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Commentary: Analysis and Evaluation of South Korea's 2022 Defense White Paper
YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NWwRZCM4nQo
Shin Sung-ho, Professor at Seoul National University's Graduate School of International Studies, points out that while South Korea's <2022 Defense White Paper>, released on February 16, reflects a hardline stance against North Korea by designating it as our enemy, this contradicts the current administration's efforts to build inter-Korean trust. Furthermore, Professor Shin emphasizes the urgent need for concrete alternatives to secure South Korea's future defense capabilities amidst a rapidly changing global landscape and a severe demographic crisis.
Video Transcript
Regarding North Korea, this white paper seems to adopt a very different and much tougher stance compared to previous ones. For instance, it explicitly designates North Korea's regime and military as our enemy after a six-year interval. Beyond that, it details North Korea's various missile and nuclear activities over the past several years, highlighting the serious threat they pose to our security and raising awareness of this danger. Consequently, it emphasizes thorough preparation and response principles, including the three-axis system and the Korean Kill Chain, in considerable detail. In this regard, the white paper stands out for its strong, hardline message towards North Korea, which also seems to be based on unavoidable realities. In fact, North Korea's missile
capabilities have significantly improved with the increased frequency of tests and launches over the past two years. Coupled with this, North Korea's rhetoric and stance towards the South Korean government necessitate a certain level of response. Nevertheless, one might question whether it was necessary to re-designate them as our enemy. For example, in the current era of US-China competition, it is widely acknowledged, even by countries like the US and Japan, that China poses the greatest threat, and they themselves state this.
Despite this, when I reviewed Japan's 2022 Defense White Paper, while it seriously warned about the threat from China, detailing it extensively like our white paper does for North Korea, it did not label China as Japan's enemy. Instead, it used the phrase 'grave concern' to express that China is a source of serious concern, which I believe would have been sufficient. This approach avoids the potential pitfalls of labeling North Korea as an enemy, especially since all wars are ultimately political acts, requiring diplomatic channels and avenues for de-escalation. Furthermore, the current administration's policy, such as the 'Audacious Plan' for North Korea, expresses a willingness to cooperate, and the defense white paper still mentions preparations for peaceful unification and the need to build inter-Korean trust.
Therefore, the strong and conflicting signals in the white paper seem quite pronounced, which is a point of concern. As the Ministry of National Defense's white paper indicates, the most critical immediate threat to South Korea remains deterring and preventing another war on the Korean Peninsula. The primary threat continues to be North Korea's development of weapons of mass destruction and the North Korean regime's aggressive posture. Thorough preparation against this remains crucial, and the ROK-US alliance is still vital in this regard.
This is a fundamental aspect. However, beyond this, as the current administration and the Ministry of National Defense have stated, South Korea aims to play a role as a global pivotal state. This implies that our perspective on the security situation and factors should broaden and become more complex. As mentioned earlier, the security landscape surrounding Northeast Asia is becoming increasingly intricate, necessitating long-term security policies that consider these factors. Furthermore, while a broader perspective on the security environment in Northeast Asia and globally is important, the most significant security threat to South Korea, apart from North Korea, is the rapid demographic decline, a topic widely discussed across all sectors. This is not a new issue, but it has reached a critical stage where it could undermine the foundation of South Korea's defense policy if not addressed, and time is running out.
This issue was significantly addressed in the previous defense white paper. What was once a 600,000-strong military is now a 500,000-strong force; the Army alone has decreased by 100,000. This reduction was not voluntary but due to a lack of conscripts. Last year, the number of newborns was around 230,000 to 240,000. Even if we assume 240,000, half are female. With the trend showing more females being born, the number of males born is less than half, around 120,000. This means that in 20 years, when these individuals reach conscription age, there will only be about 120,000 potential conscripts.
Even with maximizing the number of long-term service personnel, the total active force cannot exceed 300,000. This situation will arise around 2040. This represents a massive change and challenge. How can we ensure national defense with a force reduced from 600,000 to 300,000 if the situation on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia remains as precarious as it is now? This requires serious and intensive consideration. The previous defense white paper addressed this issue in detail and at length.
This year's defense white paper proposes a solution: defense innovation and reform 4.0 utilizing AI. However, this proposal lacks concrete connection and appears vague. What exactly will be done in each area? Will it address the declining troop numbers in the Army? Will it involve deploying unmanned weapon systems to the front lines? Or will it involve utilizing the numerous guards at front-line observation posts to reduce personnel? More specific plans and discussions would have been beneficial. The proposal vaguely mentions automation and the use of unmanned systems for defense innovation, but it does not seem well-connected to the current geopolitical situation in Northeast Asia, North Korea, or the domestic demographic changes. It still feels very abstract. Therefore, discussions on future military structure, operational strategies, and the development and application of corresponding weapon systems need to be more concrete going forward.
This is what needs to be considered more concretely in the future.
*This text is an AI translation of an original written in Korean. Some translations or nuances may be inaccurate.