Foreign Policy and Security Challenges for the Next Administration in 2022

YouTube 링크 : https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_dQ1DEDp110

The East Asia Institute (EAI) invited Chairman Ha Young-sun of the EAI Board of Directors for a New Year's dialogue to discuss the foreign policy and security challenges facing the next government after the 2022 presidential election and Korea's response strategies. Chairman Ha Young-sun discussed the implications of U.S.-China competition, the North Korean nuclear issue, Korea-Japan relations, and the reconstruction of a new civilizational order post-COVID-19, as well as Korea's response directions for the new administration. A summary of the key contents of the dialogue can be downloaded as a PDF from the EAI website.

In 2022, Korea stands at a crossroads, reviewing and adjusting its national governance direction through a presidential election. As the confrontation and competition between the U.S. and China intensify, Korea's strategic options are narrowing. North Korea is accelerating its nuclear and missile capabilities by test-firing hypersonic missiles. With no end in sight to the worst-ever Korea-Japan relations, considerations for a new value and normative order emerging in the post-COVID era are also necessary. To address the myriad foreign policy and security issues facing the next administration, the East Asia Institute (EAI) conducted a research project titled "Foreign Policy for the New Government in 2022" throughout last year, publishing the results in a book. Subsequently, on January 10th, EAI invited Chairman Ha Young-sun for a New Year's dialogue on the key foreign policy challenges and response directions for Korea this year.

Q: What is your outlook for U.S.-China relations in 2022?

A: It is important to have a comprehensive perspective encompassing four arenas: economy, technology, norms, and military. First, post-COVID economic recovery will be the biggest challenge this year. Second, competition in the technology arena, which has a core impact on all stages including the economy, will intensify. In the arena of values and norms, the debate over democracy to lead the world order will continue. In the military arena, regional conflicts will persist as long as they do not escalate into direct military confrontation between the two countries.

Economic Arena

2022 will be a pivotal year in the strategic competition between the U.S. and China. According to International Monetary Fund (IMF) statistics, the global nominal Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2021 was $95 trillion, with the U.S. accounting for approximately $23 trillion and China for $17 trillion. Most global economic research institutes predict that China will gradually surpass the U.S. around 2030. However, the global economic order for the next 30 years will be significantly influenced by the success or failure of post-COVID economic recovery. Therefore, the U.S. Biden administration will prioritize domestic economic reconstruction, continue to strengthen efforts to contain China while building a global network for this purpose, and its endeavor to establish a new Indo-Pacific economic framework beyond the existing Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) led by Japan and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) led by China should be viewed in this context. Meanwhile, China, whose economy has surpassed 70 percent of the U.S. economy, will also actively respond through domestic and international efforts. However, due to the interdependence of the U.S. and Chinese economies, it is realistically difficult for the economic arena to reach polarization. Amidst this, the economic competition between the U.S. and China in 2022 will be the crucial first year that determines the next 30 years. Korea, ranking among the top 10 globally, must actively participate in the U.S.-led global network in the fiercely competitive economic arena between the U.S. and China, while simultaneously striving to leverage China cautiously, guarding against side effects.

Technology Arena

Since advanced technology is the most critical factor influencing all arenas, including the economic arena, of U.S.-China relations in the 21st century, the technology competition between the U.S. and China is bound to intensify in 2022. The U.S. will continue its efforts in 2022 to maintain or expand its technological gap with China, which is rapidly developing its technological capabilities, by focusing domestically on strengthening its technological capacity and internationally on attempting to exclude China from advanced technology fields such as semiconductors, Artificial Intelligence (AI), 5G, quantum computing, brain science, and biotechnology, and by pursuing international cooperation to build global supply chains. However, the technological gap between the U.S. and China is rapidly narrowing, and their interdependence is relatively high, making unilateral or dichotomous decoupling and the establishment of global supply chains realistically difficult. Therefore, Korea needs to make joint efforts to promote the Biden administration's pursuit of international cooperation for a more complete ecosystem of 'technology-production-consumption,' based on 'technology-production' cooperation. Simultaneously, it must explore ways to integrate Korea-China advanced technology cooperation into the U.S.-centric technology cooperation arena.

Norms Arena

U.S.-China competition is now fully underway in the arena of values and norms, following the economic and technological arenas. Looking back at the history of cyclical changes in the world order, dominant powers do not immediately face military confrontation when a new challenger emerges; rather, they first face challenges to the legitimacy of their leadership. The U.S.-China debate on norms exemplifies this phase. U.S. President Biden emphasizes democracy as the core of legitimacy and convened a virtual 'Summit for Democracy' in December with 110 countries, excluding China, on the themes of defending against authoritarianism, combating corruption, and respecting human rights. Meanwhile, China convened an international forum around the same time and published a white paper titled 'Democracy, Chinese Style,' asserting that democracy is not an American monopoly but a universal value for humanity and a key ideology the Chinese Communist Party has upheld since its founding. Furthermore, it countered that true democracy is not the 'rich democracy' of the U.S. but the 'people's democracy' of China. The U.S.-China debate on democratic norms will intensify until the next virtual Summit for Democracy, hosted by the U.S., is held again at the end of 2022. In this norms arena, Korea should actively participate in initiatives like the Summit for Democracy or the D10 meetings actively promoted by the Biden administration, while making efforts to reflect Korea's future-oriented values for the 21st century. Regarding diplomacy on norms with China, it is necessary to seek multilateral activities consistently to mitigate practical difficulties.

Military Arena

To forecast the U.S.-China military arena in 2022, it is necessary to pay attention to the content of the U.S.-China summit held in November last year. President Biden emphasized competition as a fundamental principle of U.S. policy towards China, adding that competition should occur on a path with 'commonsense guardrails' to prevent accidents, and further, that competition within established road rules is desirable. In response, China criticized the U.S. view of U.S.-China relations as solely competitive, arguing that it should be viewed from a more complex perspective. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi explained U.S.-China relations at the end of last year from the perspective of three principles: 'mutual respect,' 'peaceful coexistence,' and 'cooperation for common prosperity.' China, spending $250 billion, which is one-third of the U.S. military expenditure of $780 billion, emphasizes mutual respect for each other's core interests above all. China particularly stressed that Taiwan, Xinjiang, Tibet, and Hong Kong are its most important core interests, considered as domestic security matters. Next, it pointed to peaceful coexistence without direct military confrontation or conflict between the U.S. and China. However, it warned the U.S. that if China attempts to resolve the Taiwan issue non-peacefully, the situation will become very complicated, although it does not overturn the 'One China Policy.' Lastly, possibilities for cooperation are open regarding issues such as nuclear proliferation.

Q: What is your outlook for inter-Korean relations and the North Korean nuclear issue?

A: As long as North Korea insists on the abolition of its double standards and hostile policy toward the U.S. as preconditions, it will be difficult to achieve results in declaring an end to the Korean War. North Korea is not making a decision for complete denuclearization beyond partial denuclearization, and as long as the U.S. demands a nuclear freeze demonstrating sincerity for complete denuclearization, it will be difficult to find a breakthrough in North Korea's denuclearization. North Korea will continue to strengthen its nuclear capabilities and develop missiles in 2022. However, the simultaneous pursuit of nuclear weapon construction and economic development is realistically impossible, and while advanced weapon development is progressing, the political and military utility of nuclear weapons is rapidly being appreciated. Therefore, North Korea must prepare a new survival strategy for survival and prosperity in the 21st century.

Chairman Kim Jong-un did not issue a separate New Year's address this year, but instead outlined North Korea's direction for 2022 at the year-end plenary meeting of the party. However, this speech only disclosed domestic matters and did not reveal inter-Korean relations or foreign relations. Nevertheless, based on Chairman Kim Jong-un's speeches from January's 8th Party Congress, September's Supreme People's Assembly address, and October's National Defense Development Exhibition, which best revealed his intentions, I will forecast inter-Korean relations, North Korea-U.S. relations, and North Korean denuclearization for 2022.

Inter-Korean Relations

In the 8th Party Congress report, Chairman Kim Jong-un presented three principles regarding inter-Korean relations. First, the attitude and stance of addressing fundamental issues are important. Second, 'double standards' and 'hostile viewpoints and policies' must be withdrawn. Third, if the preceding two conditions are met, another spring may come to the Korean Peninsula. Furthermore, in his September address, regarding the declaration of an end to the Korean War, presented by South Korea as a fundamental issue, he stated, 'Before declaring an end to the war, mutual respect must be guaranteed, and biased perspectives, unfair attitudes, and hostile viewpoints and policies toward the other side must be withdrawn first.' North Korea particularly emphasizes the withdrawal of double standards and hostile policies, as stated in the second principle, as a core prerequisite.

From North Korea's perspective, strengthening nuclear and missile capabilities is offensive, while South Korea-U.S. military exercises or military buildup are defensive; this is a double standard and a hostile policy by South Korea and the U.S. However, from South Korea's and the U.S.'s perspective, North Korea's strengthening of nuclear and missile capabilities is considered minimal deterrence for regime security, and South Korea-U.S. military exercises or military buildup are seen as offensive, constituting North Korea's double standard and hostile policy. Therefore, in such a system of mutual distrust, it is difficult to achieve results in inter-Korean relations through a declaration to end the war. First, the differences in perspectives between North and South Korea must be honestly acknowledged, and efforts should begin by seeking practical measures for sharing perspectives.

North Korea-U.S. Relations

The 8th Party Congress report presented three principles regarding external relations. First, diplomacy's primary mission is to defend dignity, enhance national prestige, and protect national interests, while firmly adhering to the principle of self-reliance. Second, focus on suppressing the U.S., the primary enemy of the revolution, and establish solidarity of anti-imperialist self-reliance capabilities. Third, the key to new North Korea-U.S. relations lies in the U.S. abandoning its hostile policy toward North Korea, and engaging with the U.S. on the principle of strength against strength and good faith against good faith. In the September address, it was emphasized that since the U.S. Biden administration's military threats and hostile policies toward North Korea have not changed at all, a tactical plan for a strategy toward the U.S. should be prepared based on an analysis of U.S. trends toward North Korea, the U.S. domestic situation, and the rapidly changing international dynamics.

Excessive expectations for North Korea-U.S. relations in 2022 are also difficult. The failure of the Hanoi summit in 2019 and the subsequent frustration of working-level negotiations in Stockholm clearly demonstrated that the calculations of both sides are completely different. Therefore, unless both sides meet with new calculations, it is unlikely that another summit will be held even if working-level negotiations progress. Since the advent of the Biden administration, the official stance has been a 'calibrated practical approach.' However, the maximum adjustment that the U.S. can accept is a nuclear freeze that demonstrates sincerity for complete denuclearization. North Korea's 'parallel development' (병진 노선) policy has not yet led to a strategic decision for complete denuclearization. The limit of adjustment proposed by North Korea, based on the calculations from the Hanoi summit, is partial denuclearization, involving the abandonment of the Yongbyon nuclear facility in exchange for sanctions relief and phased, simultaneous actions. It is difficult to find common ground between the U.S. demand for a 'sincere freeze' and North Korea's proposal for 'partial denuclearization.'

North Korean Denuclearization

At the National Defense Development Exhibition in October last year, Chairman Kim Jong-un emphasized the need to 'qualitatively strengthen war deterrence and further accelerate the development and production of strategic and tactical means essential for national security' in accordance with the 'Second Five-Year Plan for Defense Industry Development (2021-2025)' presented at the 8th Party Congress, amidst the unstable current situation on the Korean Peninsula. In his January speech last year, he also expressed pride, stating that the construction of nuclear forces is 'a miracle unprecedented in history and a historic achievement to be left to future generations.' Therefore, North Korea will continue to strengthen its nuclear capabilities and develop missiles this year.

However, these efforts by North Korea will soon face two major obstacles. First, the attempt to pursue survival and development rights complementarily through the parallel development line is bound to fail. Realistically, achieving the plan's goals is impossible while pursuing economic development plans amidst continued international economic sanctions. Second, nuclear weapons will not become an 'all-powerful sword' that can deter threats to regime survival in the long run. The U.S. Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and National Security Strategy Report (NSSR), scheduled for release early this year, will emphasize 'Integrated Deterrence' instead of 'Nuclear Deterrence' and introduce new concepts such as 'All-Domain Operations' and 'Joint Warfighting Plan.' In line with these U.S. changes, China is also actively discussing new concepts such as 'All-Domain Operations' (全域作战) and 'Intelligent Warfare' (智能化戰). While the pursuit of complex deterrence by the U.S. and China does not render nuclear weapons entirely meaningless, new forms of deterrence encompassing advanced weapon systems beyond nuclear weapons are emerging in the future military arena. Therefore, the political and military utility of nuclear weapons will rapidly diminish. Consequently, North Korea must accurately recognize the new changes in the military arena and urgently devise new calculations for survival and prosperity in the 21st century.

Q: Korea-Japan relations are difficult. What is your outlook for the future relationship between the two countries?

A: Following the presidential election in Korea, the two countries, Korea and Japan, must resolve pending issues led by Korea. However, to escape the vicious cycle of Korea-Japan relations, a new vision for the next century is needed. In the short term, Korea and Japan should consider cooperation for individual and regional interests amidst U.S.-China strategic competition. In the medium term, Korea and Japan must prepare for an era of equal comprehensive national power. In the long term, joint leadership considerations for coexistence are necessary in the process of reconstructing a new Asia-Pacific civilization in the 21st century.

A Century-Long Vision

After the presidential election in Korea, both Korea and Japan will inevitably strive to resolve the two major historical issues of comfort women and forced labor, which have reached an impasse. The new government in Korea might be able to create a breakthrough with a new vision: respecting past agreements and taking follow-up measures for the comfort women issue, and refraining from further monetary demands from Japan regarding the forced labor issue. However, genuine improvement in Korea-Japan relations requires both countries to move beyond the limitations of nation-centric, closed modern nationalism and formulate a new century-long vision capable of addressing the task of reconstructing a new civilization in the 21st century. Therefore, Korea and Japan need to review their respective efforts within the context of the Asia-Pacific order being rebuilt amidst U.S.-China strategic competition in the short term, prepare for a more desirable encounter in the 2030s when the comprehensive national power of Korea-Japan relations is expected to become equal in the medium term, and consider their leading roles for coexistence, not co-destruction, in the process of building a new civilizational order in the 21st century in the long term.

U.S.-China Strategic Competition and Korea-Japan Relations

U.S.-China strategic competition is actively driving the reconstruction of the Asia-Pacific order. The U.S. is reimagining the Indo-Pacific order while containing China's rise as an emerging power. Kurt Campbell, who plays a central role in shaping the Indo-Pacific order, described the U.S. policy direction as a 'global, balanced approach.' This approach aims to establish an operational system for the success of 'Build Back Better' (BBB) at a global level with domestic consensus. Accordingly, frameworks such as AUKUS (Australia, United Kingdom, United States) and the Quad (Australia, India, Japan, United States) are being established. While AUKUS has a strong military character, it is emphasized that the Quad, considering ASEAN and others, has stronger cooperative (for) elements than confrontational (against) ones. Korea-Japan relations will form an important component of this operational system. Therefore, Korea should actively participate in the Quad in cooperation with Japan, while simultaneously making efforts to prevent the strategic deterioration of U.S.-China and inter-Korean relations.

Equal Comprehensive National Power of Korea and Japan

Korea and Japan will enter an era of equal comprehensive national power around 2030. The Center for Business and Economic Research in the UK recently published long-term forecasts for nominal GDP. Based on this data, per capita nominal national income is projected to surpass Japan's around 2030. In terms of military spending, Korea spends 2.6 percent of its GDP, while Japan spends 1 percent. Consequently, Korea's military spending is expected to exceed Japan's in the mid-2020s. To minimize the negative impacts and maximize the positive effects of these structural changes, Korea and Japan must move beyond nation-centric, closed nationalism and pursue cooperation for genuine mutual respect and common prosperity.

Reconstruction of the 21st Century Asia-Pacific New Civilizational Order

Korea-Japan relations will find it difficult to find a breakthrough as long as both countries attempt to find solutions from the perspective of exclusive modern nationalism, as they are doing now. Therefore, a longer-term perspective is needed. Korea and Japan must move beyond the exclusive identity of nation-centrism and strive for a new civilization that forms composite identities at the individual, regional, and global levels. To this end, along with mutual domestic efforts, Korea and Japan must jointly lead the regional competition between the U.S. and China towards coexistence rather than conflict, and simultaneously make joint efforts to embrace other protagonists in the Asia-Pacific order as middle powers.

Q: What specific proposals are made by EAI's "Foreign Policy for the New Government in 2022" project regarding Korea's four major foreign policy goals, including "Leading Diplomacy for Coexistence Post-COVID"?

A: To successfully play a leading role as a co-protagonist in the stage of reconstructing a new civilization, which will fully unfold after the global pandemic of COVID-19, Korea must proactively pursue coexistence diplomacy that aims for the complexification of protagonists, stages, and performances.

Reconstruction of the Post-COVID New Civilizational Order

Despite EAI proposing 'Leading Diplomacy for Coexistence Post-COVID' as one of the four major tasks for the new government, the reality is that there is little significant interest from political, media, and academic circles. We believe that raising awareness about why leading diplomacy for coexistence is an urgent and important issue in 2022 is the primary task. We have experienced immense difficulties over the past two years due to the global pandemic of COVID-19. In fact, seeing the entire nation wearing masks and practicing social distancing resembles a war, albeit without firearms. Just as new orders have always emerged after wars throughout history, a new civilizational order for the 21st century will rapidly emerge after COVID-19.

In terms of military power and economic strength, which are modern indicators of national power, Korea ranks 10th globally in nominal GDP and also 10th in military expenditure. Korea has experienced the pain of having to step down from the international political stage due to its failure to properly read the transition of the new civilizational order during the modern transition period. Therefore, Korea's future in the 21st century will be determined by how well it can read the shape of the new civilizational order that will fully emerge after COVID-19 and how creatively it responds.

Complexification of Protagonists

Three core considerations are necessary. First, the complexification of protagonists. In the transition period of modernization in the 19th century, nation-centric, closed nationalism was an important standard. In the post-COVID world order, open nationalism, or global nationalism, will become more important. Therefore, first, alongside diplomacy with the U.S. and China, diplomacy with North Korea, and diplomacy with Japan, it is necessary to strengthen networks with other protagonists in the Asia-Pacific as a middle power. Second, it must be possible to lead the discussion and practice of re-globalization in the 21st century, which will fully unfold in the post-COVID order. Third, it is necessary to actively participate in the discussion and institutionalization of the cyberspace that has newly emerged due to the information and communication revolution. Fourth, COVID-19 provides an opportunity for humanity to reflect on the Anthropocene, where human activities have excessively impacted the Earth's ecosystem. Korea should also actively embrace these new changes and lead the way in pioneering new horizons.

Complexification of Stages

Second, the complexification of stages. Alongside the modern economic and military arenas, the importance of ecological, cultural, technological, and co-governance arenas will rapidly rise. COVID-19 has made humanity realize the importance of the ecological arena. Recent research suggesting that the northward migration of bat habitats due to climate change is an indirect cause of the COVID-19 outbreak is highly intriguing. It is impossible to play a leading role in the post-COVID new civilizational order without becoming a protagonist in the ecological arena, not just the economic and military arenas. The recent spectacular success of BTS and 'Parasite' confirms the importance of the cultural arena. Beyond the success of specific cultural content, there is a need for Korean stories, songs, and dances that resonate with more people worldwide, transcending the value and norm models presented by the U.S. and China. Furthermore, the information and communication technology revolution is fundamentally important as the underlying stage that reconfigures the four central arenas. Korea, which has achieved certain successes in this arena, must be able to present new models that address both the positive and negative aspects brought about by advanced technologies like AI. Finally, the need for a co-governance upper stage, where all protagonists of the stages can participate and complexly direct the four central stages and the underlying stage, is rapidly increasing. Korea, an advanced middle power situated at the center of East and West, must jointly participate in the process of reconstructing this new civilizational stage of the 21st century, from design to completion.

Complexification of Performances

Finally, the complexification of performances. The post-COVID world order discussions, centered around great powers, are fundamentally based on the principle of competition, with minimal cooperation aimed at preventing the maximization of conflicts such as war and poverty. However, the future we will face requires discussions that go a step further. What the EAI research team has proposed is a politics of coexistence based on continuous self-reorganization and co-evolution. It is hoped that this discourse can be presented as a new standard of complex performance by Korea amidst the conflict between the U.S. and China over the new civilizational order of the 21st century.

If Korea in 2022 successfully begins to tackle the four major tasks—the complexification of U.S.-China diplomacy, the 21st-century resolution of North Korean denuclearization and North Korean issues, a new century-long vision for Korea-Japan diplomacy, and the leading promotion of coexistence diplomacy as a new civilizational standard for the post-COVID order—then, just as BTS captivated the world as vanguards of the new 21st-century civilization, Korea can emerge as a new attractive nation of the 21st-century civilization.■

■ Author: Ha Young-sun_ Chairman of the EAI Board of Directors, Professor Emeritus at Seoul National University. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Washington, USA. He has served as a professor at Seoul National University's Department of Diplomacy, a visiting fellow at Princeton University's Center for International Studies, a visiting fellow at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Director of the Institute for International Studies at Seoul National University, Director of the Institute for American Studies, President of the Korean Peace Studies Association, Co-Chair of the Korea-Japan New Era Joint Research Committee, member of the Presidential National Security Advisory Council, and member of the Senior Advisory Council for the Inter-Korean Summit Preparation Committee. He is currently active as Chairman of the EAI Board of Directors and Professor Emeritus at Seoul National University. His recent books and edited volumes include "World Politics of Love: War and Peace," "A Correct View of Korean Diplomatic History: Tradition and Modernity," "The U.S.-China Competition for the Asia-Pacific Order," and "International Politics of Four Embassies: Analysis of Joseon Missions to China and Yeon-haengrok from the 16th-19th Centuries." He also wrote the "Ha Young-sun Column" for the Chosun Ilbo and JoongAng Ilbo for seven years.

■ Managed and Edited by: Kim Yang-gyu_EAI 사무국장

    문의: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 202) | ygkim@eai.or.kr

Video Script

Chairman Kim Jong-un did not issue a separate New Year's address this year. We have reconstructed what Chairman Kim Jong-un's basic documents throughout the year indicate regarding his year-end report. The key to inter-Korean relations is this: the basic principle from the Party Congress is that North Korea will adhere to three principles regarding inter-Korean relations. First, stop the constant talk about irrelevant matters. What about humanitarian cooperation? Let's start with what can be prioritized, such as tourism. From North Korea's perspective, it must start with what needs to be done.

In other words, the basic principle is that fundamental issues must be resolved. The first basic principle is that double standards must not be applied, and simultaneously, hostile policies must be abandoned for inter-Korean relations to improve. If these conditions are met, another spring will come.