[North Korea and the World] 2022 vs. 2023: How Have North Korea's Provocations Changed?

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZR3FG9mOyiQ

Park Won-gon, Director of EAI's Center for North Korean Studies (Professor at Ewha Womans University), analyzes the characteristics of North Korea's provocations in 2023, which are distinctly different from previous periods, and discusses their intentions. North Korea anticipates nearing the status of a de facto nuclear-armed state by conducting nuclear and missile provocations against South Korea and the U.S. across various platforms. However, this is assessed to have conversely created significant burdens for the North Korean regime, such as strengthening the readiness of the ROK-U.S. combined forces, improving ROK-Japan relations, and the emergence of U.S.-led large military cooperation bodies. The author argues that adhering to a strategy of direct confrontation ultimately infringes upon North Korea's right to development and survival.

■ Park Won-gon_Director of EAI Center for North Korean Studies. Professor of North Korean Studies at Ewha Womans University.

■ Managed and Edited by: Park Ji-soo, EAI Research Fellow

    Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | jspark@eai.or.kr

Video Transcript

So why is North Korea engaging in these actions? I believe it's because they have a high degree of confidence in their nuclear capabilities. With North Korea effectively recognized as a nuclear-armed state, there's a growing opinion that nuclear disarmament should proceed. From North Korea's perspective, the moment they've been waiting for is arriving. However, significant progress is being made. This must be a major concern for North Korea, and it's likely the reason why, as the National Intelligence Service recently stated, Chairman Kim Jong Un is unable to sleep at night.

Hello, and thank you for watching the second episode of Park Won-gon's 'North Korea and the World.' Last time, I provided a general overview of North Korea's thoughts, policies, and actions from 2018-2019, the period of the inter-Korean peace process, up to last year in 2022. In this episode, I will provide a comprehensive overview of the characteristics of North Korea's provocations from January to the present in 2023. I will also discuss the counter-reactions that have arisen, which are significant, given North Korea's apparent trajectory towards becoming a full-fledged nuclear-armed state. First, the provocations in 2023 exhibit notable characteristics.

This can be compared to 2022. The first point is that North Korea is specifically targeting South Korea and the United States with its provocations. This is not arbitrary; it signifies an emphasis on justification. However, the provocations in 2023 show a different pattern. They are specifically targeting the U.S. and South Korea, claiming they are testing and conducting field tests of their weapons. This indicates a significantly heightened level of tension and risk. Second, and this is a cause for concern, North Korea has historically refrained from provocations during ROK-U.S. combined exercises. This was a kind of taboo. Combined exercises between South Korea and the U.S. began in 1976, and for a very long period, North Korea would go silent during these exercises. For instance, Kim Jong Il, Kim Jong Un's father, would disappear and only reappear after the exercises concluded. This was because when the ROK-U.S. conduct joint exercises, formidable U.S. strategic assets, as well as South Korean assets, are mobilized, providing comprehensive surveillance, reconnaissance, and strike capabilities.

From North Korea's perspective, there's a possibility of being attacked by these U.S. assets. I will discuss this aspect in more detail at a later time. The crucial point is that North Korea did not engage in corresponding provocations during combined exercises. Typically, provocations occurred either before the start or after the conclusion of these exercises. However, this time, provocations have occurred even during the exercises. The first instance was in November last year, when North Korea fired a missile during ROK-U.S. combined exercises. This year, in March, during the ROK-U.S. combined exercise 'Freedom Shield,' North Korea launched a submarine-launched cruise missile. So, why is North Korea engaging in these actions? I believe it's because they have a high degree of confidence in their nuclear capabilities. In academic terms, this is referred to as the 'security dilemma' or 'paradox of stability.' It means that:

Pakistan and India both developed nuclear weapons and became nuclear-armed states. Once both are nuclear-armed, neither can wage full-scale war against the other, as it would lead to mutual assured destruction, creating a balance of terror. However, the issue is that while nuclear war is deterred, limited conventional wars have actually increased, particularly between Pakistan and India. This is known as the paradox of stability. Unfortunately, a similar concerning trend is emerging on the Korean Peninsula. The ROK-U.S. combined exercises, intended to strengthen deterrence, are being met with North Korean provocations. This pattern is likely to continue, suggesting that the paradox of stability may be at play on the Korean Peninsula. Third, North Korea claims that when it fires missiles, they are not test launches but are missiles already deployed in actual combat. This is another difference from 2020. There is a figure named Tong Tae-gwan. He is, in North Korea's context, akin to the chief editor of the Rodong Sinmun.

He is a highly respected commentator in North Korea, even receiving the People's Medal. Reading his writings can be challenging. However, at this time, Tong Tae-gwan clearly stated that their test launches are shifting to training launches. This suggests a display of their capabilities, a form of 'politics of ostentation.' Fourth, and this has been ongoing since last year to some extent, North Korea is launching missiles using a diverse range of platforms.

They are diversifying their launch platforms. For example, they have shown missile launches from reservoirs, even though the submarines are not yet fully operational. They have also demonstrated missile launches from trains. Individually, these methods may not be highly effective militarily. Launching from a reservoir makes the launch point detectable. Consequently, a counterattack can be immediately launched. Similarly, trains move, and if a missile is launched from a train, the launch site can be detected, allowing for a counterattack.

The problem is that by diversifying platforms in this manner, it significantly increases the cost for the ROK and U.S. to prepare defenses. Previously, they might only need to prepare for one or two scenarios, but with North Korea's numerous launch sites, including those along railway lines and in caves, identifying and targeting all of them requires more resources. I believe North Korea is attempting this to force us to acquire more missiles, which incurs higher costs, and to necessitate more assets for detection and identification. Therefore, North Korea is pursuing this strategy. Fifth, and finally, unlike last year, when North Korea did not widely publicize its provocations internally, this year, they are fully publicizing them within North Korea.

Publicizing within North Korea means reporting in the Rodong Sinmun. Furthermore, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) is an external media outlet. This year, North Korea is including reports of its provocations in the Rodong Sinmun, which is read by North Korean citizens. I interpret this as North Korea strengthening its 'besieged mentality.' The besieged mentality, literally meaning the feeling of being surrounded, is a crucial driving force and source of dynamism for the North Korean regime, which has operated for the past 70 years. The narrative is always as follows:

North Korea is surrounded by external forces, and therefore, we must unite and be cohesive. We must prioritize this above all else for our survival. This narrative has been effectively used to control the North Korean population. Consequently, there is a need to demonstrate the heightened external tensions and the significant external threat. This year, they are stimulating this besieged mentality by publishing reports in the Rodong Sinmun about their missile launches, including justifications for these launches. This is a characteristic observed this year.

As mentioned earlier, this is not the whole story. North Korea has also enacted nuclear legislation, as discussed in the first session, and is pursuing advanced nuclear development and a strategy of direct confrontation, which they have not abandoned since 2020. In light of these developments, some international discussions suggest that North Korea should be recognized as a de facto nuclear-armed state and then pursue nuclear disarmament. Such opinions are emerging within the U.S. and South Korea. I will dedicate a separate session to discuss this aspect later. Regardless, if this were to happen, it would be the realization of North Korea's desired 'moment of destiny.' Their ultimate goal of being recognized as a nuclear-armed state would be within reach. However, in reality, there are counter-reactions to this.

When the working-level talks in Stockholm in 2019 broke down, North Korea demanded two things from the U.S.: the right to development and the right to survival. The right to development was demanded by Kim Jong Un at the Hanoi Summit in February 2019. It involved the lifting of all five UN Security Council sanctions imposed since 2016, arguing that these sanctions hindered North Korea's development. The right to survival, however, goes beyond merely suspending ROK-U.S. joint exercises; it entails their permanent cessation and the permanent prohibition of U.S. strategic asset deployments to South Korea, potentially even their withdrawal. In any case, encompassing all these demands, North Korea's desired rights to development and survival are, in fact, being increasingly infringed upon.

This is because North Korea's continued pursuit of advanced nuclear development and missile launches has led to a significant enhancement in the readiness and scale of ROK-U.S. combined exercises. These exercises are conducted more frequently, and U.S. strategic assets, including strategic nuclear submarines, are deployed. From North Korea's perspective, this situation poses a greater threat to their survival, creating a counterproductive effect. Second, as you are well aware, ROK-Japan relations are finally normalizing. As you know, ROK-Japan relations had reached an all-time low. The primary driving force behind the normalization of ROK-Japan relations, I believe, has been North Korea's nuclear drive. Last year, with North Korea's relentless missile launches, public opinion in both South Korea and Japan, despite historical difficulties between the two countries, has increasingly recognized the need for cooperation in the face of the North Korean threat. Paradoxically, while we cannot manipulate history in a laboratory setting, if North Korea had not pursued its nuclear program so aggressively, it would have been extremely difficult to achieve this level of bilateral relations and security cooperation. Therefore, from North Korea's perspective, ROK-Japan cooperation is a significant disadvantage. This cooperation has emerged precisely because of their actions. Furthermore, ROK-U.S. cooperation is also strengthening. Following the ROK-U.S.-Japan joint statement in Phnom Penh last November, and with the ROK-U.S.-Japan summit scheduled for August, these developments are highly unfavorable for North Korea. Consider this: ROK-U.S. joint efforts to address North Korea's nuclear issue already place a significant burden on North Korea. The addition of Japan's cooperation further diminishes the utility of North Korea's nuclear weapons.

Japan possesses significant military capabilities in two key areas: anti-submarine warfare and missile detection and identification. Japan's Aegis destroyers are highly capable. While the U.S. and South Korea also have Aegis destroyers, U.S. Aegis destroyers are not always stationed in the region. They can detect and intercept missiles within a 1,000 km radius. However, Japan's proximity to the region means that increased joint exercises enhance missile detection and identification capabilities against North Korean launches. This presents a significant challenge for North Korea. Furthermore, as you may have recently observed, leaders from South Korea, Japan, and the U.S. have participated in the NATO summit for two consecutive years. The term 'AP4' has even emerged, referring to the four Asia-Pacific countries: South Korea, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. These four countries are forming alliances and strengthening cooperation with NATO. This aligns with the U.S. concept of 'integrated deterrence.' Simply put:

NATO's primary operational area has traditionally been Europe, but it is now expanding into the Indo-Pacific region, cooperating with U.S. allies in the region. While the level and scope of this cooperation have room for further development, strengthened cooperation means that North Korea would have to contend with not only the ROK and the U.S. but also NATO allies, effectively facing a colossal military cooperation bloc. This inevitably diminishes the utility of North Korea's nuclear weapons. Therefore, significant counter-reactions have emerged. Finally, I would like to add one more point. There is a common discussion these days about the ROK-U.S.-Japan versus China-Russia-North Korea dynamic. However, historically, if you look back at history books, the relationship between China, Russia, and North Korea, starting from their collaboration during the Korean War in 1950 and continuing to the present, has been marked by a profound lack of trust between them. There are numerous historical precedents, and authoritarian regimes, particularly those with one-man rule, inherently distrust each other.

Japan possesses significant military capabilities in two key areas: anti-submarine warfare and missile detection and identification. Japan's Aegis destroyers are highly capable. While the U.S. and South Korea also have Aegis destroyers, U.S. Aegis destroyers are not always stationed in the region. They can detect and intercept missiles within a 1,000 km radius. However, Japan's proximity to the region means that increased joint exercises enhance missile detection and identification capabilities against North Korean launches. This presents a significant challenge for North Korea. Furthermore, as you may have recently observed, leaders from South Korea, Japan, and the U.S. have participated in the NATO summit for two consecutive years. The term 'AP4' has even emerged, referring to the four Asia-Pacific countries: South Korea, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. These four countries are forming alliances and strengthening cooperation with NATO. This aligns with the U.S. concept of 'integrated deterrence.' Simply put:

NATO's primary operational area has traditionally been Europe, but it is now expanding into the Indo-Pacific region, cooperating with U.S. allies in the region. While the level and scope of this cooperation have room for further development, strengthened cooperation means that North Korea would have to contend with not only the ROK and the U.S. but also NATO allies, effectively facing a colossal military cooperation bloc. This inevitably diminishes the utility of North Korea's nuclear weapons. Therefore, significant counter-reactions have emerged. Finally, I would like to add one more point. There is a common discussion these days about the ROK-U.S.-Japan versus China-Russia-North Korea dynamic. However, historically, if you look back at history books, the relationship between China, Russia, and North Korea, starting from their collaboration during the Korean War in 1950 and continuing to the present, has been marked by a profound lack of trust between them. There are numerous historical precedents, and authoritarian regimes, particularly those with one-man rule, inherently distrust each other.

There are numerous historical precedents, and authoritarian regimes, particularly those with one-man rule, inherently distrust each other. Therefore, the current cooperation between China, Russia, and North Korea is possible only because of the common enemy, the United States. I do not believe they share fundamental values or basic interests. It is a union of convenience, and as such, it is always susceptible to collapse. My point in presenting this is that while North Korea's ambition to become a nuclear-armed state may seem within reach, the reality is that its nuclear utility is being significantly undermined by various counter-reactions. This must be a major concern for North Korea, and it's likely the reason why, as the National Intelligence Service recently stated, Chairman Kim Jong Un is unable to sleep at night. Today, I have provided an overview of North Korea's actions this year and the counter-reactions that are unfolding. In the next session, I will meet you with a related topic. Thank you.

Today, I have provided an overview of North Korea's actions this year and the counter-reactions that are unfolding. In the next session, I will meet you with a related topic. Thank you.