[Global NK 국제회의] 세션 1. 핵 경쟁과 동아시아 안보위기

YouTube 링크 : https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GcJbyNtnNNU

지난 5월 10일(수) 동아시아연구원(EAI, 원장 손열 연세대 교수)은 <글로벌NK (Global NK: Zoom & Connect)> 프로그램의 일환으로 “동아시아 핵 경쟁과 확전 가능성 대응: 미래 한반도 질서 구축을 위한 한미중 협력방안” 국제회의를 개최하였습니다. 첫 번째 세션에서는 한미중 안보 전문가들은 지속되는 북한의 핵 위협과 억지체제의 미래 및 미중 관계 현황에 대해 논의하였습니다. 참석자들은 양국 간 “전략적 경쟁”의 정의에 대해 열띤 논쟁을 벌이면서도, 미국과 중국 정부 모두 양국의 관계 악화에 책임이 있다는 인식을 공유했습니다. 나아가 한미중뿐만 아니라 모든 관여 국가들이 한반도 평화에 대한 공동의 이익을 모색하여 협력을 도모해야 한다고 강조했습니다.

■ 일시: 2023년 5월 10일(수), 09:30-11:10

■ 장소: 웨스틴조선 서울호텔 오키드룸

■ 참석자(가나다순): 김인한(이화여대 교수), 박원곤(EAI 북한연구센터 소장; 이화여대 교수), 존 박(하버드대 벨퍼센터 국장), 매튜 번(하버드대 케네디스쿨 교수), 자칭궈(북경대 교수), 장투어셩(궈관 싱크탱크 주임), 하영선(EAI 이사장; 서울대 명예교수)

■ 발제: 매튜 번 교수(하버드대 케네디스쿨)

“Deterring Without Provoking”

• Whenever a state makes its key decision, its security implication to the adversary and the adversary’s potential response must be considered. In this context, in order to maximize security, the state must assess both the defense-deterrent value and provocation risks.

• What the ROK and U.S. see as deterrent and defensive may be seen as an offensive threat to the DPRK. In crisis, therefore, North Korean misperceptions of ROK-US actions could provoke unwanted escalation.

• Escalation risks link deterrence of large-scale war and smaller provocations. “Core” deterrence, or stopping a full-scale war “out of the blue” is likely to be strong, but deterrence of smaller-scale provocations may fail. Big concern on deterrence lies on the inadvertent steps that could lead to war when small conflicts get out of control.

• In planning responses to provocations, combined ROK-U.S. forces need to consider both the effect on deterring further outrages and the risk of provoking DPRK.

• “Deterring Without Provoking” Policy Dilemma #1: ROK-U.S. want conventional superiority for defense and deterrence, but history suggests that side facing conventional inferiority is more likely to use nuclear weapons.

• “Deterring Without Provoking” Policy Dilemma #2: ROK and U.S. want to improve their ability to target DPRK nuclear forces, thereby exacerbating DPRK fear of such targeting. This increases incentive to build more weapons or even pre-delegate nuclear use authority.

• So how do we mitigate these dilemmas? Reduce the temperature, strategically include provocation risk in planning, apply confidence-building measures, and employ nuclear restraints.

■ 발제: 자칭궈 교수(북경대)

“The Imposed Strategic Competition: China’s Response and Its Position on the North Korean Nuclear Program”

• The term “strategic competition” is “imposed” on China by the U.S., and China has never accepted this term. China believes that this term does not adequately capture the complicated bilateral relationship. Outright “public” competition is untraditional for Chinese—instead, Chinese tend to compete under the table.

• United States’ determination to engage in a “strategic competition” has resulted in a distinct pattern of behavior that makes the relationship more difficult and confrontational. Trump and Biden have both been pursuing high-tech decoupling, supply chain redirection, and military preparation in places of China’s interest.

• Of all U.S. actions, China is most concerned about U.S. challenge against the territorial sovereignty and integrity over Taiwan. Under this circumstance, China is rethinking its national strategy.

• Since Biden came into office, U.S. policy toward China has become less volatile and outright provocative. Yet Congress poses the problem—it has become increasingly proactive over Taiwan, passing bills and resolutions unfavorable to China.

• While U.S. “containment” policy against China aims to take away China’s stake in the international order, China must be stronger and more capable to “wreck the [U.S.-led] order” if it finds interest in doing so. Against this background, China rethinks its nuclear policy.

• China’s nuclear policy has been based on three pillars: (1) minimum in number, (2) no first use, and (3) nonproliferation. With growing U.S. threat, there is growing voices in China calling for a stronger stance.

• In short, U.S. should stop meddling with Taiwan and engage with China. It is never too late to stop confrontation and seek cooperation.

■ 발제: 박원곤 소장(EAI 북한연구센터; 이화여대 교수)

“North Korea’s Nuclear Maneuverings: Signaling the Demise of Longstanding Pursuit for Complete Denuclearization?”

• Since 2019 until today, DPRK continues provoking, developing nuclear weapons, and pursuing its “Frontal Breakthrough” policy. “Frontal Breakthrough” constitutes four principles: (1) self-reliance, (2) ideological indoctrination, (3) confrontational policy toward ROK and U.S., and (4) nuclear development “in the most sophisticated way.”

• Clearly, DPRK’s ultimate goal is to be recognized by the world, U.S. in particular, as a de facto nuclear state. In this context, complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement (CVID) and complete denuclearization are rather unrealistic.

• While North Korea continues provocations, there are clear differences in its behavior that have serious implications. Pyongyang explicitly states that the provocations target ROK and U.S., conducts tests during ROK-U.S. joint military exercises, deploys missiles for tangible warfare, diversifies platforms to launch the missiles, and broadcasts its provocations to its own people.

• While the international community must not holistically disregard the possibility of a seventh nuclear test, DPRK is facing some critical difficulties. Strengthening ROK-U.S.-Japan ties and advancement of the high-tech sector are burdensome to the DPRK. While Kim Jong Un declared that DPRK will achieve 1.4-fold increase in GDP by 2026, this is virtually impossible partially due to its self-imposed border closure.

• For effective economic development, North Korea must inevitably come to the negotiating table and take meaningful steps for denuclearization. Without such actions, there remains no chance for sanctions relief.

• Partial denuclearization without a clear and comprehensive goal of complete denuclearization could provide space for DPRK to find ways to retain its nuclear arsenal indefinitely.

■ 토론1: 존 박 국장(하버드대 벨퍼센터)

• In a perception vs. reality perspective, we are currently seeing an important dynamic of perception being greater than reality. In fact, contrary to this perspective, historical reality shows that the U.S. is resilient and adaptive to changing order. It also suggests that the U.S. is not in an irreversible decline.

• If the strategic competition between U.S. and China is “imposed” by the U.S., as Professor Jia Qingguo suggests, this perception reflects that there is a clear difference in how the two countries are defining or the term.

■ 토론2: 장투어셩 주임(궈관 싱크탱크)

• Kim Jong Un’s claim that North Korea made a “significant nuclear achievement” is “not totally groundless, but overstated.” The international community is concerned about DPRK’s potential nuclear test, but it seems unnecessary for them to conduct it. DPRK already has sufficient capability to deter U.S., ROK, and Japan.

• Yet nuclear conflict due to miscalculation could be possible. In an event of a serious military confrontation between ROK-U.S. and DPRK, North Korea may strike first or the U.S. may strike preemptively.

• Some Chinese experts believe that DPRK’s possession of nuclear weapons reduced the possibility of conflict on the Korean Peninsula. This, however, increased the risk of nuclear proliferation, potentially creating a domino effect in the region. North Korea’s development of weapons could provide U.S. an excuse to deploy strategic asset to ROK or Japan, thereby posing immense security threat to China.

■ 토론3: 김인한 교수(이화여대)

• Professor Bunn mentioned that ROK-U.S. should avoid provocation and provide reassurance to secure deterrence. Yet this begs an important question about South Korea’s security concerns from the lack of its capability to deter DPRK’s “nuclear” attack. ROK-U.S. must find a balance between keeping a strong alliance and alleviating DPRK’s security concern.

• Regarding Professor Bunn’s call for the need to “reduce the temperature,” the international community should keep in mind that various approaches like the Sunshine Policy and Six-Party Talks have been taken, but were ineffective.

• On Professor Jia Qingguo’s presentation on the “imposed” competition, one should remember that ROK and U.S. never shut China out of the table. China should fulfill its duty by raising its voice against DPRK provocation because this is also a China problem.

■ 토론4: 매튜 번 교수

• One important aspect in deterring Kim Jong Un from using nuclear weapons is convincing him that the U.S. will not threaten regime survival as long as he doesn’t attack (the U.S. or its allies in the region).

• China has done just as much as the U.S. to “impose” the strategic competition.

• Given that Secretary Blinken officially said that he hopes to schedule his trip to China, hopefully U.S. and China will get back to conversation. There are many world challenges like climate change, future pandemic, and nuclear war, for which U.S.-China cooperation is required.

■ 토론5: 자칭궈 교수

• China has its own share of responsibility for deteriorating bilateral relationship. China could have handled better in some respect.

• At the moment, U.S. and China both face opportunities and shared interest in stabilization and even improvement of bilateral relationship. Biden has flexibility to handle the relationship with China, and China needs to restore economic growth.

■ 토론6: 박원곤 소장

• DPRK emphasizes its right to survival, which includes permanently halting joint military exercises and deployment of strategic assets, and withdrawal of the USFK. At the same time, DPRK knows that ROK and the U.S. will not attack them first.

• Nevertheless, both the ROK and U.S. governments need to work on signaling the possibility of dialogue with North Korea. Biden administration’s “calibrated and practical approach” still remains elusive.

• Meanwhile, it is critical for ROK to enhance its own deterrence capability with the help of the U.S. and Japan. As South Korea needs to pursue integrated deterrence with the U.S., it has no choice but to further strengthen the ROK-U.S.-Japan trilateral cooperation.

■ 김인한_이화여자대학교 정치외교학과 교수.

■ 박원곤_동아시아연구원(EAI) 북한연구센터 소장; 이화여자대학교 북한학과 교수.

■ 존 박_하버드대 케네디스쿨 벨퍼센터 한국프로젝트 국장.

■ 매튜 번_하버드대 케네디스쿨 제임스 R. 슐레진저 교수.

■ 자칭궈_북경대학교 교수.

■ 장투어셩_궈관 싱크탱크 주임

■ 하영선_동아시아연구원(EAI) 이사장; 서울대학교 명예교수.

■  담당 및 편집: 박지수, EAI 연구원

    문의: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | jspark@eai.or.kr

www.youtube.com/embed/GcJbyNtnNNU

영상 스크립트

let me begin with the first session entitled nuclear competitions and security challenges in East Asia dprk policies are ROK us and PLC and the scenarios of military confrontations it is perfect timing for us to have this kind of conference today first as far as I know it is the first major International Conference in Seoul right after the Washington declaration by rokus Summit if you can have a chance to read the North Korean basic materials such as the noodle daily newspapers or kcna it is very interesting for North Korea

shows a very detailed and serious response to the uh uh Washington declaration and second it is also the uh one of the first trilateral International Conference between ROK U.S China under the difficult situation of covid-19 also the a little bit difficult situations between the U.S and China I personally hope that the top level of foreign officials of the both the China and the United States will sooner or later resume the delay meetings and the second half of the this year for that kind of purposes I think the

first step we should do as the a develop much more deeper understanding of each other's policies and positions towards are the opponents third it is also the rare occasion for us to discuss the the theme we will have a discussion from a little bit longer perspective of decides it decaled to any 30s uh it seems that we are approaching the dead end whether we can develop new kind of the strategy of symbiosis or we will face much more catastrophe uh situations in that sense I think the first session is critically important

for us to develop the new perspective on the the difficult topics to have a discussions we eai invited three globally eminent Scholars experts and also three uh very much famous discussions let me introduce three people presenters and also discussing to my left Matthew burn as the professor of Harvard University's Kennedy School of government has Specialties on the deterrence and arms control and also the nuclear proliferation issues he also served at for as an advisor to the office of science and Technologies and in addition he

awarded the the winner of most prestigious uh award and also he is the author of The more than 25 books on the topics we will discuss today and also more than 150 articles what and next Professor charging from China it is a professor and former dean of School of International Studies a peaking universities he taught that the major university of the United States and he served for the University Peking University quite a long time and he maintained very close relations with the eai and he has been a member of the standing

committee of the Chinese people's political consultant conference he's also the director of The Institute for China U.S People to People exchange of the ministry educations he also published quite extensively on the major topics including the East Asian peace and security issues and U.S China issues and third presenters will be the foreign professor and Department of North Korean studies and director of The Institute of unification studies that women's universities he also served as a chair of Center for National North Korean

studies at East Asian Institute he is one of the leading scholars in ROK on the North Korean studies and also the international relations of the station arenas in addition we also invited the three discussions first let me introduce the John Park who is the director of the career project at the Harvard Kennedy schools Belfor Center he also advises yeah North Korea Northeast Asia policy focused officials and the U.S government and he is quite active and published major Publications and also he played the important role

to represent the are okay and relevant Powers position on the Capitol Hill and third discussion our second discussion he is the chairman of the academic committee the Grandview institution and the Sydney fellow at the China foundation for international and strategic studies previously he was the deputy defense Natasha at the Chinese Embassy United Kingdom and another important discussion will be the Dr Kim in Han he is an associate professor of the Department of political science at yiha Women's University who

is currently serving as vice president of international Affairs at the school he we sweep this PhD in from University of Virginia he also worked on the major issues of peace and security issues on the Korean Peninsula and also the East Asia Arena as a whole because of time limit I think three presenters will sum up the basic positions less than 12 minutes and after three presentations three discussions can use roughly seven or eight minutes uh to have a product of comments on the presentations let me invite the

professor mattybourne as a first presenter yeah translation to uh Peters did some damage to the formatting so I hope they won't be too bad Mike is not working how's that yeah that sounds louder than it should be uh so thank you very much it's a pleasure to be here and it's a pleasure in particular to be able to have a dialogue between these three uh important countries uh I am uh totally in agreement with my Chinese colleague who will speak after me that unless we can find ways to build cooperation as

well as whatever disagreements we have between the United States and China the world will be a lot worse off my paper though focuses primarily on issues here on the Korean Peninsula but I think the issues I'm going to talk about apply to competitors everywhere that they the main point that I'm trying to make next slide please is that whenever you make a key decision you need to think about what your adversary or competitor is likely to do in response so Otto von Bismarck the German leader remarked that

it's very dangerous to play chess one move at a time to think only about the move you're going to make and not the move that the adversary will make in response and what that will mean to the game uh and so the problem is one of the problems is misperception that what the United States and the Republic of Korea may see as completely defensive the North Koreans may see as an offensive threat that they need to respond to and that response may be endanger our security um and so to maximize our security each

time we're making a weapons purchase laying out a military plan taking a military action in a crisis or conflict we need to think about how will that look to the other side and how will they respond and how will that affect our security next slide please so think about uh in a crisis or as it might evolve into our conflict imagine that the North Koreans commit another awful provocation uh shelling an island again or something like that excuse me South Korea might well believe that it was necessary and reasonable to strike

back to re-establish deterrence you could imagine that North Korea might see what the U.S and ROK forces had done as an escalation and might use a few conventionally armed missiles perhaps on U.S air bases to interfere with what we were doing and as a warning but once the North Koreans started using missiles the United States and the Republic of Korea might well decide we need to go after the North Korean missiles with the kill chain approach that then puts the North Koreans in what strategists call I use them or lose them

position where if they don't use their nuclear weapons they might not have them anymore and the campaign to hunt for and destroy the North Korean missiles might look to North Korea very much like the campaign that would be the Prelude to invading North Korea and so there's a real Danger that that might provoke North Korean nuclear years next slide please um nonetheless I think that core deterrence is likely to be very strong U.S and ROK forces combined can certainly defeat a North Korean invasion of the South if

it's conventional only and North Korea knows that there would be gigantic risks to the survival of its regime if it were to use nuclear weapons so I worry more about the inadvertent steps to war when a crisis or small conflict is getting out of control the things that happened that neither side initially intended before the conflict began and so we have to think about the risk of what we may be provoking with each military action that we take and the lessons of the crises of the Cold War which we've been exploring in a

bit more detail in a project we call data for deterrence uh in our Harvard group is that crises are really very difficult to manage and I'll say a little bit more about that in a moment next slide please next slide oh there we are okay so John F Kennedy after the Cuban Missile Crisis drew a number of lessons but two of the important ones I think were one you always have to give your adversary some face-saving way to get out of the crisis without escalating the war two in a crisis modern militaries are large unwieldy

organizations all sorts of things happen that neither leader actually intended as he pithily put it there's always one son of a who doesn't get the word next slide please so the need to deter without provoking the adversary to do more does create difficult dilemmas United States and the ROK of course would want to maintain conventional superiority over North Korea and yet if you look at these crises of the Cold War when one side was really conventionally inferior they were more likely to consider the use of nuclear

weapons because they had few non-nuclear options for example West Berlin was completely surrounded by Soviet or East German forces there was no way to defend it with conventional forces alone and so the United States planned to use nuclear weapons early in a conflict if the Soviet Union ever tried to seize West Berlin fortunately that deterred that plan deterred the Soviet Union from ever trying to cities so similarly the ROK and the United States would like to maintain the ability to threaten North Korean

missiles North Korean leadership but that threat then provokes the North Koreans to think I need more better different missiles to keep my Force survivable and those dilemmas are not unique to this peninsula they exist between the United States and China they exist between the United States and Russia there are certainly things the United States and NATO would like to do to that would help Ukraine in its war that they don't do because they fear that it would provoke Russian actions that would be contrary

to Ukraine's interests and to NATO's interests and similarly there are many things Russia would love to be able to do to prosecute its war in Ukraine that it doesn't do it doesn't attack for example weapon supplies to Ukraine while they're still in NATO countries because it fears the result of provoking nada next slide please next slide there we are so ultimately deterrence requires reassurance of the adversary as Thomas shelling put it stop or I'll shoot implies if you stop I won't shoot and you have

to convince the adversary that you won't shoot if they stop uh and so reassurance becomes a fundamental part of successful deterrence next slide please so what kinds of things could we do to try to mitigate some of these dilemmas I think if we can find a way and so far North Korea is just rejecting any Outreach but if we can find a way reducing the temperature and the the hostility and the intensity of the hostility on the peninsula is I think the most important step we could take work keep on the previous slide no no

there we are uh systematically including the risk of provocation in our planning we ought to have a group whose job is to constantly assess and be the sort of voice of provocation risk in a certain sense um there are confidence building measures that could be taken some of them unilaterally even if North Korea isn't responding some of them jointly if and when we managed to get back to talks with North Korea and then ultimately if we do manage to get back to talks with North Korea they're not realistically giving up

their nuclear weapons anytime soon we should keep denuclearization as the long-term goal but in the near term we should focus on particular restraints that we think would reduce the risk and we need to do more thinking about exactly what we would ask for in those first steps and what we would offer in return and I'll stop there thank you okay um thank you uh Professor ha many thanks to uh the East Asia Institute to invite me and my colleagues it's great to work with uh Harvard colleagues I'm not going to go over my paper

again but briefly I'll focus on a few uh points first of all as I uh said in my paper that uh the so-called strategic competition is something that is in post on China has never accepted the term the term first came up actually during the Bush Junior Administration uh around the time he got into the White House he started to say that China U.S relationship is a strategic competition and then we had 9 11 and then he dropped the term the term was re-used Again by Trump after he came into office but uh

China has never accepted the term strategic competition to describe the relationship why because First China believed that such kind of description uh is too negative from Chinese perspective uh we don't like uh you know to describe our relationship as competition you know actually in the Chinese tradition we feel we we compete under the table rather than in in public in politics you know this is a very untraditional from a cultural perspective secondly Chinese do not believe that this term captures the complicated

relationship between the two countries okay of course we have areas of competition we have even air areas of Confrontation but uh a very important aspect of our relationship is cooperation we tend to forget that when we talk about competition so China has been very reluctant to accept the term sometimes you'll hear Chinese officials talking about positive or constructive con competition as opposed to malign competition yeah you know I wrote an essay on this a short essay on this a few a couple of

years ago but but again competition is not a term that China Chinese government wants to use to describe the relationship uh the third point I want to make is that the U.S determination to engage in a strategic competition with China has resulted in a pattern of behavior that has made the relationship between the two countries increasingly difficult and confrontational we he we heard you know who have seen tariffs imposed during the Trump Administration where I've seen a high-tech decoupling that has been going on since the Trump

Administration and the the white Administration is accelerating this process and also supply chain restrict redirecting uh that's part of the strategy of the Trump and and by Administration and also military preparation so you see despite a huge deficit U.S government is facing actually they are having a great difficult time to figure out whether they should set a ceiling for it at the moment uh they are increasing the the U.S defense budget uh quite dramatically uh and above all and also building

anti-china coalitions uh we have quad in addition to a lot of military alliances around China and above all the efforts to challenge China's territorial integrity and sovereignty over Taiwan and of course in the Chinese eyes the most offensive and perhaps the most dangerous thing the US has been doing is to challenge China's territorial integrity and sovereignty over Taiwan during the past few past decades the U.S as we need all the three commitments it made for normalization of the relations between

the two countries meaning uh you know aberration I mean suspension of uh withdrawing diplomatic relations let me see now the U.S has basically restored a lot of official relationship with with Taiwan and and also aberration of the treaty Mutual defense treaty now the U.S is renewing its defense commitments with the relationship with Taiwan and also withdraw troops from Taiwan and now the U.S is sending more and more military personnel to train uh Taiwan uh troops of the Taiwan authorities so uh so it's under that kind of

circumstances that China is rethinking it's strategy of peaceful unification okay um the U.S Congress I mean after Biden came into office I think U.S policy on Taiwan has become less volatile less official officially uh moving in a more provocative Direction but the Congress has become a major actor increasingly proactive so you see dozens and dozens of Taiwanese Taiwan related bills and resolutions passing in the Congress groups and groups of members of the U.S Congress going to Taiwan as if they

don't have anything to do and uh and uh two speakers of the house Nancy pelusi and Kevin McCarthy competed in putting the Taiwan problem on the headlines at China's expense okay so uh the the U.S policy of containment against China constitutes efforts to take China's stake out of the existing International order one piece by piece okay so if it is successful if U.S successfully deprives China of its stakes in the existing International order then it would put china back to the 1950s and 60s when China did not have any stake at

all in the international order and vowed to do whatever it takes to overthrow that order okay and unlike the old days however China is much stronger today so it has much more capability to whack the water if it if it finds in its interest so it is against this background that Chinese are debating uh their country country's nuclear program uh nuclear policy okay China's nuclear policy has three major components to it minimum in number no first use and dump proliferation okay so as the U.S challenges China's

territory integrity and sovereignty over Taiwan and China's efforts to stop let me in recent years military confrontation and indeed war between the two countries in the over Taiwan uh have become increasingly likely and given the increasing threat the U.S poses to China increasing number of people in China subscribe to the idea that it's time for China to reconsider its nuclear weapon policy some argue that China should drastically increase the number of nuclear weapons okay like he talked about 1000

Warheads as opposed to a couple of hundred and there are other people who argue for even more okay and some people in China believe that China should change its no first use policy okay the US has not commit to it some other nuclear Powers have not committed to it why should China you know committed to with no first use and some other con people believe that since the U.S has changed this non-non proliferation policy by supplying Australia with this with nuclear submarine and is considering deploying

nuclear a tactical nuclear weapons in Japan and South Korea China should also change its policy on non-proliferation okay what that means is that if the U.S decides to supply nuclear material or weapons to countries hostile to China China should do the same to the U.S okay so that's the argument by some people in China and it's gaining uh currency uh in the against the context of deterior rating U.S China relations at the moment China's official position is remains to uh to adhere to its long-standing nuclear weapon policy

however if the U.S pressures on China especially on the Taiwan problem are increasingly the I will increase then China probably would have to consider reconsider its policy on nuclear weapons so if one does not wish a nuclear arms race nuclear proliferation or maybe a nuclear war between China and the US it's time to Earth the US especially the US Congress to stop messing up with China's territorial integrity and sovereignty over Taiwan and work with China to manage their differences and engage in cooperation

where their interests overlap between China and the Us and other countries should resist the pressures to take sight and exercise their influence to make it clear that they oppose china-u.s confrontation and would act accordingly it is never too late to do a good thing so let's hope thank you thank you Professor Chingo next turn will be the professor pop is my honor and privilege to be here and at the same time on this stage there are two Dr barracks and John and me and also two professors from iwa Women's

University which is very proud of that okay actually I received the three guiding questions from the organizers eai so I will follow these three questions and since I'm teaching at the department of North Korean studies and we'll talk about the nosecrans perspective and what their intentions and goals at this very moment and you probably know very well about the North Korea's very serious provocation last year they launched more than 70 missiles which is the highest numbers in their history and still they continue to have this

kind of a propagation this year too and I think North Korea has continued to so-called the line its policy direction that has been declared in December 2019 I know you know that the 2019 is the most important year because February does break up the Hanoi Summit and North Korea has returned to the old policy and according to their line and it's actually called frontal breakthrough line which is a little bit weird translation but North Korea has used that translation in Korea we said that but anyway there are four very important

principles in that the policy Direction first self-sufficiency self-reliance and it's very uh you know common theme that North Korea has used for past December decade decade and then second one is ideological confrontation or struggle they are going to strengthen the ideological indoctrination for their own people and third one is a confrontational policies toward the South Korea and United States and finally they are going to develop their nuclear weapon in the most sophistic way and it's going to be a long-term

struggle against these two countries I don't think there is any change over past couple of years to about this policy line or polish direction or line still here in 2023 May at this moment I think North Korea has continued to this kind of policy line the ultimate goal is pretty clear that North Korea want to be a Defector nuclear weapon state that has been recognized and acknowledged by the whole world especially from the United States and then the total cvid or the denuclearization of North Korea is a

very unrealistic goal and what that's what the ultimate want at this moment and second guiding question that I got from the organizer is that the key escalation pathway on the Korean Penance law and the uh those kind things okay I will talk about the kind of a very distinctive characteristics of North Koreans provocation this year and I think a very clear differences between this year and the last year previous year first North Korea has expressed a very clear intention that this year's provocation is targeting against South

Korea and United States even though North Korea has a such a large numbers of the military the missile provocation last year they haven't mentioned clearly about the targeting to South Korea or the United States instead they talk about this is just for their ordinary the the weapon development plan in 2021 North Korea hold the eighth party Congress and they introduced five-year the uh The Five-Year defense development plan and North Korea has after conducted several missile tests last year North

Korea has mentioned that this is the what they just followed this five-year defense the defense uh development plan but this year every time they fired the missiles they are saying that this is against South Korea and United States and second one is I think it's very serious because North Korea for the first time in their history the last year this September they launched the missile during the South Korea and United States joint military exercise during this joint military exercise North Korea has never ever they have the

any kind of provocation for past several decades so definitely this is the reflect their confidence on their nuclear capability then in this year the March we have I mean South Korea in the United States have a huge scale the joint military exercise which has been called Freedom Shield and during during this time of period North Korea's one more time conducted the missile test and third one is North Korea deployed missiles for tangible welfare rather than the mere test launches every time this year they fired

the missiles they said that this is the not just development stage but this is actually deployed in the field and they just train for this military exercise so that's the another important differences compared to the previous year and fourth and I think Professor van already mentioned a little bit about that North Korea is trying to diversify their platforms we see the various way to launch missiles the mobile launchers trains reservers even they launched missile in the golf course Lake and it creates huge kind of cost for the South

Korea United States because I think South Korea United States enough capability to to deter and even strike this kind of North Grand missiles but if North Korea continue to expand this the platform and then it will create huge amount of money to prepare for the North Koreans possible attack and finally I think this is most important differences and this is North Korea's this year they are talking about their missile launches and provocation against South Korea United States to their own people the

last year more than 70 meters but very few times they just mentioned to their own people but this year right after they launched the missiles and they are you know released to their official the newspaper like and then they said that this is against South Korea United States I think of this reflect the current North Korean situation we all know that North Korea is a very serious economic difficulties so this is their typical way respond to this kind of a domestic difficult domestic difficulties by creating the tension

around the Korean panels that we called it as seized mental Latinos Korea has continued to say that they diseased by the South Korean United States so overall this is the very new kind of a trend phenomena that we are seeing at this year is which is very serious and about the possibility of seventh nuclear test I still believe that we should not exclude the possibility of 70 nuclear tests and I think there are two reasons that North Korea wanted to have a seventh nuclear test both military and Military the technologically and also

politically so I'm not going to go detail but we have to prepare the possibility of North Koreans nuclear test but at the same time last year North Korea has also faced some serious challenges and I mean there is some repercussion about North Korea's Relentless person about their nuclear weapons first we are seeing that the very growing the uh cooperation among three countries trilateral Corporation South Korea Japan and United States and you know that South Korea and finally overcome those who the for pastors ever

the years difficulties with Japan why not they try to normalize relations and at the same time this month we will have this another trilateral Summit between three countries and we all already conducted the server the military training and this is a kind of a huge burden to North Korea because North Korea has to right now uh respond to this kind of the joint effort by three countries which is a military height we have all the that military the weapons so at the same time North Korea is the suffered economically we all know that

technically this is third year that actually they still blocked their border of course they are very limited uh open to Russia and China but not fully open at all so and at the same time Kim Jong-un himself mentioned in the 2021 at 8 party Congress that he showed this plan that North Korea will um develop their economic to the 1.4 time speaker in Target year until 2026 and the last September North Korea's held the Supreme people's assembly Kim Jong-un confirmed this uh the goal one more time but we all know that that is

impossible goal because if North Korea wanted to develop their the economy for 1.4 times bigger than the uh the previous years and they have to develop every year at least four percent but we all know that in 2021 according to Bangkok Korea here in Korea say that North Korea has just 0.5 percent of developed and I don't think this kind of Trend will never change but we see in order to have a some kind of economic achievement this inevitable that North Korea should come to the negotiation table and at least doing some kind of

meaningful denuclearized measure digital crisis stepped unless they weren't doing that there is no chance that the any kind of the sanctions really for sanction lift and recent lately okay then I will move the third questions and that is about the arms reduction and the what is the goal of the genocide of course there are many uh you know debate about this one right now especially in the United States and then there are some group of people saying that the uh who completed the inequalization of North Korea is

definitely unrealistic so we have to pay out I mean the some of the USD people saying that Americans say that we have to pay more attention about the freeze of the especially nosecrans ICBM developments and or we have to focus on departure denuclearization instead of the full denuclearization which is a very serious challenge to South Korean people you all know that in South Korea we have a at least 60 something percent to 80 percent support their own nuclear Armament I hope this Washington declaration can reduce this kind of

public support for the our own nuclear armamentality but it is true that many people in Korea worry about this the North Koreans nuclear development but uh these kind of things we have to think about if just in the United States are talking about partial correlation without any kind of a clear goal of the full denuclearization of North Korea will create huge kind of problem here in Korea because uh I'm running out of time I'm gonna stop here actually I will talk about this outgrade policy but I still

don't have time I may I I hope I will have a chance to talk later thank you so much for the the comments there I've been asked to comment on Professor judging wo's paper as well as Professor pakpong's paper and so I'll keep it brief here with Professor Jazz paper I I wanted to start with the context and something of diagnosis as well if you look at it from the perspective of perception versus reality I do think it's important to frame our discussions with an examination of three key events the first one was 2001 911 and 10 years of

the global war and Terror a period where from a U.S perspective that was the number one Global priority uh there are many developments that are happening today that are rooted from that time period that I do think we have to investigate uh and examine it more closely the second is the two 2007 Global financial crisis this was a period where particularly for the United States if you look at it from the perspective of the ability to respond to a crisis that was extremely Swift that required unprecedented type of measures it is

something that revealed aside the vulnerability of the United States in that respect as well the third is the early days of the pandemic and where the U.S responds to it in many respects a type of reaction that took much longer it was learning by doing as that played out as well the point I wanted to emphasize what that what we see here is an important Dynamic of perception being greater than reality I do think there is an overhang from these three particular periods where still colors a lot of the analysis

in terms of particularly the U.S role U.S reactions but the historical reality is that the U.S is resilient and adaptive so we really need to increase the aperture in terms of how we are looking at some of these flows otherwise a core Assumption of a lot of the analysis is that the US is in the process an irreversible process of the client the historical record doesn't show that the second point I wanted to emphasize here and this is leading up to a question to Professor Jaz with your formulation of the imposed strategic

competition I you know this is in reaction to the period prior where there was a big emphasis in China I'm trying to establish a new type of gray power relationship as it was framed back then if this is currently the U.S formulation as you mentioned in your paper of an imposed strategic competition and clear differences in definition and understanding between the United States and China how do you see China seeking to set its own path clearly this is not a dynamic in terms of the imposed strategic

competition so how are you seeing the formulation of a path forward that is proactive not reactive from the Chinese side the second one when we look at it from the perspective of the immediate period that we're in right now and it's not a period that will go away anytime soon the increasing focus on economic statecraft uh with this as you pointed out professor John there's a lot going on in terms of the U.S in terms of the use of economic statecraft particularly in the area of restricting Advanced microchips

and with that the examples here the high-tech decoupling as you pointed out I think the revision and the adaptation in terms of the terminology in Washington now is it's de-risking aspects of it but the question to you is how do you see China's responses to the US's increasing economic statecraft up until now we haven't seen much by way of action if you could shed some more light in terms of what some of the debates and some of the thinkings are in China related to how China May respond to the increasing use of U.S economic

statecraft and switching to Professor pakwangun this is an area where I'm curious how you're seeing the key Criterion factors the ones that you apply to assessing the effectiveness of enhanced deterrence that would match the growing dprk nuclear threat first question and the second one is clearly two key highlights of President yun's State visit to Washington number one was the Washington declaration and the second one was a nuclear consultative group the focus now is squarely on how to implement a big focus of discussions

that our group other groups are engaged in is designing and implementing this type of process so for you what is essential uh in your mind's eye when it comes to designing this process you know clearly there's there's a lot to build out and what are the priorities that you see and then finally I I this is something that I'm curious about we hear a lot about South Korea soft power and if president yoon's visit to Washington was a focus on hard power when we hosted A Hymn for his uh Speech in the Kennedy School Forum there was a

big focus on soft power President Joe and I moderated the event and in one of the responses that President Yoon gave to our student president yoon's explanation I thought was very nuanced in terms of soft power and Professor Nye said that if president Yoon were a student at the Kennedy School he would give him an a so with that is the context what role do you see for South Korea's soft power in deterrence particularly in telling the complex story of South Korea's current circumstances and how that would inform

the International Community on next steps thank you foreign thank you first I'd like to share with my view on North Korea nuclear capability and it's a threat back in 2017 dprk reached initial Nuclear Strike capability since then admit the deteriorating China U.S relations especially the outbreak of the Russia Ukraine war the dbrk has gotten a rare opportunity to develop its nuclear capability and expand its nuclear Arsenal since last year the dbrk has been developing all kinds of missiles and appears to have become a missile

power at the Workers Party Congress in January 2021st King Jong-Un said the dprk has made a huge achievement on nuclear program to based on this in the future dprk will develop a variety of tactical nuclear weapons push ahead with the production of ultra large nuclear warheads to strengthen actual combat capability what he said is somewhat exaggerated but not totally groundless since last year the International Community has been deeply worried about the possible DPR gives the seventh nuclear test

but the North Korea has not conducted it till now I don't think it's necessary for the dprk to conduct a new nuclear test India and Pakistan have each conducted six or five nuclear tests and the nonsense the dprk's nuclear capability is now sufficient to deter the U.S Japan and our okay although it doesn't have the nuclear capability to attack the U.S Mainland and it's a hydrogen bomb test has not been successful last year the dprk issued a new nuclear force policy decree which changed the known Force use policy of nuclear

weapons proposed several years ago and specified five circumstances and which it could use nuclear weapons first this obviously increases the risks of nuclear conflict one possibility is miscalculation of the dprk could lead to a nuclear conflict another possibility is in the event of a serious military conflict between the U.S the Aoki and the dprk the dprk would use nuclear weapons first for its survival the third possibility is U.S would could launch a preemptive nuclear strike against the gprk if it believed the dprk

could use the nuclear weapons first in addition some Chinese experts have a little bit different thinking they they think the possession of nuclear weapons the dprk's possession of nuclear weapons May reduce the possibility of conflict in the war on the peninsula but at the same time the risks of nuclear proliferation May greatly increased this year South Koreans are present in said are okay would be considered developing nuclear weapons if ROK goes nuclear what about Japan if the situation continues there would

be a nuclear domino effect in Asia and this will be followed by a serious increase in nuclear security and safety risks the development of the dprk is nuclear forces will give the U.S the best excuse to deploy land-based intermediate missiles in the in East Asia stranding anti-missile deployment and increases the deployment of strategic assets on the peninsula which will possess a serious threat to China's security so I only have for one minute so uh I I would only say the second about the second issue what are the key

escalation pathways on the Korean president I think there are seven pathways first the dprk continues to evacuate variously vigorously developed its nuclear actual combat can be capabilities second the U.S Japan and our okay further strengthen the large-scale joint ability to use and the U.S further strengthened extended the deterrence and conduct more frequent activities of its strategic assets on the green person and its surrounding Waters third contingency similar to kinan worship and young ping Ireland instance breaks out

between the source and the North fourth the U.S and ROK surrendered the deployment of thought in ROK five the United States redeploy tactical nuclear weapons in Aoki all agree to nuclear sharing with our okay and Japan sixth ROK decides to develop its own nuclear weapons seven the dprk is nuclear and the missile tests show that if it will soon have the capability to attack the U.S Mainland I'll stop here thank you okay um so yesterday I was asked to make comments uh focusing on um Professor Bunn and Professor Gia so

I'll go that way and they asked me to provide some Korean perspectives about the issue today so the um that's kind of my focus today so the hosta from Professor about new presentation in your paper so the ouster from the what I agree with you the first of all no one will disagree that we need to prevent escalation on the Korean peninsula nobody we like things going out of control so I totally agree with you saying in your presentation in your paper that code avoiding unnecessary a new provocation is a fundamental part of a

successful deterrence codent and the second part I agree with that is a deterrence involves very complicated calculations so particularly in the in the in the Korean context we are not just dealing with North Korea so the US I'm in Washington and so they deal with Pyongyang but at the same time they have to think about responses or reactions from major actors including Beijing and Moscow and Tokyo well so agree with your point but yeah I have to when I thought about you already on the presentation and paper so just I

have I kept I couldn't stop thinking about this that is so the under my impression through your presentation that was uh the other key argument was we don't have to push um Pyongyang into corner and we should do everything uh not to provoke uh North Korea because North Korea uh if they feel threatened in terms of security and they have nuclear weapons and things can go out of control but one thing kind of missing from the presentation that was South Korea's security concerns that's what I wanted them to ask and that's

what I want to focus so it is important to alleviate North Korea's security concerns but the thing is um I'm afraid that any if we step too far if some actions we take May undermine South Korea's security so for successful the deterrence we you mentioned that we need to avoid unnecessary undue the unprovocation and at the same time reassurance is important I agree but the thing is well we should think about the idea of the first and the most important requirement for successful deterrence is capabilities strong capabilities to

deter attack from North Korea so the end of the other things are kind of the scenarios you mentioned at the end of paper and presentation you provide a Vibe and then when I thought about them I should we should think about trade-offs between strong U.S ROK Alliance versus the other things the scenarios you mentioned um U.S ROK Alliance I mean rokus Alliance is strong it is strong because of uh regular drills military exercises and we share the under and trainings and it is strong because of weapon systems

we adopted from the United States and operational doctrines to countries have built up together and developed together but well North Korea always shows the signs of they are paranoid with what we have done so far so they have hated them so the other that said the other things I have to keep thinking about how to balance you know keeping our lives strong with Washington versus to the end alleviating the um the security concerns of North Korea so that's kind of the end the first thing the uh we should think

about and the second is um going back to the scenarios you mentioned such as reducing temperature and reassurance in peace time one thing I want to mention is we have been there we have in there from 1990s sunshine period and throughout the process of you know six uh six party talks even you Washington provides kind of negative secure security assures to North Korea but the result was just gonna same we just watched North Korea being wild and provocative so what you would just say about kind of lessons we have learned throughout the

under three decades of dealing with North Korea we have tried everything virtually diplomacy and the under sanctions and sometimes coercion but we are still here so you know what would you say about the lessons we learned that's kind of the other the second uh question I had and the about the other Professor Gia I agree with you that with growing rivalry between Washington and Beijing the chance for cooperation to denuclearize North Korea is getting a slim uh but you know here's the thing is kind

of recent development uh even though Canada China is worried about this and so going too close to Washington but the thing is I want to I want to remind you of the fact that Washington and Seoul didn't shut Beijing out from the whole process think about it in Washington D under the Declaration last week they came up with Canadian expanded uh extended deterrence but the thing is you also is to say that Washington and Seoul have closely consulted with Beijing and let them know let them know that we are

making this Canadian Advanced progress sodium sodium we wanted to stay in the loop okay so then I think that you know cooperation is still possible between Washington and Beijing and including and Korea and the other thing is we're outside at the end of Beijing are better uh wake up an issue today in the rain in North Korea's approvocation is mentioned earlier in the Curious voice for nuclear Armament is still strong out there even though the extended deterrence promised in the Washington declaration this time maybe

mute the voice temporarily but depending on what's going on with North Korea at the same time depending on what's going on with Beijing about raining in North Korea and your nuclear program or Mr programs the voice can resurface any time so the under China shouldn't um exclude I mean China shouldn't say that you know I won't do anything or I can do anything because of bigger issues like in the U.S and Indian China rivalry I think that's not good for the under Chinese National interest so one thing just I want to say the

other the last small thing the last thing I want to say is well key factor deciding South Korea's distance with Washington that was definitely North Korea and the um then also the undecided distance South Korea has with Japan so the other let me wrap up my comment with the um the concluding remarks of Professor Gia you mentioned so the under China it is never late to do a good thing let's hope okay time is almost up but uh let me add very briefly a very short question to it three presenters first one as

professor Matthew burn and the effectiveness of extended turns as I briefly mentions North Korea's Kimmy Zhang mentioned extensively on the criticized the one specific word of the the End North Korean leadership if North Korea used the technical nuclear weapons how would you evaluated that kind of exchange of views on extended deterrence from your point of view and second Professor Char ching were it is very clear you are very pessimistic about the future of U.S China relations in the short term period but

how would you evaluate the long-term perspective of U.S China relations right after the valley Summit between two prisons there was a brief period of thawing uh blinken used the word the world United States will start the office of the China coordination and also Wang Yin also mentioned there are possibility of the period of the exploration how is you forecast the world sooner or later there will be another meeting between two uh who's to expect but final question Twitter the security guarantee issues based on the

Washington declare Declaration the next step will be the we have to give us some kind of the positive signal for the North Korea returning back to the dialogue in that cases The crucial issues might be the security guarantee but from our point of view of denucleation we can security guarantee of non-nuclear leadership but it's very difficult for us to give a security guarantee of nuclear leadership how can we solve this kind of dilemma because uh limited times I think the three paper presenters will respond very

briefly to a deep comments and my personal comments and I rather two or three minutes so uh first of all I want to thank all of the commenters for their interesting uh thoughts and questions uh it is absolutely true that my paper focused Less on building up the capabilities of the alliance then on thinking through what that might imply because I've felt that the building up of the capabilities was already the focus and the the new thought I wanted to inject was more thinking through how the adversary might respond but you're

absolutely right that you know there's a need to maintain capability for deterrence and that's what makes the security dilemma a dilemma uh uh with respect to the question about uh uh Kim jong-un's criticism of uh the U.S and ROK position that any use of nuclear weapons would lead to the end of the North Korean regime uh you know his primary goal is maintaining the North Korean regime and so of course he's going to criticize that uh position he wants to deter us from doing anything that would threaten uh his regime just

as we want to deter him from using nuclear weapons um but I think that one part of our effort to deter him from using nuclear weapons is convincing him that his regime won't be threatened by us as long as he doesn't attack South Korea underline South Korea use nuclear weapons Etc um all right with if I could just come and write a sentence or two on Professor Jazz useful paper I I would say that uh the United States point of view would be that uh China has done at least as many things to impose competition on the

United States as the United States has done to impose competition on China and uh I think this is that both China and the United States are sort of failing to see the security dilemma that I was talking about and feeling to Think Through gee if we do this how will that be seen in the other capital and how will that uh provoke it's I'm very hopeful that we will get back to talking to each other at a senior level secretary blinken has already said that he hopes to schedule his trip to China soon and I think

as you said that there are so many challenges the world faces that can only be solved if China and the United States are are working together I mean there's the Korean Peninsula but globally one can immediately think of three giant challenges that cannot be solved unless our countries work together avoiding nuclear war avoiding catastrophic climate change and avoiding catastrophic Global pandemics all of which are Global Society is coping with right now as we speak so I share your desire for our countries to

figure out ways to begin getting back to more productive relations okay thank you thank you very much for your useful comments uh basically I want to make 2.1 is a uh well China has its own share of responsibilities for the deterioration of the relationship that's for sure we can handle it better if we have a if if we can do it another time but it's unfortunate that we can't uh the second point I want to emphasize is that probably at the moment we are facing opportunity for stabilization and maybe even Improvement of the

relationship the U.S had the midterm election after the midterm election uh Biden no longer needs the votes to pass the legislations for domestic purposes uh because he can't right so he has greater flexibility in terms of handling the China problem a China issue okay it's relationship with China okay like the tariffs you know Trump imposed on U.S impulse from China from China it doesn't make any sense it contributes to the inflation of the U.S they should have done something about it and also in China we have the nine the

20th party Congress okay and you have new faces and these at the top are loyal to uh the present party secretary so it's time to do to deliver okay and after three years of covet and economic situations not growth is quite uh low so it's time to restore the economic growth and domestically we want to encourage the private entrepreneurs to play a larger role overseas we need a stable International environment the key to that to to that environment is the US we need to work out a relationship with

the US so both sides have the need to do something to stabilize the relationship but the problem we have is uh you know this uh Taiwan problem the Congress which doesn't which which is under no control by itself and itself cannot control itself so it's it's it's pushing this time on problem ahead of us okay so it's a Taiwan problem is our is the core interest of China China cannot give in so uh so now we have a prop we have a a a terrible situation that is uh both both sides say that they need high level and

governmental Direct dialogues and uh blinken is supposed to come to China but the problem is uh we have uh you know Congress passing this law and that legislation visiting this sending people to Taiwan and try to sell arms to Taiwan that sort of thing so what can you do okay uh so we are facing this problem uh you know it's like China's setting weapons to Texas okay you know supporting arguing that the U.S government and Texas have to have a peaceful settlement you know this is incredible so something something

happened you know you'll feel offended if you're American if China does that okay let me stop here thank you very much Professor Hall asked a very difficult question and how do we give a secret guarantee to North Korea first of all North Korea wanted to have the so-called their right to Survivor and this is one of the conditions that North Korea will have the dialogue meaningful dialogue with United States and then they are saying that the right to Survivor include first of all the permanent hood

of the South Korea U.S joint military exercise and at the same time permanent hold of the deployment of the Strategic asset of United States to the Korean penis right and this is actually going on the final part is the withdraw of the South U.S forces in Korea and to me I don't think North Korea's will I mean the eldest leadership of North Korea have a really serious the security uh threat from South Korea or United States I think North Korea well aware that South Korea United States do not have

any plan to strike preemptively or a forced to North Korea we I mean South Korea United States have operational plan 515 and we will revise to as the 5022 and then there is no no the uh the way to strike first to North Korea unless North Korea will have a very clear signal that they are going to launch their nuclear missiles then it is kind of international right and self-defense too we have a preemptively strike in that missiles but other than that there is no way to strike first or start the war against North Korea the

politically I don't think any president votes from the United States and South Korea will start war against North Korea I think Northcrest know this fact very well so I this is a very difficult question and at the same time but we have to talk about their security issue and at the same time we have to talk about their economy issue too but at this very moment especially the United States I'm pretty much a frustrated that they didn't they don't put the North Korean issue at the any top agenda in their foreign policy at all still the

special stay in the Indonesia and then and this especially Washington talk and watching the Washington declaration the summit between South Korea and United States a couple of days ago they both presidents haven't mentioned at all any the possibility of dialogue with North Korea at all even though they joined the statement to mention that the dialogue and diplomacy is the only solution permanent solution of the Korean Peninsula problem but they haven't mentioned at all especially President Biden and and at the same time I still

don't know what the calibrate and practical approach to North Korea made by the binary Administration so what I'm trying to say is that both United States and South Korea of course with help of the China to do more uh actively to pursue some kind of dialogue or diplomacy front at this moment but at the same time your first question it is very important and essential that South Korea need to enhance our own deterrence with the cooperation of across United stays in Japan and then there is a so-called integrate difference that

introduced by the United States last year NDS National defense strategy I think that there's a very vital way to enhance our deterrence so South Korea actively pursue this uh integrated terms with the United States and at the same time as I already mentioned that we have to no choice but to have more the beef of the trilateral cooperation among three countries okay I'm gonna stop here okay let's see next is supposed to start let me ten so it's almost impossible for me to open the floor but I would like to invite

one very brief question from the floor it's a great honor to have a talk I have a question to John Park and you explained the in effectiveness of economic sanctions toward North Korea as a Superbird phenomenon and assuming that sanctions against North Korea are antibiotics there are various forms of sanctions such as asset freeze suspension of Aid and financial sanctions and I think the final suspensions are relatively effective rather than the other measures however an obstacle to financial extension is outliers who

provide an exit to North Korea such as China and I would ask John bark that what do you think about persuading that outliers like China for Effective Financial sanction and deterrence thank you thank you very much for your question uh let me be brief uh the two main points that come up in terms of the application of economic statecraft I think a lot of the studies show that sanctions are effective when it's a policy tool embedded in a larger strategy and so as we've heard right now in dealing with North Korea there's a

lot of stalemate things are stalled sanctions have increasingly become in some instances the strategy itself so with that there are some important elements and there are different types of sanctions the ones that focus on trying to impede the further growth of the North Korean nuclear weapons program I think is a priority for all as we heard from Professor Bunn there are common areas for cooperation in that respect the need for sanctions and the increasing application of them for that particular purpose I think is a a common

area of global cooperation the second thing I wanted to mention is related to your point about sanctions under the broader heading of economic statecraft the rationale the reason why I posed a question to Professor jaw about the way that China is debating and thinking about responding to U.S economic statecraft as a large number of the security issues that we've heard from the various speakers are unfolding and there's greater discussion about in preparations as well the next step in terms of economic

statecraft can inform why they're accurately or not different types of threat perceptions and can amplify and accelerate so I do believe that the critical phase and important area cooperation for us is to think about the economic competition and the economic statecraft piece very carefully because it can trigger path dependent type of reactions that can be very difficult to contain and so I agree with the all the members of the panel here in terms of focusing on the security piece but as we're focused on that the area

that we need to manage very very carefully is the economic statecraft piece thank you for your question