North Korea and the World: North Korea's "Head-On Breakthrough" Strategy Declared After the Collapse of the Hanoi Summit in 2019

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yqyJhbsA7Tg

The East Asia Institute (EAI) is launching the "North Korea and the World" series featuring Park Won-gon, Director of the EAI North Korea Studies Center and Professor at Ewha Womans University, on the EAI YouTube channel.

In the first installment, Director Park Won-gon explains the "Head-On Breakthrough" strategy declared by North Korea following the collapse of the North Korea-U.S. summit in Hanoi in 2019. The author analyzes that the core of the "Head-On Breakthrough" lies in ideological struggle, self-reliance, advancement of nuclear capabilities, and preparation for a protracted war. He assesses that North Korea's announcement of an aggressive and radicalized nuclear strategy is part of this line, aiming to gain recognition as a nuclear-weapon state. He specifically points out that North Korea's new nuclear doctrine, directly explained by Chairman Kim Jong-un in 2022, poses a serious threat to South Korea's security by leaving open the possibility of using nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula based on arbitrary judgment and interpretation at any time.

■ Park Won-gon_Director of EAI North Korea Studies Center. Professor of North Korean Studies at Ewha Womans University.

■ Contact and Editing: Park Ji-soo, EAI Research Fellow

    Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | jspark@eai.or.kr

Video Transcript

To gain the initiative in the early stages of war, they would use nuclear weapons. That is, they have clearly stated their intention to use nuclear weapons against South Korea. To summarize, this means they can use nuclear weapons at any time based on arbitrary judgment and interpretation. They will maximize their nuclear capabilities. Once that is complete, they will seek a decisive negotiation with the United States. It is true that North Korea is largely acquiring that capability. Hello, I am Park Won-gon, Director of the EAI North Korea Studies Center and a professor in the Department of North Korean Studies at Ewha Womans University. I am very pleased to meet you all for the first time through this YouTube channel.

Going forward, we will make considerable preparations to delve deeply into important issues related to North Korea, and at times, expand the discussion to include various surrounding countries, particularly the U.S.-China relationship, which is very important for the Korean Peninsula and North Korea. We will meet you with expanded topics. For our first session today, I pondered what to cover. However, I decided to provide an overview of North Korea's current situation, intentions, and the line they are pursuing.

However, going too far back into the past might not be appropriate given the current circumstances. If necessary later, we will provide an in-depth account of what actually happened during the so-called Korean Peninsula Peace Process of 2018-2019, which you are all likely familiar with. Today, however, I will focus on North Korea's thoughts, policies, and strategy from the end of the Korean Peninsula Peace Process, specifically from December 2019 to the present, August 2023, and how they are shaping their current path.

It began in December 2019. As you all know well, through the Korean Peninsula Peace Process in 2018 and 2019, we experienced various historic events that were previously unimaginable. The most significant was the meeting between the United States and North Korea, nations that were once sworn enemies. North Korea consistently refers to the United States as a nation that must be "skinned alive" – a harsh expression, but it reflects their deep animosity. Similarly, the U.S. has viewed North Korea as a hostile nation for 70 years, maintaining no relations and constantly highlighting the North Korean threat. The fact that the leaders of these two nations met is undeniably a historic event.

However, after the Hanoi Summit in February 2019 between President Trump and Chairman Kim Jong-un, working-level talks between the U.S. and North Korea in Stockholm broke down. Subsequently, North Korea announced its policy direction, or what is commonly referred to as its "line," in December 2019. Through the 7th Party Congress's 5th Plenary Meeting, they unveiled their policy initiative, the "Head-On Breakthrough." This marks the beginning of the "Head-On Breakthrough" line, which I believe North Korea continues to pursue even as of August 2023. This "Head-On Breakthrough" has four core characteristics. The most crucial among them is the intensification of ideological struggle.

When North Korea emphasizes the intensification of ideological struggle, it signifies their intention to sever ties with the outside world, unite the populace internally, and exert greater control over domestic affairs. The second point, which North Korea has consistently spoken about for the past 70 years, is "self-reliance." To be more specific, since the official adoption of Juche ideology in 1968, "self-reliance" has been a recurring theme. The expression "self-reliance" itself implies an effort to endure without external assistance, relying solely on North Korea's internal strength.

This means striving to develop the North Korean economy solely through internal efforts. Therefore, ideological struggle and self-reliance are the two core pillars for consolidating North Korea internally. The third aspect of the "Head-On Breakthrough" that North Korea articulated is the maximization of its nuclear capabilities through these efforts. This implies that during this period, North Korea would continue its work on nuclear development. The fourth and final core principle is that this is a long-term endeavor, meaning North Korea will persevere for as long as possible until it can maximize its nuclear capabilities. These are the four core principles of the "Head-On Breakthrough," and as I reiterate, they continue to be observed even as of August 2023. Following this, North Korea convened the 8th Party Congress in January 2021.

A Party Congress, from a systemic perspective, is significant. As you know, North Korea operates under a unique leadership system, where a leader symbolized by the Supreme Leader governs the entire nation. In simpler terms, it is a one-man rule system. Nevertheless, from North Korea's standpoint, the Party Congress is indeed the highest-level decision-making body institutionally. Under Kim Jong-un, Party Congresses are held every five years. In 2021, the 8th Party Congress was held, at which North Korea announced two important plans. The first is a five-year economic development plan, and the second is a five-year national defense development plan.

What is crucial here is that the 8th Party Congress reaffirmed the "Head-On Breakthrough" strategy, which was announced at the 7th Party Congress's 5th Plenary Meeting in December 2019. The 8th Party Congress, at the highest institutional level, confirmed that they would continue with this "Head-On Breakthrough." Furthermore, the "National Defense Development Five-Year Plan," in particular, provides a portfolio of their weapon development plans. When it was first announced, many, including myself, were skeptical about whether North Korea could actually achieve these goals.

This includes things like hypersonic missiles and military reconnaissance satellites, which North Korea has long desired. At this point, excluding the nuclear-powered submarine, which is one of the five key strategic weapons mentioned, North Korea is at least attempting the others, and while some attempts have failed, development is clearly ongoing. This signifies that the goal of advancing nuclear capabilities through the "Head-On Breakthrough," as mentioned earlier, was reaffirmed at the Party Congress and continues to be pursued.

Another point confirmed at the 8th Party Congress was North Korea's declaration of being a complete and full nuclear-weapon state. Therefore, if any dialogue were to commence in the future, it should involve nuclear disarmament negotiations. The core of such disarmament negotiations would be North Korea's de facto status as a nuclear-weapon state. In English terms, it means negotiating partial nuclear reductions while holding the status of a de facto nuclear-weapon state. This was also reaffirmed at the 8th Party Congress. Following this, tensions on the Korean Peninsula continued to escalate. Notably, March 24, 2020, warrants attention, as North Korea launched the Hwasong-17. The Hwasong-17 is an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). South Korean and U.S. intelligence agencies believe that it was not the Hwasong-17 but rather a relaunch of the Hwasong-15, which North Korea claimed completed its "state nuclear force" on November 28, 2019. However, North Korea announced it as the Hwasong-17. You can easily verify this on YouTube.

North Korea created this for propaganda purposes, and it is quite unique. I had never seen anything like it before. It appears to have utilized techniques similar to those in the famous movie "Top Gun." For example, Kim Jong-un appears in slow motion, putting on and taking off sunglasses, and the hangar doors open, with two or three commanders walking slowly alongside him. From our perspective, it might seem somewhat kitschy, but it represents North Korea's attempt to cater to the tastes of the "Jangmadang generation," referred to as their new generation. This attempt began around this time.

It's an interesting point, and I think you'll find it amusing if you look it up. However, the more significant meaning here is that North Korea, in April 2018, during the Korean Peninsula Peace Process, declared a moratorium through a plenary meeting. This moratorium involved refraining from nuclear tests and ICBM tests. Publicly, this moratorium was not broken until March 24, 2022. However, with the launch of what they called the Hwasong-17 on March 24th, they publicly broke the moratorium. Since then, North Korea has continued to conduct missile launches.

In 2022 alone, North Korea launched ICBMs eight times, apparently in an effort to achieve the practical completion of their Hwasong-17. Furthermore, 2022 was a year in which North Korea publicly exposed its nuclear strategy, which, under the "Head-On Breakthrough" line, became notably aggressive and radicalized. In April 2022, following the announcement of the Hwasong-17 launch on March 24th, Vice Department Director Kim Yo-jong issued a statement containing the following content:

North Korea's nuclear weapons can be used in the early stages of a war on the Korean Peninsula. This is highly significant because the purpose of North Korea's nuclear development has been a subject of considerable debate among researchers. Additionally, there has been debate regarding the targets of North Korea's nuclear use. While North Korea has consistently justified its nuclear development as a measure of self-defense against the perceived threat of a U.S. nuclear attack, it has also publicly stated that it would not use nuclear weapons against South Korea, its fellow countrymen and people. However, through Kim Yo-jong's statement on April 5, 2022, these claims were all refuted. The statement declared the intention to use nuclear weapons to gain the initiative in the early stages of war, which clearly implies targeting South Korea. Perhaps more importantly, eleven days later, on April 25th, North Korea held a military parade where Kim Jong-un delivered a speech that included a very significant nuclear doctrine.

The speech stated that North Korea has two missions for its nuclear weapons. The first mission, as Kim Jong-un himself stated, is a military mission of preventing war. However, the problem lies with the second mission, which is the ability to use nuclear weapons if the fundamental interests of the state are threatened. The issue here is that, as you might consider, what exactly constitutes the "fundamental interests of the state"? It is a very ambiguous concept. Therefore, after first hearing this speech, I looked into it.

What did North Korea mean by fundamental interests? A very extensive list emerged. For instance, raising human rights issues against North Korea is considered an infringement of fundamental interests. The joint military exercises conducted by South Korea and the United States are naturally seen as harming North Korea's interests. Furthermore, the international economic sanctions imposed on North Korea are also considered to harm the fundamental interests of the state. To summarize, this means that nuclear weapons can be used at any time based on arbitrary judgment and interpretation. This is indeed a highly aggressive and dangerous nuclear doctrine. This was announced on April 25th. Moreover, from North Korea's perspective, as you are likely aware, the pronouncements of leader Kim Jong-un carry the highest authority. There is the North Korean constitution, the Workers' Party regulations, and then the leader's statements. Therefore, this can be considered a statement with the highest institutional authority. Following this, and perhaps something you have heard about, in September 2020, North Korea's Supreme People's Assembly was convened, and North Korea enacted and passed nuclear legislation. The details of this legislation were also publicly disclosed. Here, we need to focus on two aspects.

It was announced on April 25th. Moreover, from North Korea's perspective, as you all know well, the statements made by leader Kim Jong Un carry the highest authority above all else. North Korea has its constitution, its Workers' Party rules, and then the leader's statements. Therefore, this can be seen as a statement with the highest level of institutional authority. Next, as I believe many of you have heard, in September 2020, North Korea's Supreme People's Assembly was convened, and North Korea enacted and passed nuclear legislation. The contents of this legislation were also publicly disclosed in such detail. Here, we should focus on two aspects.

One is that the status and control of all nuclear weapons are subject to the "sole authority of the Chairman of the State Affairs Commission, Kim Jong-un," as stated in the title. This means that all decisions regarding nuclear weapons rest with Kim Jong-un. Additionally, there are five conditions for the use of nuclear weapons. One of these conditions states that if an attack is imminent or occurs against the state leadership or the state nuclear force command, it will automatically trigger a nuclear war. What this implies is that any attempt to attack Kim Jong-un will automatically lead to war. From North Korea's perspective, this not only protects the leader Kim Jong-un but also, in a way, reveals North Korea's vulnerability. This is because North Korea's system is a unique leadership system; if the leader of this unique leadership system is eliminated, its ability to wage war will inevitably decline significantly. However, this aspect has been highlighted, and there is room for interpretation. In November 2022, North Korea again launched the Hwasong-17.

The launch on March 24th was, in fact, the Hwasong-15; the one launched in November is the Hwasong-17. It was at this point that Kim Jong-un's daughter, Kim Ju-ae, famously appeared. This has led to speculation about whether she is the successor in the fourth-generation hereditary succession, a topic I will address separately in a future discussion. More importantly today, it signifies that North Korea has been continuously enhancing and developing its nuclear capabilities, particularly its ability to strike the mainland United States. Therefore, with the launch of the Hwasong-18 in 2022, it appears that North Korea is moving towards the final stage of advancing its nuclear capabilities for striking the U.S. mainland as part of its "Head-On Breakthrough" strategy.

The objectives and goals of North Korea in 2022 are as described above. So, what exactly was North Korea aiming for? It is very clear. Based on the 8th Party Congress, the 7th Party Congress's 5th Plenary Meeting, and the subsequent numerous North Korean meetings and declared lines, North Korea's objective is unambiguous: acknowledge us as a nuclear-weapon state. To achieve this, they will maximize their nuclear capabilities. Once this is completed, they will seek a decisive negotiation with the United States. This is their objective. Unfortunately, it is true that North Korea is largely acquiring these capabilities.

In particular, the capability for tactical nuclear weapons, often referred to as low-yield nuclear weapons, which can strike at least South Korea, Japan, and Guam, is considered to be almost operationally deployed. North Korea is developing the capability for intercontinental ballistic missiles that can strike the U.S. mainland. Therefore, in this first session today, I have provided an overview of the events that have transpired since 2018, starting from 2020 up to last year, along with my interpretation. In the next session, I will discuss what has happened in 2023 and the new challenges North Korea faces as a result. Thank you for listening attentively to this first session.