Commentary: North Korea's Future After Codifying Nuclear Weapons and South Korea

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D7oGxTI8Jo0

Ha Young-sun, Chairman of EAI and Professor Emeritus at Seoul National University, emphasizes that North Korea's codification of nuclear weapons, including the option of a pre-emptive nuclear strike against South Korea, should be viewed as a North Korean strategy to use nuclear weapons as a tool for coercive diplomacy. He stresses that nuclear weapons possess sufficient power to nullify the significant disparity in national power between South and North Korea, and thus, a response must be urgently prepared. Furthermore, he points out that North Korea cannot achieve rapid economic growth while possessing nuclear weapons, and argues that efforts must be continuously made to increase the costs of possessing nuclear weapons and enhance the benefits of denuclearization in order to build a future prosperous Korean Peninsula order.

1. Implications of North Korea's Offensive Nuclear Weapons Codification

2. North Korea's Future and South Korea's North Korea Policy

(1) North Korea's Future

(2) South Korea's Policy Direction for North Korea's Denuclearization

■ Ha Young-sun_ Currently serves as Chairman of the East Asia Institute (EAI) and Professor Emeritus at Seoul National University. He has served as a member of the Senior Advisory Council for the Inter-Korean Summit Preparation Committee and the Presidential National Security Advisory Council (2008-2016). He holds a bachelor's and master's degree in Diplomacy from Seoul National University and a Ph.D. in International Politics from the University of Washington. He was a professor in the Department of Diplomacy at Seoul National University (1980-2012) and a visiting scholar at Princeton University's Center for International Studies and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. His recent books and edited volumes include "The Geopolitics of Love: War and Peace" (2019), "A Correct View of Korean Diplomatic History: Tradition and Modernity" (2019), and "The US-China Competition in Building the Asia-Pacific Order" (2017).

Video Transcript

If we look closely at the legislative issue, the first law was actually enacted in 2013. The first law was primarily related to North Korea's right to self-defense against the US policy of hostility, stating that it had no choice but to develop its own military capabilities as a minimum deterrent. In contrast, this latest legislation, upon closer examination, contains content that goes significantly further than that. The most important aspect is the clause specifying the conditions under which nuclear weapons would be used, which we need to examine carefully.

It includes five articles, the core of which states that nuclear weapons can be used immediately if an attack, or signs of an attack, using nuclear or non-nuclear weapons is launched against North Korea's command structure and nuclear control organization. Simultaneously, it includes a provision, absent in the first legislation, that North Korea has the right to cease the use of nuclear weapons in case of an emergency or when a catastrophic crisis approaches. It was widely reported on October 10th that Chairman Kim Jong-un directly supervised military drills of tactical nuclear operation units. The report details, firstly, the targets in the southern part of the Korean Peninsula. It specifies targets such as military installations in South Korea or airfields. Secondly, it discusses the delivery systems, missiles, that would be used to attack these targets. Lastly, it specifies which tactical nuclear weapons would be employed. This could be considered somewhat unusual if viewed from a media perspective. Imagine a soccer match; if one team's coach were to reveal the strengths and weaknesses of each player, explain the strategy for the first and second halves in detail, and also disclose their analysis of the opponent's weaknesses before the game, what would be the outcome?

So why did North Korea disclose such detailed information on October 10th? From North Korea's perspective, the primary reason is to declare the commencement of psychological warfare by warning the adversary of the military utility of tactical nuclear weapons. Therefore, nuclear weapons have a dual nature; we must consider their political and military aspects separately. Thus, combining the legislation enacted in September and Chairman Kim Jong-un's direct supervision of military drills in October, we are witnessing the full-scale commencement of North Korea's tactical nuclear weapon psychological warfare on the Korean Peninsula. Interpreting the series of actions and official statements made by North Korea in September and October within North Korea's framework is crucial for proper understanding. Despite this, looking back at the period from North Korea's first nuclear test in 2016 to the present, the first major misunderstanding was that the development of nuclear weapons was likely for negotiation purposes.

This was the prevailing view among most North Korea and nuclear experts, both domestically and internationally. The fact that it was not for negotiation purposes has become clear over the past decade. The second misunderstanding was perhaps the hope that North Korea's nuclear weapons were for exercising self-defense rights against the US policy of hostility, and therefore, the risk of their use against countries like South Korea, which do not possess nuclear weapons, was minimal. However, this hope appears to have been significantly mistaken, given the recent public, systematic, legal, and strategic discussions regarding the use of tactical nuclear weapons. This indicates that the second misunderstanding was also substantial.

A third misunderstanding might be how we should respond, given that North Korea already possesses nuclear weapons. What if we devise a response strategy based on the premise that they currently possess nuclear weapons? This could be considered the third misunderstanding. This is because the relationship between two political entities in an adversarial relationship, where one possesses nuclear weapons and the other does not, is a complex issue.

In reality, there is an enormous disparity in national power between South and North Korea. For instance, North Korea's per capita income is currently around $1,000, while South Korea's has long surpassed $30,000. This means South Korea possesses an economy approximately 60 times larger than North Korea's in terms of total GDP. Therefore, some might think there is no need to worry excessively, even if North Korea possesses nuclear weapons. However, historical reality shows that nuclear weapons, if possessed by one party in an adversarial relationship between two political entities, carry the risk of significantly nullifying even a substantial disparity in national power.

In the long term, two points need to be made. Firstly, from North Korea's perspective, we are currently preoccupied with how to respond to recent changes in North Korea. However, in reality, the decisions made by North Korea in September and October can only be judged as a grave misstep for the long-term future of North Korea and its 25 million people. The core reason is that the two pillars upon which North Korea stands are its nuclear capabilities and economic growth. However, the crucial issue is that these two cannot coexist easily as long as North Korea maintains its nuclear arsenal. Yet, North Korea continuously strives to pursue both simultaneously. Even today, it is practically attempting to pursue both, but this is realistically impossible.

So, what will happen? As stated in the 8th Party Congress, North Korea is planning a five-year economic development plan from 2021 to 2025, and then another five-year plan from 2025 to 2030. In my opinion, the future of North Korea's 25 million citizens depends on the successful implementation of the current five-year economic development plan and the subsequent one. However, the first five-year plan is already facing considerable difficulties, partly due to the COVID-19 pandemic, which resulted in negative economic growth for North Korea in the last two years. Recently, during a lengthy policy speech accompanying the September legislation, Chairman Kim Jong-un expressed a desire for economic growth of approximately 1.4 times the 2020 level by 2025. In my view, achieving this level of economic growth will make it very difficult for North Korea to emerge as a protagonist on the world stage in the 21st century.

So, what should be done? The first key challenge is how to achieve double-digit economic growth without possessing nuclear weapons. In this regard, the legislation and military drills related to tactical nuclear weapons demonstrated by Chairman Kim Jong-un in September and October are not desirable choices for North Korea. Secondly, if these actions are not beneficial for the 25 million North Koreans, for the Korean Peninsula, for the Indo-Pacific region, or for global denuclearization, what efforts can South Korea make towards such long-term goals? To put it simply, if the ultimate goal is a denuclearized and prosperous North Korea, then the cost of possessing nuclear weapons must be increased, and the benefits of not possessing nuclear weapons must be maximized. What kind of efforts can South Korea, North Korea, and relevant parties make? Firstly, there is the issue of sanctions. Some argue that sanctions are ineffective, citing the war in Ukraine or US sanctions against China. However, if denuclearization is the right path for North Korea, then various sanctions loopholes, which exist through China and Russia, are unavoidable in order to increase the cost of nuclearization. Nevertheless, these are unavoidable in guiding North Korea towards nuclearization. Secondly, the issue of sanctions demonstrates that even with extensive nuclear development, especially in an era of rapid military technological innovation, the utility of nuclear weapons is decreasing exponentially. Therefore, exploring new deterrence systems is necessary.

How can we nullify the practical effectiveness of North Korea's nuclear weapons through integrated deterrence? As explained earlier, this remains important. Thirdly, to maximize the benefits for a non-nuclear North Korea, two factors are crucial. Since North Korea claims to possess nuclear weapons for its survival, the first priority must be a concentrated effort by South Korea, the region, and the world on ensuring the regime security of a non-nuclear North Korea. Secondly, what efforts can South Korea, the region, and the world make towards the economic prosperity of such a denuclearized North Korea? This is the homework assigned to us. The most critical factor is that if North Korea's ultimate goal in the 21st century is to become a prosperous nation without nuclear weapons, then North Korea itself must be able to calculate that the benefits of transitioning from a nuclear-impoverished state to a denuclearized prosperous state are far greater. Therefore, the final decision rests with North Korea, which must be provided with sufficient information to become a wiser and more knowledgeable nation than it is today. If these two elements are combined, then perhaps we can dream of a future of a denuclearized, prosperous Korean Peninsula where North Korea and a middle power like South Korea can meet beautifully.

So, what should be done? The first key issue is how to achieve double-digit economic growth without possessing nuclear weapons. This is, in fact, the greatest challenge. In that regard, Chairman Kim's actions in September and October, such as the legislation related to tactical nuclear weapons and actual field exercises, are not desirable choices for North Korea. Second, if these actions are not beneficial for the 25 million people of North Korea, for the Korean Peninsula, for Asia, the Indo-Pacific, or for global denuclearization, then what efforts can South Korea make toward such long-term goals? To conclude with a slightly broader perspective, the matter is simple.

If a denuclearized and prosperous North Korea is the ultimate goal, the cost of possessing nuclear weapons must be increased, and the benefits of not possessing them must be maximized. South Korea must make concerted efforts with North Korea and relevant parties to achieve this. What kind of efforts are possible? The first is the issue of sanctions. Some may argue that sanctions are not very effective, given the war in Ukraine or the US sanctions on China. However, if denuclearization is indeed the best path for North Korea, then to increase the costs of nuclearization, certain loopholes in sanctions, inevitably present and exploited through China or Russia, still exist. Nevertheless, these are unavoidable to guide the path toward denuclearization. This is the first point. The second point concerns sanctions: In reality, no matter how much nuclear weapons are developed, especially amidst the current process of innovation in advanced military technology, their utility is demonstrably decreasing exponentially. Therefore, the search for a new deterrence system is necessary.

The most critical factor is that if North Korea's ultimate goal in the 21st century is to become a prosperous nation without nuclear weapons, then North Korea itself must be able to calculate that the benefits of transitioning from a nuclear-impoverished state to a denuclearized prosperous state are far greater. Therefore, the final decision rests with North Korea, which must be provided with sufficient information to become a wiser and more knowledgeable nation than it is today. If these two elements are combined, then perhaps we can dream of a future of a denuclearized, prosperous Korean Peninsula where North Korea and a middle power like South Korea can meet beautifully.

The most critical factor is that if North Korea's ultimate goal in the 21st century is to become a prosperous nation without nuclear weapons, then North Korea itself must be able to calculate that the benefits of transitioning from a nuclear-impoverished state to a denuclearized prosperous state are far greater. Therefore, the final decision rests with North Korea, which must be provided with sufficient information to become a wiser and more knowledgeable nation than it is today. If these two elements are combined, then perhaps we can dream of a future of a denuclearized, prosperous Korean Peninsula where North Korea and a middle power like South Korea can meet beautifully.