[EAI Roundtable] Meeting on Strategies for Promoting Foreign Aid for Democratic Development

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L8G8lE7X38k

1. Q&A

The East Asia Institute (EAI) held a roundtable meeting on strategies for promoting foreign aid for democratic development on March 22. Julia Leininger, a program manager for development cooperation at the German Institute of Development and Sustainability, and Helena Bjuremalm, a specialist at the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, explained the international cooperation and humanitarian aid strategies of their respective organizations. Experts in attendance, including Professor Kim Dong-taek of Sogang University, Professor Shin Jeong-seop of Soongsil University, Director Lee Dong-hyun of KOICA, Assemblymember Lee Yong-sun of the Democratic Party of Korea, Assemblymember Jang Hye-young of the Justice Party, Professor Jang Hye-young of Chung-Ang University, Professor Cho Jeong-in of Sookmyung Women's University, Assemblymember Choi Hyung-du of the People Power Party, and CEO Han Jae-kwang of Better Futures for Development (PIDA), agreed on the necessity for South Korea, which has transitioned from aid recipient to aid provider, to become a responsible global power leading democracy and peace. They discussed effective foreign aid measures for promoting democracy.

2. Building Effective Narratives for Democracy Support

Julia Leininger, program manager for development cooperation at the German Institute of Development and Sustainability, emphasized the need for efforts to promote and consolidate democracy amidst a wave of authoritarianism. While democracy aid since 2010 has led to changes in recipient countries and contributed to the institutionalization of democracy, she argued for the application of the principle of 'do no harm to democracy' due to the limitation that foreign aid often provides substantial funds to authoritarian governments rather than civil society. She also pointed out the necessity of forming effective narratives to support democracy, explaining three key elements: 1) the intrinsic value of democracy, 2) the correlation between democracy and sustainable development, and 3) transnational solidarity in the pursuit of democracy.

3. Measures to Enhance the Effectiveness of Democracy Support

Helena Bjuremalm, deputy head of the Democracy Unit at the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), explained SIDA's approach to democracy support, focusing on the principles of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. She also proposed involving numerous partners with expertise in areas such as media development, women's rights, and youth political participation in discussions on democracy support measures. Recognizing that political parties often act as gatekeepers for women's political participation, she stressed the need to focus on transforming party structures and gendered institutions rather than solely on developing the capacity of individual female politicians.

Video Transcript

South Korea has rapidly transitioned from a recipient to a provider of aid, and in terms of institutions and especially elections, it can be considered a democracy in name and reality. However, in aspects like gender equality, LGBTQ discrimination, and other areas, democracy appears to be weakening. Therefore, within the broad theme of aid, I felt that we should become a good model ourselves. While the scale of ODA from South Korea has been increasing rapidly compared to 2019, beyond aspects supporting economic development, various objectives such as promoting democracy are not well integrated.

How can we persuade within the bureaucratic level? How can we frame the narrative within the bureaucracy? Can we strengthen the domestic narrative for aid? I would also like to ask for tips on this. In Germany, to persuade the public about democracy support and development aid, they emphasize that their wealth is based on exports and that their economy survives thanks to these exports. South Korea, like Germany, has significant economic and trade relations with other countries. It is well-known that democratic countries are relatively more reliable partners in international trade.

Development outcomes will also be positively influenced by peaceful relations between countries, and the more countries understand each other, the higher the likelihood of maintaining such peaceful relations. In Germany's case, there is an aspect of solidarity that they wish to reciprocate to other countries. You asked about narratives and methods for integrating democracy aid into Official Development Assistance (ODA). One important point is to acknowledge that South Korea's ODA is value-based, and that countries like South Korea, Germany, and Sweden advocate for certain values.

Authoritarian states clearly acknowledge and advocate for their values. For a long time, the European Union was reluctant to publicly state that it advocates for certain values, out of a desire not to impose its values. Sweden has invested in transparency and public disclosure for decades. It very transparently communicates to the public not only what SIDA is currently doing but also lessons learned from its mistakes. Furthermore, it strives to disseminate this information through various channels.

This could be through Instagram or YouTube, or through conventional communication methods like press releases. Seeing that 70% of the world's population still lives under dictatorships, I believe we still have a long way to go. In the 1970s and 1980s, during the intense process of democratization, we received significant support from Western democratic countries. I recall that various forms of aid and support, including training, facility support, and program support, played a crucial role in the genuine process of democratization and human rights movements, particularly among workers, farmers, students, and religious communities.

I believe this approach is likely continuing in the Global South. You differentiate between support and protection, so-called democracy aid, into two areas. Could you please explain the difference in more detail? As we understand it, the distinction between democracy support and democracy protection stems not from what is done, but from when the support is provided. Democracy support is provided during the process of democracy formation. A certain level of democracy is already maintained and improving, and we support promotional activities.

For example, this support could include assistance for institutional architecture, such as statistical offices. Democracy protection is an aid approach used when authoritarianism intensifies. Protection in this context can take the form of safeguarding human rights activists, judicial independence, or academic independence. One important point is that democracy support is easier than democracy protection. Because there are more actors and institutions to support, donor countries can provide support such as assisting parliaments or enhancing accountability between the judiciary and the legislature.

Conversely, in the case of democracy protection, as authoritarianism deepens, cooperation between countries tends to become more difficult because it is a phenomenon directly linked to the partner government with which the donor country is engaged. Regarding democracy, the two presenters have made very important points. Whether it is the promotion of democracy, support for it, or its protection, there are clearly different levels. Whether ODA should be for democracy, or whether democracy ODA is more effective through the protection of democracy, are common concerns for all the institutions providing this support.

In South Korea, what is referred to as 'democracy ODA' tends to focus on institutional reform rather than the promotion of values. There are a series of circumstances that compel a greater focus on institutional reform aspects rather than democracy as a value. Moving forward, the simultaneous promotion or parallel deepening of democracy as an institution and democracy as a norm or value will be an important aspect of the future development direction of ODA in South Korea.

Looking at South Korea's international development cooperation, it seems to have primarily emphasized economic and social aspects. In other words, there has been very little support for the development of democracy in developing countries. I reviewed the government's budget and projects from 2017 to 2021. There were 7,192 projects over five years. Of these, only 30 projects, or 0.4%, explicitly mentioned democracy or human rights in their project titles. While there is a strong focus on supporting the economic and social development of developing countries, it is true that there has been a significant lack of support for democratic development.

South Korea lacks independent programs for supporting civil society in developing countries. While programs supporting South Korean civil society are indeed very active, a program that directly supported civil society in developing countries existed from 2012 to 2015 but was abolished and has not been restored. What principles are used to prioritize support for civil society in developing countries? Or do you provide support indiscriminately, even to civil society organizations that are violent, oppressive, or not considered positive?

Supporting civil society alone is insufficient; a multi-layered approach and support for institutions are also necessary. Civil society cannot achieve results without a government that is accountable for its decisions and can translate people's demands into political decisions and outcomes. Therefore, both actors and institutions are crucial. Furthermore, you pointed out that democracy support is not explicitly included in South Korea's ODA framework. Regarding this, we might be able to conduct some experiments within the existing framework of priorities inherent in South Korea's aid framework.

One speaker mentioned that economic development is a key priority of South Korea's ODA, but economic development also relies on democratic values such as fair public administration, openness, and transparency. Therefore, we can consider trying something within the existing framework and gradually expanding the framework. South Korea's ODA has reached the 4 trillion won era, and a paradigm shift is truly needed. Within the National Assembly, there is a consensus that development aid should be expanded compared to other agendas, and there is also a certain level of public support for this.

However, most South Korean citizens readily agree when aid is framed as being for our economic interests. But I understand that the level of support significantly drops when it comes to human rights, poverty reduction, or gender equality, for example. In that regard, the will of the National Assembly is very important. When we provide democracy aid, are there any methodologies that you, the two presenters, have found to be highly effective or impactful, even with smaller amounts?

One very important point is that aid should be flexible, long-term, and take the form of so-called core support, which supports partners' self-established strategic plans and annual reporting methods. Currently, many donor countries require the execution of specific projects that must be reported in a particular way, demanding significant time and resources from the supported organizations. Core support is a very important methodology because there are many more practical things that can be done with the time saved from reporting. I empirically examined whether foreign aid to African countries mitigates or exacerbates electoral violence. Statistical analysis surprisingly showed that electoral violence actually increased.

This suggests that dictators can use ODA for electoral violence or fraudulent elections. Why is it that in Africa, unlike other regions, democracy aid has shown less effect, and foreign aid is instead being used to strengthen dictatorships? I am curious if you could explain why such different effects occur in different regions.

One possible solution is to focus on the entire electoral cycle, which occurs every 4-5 years, and to work with various actors. Since the context is always quite different, a flexible approach is necessary, and core support, which allows local partners to make decisions based on their judgment of what is most effective in a specific context, is likely to be useful. In the case of African countries, the general level of conflict is high and the level of democracy is much lower, so the starting point for democracy aid is more disadvantageous compared to other countries.

We all know from our own historical experiences that democratization is an unending process, its outcomes cannot be guaranteed, and it can be a conflict-ridden process. Therefore, donor countries must always be aware that there is a certain level of risk. For example, while we want to avoid promoting conflict as much as possible, we must also be aware that it may be unavoidable in the process.