[Global NK Interview] 제니 타운(38노스 공동대표)

YouTube 링크 : https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4rCvHDT0KFE

[Editor's Note]

동아시아연구원 는 올해 초부터 지속된 북한의 미사일 도발에 대한 미국 정책커뮤니티의 반응과 새로 취임하는 윤석열 정부와 바이든 행정부 간 대북정책 협력 전망을 논의하기 위해 제니 타운 38노스 공동대표를 초청하여 대담을 진행했습니다. 타운 공동대표는 최근 일련의 북한 미사일 시험 발사는 대내정치 차원에서 김정은 정권이 가시적인 정치적 성과를 보여주기 위한 목적에서 비롯되었다고 분석했습니다. 다가오는 한미정상회담은 윤석열 정부 시대 한미관계 강화 방향 및 미국 외교정책 무대에서 북한문제가 차지하는 비중을 알 수 있는 상징적인 행사가 될 것이라 전망했습니다. 아울러, 미국의 정책 커뮤니티는 미중 경쟁 문제에만 매몰될 것이 아니라 동아시아지역 개별국가 및 양자관계에도 주목해야 할 것이며, 대북정책 논의과정에서 한국 전문가들의 관점을 더욱 적극적으로 반영해야 한다고 제언했습니다.

1. The Socio-economic and Political Context of Pyongyang’s Missile Tests

• Ms. Town views that Pyongyang’s weapons proliferation gives Kim “concrete tangible successes” for the path he set forward for North Korea, serving as a tool to showcase the tenacity of his leadership against the backdrop dire socio-economic circumstances in North Korea.
• On top of that, greater U.S.-China strategic tension discouraged the two countries from cooperating on North Korea issues. In turn, “China and Russia have continued to advocate for sanctions relief for North Korea for humanitarian and livelihood purposes.”
• Under such a political environment, Ms. Town forecasts that “we are not going to get the same sort of international response we got in the past” outside of unilateral actions.

2. Prospects for ROK-U.S. Relations Under the Yoon Administration

• Ms. Town states that Yoon’s plans to further develop and deepen ROK-U.S. ties have “been largely welcomed from Washington as a way to repair some of the mistrust that has grown over the past five years between Trump and Moon.”
• Regarding the ROK-U.S. summit set to unfold ten days after Yoon’s inauguration, Ms. Town predicts that the summit will likely be a symbolic meeting, signaling Yoon’s aspirations to “get off on the right foot” on ROK-U.S. relations.
• Nonetheless, the summit does show that “despite what’s going on in Russia, South Korea and the North Korea issue, the Korean Peninsula are not a low priority.”

3. Policy Response from Washington to North Korea Issues

• Ms. Town claims that North Korea’s recent provocations have generated greater interest on not on North Korea issues, but also on the Korean Peninsula in general in Washington, reflected by a notable increase in the number of relevant events, research, and outreach.
• “North Korea’s actions and continued provocative behavior is a real manifestation of what happens when we get too focused on great power competition.” In this regard, Ms. Town states that Washington’s tendency to focus on great power competition should be complemented with research into how that strategic environment affects individual countries such as South Korea and bilateral relationships in the region.

4. Incorporating South Korean Voices into Washington’s Policy Circle

• Ms. Town posits that policy circles in Washington are “always looking for ways to highlight South Korean voices and perspectives on the region, so that it isn’t fully dominated by U.S. narrative across the political spectrum.”
• She views that more Korean perspectives available in English will “help the global community better understand the concerns, threat perceptions, and challenges that we’re dealing with collectively.”

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■ 담당 및 편집: 이승연 _EAI 연구원

    문의: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 205) | slee@eai.or.kr

영상 스크립트

Today we have Ms. Jenny Town, who is running 38 North. She has built very good relations with the EAI and we have cooperative relations in several projects. Today, we will ask her several questions regarding North Korea and U.S.-South Korea relations.

The first (question) is about North Korea. So North Korea has been conducting a series of missile tests, and I guess South Korea and the U.S. must be very much concerned about it. So how do you see the intentions behind all these test firings? And then there is a concern in South Korea on the Biden administration’s foreign policy priorities.

It is probably about the Ukraine war diverting attention from East Asia or the Korean peninsula. So North Korea might be a low priority. So how do you expect North Korea in the coming month in terms of the Biden administration’s foreign policy agenda?

First, thank you for having me on the show. It’s always great to work with you, the East Asia Institute, and Global NK. However we can cooperate is always a good thing. I think it’s important to keep in mind that for North Korea to be doing the back to back testing that it has been doing, these technologies have been in the works for a very long time.

So it isn’t like suddenly one day they decided, “hey, this is a good moment - let’s start testing.” But this is a research and development (R&D) cycle that’s been ongoing especially since at least January 2021 when North Korea laid out the goals for the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program during the eighth party congress.

So why they’re doing them all at once – it’s hard to say. And most likely there’s multiple reasons as to why they’re doing it and why they’re doing it the way they are. My sense is that there’s a lot of domestic political goals that these tests serve especially in the idea of Kim Jong Un being able to accomplish goals that he set at the beginning of his tenth year in power at a time when the economy is not doing so well and when the social situation, the domestic situation doesn’t look very promising,

since there’s you know, Kim Jong Un and North Korea has no control over the global pandemic and how long that’s going to take for them to be able to open their borders again. So this gives Kim Jong Un some concrete tangible successes against the plan that he set in January 2021 that he can claim as a function of his leadership.

How effective that is in compelling the people is questionable. Certainly the people don’t care as much about the success of missile tests as they do in resuming business, resuming market activity, the food situation and things like that. But again, it really does help feed into this persona of being someone who is able to accomplish things even in difficult times.

But obviously there’s a lot of other political considerations going on as well, including the rising U.S.-China competition, meaning it’s much harder for China and the U.S. to come to agreement on how to deal with North Korea as well. So unlike 2017, when there were reasons for the U.S. and China to cooperate on North Korea and China was willing to do more than it was even comfortable doing at certain times, the benefits of the U.S.-China cooperation – that political environment – is gone.

And so what you’ve seen instead is China and Russia continuing to advocate for sanctions relief for North Korea for humanitarian and livelihood purposes, even while North Korea is doing these missile tests. How far that patience and that willingness to remain on the side of North Korea in that aspect is, I think, very unclear.

And what we’re seeing at the UN Security Council there’s a lot of debates going on where there is sort of still universal condemnation of North Korea’s actions but again a real disagreement on how to respond to them. And so I think in the U.S., South Korea, and Japan, there’s obviously a push to impose new punishments especially for ICBMs, the resumption of ICBM testing.

But outside of unilateral actions we’re not going to get the same sort of international response that we got in the past. So it’s a very different political environment now in which North Korea is doing this. And certainly the South Korean inauguration of president-elect Yoon is coming up.

You know how much of this is geared towards the inauguration and the new administration. And I think it’s really questionable because again these moves have been intensely going on since January even before the elections, before it was clear who was going to be the winner.

I think it’s mainly because of the U.S.-ROK joint military exercises coming up. There’s a lot of different factors that really play into the decision making of basically what comes next and when it might come. You have very good points about North Korea’s intentions and the changing international environment surrounding the North Korean nuclear problem, inter-Korean relations, the U.S., and North Korea, and possibly the future environment for resuming negotiations.

Thank you very much. The second question is about, how you just mentioned, the inauguration of new president Yoon Suk-yeol. And there will be a summit meeting between Biden and Yoon just ten days after inauguration. That’s very early. And I guess that because president-elect Yoon mentioned many times that the ROK-U.S. alliance will be the central axis of its foreign policy in general.

So there might be high expectations about closer U.S.-South Korea relations. So how do you expect president Yoon’s foreign policy and the coming summit meeting? I think we’ve seen a lot of talking points about where the Yoon administration hopes to go especially in further developing and deepening U.S.-ROK ties.

I think this has been largely welcomed from Washington as a way to repair some of the mistrust that has grown over the past five years between Trump and Moon and some of the signaling that happened in the media instead of behind closed doors. I think there were lots of missteps and miscalculations that went on throughout that period that we’re hoping to move away from and back to a closer cooperation, especially deepening.

I know in South Korea, there’s a lot of expectations of deepening economic relations as well as part of a larger strategy of not only for the alliance itself, but in terms of being able to reduce some of the dependence on China and reduce some of China’s influence in the region overall.

Ten days after the inauguration; it’s very soon. I think there’s going to be a lot more symbolic value to this summit than it is like a real substantive meeting that’s going to take place. But I think it does show that despite what’s going on in Russia, South Korea and the North Korea issue, the Korean Peninsula are not a low priority, but it does matter.

And the U.S. is very concerned about what’s happening in Asia. They are very concerned about what’s happening on the Korean Peninsula. And they should be able to walk and chew gum at the same time as we say. So I do think the expectations might be high but I think it’s largely a symbolic meeting this early in the new administration to try and get off on the right foot.

Thank you. That’s a very good point. There is also public opinion in South Korea that the summit in some sense should be symbolic because we have to work on the real agendas as time goes on. And we have many issues to deal with like China and North Korea after the summit meeting.

So we have to be prepared for the series of the relations with surrounding powers as well. So far, you know you’re very famous in South Korea. You’ve been running 38 North very successfully. So we want to know, how is the North Korea agenda reflected in policy institutions in Washington D.C. or the U.S. in general, and how do you think those institutions will deal with the North Korean issue in the future?

And you know very well what’s happening in South Korea in terms of policy institutions and think tanks. How do you expect or give us some advice about South Korea’s think tanks in making relations with U.S. institutions in the future? I think in Washington there’s always more interest in Korean peninsula issues when Korean Peninsula issues are more visible on the global stage.

So when North Korea is testing, there’s definitely more events around, there’s more research around, there’s more outreach around Korean Peninsula issues in general, not just North Korea. So I think it really it does highlight the importance of the Korean peninsula to regional security, to U.S. interests in Asia as well as to our allied relations and the rising challenges and concerns that come with the changing security environment.

So I think you will see a large focus even though DC policy circles tend to be very focused on china and great power competition. North Korea’s actions and continued provocative behavior is a real manifestation of what happens when we get too focused on great power competition and don’t deal with the details of the individual relationships and the bilateral relationships in the region.

So I think you will see a lot more of looking at the strategic environment as a function of how it affects the Korean peninsula or how the Korean peninsula affects the strategic environment as well. And I think that’s sort of the direction of where policy research is going in order to better align with U.S. interests and priorities as well as just the rising challenges that it poses to regional security and global security.

In terms of cooperation between U.S. and ROK think tanks, I think there is actually a lot of cooperation that does go on. Several delegations will come through from both Seoul and Washington from different think tanks and different government agencies.

And I hope that will continue. I hope they’ll pick that up now that the pandemic is easing off and pandemic restrictions are easing off. But I think actually even during the pandemic being able to do more online and having the virtual environment be more broadly accepted has opened a lot of opportunities for cooperation.

I think DC has gotten used to doing evening events in order to be able to do more with our South Korean partners. But in policy circles, we’re always looking for ways to highlight South Korean voices and perspectives on the region so that it isn’t fully dominated by U.S. narratives across the political spectrum.

But you know it includes our allies in the region and how they’re thinking about the situation. The more, I think, we can get of Korean perspectives into English and to help the global community better understand the concerns, the threat perceptions, and the challenges that we’re dealing with collectively, I think will be beneficial to all.

Those are very good points. Actually what Global NK is doing is to make South Korean opinions known in English and not just to the U.S. but globally. So probably with more help with 38 North I think Global NK can do better work. Thank you very much. Thank you.

Very helpful comments on various issues. And hopefully I will continue online and also offline meetings as well. And we hope to have you again in the future. Thank you very much, Jenny. Thanks Chaesung.