[Changing Korean Voters] Short Interview with the Author: ⑥ Have the 86ers, Icons of Democratization, Become Conservative?

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=92hGf4OJmT4

The East Asia Institute (EAI) is operating the project <Changing Korean Voters>, which researches the 20th presidential election and Korean political reform tasks based on the presidential election panel survey conducted with Korea Research. Following the release of special reports by the research team to ascertain the current state of public sentiment, we are releasing short interview videos with the authors to present key points for observing the trends in public sentiment revealed by this election.

■ Author: Bae Jin-seok_Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Gyeongsang National University. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Texas, Austin. His main research areas include elections, political parties, and public opinion in the context of democratization and new democracies. As a senior researcher at the East Asia Institute, he was involved in the practical work of establishing the Asia Democracy Network (ADN) and the Asia Democracy Research Network (ADRN) in 2013.

■ Editor: Jeon Ju-hyun_EAI Researcher

Contact: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | jhjun@eai.or.kr

Video Transcript

1.2 The report poses a somewhat controversial question: "Have the 86ers, who were once icons of democratization, become conservative?" Following the presidential election, interest in the '86 generation' has increased. There are voices suggesting they still have a role to play. The 86 generation, often called the 'icons of Korean democratization,' left a strong impression with their progressive stance in their 30s. However, this has not always been the case. In 2007, there were calls that the progressivism of the 86 generation had disappeared. Therefore, the report examines whether the 86 generation, born in the 1960s, is still ideologically and politically progressive, has become conservative, or was never progressive in the first place.

The 50s are a crucial cohort in our research. This is because the so-called 'age effect,' where individuals who were progressive become conservative as their income increases and social status solidifies, is observed. The 2020 election was the first election where the cohort born in the 1960s, now in their 50s, became the largest demographic group. Thus, we can verify the conservatism of the 86 generation through this election. The report raises the question of whether the 86 generation can overcome the age effect, which suggests people become more conservative as they age.

We need to examine whether the political alignment of the 86 generation was more pronounced in the 2022 presidential election compared to previous elections. In the 2017 and 2012 presidential elections, which were largely binary contests, the pattern of younger voters supporting the Democratic Party and older voters supporting the People Power Party seemed to hold. However, this pattern does not appear to have been confirmed in the recent election. Even when controlling for other factors that influence voting choices, such as region, gender, education level, and income, the characteristic of generational cohort does not seem to have a significant impact on the choice.

Then, we must examine the factors that influenced the voting choices of the 1960s cohort, or the 86 generation, in this presidential election. These factors likely include ideology, approval ratings of President Moon Jae-in's job performance, and issues related to policy, such as whether to pursue a hardline or conciliatory approach towards North Korea.

When examining ideology and presidential approval ratings, no specific characteristics were found for the 1960s cohort. They appear to align closely with the average voter. The only area where some differences are observed is related to North Korea policy. Generally, individuals with progressive tendencies prefer conciliatory policies toward North Korea and advocate for welfare over growth-oriented policies. However, the 1960s cohort shows a slight deviation from this pattern. The proportion of those who prefer a conciliatory policy toward North Korea is relatively higher compared to other generations.

However, the proportion advocating for welfare policies is somewhat lower. This difference is more pronounced when compared to generations younger than the 86ers. In summary, no specific generational identity for the 1960s cohort was confirmed in the 2022 election. This is also true for other generations. Therefore, the election highlighted the need to focus more on intra-generational differences rather than inter-generational differences. The final question is: have the 86ers become conservative?

The specific voting characteristics observed during their youth and early adulthood, such as those of the 86 generation, appear to be generally maintained. A drastic shift towards conservatism upon entering their 50s is not observed. This shows a significant difference from previous generations. However, it is not accurate to assume that they voted progressively in their 20s and 30s simply because they identified as progressive. If you refer to the report, you will find graphs that clearly illustrate this.

Therefore, I cautiously suggest using the neutral term '1960s cohort' instead of the potentially over-interpreted term '86 generation,' which is often used to refer to individuals born between 1985 and 1986. The discussion also emphasizes the need to pay more attention to intra-generational differences rather than inter-generational differences.