final question is about the Korean case I think the the Korean government exclude I mean uh Huawei uh Telecom equipment gradually and very quietly not to make a trouble with China if uh this is the case I would I mean classify the Korean case as a light Hing what you think about my assessment but I I think that I mean Professor Sun Also I mean can uh reply

my final question thank you am am I right okay okay I'm youngly and I thank organizer for organizer organizer for inviting me to be a discuss for this wonderful panel and Professor Le paper uh Professor Le paper is really um Pleasant to read and uh indeed paper does uh do I think a great service to those of us who are interested in evolution of South Korea's um Economic Security strategies over the last 60 years in other words uh quite a few walks um have recently attempt to uh analyze the nature of South Korea's econ

economic uh security policy but none of them seems to be so successful to accomplish the task so in my view uh Professor Le uh paper offers much needed comprehensive and systematic account of it and uh with the case of South Korea's uh high technology policy policies uh the paper does uh that by uh identifying as he mentioned already in his presentation uh four key features of South Korea's economic security policy they are uh countering uh economic Coalition mitigating structural vulnerabilities strengthening Tech

sovereignty and finally inducing International cooperation so as much as I like this paper I was in trouble when I prepare my my comments it is simply because I might have nothing to say so discussion to my embarrassment so last night I squeezed myself I squee the paper to uh say a few things about about so I have three uh comments and suggestions as a result okay so my first comment is on uh supplying some conceptual definitions of um Economic Security and geoeconomics early on in this paper both uh concepts are Central

to uh this paper but our scholary community has not yet reached agreements on what they EX exctly mean and how we operationalize them uh as such offering working definition of these two terms would give readers much easier time to follow the paper's analysis including such an expression as economic security strategy responding to geoeconomic challenges on page three so relatedly the concept of tactical linkages and substantive linkages are usefully suggested early on as two mod of Economic Security linkages but they are

rarely reconnected to a subsequent discussion so I I suggest that the paper might need a tighter linkage between these two concepts and the following empirical analysis that's that that's my uh first comment and second comment is concerned with the question of where the four features of South Korea's Economic Securities are directed at uh in current form countering economic coion mitigating structural vulnerabilities uh strengthening Tech sovereignty and finally inducing International cooperation are all

directed against China so I do understand this formulation in the midst of us China strategy competition but at the same time there are some aspects of South Korean Economic Security Security in critical tension with US policies uh therefore I think some adjustment is needed uh in this regard when the paper is to be revised uh my fin final comment is about organization of the paper uh in the third section of the paper entitled high technology as Nexus between economy and and security uh subsection entitled securing industrial

policy techn Technology Innovation NEX Nexus in my view needs to be moved up into introduction of the paper uh it is simply because a subsection deals mainly with conceptual distinction between traditional industrial policies and economic security strategies so I'm not sure if my comments make any meaningful suggestion to the future of the paper uh but uh I look forward to reading Fuller version of the paper or book shortly thank you I stop here thank you uh thank you uh thank you very much for inviting me eii

uh this is my great pleasure to read all three papers in advance and uh but I'm a designated uh commentator to uh discussion for Professor Kim yonin but before going to my comment to Professor Kim let me just pose just one question to each uh previous speakers first to my friend uh CH uh uh Chen quick uh I really love your paper of course as usual but my just one small question is because as a two speaker today uh you know discuss about economic coion so uh economic coion so I think we understand

your perspective on you know hitching but um if some country especially light hitching countries uh got uh strong economic coion could they really maintain their position this is just a my small question but you know this is a little bit different angle to you know discuss about uh economic I hedging in Economic Security and my uh small question to Professor Lee uh so iide of course as usual enlightened by your papers but uh in the very very last part you discussed high technology as a leverage for international cooperation

and of course you know as my previous discussion say uh this is very excellent point but my question is yes we have to do it we have to seek the uh seek uh try to use uh high technology as a leverage but by what mechanism we can do uh so this is uh just another very small question to you so to Professor Kim uh I love your paper but before going to the detail uh just let me put economic coion in a bigger context context because everybody uh start to discuss Economic Security uh recent years but as

Professor Lee said we don't have any particular definition so I decently pick up what kind of areas we have to discuss in Economic Security and I recently prepared one slide and it has 20s areas uh in Economic Security starting from like critical mineral management infrastructure management supply chain patent management security clearance export control semiconductor policy industrial security cyber security human rights due deligence data security International standardization fighting against disinformation and econic

coion so so I think uh but you know even though you know we have to admit economic coion is one very important part of Economic Security but we uh every countries have to make a preparation for each areas so this is a really big challenge for us now uh especially data security will come up very soon as a very uh can say important areas uh and we have to uh make our domestic role enhance our domestic role and preparation for that but having said that economic coion is again you know very important topics now and G7

countries of course including Korea as invited guest this year uh made a a really big achievement uh this year's hirosima Summit and they discuss how to deter they use the word deter how you how they use uh deter bance against economic coion so G7 countries are now very busy in discussing the new SEC New Economic Co anti-economic coion platform I don't know still what kind of things they really will create deterence by denial deterence by punishment we don't know but maybe uh because some countries actually including Japan

attemp to for temp to include some aspect of punishment so the new mechanism might have some uh you know deterence by uh punishment uh scheme but the main focus might be deterrence by denial but anyway so uh many count start to discuss including G7 but also EU EU recently published a New Economic Security strategy but they discuss uh eu's way uh you know ACI against econic coion Japanese government also is say to publish a new security Economic Security strategy report or something but I don't I don't have any particular information

on that at this moment but you know every country has big interest and uh preparation uh on economic coion and the reason why especially Japan are now very uh how can I say serious about that is we are now having economic coion from China after uh Japan government decision uh to uh uh to uh dispose arpus uh arpus water from fushia uh to uh Pacific Pacific Sea to the Pacific but anyway so uh now it is very important for us to discuss about theion we know that very well so let me just give us some question and comments to

papers and really important papers uh but uh I think first of all we have have to distinguish the Chinese way and Japanese way uh but before going to that even though I said Japanese way we only had one case but unfortunately that was against your country I'm very sorry for that and prime minister AB actually he left before assassination actually after assassination this is published but uh before assassination he left interview and and that book is published already and he admit he wanted to use economic

coion against against Korea because of political reason not you know export control why do you think is just a you know kind of bureaucratic reasoning right so we know that very well now after you know uh his uh B his interview publish but you know don't let don't you know take us long because that was only one very exceptional case right and Japan's case was also very exceptional because Japan's case we use our EX export to Korea as our you know tools but in China's case they normally use import as as the two right of course in

Korea case you know it is more uh more complicated because they also use as methods like you know they even um how can say um uh try to punish a Lotte uh and other companies in China uh by other legal measures but in most cases China triy to use their power to buy from another country in Japan's case we they you know Japan Government tried to use the power to export to you know sell uh important goods so I think this is very important you know for us to take a note right and and in in the future you know

we will see more and more econic coion from China not Japan you know don't take me long again right but I don't I really don't think Japan government will repeat the same mistakes but China will make the same mistakes again and again in the future even though we know economic coion in most cases failed you know to satisfy uh their political and diplomatic uh objectives so uh we really have to distinguish Japan's case and uh Chinese case and for Chinese case you know uh their power to purchase or you know

invest uh is the source of the power we have to take notes of that and and my another comment uh to Professor Kim's paper is even though you pick up four areas or four say four factors uh you know to distinguish Japan's case and Chinese case but I think the another important factor is ambiguity I mean because the success of China and failure of Japan is really up to uh we I mean Korea didn't know how much and by when uh until when uh the sanction would take place right so and they are always very ambiguous in and

also in scope of sanction so ambiguity is ambiguity was very important uh to make a big success in E coion so you know we I mean as a targeted country Target country uh so how can we you know uh make a counter measure against China if they do this strategy very well you know keeping ambiguity right so I think that still I believe you know what we really have to do is to team up over the country like including South Korea Japan United States and Australia and other countries but my final comment is

United States is not very reliable in economic coion they always admit that they always say we cannot let Market access for many times right they try to limit Market access even though their allies are targeted so I think you know we really have to rescue ourselves you know uh among allies and partners so for that sake I think you know we have to know you know what is China's strategy and but the my you know again my point is China strategy or China use of economic coion is always very ambigious we don't know what is the real

political aims we don't know next to which area they will employ coion so this is my last comment thank you very much thank you very much uh for excellent uh discussion uh we have some time but uh I think uh if you listen to the answers from the presenters we may uh be short of time so let me collect questions from the floor if you have uh so if you have any questions or comments to presenters or discussants one question for the panel um the unpredictability it was mentioned by a couple of you within American

domestic politics and what that does to any sort of strategy hedging light or heavy balancing soft balancing any of these things it all seems to have been based at least normally in most of the work on Asian Security on a degree of stability and predictability in US foreign policy behavior and that's been thrown out the window and I just wonder both in terms of our academic work but also in terms of policymaking what you do with that if you have a solution let me know thank you that's a question that we'll

face after one year from now on so uh chuni please all right um thanks very much I think I have a question or questions from Chung from Professor Lee and my friend real sahashi and then I think I can relate uh to what alen if I may uh uh the very uh I would say spot on issue of unpredictability I think in IR among IR Community among IR literature we do use the word uncertainty a lot and that's uh I guess interchangeably with un predictability so um to uh if I can respond and then also relate to uh all

other questions that were posed to me is that I think that is the mother of everything right uncertainty if uh it's a certainly the most important factor for Hing Behavior because we can say that if things are certain there is no need to hedge make your decision either you want to align with us completely or you I you you align completely with China if you like completely with us we call it as a kind of like a straightforward decision same with bandwagoning with China can be straightforward but at the moment

because of uncertainty about two conditions States especially in Southeast Asia but also Beyond have decided to H until and unless that two conditions become more certain Hing behavior however imperfect impermanent will continue in one way or another and also bear in mind that my favorite saying Hing is often a policy without pronouncement meaning that uh countries H without saying and telling the whole world that hey we are Hing right because they would uh defeat the purpose so with that uh what are the two conditions that

allow me to uh relate uh to respond back so two conditions uh one is about threat perception the other one is about align support if you know exactly uh who is your number one threat across the board across the board black and white if you are in a black white situation no room for Hing you make decision if you see that China across the board threat race in economic insecurity and political and you know for certain you can count on us uh to to land the support that you need no need to hedge you just make the

decision no hedging but you are uncertain about both threat and also both uh the alliance support you will say that uh let's do what we have been saying in in Daily context right let's not put all eggs in one basket that's what Hing in layman term right you are don't burn the bridge keep the options open because you will never know things are uncertain and uh us was mentioned you were referring to the domestic context I think countries uh in Asia particularly I think us airies and partners are even more nervous everybody

is nervous airies and partners are even more nervous because of trump might come back right that is the largest uncertainty uh domestically for us but externally for all of us all countries right so uh something beyond our control but it does affect us because it it does affect that to what extent and for how long we can count on a us or US card to counterbalance whatever a trap assessment right so uh that I think I hope by that I answer uh the very fact that uh uh and that allow me to relate to uh uh real question of whether or not

the Hing WEA light or heavy will last forever right nothing lasts forever right nothing lasts forever since we are in Korea very uh plainly uh and that relate to Professor Lee I think I agree with you uh Coral seems to be light Hing rather than heavy Hing light Hing as I said are those that uh see uh heavy haing are those that who see RIS in a darker shapes very seriously very nervous and are more determined to take actions to counter track mitigate the risk and more ready more open to review that kind of concern right to Define

even the sources so from how we see in Southeast Asia we thought the South Korea's policy has been shifting quite a bit from moon to Yen moon it's a very light Hing y seems to be like much Havier if not already a balancing but much heavier in the sense that earlier for example South China see a South Korea keep distance right uh you you're concerned about that but you don't really want to make it a very open same with the Taiwan but these are all kind of like shifting so on and so forth so I think uh the best way to respond to that

would be to relate to the certainty issue certainty about the Align support and certainty about the threat and perception right so nothing is uh last forever but when conditions change countries evolve accordingly South Korea is one example another example would be uh Vietnam right and also uh uh uh Philippines Philippines from DTE to Cent bong bong you see that it's like Hing to a heavy Hing if not already balancing right and why is that track perception change China's action it is a source of issues and then again us factor is

another issue right the real test will be next year if and when Trump does come back let's see uh to what extent and how many countries policy will be shifting again that will be a real test uh to see whether the so-called Hing theory of saying that the he threat perception and also aect support that will be the primary one so with that uh let me very quickly uh turn to the issue of uh waging right perfect uh Chason is always a spot on right uh in I literature we also say that small states hit big

Powers wtch right so H and W sounds very similar but uh you know it's a very different depending on where you see whether you are small countries or you are big Powers small countries because of you are much more weaker and smaller you are more vulner vable you'll be more affected by uncertainty and also their implications you know that you need to be cautious big Power because of capability superiority you can do a lot of things not everything but a lot of things so it's natural for big powers to

wage whenever possible and China is not the only big Power that have the tendency to do that right but to relate your question to respond to your question I would say that we need to uh U make distinction between two kind of scenarios one scenario China definitely is exploiting the differences across smaller countries in Southeast Asia but there but it's not always the case there are also cases where you do see that uh China might want to wage but cannot do that so what are the two uh type of cases one is uh cases where involve

Collective action as a group Asians as a group the policy decision on South China Sea China does try to W exploiting uh LA and Cambodia for example who do not have direct State on South China Sea to have position that more C Insight collap overlap with China uh so that is the first time I think that's quite natural the second type 5G and uh you know digital connectivity issue this is a decision at the national level bilateral relations not Collective so China might want to wage but you know individual

asan countries individual Southeast Asian states make our own decision so China does not really have the rumor to which but China what is doing it's you can say a counter Hing whatsoever China does try to win over countries who are uh excluding China uh in the earlier rounds and uh never give up try to persuade by many means time because of time I can only very quickly share two examples right one is Malaysia and then the other one is uh Singapore Malaysia despite the light heding approach earlier round under and that's profly a

question whether government Chang policy change or not the answer is yes uh not always but chances are higher so in the case of Malaysia we uh did have few rounds of government changes unfortunately so earlier government moini government made the decision of choosing ericon yeah there was a time we had the workshop early on uh choosing Ericson over Huawei but there was a commercial decision because of uh Aron offer much better uh uh package is not because of politics or job politics and now fast forward to today under

different government an ibraim government an Ibrahim is perceived as someone very close to us right he made the decision recently by allowing the second Network and saying openly that this second Network that is going to open the next year meaning the next month and onwards would allow a Huawei to take part so meaning that we are know Malaysian government is now uh taking uh you know actions political change to allow for so call quote unquote technological neutrality right technological neutrality of trying uh to

make decisions that allow smaller countries Us in Southeast Asia to uh send signal to both competing Powers us and China that when we make decision those are specific not across the board so nothing personal so Malaysian government is one case another example would be the case that the Singapore's decision as I mentioned earlier on uh of choosing uh two from us back company two from Chinese back company for the data center so examples can go on but uh uh fundamentally I think Hing means that it's not permanent we know it has its

own problems but country's governments will adjust accordingly as the level of threat evolve as the level of Ali support evolve we do not have Crystal at all but we do know that if I theory is anything to go by these two conditions will determine whether when and for how long Hing will uh evolve either for digital connectivity or other uh Interstate Corporation issues thank you yeah Chi so your theory of hedging is getting better and better huh yeah so yeah thank you Professor uh lee for your yeah insightful comments

and questions yeah uh Professor Lee always touches upon the fundamental issues rather than detailed one like uh specific issues and then like actually his question and comments always uh push me to think more thoroughly to come up with the more refined ideas and sophisticated uh methods uh but I think his questions are somehow actually related to each other so I would like to lump them together uh to answer in know kind of the wholesale manner the first one is that the conceptual issues the differences between geoeconomics and

economic security actually by the class according to the classic definition uh by geoeconomics you usually mean the country's mobilization of economic means to achieve foreign policy objectives so in that regard actually the basic assumption is that there is a hierarchical relationship between the economy and security security as a goal and the economy or economic as a uh means so but Point here is that in the age of the 21st century and in the age of the hyper uncertainty actually the more important is the uh how to link the

economy and uh Security in that regard the linkage matters more than the just like uh how to mobilize the economic means to achieve the foreign policy objectives in that regard I would say the uh the how to link the economy and security is all the uh fundamental question we have to think about in that regard I in my paper I uh uh addressed some issues related to the differences between the techical linkages and substantial uh substantive linkages actually uh in my presentation I stress that in order to effectively link the

economy and security you need a Nexus right without Nexus it is almost equivalent to the economic cion uh that has to do with the Tactical linkages actually great Powers attempt to link the econom and security without believing that they are really or practically linked together then why do we why do they do that they try to attempt the or uh pursue the Tactical linkages for the goal of the uh eliciting compromise or concession from the weaker countries so in that regard is tactical linkage is more more or less

about the economic C so we have to make a differentiation between the Tactical and sub substantive uh linkages and Professor W Le question about uh South Korea's hedging or light hedging strategy I I have to confess that I'm a big fan of your theory and then uh but one thing I have to tell you is that like in my understanding hatching should not be evaluated or assessed B on the basis of the individual case rather hatching is a more or less a national strategy we have to uh put them together all all the individual cases and then to

evaluate the hedging strategy as a national strategy in that regard many countries try to combine different policies and sometimes uh many countries try to adopt different strategies with counterveiling effects toward each other so like the exclusive focus on one individual case may not enough to explain the nature of the hatching strategy at the national level so correct me if I'm wrong and uh yeah real Point yeah always important like how is right uh yeah in my presentation I stress that South Korea tries to take

advantage of high technology as a means to uh pursue International cooperation with other countries particularly like-minded countries uh I think we have to understand the peculiar nature of the current situation uh because like only one hand every country is is indeed interested in nurturing indous indigenous Industries right but at the same time you have to stay inclusive as much as possible actually in the past actually usually industrial policy uh tends to focus on exclusively focus on the nurturing the domestic companies and

domestic Industries but this is stage of again the hyp uncertainty you have to create the more inclusive ecosystem of high Technologies that's one of the reasons why you need International cooperation on the one hand you have to nurture and strengthen the industrial competitiveness of your own industry at the same time given that no single country can be fully autonomous on their own so that's why you need cooperation so on the one hand like Pursuit Of technological sovereignty on the other hand you have to seek the inclusive

international corporation this is not actually good matches in the normal days but given that this is the hyper uncertain at age of hyper uncertainty you have to combine those two counterveiling or conflicting objectives into one national uh uh strategy or economic uh security strategy in that regard is it's going to be a very challenging task but that's the thing you have to uh address in the coming months and years yeah let me stop this uh thank you so much uh Professor Sashi uh for your very uh constructive and uh

critical comment and I know that uh you have a very uh thorough knowledge about the economic coration and in our like uh the previous Workshop I uh actually got uh many uh good lessons from your presentation so I uh and actually uh at the beginning you mentioned about uh we have to think about economic cion from the the big picture I I totally agree with that and so this is kind of like a the initial uh kind of like how can I say the scratch paper of the uh doing a new project so I will uh thinking about

I will try to embed that kind of a big picture in this paper and you mentioned about the the anti-economic corion mechanism which is uh discussed by at the the G7 level or the EU level and actually the the Victor CH actually arguing that we have to make kind of a collective resilience by taking kind of a deterence by punishment measure but as you know it is very costly and very difficult to uh maneuver collectively so uh for example like uh at the the policy level when I have a chance to talk with the the government

officials uh the probably the very first step to make kind of the anti- corve measure might be kind of information sharing between countries so let's do kind of a the only oneing information information sharing mechanism together but then usually the every the government official said that actually it's not doable yeah we cannot cause the private actors to uh report uh their any kind of information to us and usually the the private sector worrying about the retaliation from the CH the Chinese side so it is very difficult to collect

that kind of information so even making that kind of information sharing is very difficult and impossible than uh how about making kind of a the let everybody knows that that actually the China's uh the economic corion has been shows very bad track record so just let them know then that will be much easier way to uh develop the the the the next step of the the the anti-is mechanism that's the my idea and the third thing is about the the the Japanese case actually uh you mentioned about the ABS interview uh if

you share that interview with me then I will really appreciate that and so you probably know my email address so yeah looking for your reply and uh yeah you me you you're right the the Japanese case is a very uh outlier and exceptional case and that is actually very good candidate for the the the the case study the the qualitative method right so uh this is the kind of like outlier so uh by uh taking care of that kind of outli outlier seriously then uh I think we can develop or we can uh make some of the theore the the

contribution and about the uh the fourth thing about the ambiguity actually yeah uh you mean that uh I know that actually that the ambiguity might be a better uh the phrase to talking about the informality or so in in in here actually I did not Define what the how to define the the four factors I I used in in this short paper so uh at least I I thought about that uh the Chinese economic corion is taking kind of a happening in the gry zone and it takes about the informal ways but uh uh probably ambiguous or ambiguity might be a better

uh T to capture the uh the Chinese economic Coury behaviors I will so thinking about seriously in the later and uh finally you mentioned about the uh the US and us is not reliable in dealing with the economic corion and the the purpose the Carson also mentioned about is there any kind of uh the the ways of dealing with the the the the US domestic uh uncertainty in each countries so uh I think uh yeah the US might be a very uh important factor in dealing with these kind of things and uh even in the the so so yeah uh probably

yeah I do not have uh any specific answer for that but uh in when I U developing the uh the paper in the future then I will also uh thinking about the the implication of the US domestic uncertainty and more seriously and actually the professor J J also mentioned about whether China has been targeted economic corion by other country and uh in my understanding actually the thanks to the uh the asymmetry relations uh the China is more exposed to the uh the economic sanctions rather than uh economic cors so right

now we are witnessing the many different types of the sanctions on the semiconductor sectors to the uh to the to to China and the main difference between the economic cion and sanction might be it's a much more former and the rationals behind the sanction should be legal and Rule based so at least because of the the Chinese U kind of like simet relations and the biggest trade partner with the other countries uh China usually tend to be exposed to the economic sanction rather than the economic cion that's my understanding

right thank you uh thank you very much uh yesterday and today we uh dealt with four important issues and I think Economic Security issues is also very important so we addressed a lot of issues uh had a very rich discussion uh but I think there are a lot of challenges and tasks ahead so uh I think we need to continue uh this uh discussion we have focused on Military security issues so far because we uh face a lot of military challenges from North Korea and uh from surrounding countries but I think this is emerging

issues will be very important so I guess eai and other colleagues will continue to have this kind of discussion so uh please join me thanking this excellent panelist today thank you