[Visible Commentary] Neither Indigenous Nuclear Armament nor Tactical Nuclear Weapons Are Alternatives: North Korea's Offensive Nuclear Posture and South Korea

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Lh_Of3Ar9OA

In this 'Visible Commentary,' Ha Young-sun, Chairman of the East Asia Institute and Professor Emeritus at Seoul National University, discusses desirable responses for South Korea to the security threats arising from North Korea's offensive posture, including the legalization of its nuclear possession and focus on strengthening tactical nuclear capabilities. He argues that indigenous nuclear armament and the redeployment of tactical nuclear weapons, which are being discussed by some, would not serve South Korea's actual national interests and would undermine the justification for denuclearization, thus lacking validity. He proposes that a realistic alternative is to combine South Korea's tailored three-axis system with the U.S.'s integrated deterrence system.

Three Alternative Measures South Korea Can Consider in Response to the Growing North Korean Nuclear Threat

1) Indigenous Nuclear Armament within South Korea

2) Redeployment of U.S. Tactical Nuclear Weapons

3) Maximizing the Utilization of the Extended Deterrence Strategy

■ Ha Young-sun_ Currently serves as Chairman of the East Asia Institute and Professor Emeritus at Seoul National University. He has served as a member of the Senior Advisory Council for the Inter-Korean Summit Preparation Committee and the Presidential Advisory Council on National Security (2008-2016). He holds a bachelor's and master's degree in Diplomacy from Seoul National University and a Ph.D. in International Politics from the University of Washington, USA. He was a professor in the Department of Diplomacy at Seoul National University (1980-2012) and was a visiting fellow at Princeton University's Center for International Studies and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. His recent books and edited volumes include 'World Politics of Love: War and Peace' (2019), 'A Correct View of Korean Diplomatic History: Tradition and Modernity' (2019), and 'The US-China Competition in Building the Asia-Pacific Order' (2017).

Video Script

On September 8th, North Korea legalized its policy on nuclear force. It has declared a stance that it can preemptively use nuclear weapons based on subjective judgment. Recently, it was revealed that training exercises were conducted by North Korean military units and long-range artillery units. Amidst this, Chairman Kim Jong-un has emphasized maintaining the strongest nuclear capabilities and further strengthening them in the future. In today's Visible Commentary, we have invited Ha Young-sun, Chairman of the East Asia Institute, to discuss the reasons behind North Korea's legalization of its nuclear force and its offensive messaging, as well as South Korea's desirable response direction.

Looking closely at the legislative issue, the first law was actually enacted in 2013. This current law is an amendment to the 2013 legislation. Examining the first and second legislative enactments reveals significant changes. Therefore, it can be said to best reflect what North Korea has been contemplating over the past decade. The most crucial change is that while the first legislation was largely defensive in nature, the current legislation incorporates a considerably offensive stance compared to the first.

Nuclear weapons possess the characteristic of being able to nullify the vast difference in national power between a nuclear-possessing state and a non-nuclear-possessing state, even if the latter has significantly greater national strength. Therefore, in international politics, it is an extremely difficult problem to resolve the issue by acknowledging the current reality where North Korea already possesses nuclear weapons and the national power gap between North and South is immense. We must anticipate the dilemma we will face. Unless countermeasures are taken to relatively reduce or nullify the destructive power of North Korea's nuclear arsenal, either through North Korea's denuclearization or during the process of its denuclearization, inter-Korean relations will face a very difficult phase.

Broadly speaking, as is being extensively discussed domestically, we can consider three possibilities. The first is, what if South Korea also develops its own independent nuclear capability? The second is, can the tactical nuclear weapons, which were completely withdrawn in the early 1990s, be redeployed? This second option involves discussing the possibility of creating a deterrence system against North Korea's nuclear weapons by borrowing U.S. nuclear capabilities. The third possibility is to examine the U.S. extended deterrence system, which is currently operating at a strategic level.

There are numerous discussions and debates, both domestically and internationally, on this matter among policymakers and so-called experts. In my view, a significant number of misunderstandings actually exist regarding this issue. The first is the question of whether South Korea should not develop its own capabilities to create a mutual deterrence system to effectively nullify the impact of North Korea's nuclear weapons. Particularly, when looking at domestic opinion polls related to this, the public sentiment, in some cases up to 80-90%, shows strong support, leading some experts to argue that this should be sufficiently considered.

However, there is a crucial pitfall here. The reason is that, just as in the case of a market economy, achieving a perfect market requires zero opportunity costs and market costs. In such matters, I believe it is critically important to determine whether public opinion surveys are conducted after providing sufficient information. What information should be provided? In our case, South Korea has a history of attempting nuclear development. Furthermore, North Korea has already developed nuclear weapons. I believe it is necessary to conduct opinion polls after providing the general public with information about the consequences of these two historical events.

What were the consequences at that time? In the 1970s, President Park Chung-hee officially declared in 1975 that South Korea possessed nuclear development capabilities and that it would be unavoidable to develop nuclear weapons in a crisis situation between North and South Korea. The subsequent developments were as follows: The first consequence was economic sanctions. Economic sanctions came from the United States. What kind of economic sanctions were imposed? At that time, we were in the process of constructing the first unit of the Gori Nuclear Power Plant and were seeking loans from the Export-Import Bank of the United States for the second unit. The U.S. authorities stated that if South Korea were to develop nuclear capabilities for military use, it would be difficult to provide further loans for the construction of nuclear power plants in South Korea. This was the first economic sanction. Despite this, then-President Park, perhaps judging survival to be more important than economic constraints, did not easily give up. The second card presented by the U.S. to South Korea was that if it continued to pursue facilities such as steel mills, as it was doing at the time...

...cooperation or technology transfer related to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, which had been ongoing between the U.S. and South Korea, would no longer be provided. In other words, the possibility of economic sanctions extending to technological sanctions was raised. Nevertheless, President Park did not give up. What was the third and final card? If South Korea were to independently develop nuclear weapons to enhance its deterrence capability against North Korea, a significant problem would arise in the ROK-U.S. military alliance. As a first step, it was raised that military support from the U.S. for the modernization of the South Korean military, which we were pursuing at the time, including the support for seven key programs, would no longer be possible.

Consequently, developing independent nuclear capabilities at the cost of undermining the ROK-U.S. military alliance would realistically lead to difficulties that contradict the original purpose of deterring North Korea, forcing President Park at the time to reluctantly abandon the decision to develop nuclear weapons. Secondly, consider North Korea's case. Until the 1970s, North Korea's economy was growing faster than South Korea's economy. About 50 to 60 years have passed since then. While South Korea's economy is now ranked among the top ten globally, North Korea is among the poorest countries in the world. What is the primary reason for this? The primary reason is likely North Korea's nuclear development. As a result of its nuclear development, North Korea has faced economic sanctions, and consequently, it has had no opportunity to achieve the double-digit economic growth for 30 to 40 years that China achieved through its reform and opening-up policy. Therefore, if the South Korean public were asked whether they would develop nuclear weapons to seek a balance with North Korea, even if it meant enduring all the international political, economic, and technological difficulties that would follow, and accepting the current state of national backwardness, the results would likely be significantly different from current opinion polls.

Therefore, considering the overall cost-benefit analysis, it is unequivocally clear from an expert's perspective that indigenous nuclear development at the current stage would incur far greater costs than benefits for South Korea. Secondly, what about re-borrowing tactical nuclear weapons that were completely withdrawn 30 years ago? Even as someone who has observed nuclear weapons for nearly half a century, I feel considerable confusion about this issue. This is because even experts who claim to understand this issue well harbor significant misunderstandings. First, the question is whether the United States actually possesses tactical nuclear weapons. As you know, during the Cold War, the U.S. and the Soviet Union possessed nearly 60,000 nuclear weapons, but this number has decreased over the past 30 years of post-Cold War development. Among these, how many are considered tactical nuclear weapons, which we are considering redeploying? Currently, the United States is disclosing its nuclear weapon holdings. As of 2022, it possesses approximately 3,700 nuclear weapons. Of these, 3,500 are strategic nuclear weapons, which are not directly related to us. This leaves about 200 weapons. Why are these 200 weapons held? Of these, 100 are deployed in Europe, at six military bases in five countries. The remaining 100 are a minimal stockpile within the United States. Therefore, if we were to suddenly suggest redeploying tactical nuclear weapons in the Korean Peninsula, similar to NATO, the United States would likely be taken aback. It is very difficult for policymakers and military experts to reach a consensus on whether these weapons, which are in a state of being stockpiled, can be effectively deployed in the Indo-Pacific region. The U.S. perspective is that if they were to be redeployed, it would essentially mean placing them underground in U.S. military bases.

Therefore, if we conduct such a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis, it is a well-understood fact among experts that independent development of tactical nuclear weapons by South Korea would significantly harm the nation's international standing. Second, what would be the implications of reintroducing tactical nuclear weapons, which were completely withdrawn 30 years ago? From my perspective, having observed nuclear weapons for nearly half a century, this prospect causes considerable confusion. This is because even experts who understand this issue quite well harbor significant misconceptions. First, the question arises: does the United States actually possess tactical nuclear weapons? As you know, during the Cold War, the US and the Soviet Union possessed nearly 60,000 nuclear weapons. However, in the 30 years since the end of the Cold War, this number has decreased. Within this context, how many tactical nuclear weapons, which we are now considering redeploying, does the US currently possess? Currently, the United States has been disclosing its nuclear weapons stockpile in recent times.

Is it more efficient to have them regularly deployed around the Korean Peninsula in underground silos compared to strategic nuclear weapons deployed in the region? There is considerable skepticism about this. Is it not more likely that they would become targets? This is the U.S. perspective. From our perspective, considering the domestic difficulties encountered even with the deployment of THAAD, if the U.S. were to insist on deploying these weapons without being sufficiently prepared, it would be realistically very difficult to gain domestic consensus. From the perspective of both North and South Korea, North Korea's possession of nuclear weapons is a tragedy not only for South Korea and the Asia-Pacific region but also for global nuclear proliferation. Most significantly, it is a tragedy for the 25 million North Korean residents who are experiencing extreme poverty due to their country's development of nuclear weapons.

However, if we redeploy tactical nuclear weapons to South Korea, it will become difficult to argue for the necessity of North Korea's denuclearization for the sake of the well-being of the 25 million North Korean residents, thus plunging us into a significant dilemma. Therefore, the redeployment of tactical nuclear weapons is a measure that, upon realistic examination, has very little validity. Consequently, the most crucial challenge is how to maximally utilize the U.S. extended deterrence strategy, which is currently being pursued at a preliminary level, to render North Korea's nuclear capabilities practically meaningless.

Then, in what form should the current cooperation between South Korea and the U.S. in the extended deterrence strategy be developed? In the current situation where North Korea is initiating a full-scale political offensive with tactical nuclear weapons, what security enhancements or improvements are necessary? This should likely be the core of our discussion. I believe at least two points need to be discussed. The first issue, which we are currently facing, is the credibility of this strategy.

A significant number of people, including the 50 million South Korean citizens, worry whether the U.S. would prioritize the threat to Seoul or the Korean Peninsula in the same way it would consider threats to Washington D.C., New York, Los Angeles, or Hawaii. Currently, the U.S. makes the final judgment on such matters, including information analysis and corresponding strategic responses. Therefore, to secure such credibility, it is likely that a more robust institutional framework for ROK-U.S. institutional trust needs to be seriously discussed and established. This is probably the first issue.

Secondly, regarding the U.S.'s extended nuclear deterrence policy, we should note that the U.S. has been evolving its basic direction of nuclear deterrence policy since last year. In what direction has it evolved? Previously, the term 'nuclear deterrence' was used. However, as officially stated by the U.S. Secretary of Defense at the inauguration ceremony of the Indo-Pacific Fleet Commander last April, the U.S. is now fully pursuing the evolution from a simple nuclear deterrence strategy to an 'integrated deterrence' strategy to confront new warfare. This has led to the full-scale development of budgets, weapon systems, and strategies this year. In essence, nuclear deterrence means deterring nuclear weapons with nuclear weapons, whereas integrated deterrence means not only deterring nuclear weapons with nuclear weapons but also encompassing conventional weapons, and further, cyber space and outer space in a comprehensive deterrence framework.

What are the advantages of this? Why is the risk of the adversary using nuclear weapons significantly reduced? Intuitively, we can consider two effects. Firstly, by employing advanced technology in cyber space, strategic space, or outer space, it is possible to more meticulously detect the adversary's preparations and intentions to use nuclear weapons, both in advance and during the process, and thus to implement precise countermeasures. Secondly, in the current era of revolutionary advancements in technology, deterrence strategies entirely different from those of the past are becoming possible. For example, as mentioned earlier, tactical nuclear weapons, which were traditionally used for deterrence, are being replaced by the B61-12, evolving from the W88. The speed of this replacement is such that it is expected to be largely completed within this year.

What happens when this replacement is completed? When such advanced weapon systems and technologies are introduced, in the past, the use of nuclear weapons would not only destroy the intended targets but also cause significant unintended damage associated with nuclear weapons. However, with the recent B61-12, it is said that when used against a precisely set target, it can precisely eliminate only that target, with no collateral damage. This signifies the emergence of a new deterrence tool. This implies that compared to the three-axis system, which South Korea is said to have independently developed to counter the possibility of North Korea using nuclear weapons—including preemptive measures, missile defense against nuclear use, and the threat of massive retaliation if necessary—the 'integrated deterrence' strategy being developed by the U.S. can establish a far more effective deterrence system.

This suggests that the 'integrated deterrence' strategy being developed by the U.S. can establish a far more effective deterrence system. Therefore, the key to a realistic alternative lies in how to combine these two.

Therefore, the key to a realistic alternative lies in how to combine these two.