[线上研讨会] 新冠疫情与新世界秩序系列 10. 新时代的美韩合作与朝鲜

YouTube 链接 : https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R6Cv-OMkW_4

东亚研究院（院长孙烈）与布鲁金斯学会东北亚政策研究中心联合举办了“新冠疫情与新世界秩序”系列第十场线上研讨会“新时代的美韩合作与朝鲜”。2021年5月发布的《韩美联合声明》强调了为解决地区安全问题而加强韩美合作，开启了韩美伙伴关系拓展的新时代。本次研讨会上，韩美两国的专家就无核化议题的现状、韩美终战宣言合作的前景、韩国与美国的对朝政策以及2022年大选对朝政策的影响等议题进行了深入讨论。

时间：2021年12月2日（周四）22:30-23:30 (KST)

发言人：苏·金（兰德公司研究员）、金振雅（韩国外国语大学教授）、黄智焕（首尔市立大学教授）、苏·米·特里（威尔逊中心韩国历史中心主任）

主持人：安德鲁·余（布鲁金斯学会韩国讲席教授）

开幕致辞：孙烈（EAI院长；延世大学教授）

与朝鲜的正确平衡：

对朝政策展望

I. 韩美关系与对朝政策

无核化议题的现状

• 美国与朝鲜之间为达成无核化协议的努力陷入僵局。鉴于金正恩委员长认为拥有核武器是政权生存的必要条件，朝鲜很可能继续投资于核开发。
• 兰德公司研究员苏·金（Soo Kim）表示，美国应持续传递谈判意愿，并通过金融制裁、损害朝鲜国际声誉（人权侵犯、粮食问题等）、加强美国同盟等形式，促使金正恩最终选择谈判以求生存。
• 韩国外国语大学金振雅教授表示，如果朝鲜对重启对话持续无反应，拜登总统将选择维持现状而非寻求改变。金教授补充说，这种情况可能会促使相关国家选择危机管理而非军备控制作为更具说服力的选项。
• 金振雅教授表示，如果朝鲜寻求在朝鲜半岛建立新的平衡，很可能专注于军事现代化并采取“针锋相对（tit-for-tat）”的竞争策略。朝鲜似乎将避免偏离其停止核武器与洲际弹道导弹试验的承诺，从而引发对稳定-不稳定悖论的担忧。

韩美终战宣言合作前景

• 威尔逊中心韩国历史中心主任苏·米·特里（Sue Mi Terry）博士认为，关于终战宣言，目前韩美两国意见不一。虽然终战宣言草案预计将包含表明该宣言不影响南北间休战状态的条款，但鉴于朝鲜完全没有表现出无核化意愿，在美国国内很难获得支持。
• 苏·米·特里博士补充说，拜登总统在推进终战宣言时，必须通过强调韩美同盟将像以往一样牢固来安抚美国民众。
• 苏·金研究员表示，尽管美国有意讨论终战宣言，但考虑到朝鲜的导弹试验、核开发以及韩国领导层更迭过程，我们应该质疑终战宣言在当前时点的可持续性。苏·金研究员还补充了关于终战宣言可能削弱韩美关系并为驻韩美军存在提出质疑的风险。

回归“战略忍耐”？

• 金振雅教授表示，回归战略忍耐并非良策，而维持现状并不等同于保障稳定。缺乏建立信任的会谈可能成为选择军备竞赛作为国家行动方针的依据。金教授表示，如果新政府不建立与朝鲜持续对话的制度性保障，朝鲜将观察朝鲜半岛的动态。
• 苏·金研究员表示，目前的条件对金正恩政权有利，峰会和谈判无助于美国重新占据优势。美国仍应展现与朝鲜进行外交的意愿，但也必须考虑到过去美国的参与政策曾让金正恩政权争取了时间，并创造了其发展更大、更强大核武器的机会。

II. 2022年大选与对朝政策启示

李在明候选人与尹锡悦候选人之间的对朝政策差异

• 首尔市立大学黄智焕教授解释说，李在明候选人的对朝政策可以概括为“和平优先政策”，而尹锡悦候选人的政策则被视为“强硬政策”，两位候选人都有可能继承前任的政策。李在明候选人将启动的对朝政策侧重于恢复朝鲜半岛的和平，其信念是朝鲜政权的崩溃或不稳定并不直接导向朝鲜半岛的和平或统一。另一方面，尹锡悦候选人的政策侧重于施压朝鲜放弃核武器，并协调韩美之间的制裁。
• 黄教授补充说，虽然两位候选人在如何看待韩美同盟在维持韩美日同盟中的作用方面可能存在差异，但两位候选人都认同韩美同盟的重要性。
• 苏·米·特里博士表示，两位候选人的当选都带来了机遇与挑战。如果李在明候选人当选，预计韩美之间会出现分歧，但如果朝鲜打开对话之门，则可能出现机遇。另一方面，如果尹锡悦候选人当选，可能会对南北关系产生负面影响。

下一届政府的内外政策任务

• 苏·米·特里博士解释说，从韩美同盟的角度来看，韩国面临的最大风险是“被抛弃（abandonment）”与“被卷入（entrapment）”的困境，而韩国如何在美中竞争中应对这一局面是关键。特里博士认为，韩国在与主要贸易伙伴中国打交道的同时，还必须处理对朝问题，为此，她认为韩国有决心自主设定发展方向。
• 黄教授表示，下一届韩国总统将面临的国内政策环境必然是不利的。他指出，政治两极分化，无论是在政治倾向还是代际差异方面，都是国内政策环境的最大问题。
• 黄教授认为，在对华政策方面，无论下一届大选哪位候选人当选，对华政策都会相似。韩国的外交政策框架侧重于加强韩美同盟和改善韩中伙伴关系。由于韩国的对华政策并未转向敌对方向，因此在一定程度上仍有政策灵活性空间。

III. 发言人及主持人简介

■ 黄智焕_ 首尔市立大学国际关系学教授。主要著作包括《韩国统一外交的悖论：超越以国家为中心的方法》、《美国单极化后的两个朝鲜：寻求新的对朝政策》、《美国在朝鲜的军事政策的政治影响：从理论和经验证据中学习》等。主要研究领域为南北韩关系与外交政策。在首尔大学获得学士和硕士学位，在科罗拉多大学获得政治学博士学位。

■ 金振雅_ 韩国外国语大学LD学部教授。曾任韩国国防研究院朝鲜军事研究室室长，并在延世大学国际研究生院担任兼职教授，讲授国际关系理论和人道主义干预。在统一部、国家安保室、外交部担任政策咨询委员和评价委员，曾任青瓦台信息公开委员会审议委员、韩美联合司令部政策咨询委员、国务调整室国政课题评价委员。在延世大学国际研究生院获得硕士学位，在美国塔夫茨大学（Tufts University）弗莱彻学院获得国际关系学博士学位。

■ 苏·金（Soo Kim）_兰德公司（RAND Corporation）研究员，美国大学（American University）兼职教授。主要研究领域为朝鲜半岛、俄罗斯、印太战略、近距离同盟竞争、决策、宣传等。曾在美国中央情报局（CIA）、国土安全部（DHS）工作。在约翰霍普金斯大学保罗·尼采高级国际研究学院（SAIS）获得国际关系战略学硕士学位，在耶鲁大学获得法语学士学位。

■ 苏·米·特里（Sue Mi Terry）_威尔逊中心韩国历史中心主任。曾任美国中央情报局（CIA）高级分析师和战略与国际研究中心（CSIS）高级研究员。在塔夫茨大学弗莱彻学院获得国际关系学硕士学位（2008年）。在美国塔夫茨大学（Tufts University）弗莱彻学院获得国际关系学硕士和博士学位，在纽约大学获得政治学学士学位。

■ 安德鲁·余（Andrew Yeo）_布鲁金斯学会韩国讲席教授，天主教大学政治学教授，亚洲研究主任。近期著作包括《朝鲜的国家、社会与市场》。在西北大学获得心理学和国际学学士学位，在康奈尔大学获得行政学博士学位。

■ 负责人及编辑 李承妍 EAI研究员

    咨询：02 2277 1683 (分机号 205) | slee@eai.or.kr

视频脚本

大家好，我是东亚研究院（EAI）院长、延世大学教授孙烈。非常荣幸能邀请到各位杰出的专家和嘉宾参加本次题为“新时代美韩伙伴关系下的朝鲜”的在线研讨会，本次会议由布鲁金斯学会东亚政策研究中心联合主办。实际上，两个机构多年来一直保持着合作关系，包括去年11月举办的题为“美中战略竞争时代的美韩合作新前景”的在线会议，会议汇集了双方的学者。这次，我们再次讨论在美韩伙伴关系拓展的新时代背景下的朝鲜问题。联盟伙伴关系的目标和任务日益复杂和多元化。这种关系已从半岛延伸到地区事务，从军事传统安全扩展到包括贸易、先进技术、气候变化和疫情在内的广泛议题。在这些领域的联盟关系动态变化的情况下，本次研讨会将讨论两国如何就朝鲜无核化问题协调战略利益，美中战略竞争对无核化努力的影响，以及在即将到来的韩国总统大选背景下，韩美同盟与对朝政策的前景。我非常期待这次讨论。

现在，请允许我向大家介绍今天的主持人安德鲁·余博士。安德鲁·余博士是布鲁金斯学会东亚政策研究中心韩国研究讲席教授，也是美国天主教大学政治学教授，即将出版的著作《朝鲜的国家、社会与市场》由剑桥大学出版社出版。安德鲁·余多年来一直与EAI紧密合作，很高兴他现在在布鲁金斯学会任职，希望我们能进一步加强合作。本次会议我们邀请了四位在朝鲜事务领域的杰出学者：苏·金博士、金振雅博士、黄智焕博士和苏·米·特里博士。非常感谢你们抽出宝贵时间参加本次会议。接下来，我将进一步介绍今天的发言人。首先是苏·金女士，她是兰德公司政策分析师，美国大学兼职教授。她曾在美国国家情报局（CIA）担任分析师，并在国土安全部（DHS）工作过。

她是朝鲜半岛问题专家，她的研究领域还涵盖俄罗斯、美国印太战略、宣传和情报界。接下来是金振雅博士，她是韩国外国语大学语言与外交学部教授。她曾任韩国国防分析研究所朝鲜军事研究部主任，以及延世大学国际研究生院兼职教授。

我是她所属的学院。金博士是美朝关系、核不扩散和东北亚安全事务专家。接下来是黄智焕博士，首尔大学国际关系学教授。他是韩国安全研究领域的领军学者之一。黄博士发表了广泛的文章，包括《韩国统一外交的悖论》和《美国单极化后的两个朝鲜》等。最后是苏·米·特里博士，她是威尔逊中心现代汽车基金会韩国历史与公共政策中心主任。她是朝鲜问题的主要专家，曾任战略与国际研究中心（CSIS）的资深研究员，以及美国中央情报局（CIA）的朝鲜问题高级分析师。她最新的文章《朝鲜的核家庭：金氏家族如何获得核武器以及为何不放弃》于今年发表在《外交事务》杂志上。有如此阵容强大的嘉宾，安德鲁·余，现在会议就交给您了。

大家好，我是东亚研究院（EAI）院长、延世大学教授孙烈。非常荣幸能邀请到各位杰出的专家和嘉宾参加本次题为“新时代美韩伙伴关系下的朝鲜”的在线研讨会，本次会议由布鲁金斯学会东亚政策研究中心联合主办。实际上，两个机构多年来一直保持着合作关系，包括去年11月举办的题为“美中战略竞争时代的美韩合作新前景”的在线会议，会议汇集了双方的学者。这次，我们再次讨论在美韩伙伴关系拓展的新时代背景下的朝鲜问题。联盟伙伴关系的目标和任务日益复杂和多元化。这种关系已从半岛延伸到地区事务，从军事传统安全扩展到包括贸易、先进技术、气候变化和疫情在内的广泛议题。在这些领域的联盟关系动态变化的情况下，本次研讨会将讨论两国如何就朝鲜无核化问题协调战略利益，美中战略竞争对无核化努力的影响，以及在即将到来的韩国总统大选背景下，韩美同盟与对朝政策的前景。我非常期待这次讨论。

大家好，我是东亚研究院（EAI）院长、延世大学教授孙烈。非常荣幸能邀请到各位杰出的专家和嘉宾参加本次题为“新时代美韩伙伴关系下的朝鲜”的在线研讨会，本次会议由布鲁金斯学会东亚政策研究中心联合主办。实际上，两个机构多年来一直保持着合作关系，包括去年11月举办的题为“美中战略竞争时代的美韩合作新前景”的在线会议，会议汇集了双方的学者。这次，我们再次讨论在美韩伙伴关系拓展的新时代背景下的朝鲜问题。联盟伙伴关系的目标和任务日益复杂和多元化。这种关系已从半岛延伸到地区事务，从军事传统安全扩展到包括贸易、先进技术、气候变化和疫情在内的广泛议题。在这些领域的联盟关系动态变化的情况下，本次研讨会将讨论两国如何就朝鲜无核化问题协调战略利益，美中战略竞争对无核化努力的影响，以及在即将到来的韩国总统大选背景下，韩美同盟与对朝政策的前景。我非常期待这次讨论。

大家好，我是东亚研究院（EAI）院长、延世大学教授孙烈。非常荣幸能邀请到各位杰出的专家和嘉宾参加本次题为“新时代美韩伙伴关系下的朝鲜”的在线研讨会，本次会议由布鲁金斯学会东亚政策研究中心联合主办。实际上，两个机构多年来一直保持着合作关系，包括去年11月举办的题为“美中战略竞争时代的美韩合作新前景”的在线会议，会议汇集了双方的学者。这次，我们再次讨论在美韩伙伴关系拓展的新时代背景下的朝鲜问题。联盟伙伴关系的目标和任务日益复杂和多元化。这种关系已从半岛延伸到地区事务，从军事传统安全扩展到包括贸易、先进技术、气候变化和疫情在内的广泛议题。在这些领域的联盟关系动态变化的情况下，本次研讨会将讨论两国如何就朝鲜无核化问题协调战略利益，美中战略竞争对无核化努力的影响，以及在即将到来的韩国总统大选背景下，韩美同盟与对朝政策的前景。我非常期待这次讨论。

大家好，我是东亚研究院（EAI）院长、延世大学教授孙烈。非常荣幸能邀请到各位杰出的专家和嘉宾参加本次题为“新时代美韩伙伴关系下的朝鲜”的在线研讨会，本次会议由布鲁金斯学会东亚政策研究中心联合主办。实际上，两个机构多年来一直保持着合作关系，包括去年11月举办的题为“美中战略竞争时代的美韩合作新前景”的在线会议，会议汇集了双方的学者。这次，我们再次讨论在美韩伙伴关系拓展的新时代背景下的朝鲜问题。联盟伙伴关系的目标和任务日益复杂和多元化。这种关系已从半岛延伸到地区事务，从军事传统安全扩展到包括贸易、先进技术、气候变化和疫情在内的广泛议题。在这些领域的联盟关系动态变化的情况下，本次研讨会将讨论两国如何就朝鲜无核化问题协调战略利益，美中战略竞争对无核化努力的影响，以及在即将到来的韩国总统大选背景下，韩美同盟与对朝政策的前景。我非常期待这次讨论。

thank you dr son and good morning or evening to our global audience and thank you once again dr sun for your opening remarks i also want to thank eai for organizing and hosting this webinar jointly with the center for east asia policy studies at the brookings institution our partnership allows us to draw insights from experts in korea and the united states ensuring wider and more balanced perspectives on the u.s south korea alliance we only have a short one hour so i want to jump right into our topic for today

north korea and a new era of u.s south korea partnership and to maximize our time with our distinguished guests i'll just mention that our webinar is organized into two halves or two interrelated mini panels in the first half we'll be joined by miss suk kim from the rand corporation and dr gina kim from hanguk university of foreign studies to discuss the moon invited administration's current efforts to pursue negotiations including the much discussed end of war declaration and then in the second half dr jiwan

fang from the university of seoul and dr sue terry from the wilson center so i almost said csis again uh so dr sue terry from the wilson center will address north korea policy in the context of upcoming south korea elections and a new current government next year so we'll be talking about uh north korea policy in the current context and then moving forward with the next south korean government as well as other issues that might pertain to the u.s south korea alliance so without further ado let me first turn

to sue kim from rand to address our opening set of questions sue can you give our audience here a rundown on the current status of where we're at regarding steps towards denuclearization on north korea and while we're there how would you evaluate the biden administration's approach to north korea thus far sure thank you andrew uh good morning d.c and good evening to our colleagues in seoul um just to get the ball rolling i'll be touching upon nuclear talks from north korea by the administration's

approach to kim jong-un thus far and finally our approach to this topic du jour and war declaration so where are we when it comes to the nuclear talks um two years actually three have passed since trump and kim have been they walked away from the hanoi summit with a no deal and of course north korea has been diligently pursuing its nuclear weapons development and missile delivery systems so i would say that the threat is actually an immutable constant and we know that kim jong-un is going to continue to invest hundreds of millions

if not billions of dollars in perfecting and diversifying his nuclear weapons program he's not going to be easily deterred so long as the weapon system remains inherently tied to the regime's existence and of course kim's survival and even if the united states and south korea their military capabilities are superior and more advanced than north korea's the lethality of the dprk's nukes and missiles as well as i would say the intent to use them towards the region and the united states is an issue that's going to be

underscored and i think equally worrisome is the dprk's proliferation of illicit activities so we're talking about the the steadily expanding creep um the criminal creep in cyberspace uh human rights violations and other behaviors that actually go against the the grain of international norms and you want to see resolutions that become more and more ingrained and deep seated into the dprk's being so this makes it all the more challenging for us to tackle the dprk problem beginning with of course the

nuclear weapons so in this respect the sooner we can address the nuclear issue the better obviously but right now we've not heard of any contact between the united states and the dprk negotiators but i don't think this is such a bad thing um rather than laying out all of our cards before the north koreans to clinch an agreement we should continue to indicate the willingness to dialogue while also applying the the appropriate inducements to bring the north koreans back to the negotiating table and by inducements

ideally it would be less in the form of concessions that reward and validate kim's behavior but more squeezing the kim regime financially through sanctions uh reputationally by exposing and shaming kim's crude divides of human rights and diplomatically by strengthening our alliance strategy towards the dprk and also the broader regions that ties together to leave kim essentially with no choice but to negotiate for survival and lately two topics have been dominating the discourse in seoul and one of course is the uh the upcoming

elections and two the end of war declaration so the timing and rationale for the the declaration it seems to be more along the lines of like grafting peace onto reality that that seems a little bit distant from being fertile when it comes to a declaration in addition to weapons testing pyongyang doesn't seem to have an appetite for this proposal which could of course be part of the strategy it makes seoul more anxious and and more insistent and urgent to bring a declaration into fruition and washington for its part

has been expressing willingness to discuss this topic but i think we should ask ourselves here whether the declaration now amid the the ongoing testing you know his determination to keep his nuclear weapons and at the cusp of a leadership transition in south korea is actually going to be sustainable so both from an implementation implementation perspective as well as the potential security alliance and regional applications of a precipitous dash to on the end of ward declaration doesn't seem to be

well timed so the fact of the matter is both proponents and opponents of the end of our declaration they're well aware of the fact that this is going to have broader implications so this is not merely a symbolic document it's it's not going to you know place it it is going to place the korean peninsula and the broader northeast asia region on a different trajectory so it spells implications for the alliance which rests on the foundations of you know the common north korean threat um but it's seeking to also advance

beyond um to work together on the shared political and ideological values among common regional threats including china's aggression and new challenges including supply supply chain disruptions pandemic etc etc so i think for north korea the end of our declaration is going to help kim inch closer towards other milestones including the estrangement of us rok relations um the overall reduction if not expulsion of us fk troops from the peninsula which consequently is going to weaken seoul's foothold and and the place it's

going to place seoul under a firmer north korean hand it's going to reverse the political economic and social progress it's made over the past seven decades so there's a lot to think about and what the end of what declaration in one hand and then the nuclear weapons and the other i think it's going to make him even more strongly positioned to subdue the cell so this is a good place for me to pause and i'll look forward to my co-panelists and i look forward to the discussion thanks so much sue and you preempted me

because i was going to ask a follow-up question about whether the end of war declaration has helped build any momentum towards korea peace but it sounds like you think in some ways it may have an opposite effect of even perhaps destabilizing the region so i know uh are some of our listeners may have questions on that or different views um but yes let's let's move on now to dr gina kim uh gina so let me turn now to you to offer a few remarks you know president moon has clearly signaled his interest in engaging north korea and the

biden administration has also stated it's pr that it's prepared to meet north korea anytime and anywhere what is the motive though behind kim jong-un's critical stance towards biden and moon's efforts for resuming talks because it sounds like uh president moon for sure and even the biden administration are open to some sort of negotiations but kim jong-un has really given uh both governments the cold shoulders so could you uh could you maybe describe what you think is happening behind uh behind north korea

and their rationale all right um i would like to thank the brookings and eai for giving me this opportunity to share my thoughts with other distinguished experts on korean peninsula issues well many scholars present skeptical views on the reversal of the nuclear program of the dprk because its nuclear armament aims to improve self-defense externally and to cement its authority internally so in particular experts on nuclear arms control argue that the dprk lacks a reason to choose denuclearization

in addition to that the means of pressure are quite limited besides the leadership in pyongyang cannot be entirely immune from the political cost of high profile meeting that failed once clearly the dprk is seemingly refraining from taking steps that could lead to escalated tension on the korean peninsula however the fact that the dprk remains unresponsive to the continued message of resumption of dialogue from the biden administration as you said raises some concerns among many of the parakeet watchers

in the absence of a response from the dprk the by the administration will prefer in the long run to maintain the status go instead of offering drastic incentives to negotiations with the dprk and in my opinion if this situation continues the idea of crisis management through arms control instead of the denuclearization of the korean peninsula will become increasingly persuasive that's something the dprk may want to wait and see moreover in a situation where competition between the u.s and china is

intensifying the motivation for the dprk and china to tighten their strategic relations will certainly increase this will raise alarm at least among south koreans about losing leverage on north korea and seoul will try actively engaging with pyongyang then either way the dprk will not think that it is losing a game to keep the size of the wind steps so small and rigid um which will give the dprk a bargaining advantage the dprk will pretend that it is not really bothered by any cost caused by no agreement

if the dprk pursues a near-term interest in revitalizing economy conditions then its immediate goal is to return to the talks with the intention to discuss what was previously offered by the north koreans in february 2019 that is partial sanctions relief in exchange for partial declaration of its nuclear program and the dprk's strategy will be avoiding unnecessary tensions on the korean peninsula and obviously action for action is a principle that the dprk has adhered to for many many decades if the prk believes that it can model

through then it is likely to seek a new equilibrium on the korean peninsula through military modernization in a tit-for-tat rivalry with south korea in this case the dprk will also avoid unnecessary escalation but there will be a much concern about the instability instability paradox to complete the pre-planned research and development cycle the dprk will need testing new weapon system before deployment for technical reasons the peer case strategy to up the ante to achieve political compromise and to be

recognized as a nuclear weapon state will be the worst case scenario in my mind then pyongyang need to speed up efforts to demonstrate credible deterrence capabilities but this strategy is not without risks confirming its commitment to invest more in force enhancement well helps the leadership in pyongyang increase the audience cost internally and therefore demonstrate externally that north koreans are not in position to make compromise or flexibly negotiate with the the u.s however escalation to a degree

in which pyongyang can increase just attention just enough to get international attention in a way not to upset beijing and moscow will be the challenge for the dprk currently the moon administration has confirmed many times that it would pursue at least the minimum goal with which is recreating the condition for starting a dialogue within the term it seems that um the south korean government worries that time is running out and therefore tries to push hard to declare and end the war on the korean

peninsula that does not have any legal implications in the expectation of creating a momentum for talks so the question is and i i also wonder if we have any alternative option right now obviously acknowledging north korea as a de facto nuclear weapon states will be a potential blow to the geneva agreement six party talks and related inter-korean agreements because all of these are based on 1991 joint declaration of the denuclearization of the korean peninsula well returning strategic patience may

not be a good idea because the perceived status quo does not necessarily mean stability because in the absence of talks on confidence building measures the arms race can be a natural course of action between the two koreans in south korea's presidential election is coming and a new government will need time to review the previous dprk policy then the dprk may want to test the water and refrain from making any suggestions for further dialogues if we don't have any institutional mechanism to continue

talks with the dprk separately from domestic political events however there will be a rough road if we link end of war declaration with denuclearization only then the dprk will resist it and the dprk set the precondition of declaring and end the war that is resolving the issue of u.s hustle policy well because the term house policy includes comprehensive issues political economic and military so we need to think ahead how to tighten the linkage of key issues that all concerned parties intend to address

well um i'll stop here and look forward to further discussions thank you okay excellent now sue and gina it seems like you know both of you are pretty you're more between skepticism and optimism you're more on the skeptical end if i were to ask whether the moon government will be able to make any progress towards korea peace before the end of end of the term um but i wanted to pick up on a thread that you guys uh both addressed uh directly for gina and indirectly for soon it's this idea of strategic

patience and as we all know for north korea in the land of lousy options on north korea it some think that strategic patience at this time may actually be better than pushing for uh engagement but gina you just mentioned that strategic patience may not be may not be ideal because it could we might end up leading to an arms race so in your case it sounded like you were leaning towards the argument that perhaps strategic patience is all that we can do for now because um you know again because there aren't

great options and now is just not the time to really push for something like the end of war declaration so if i could just have either of you follow up a bit on on whether you think the strategic patients given the risks that are involved with it if this is if this is really the only option that we have or if there's some something else that we should be we should be trying and i think that's where the end of war declaration comes in it is uh i have my own uh views on this but i i'll put those aside but i was wondering if

you could say something about strategic patients being the only option or whether we should try to push ahead with engagement so i don't know who wants to go first maybe maybe i'll go back to sue sure so i think when i guess the point of my talk was that you know we're not just sitting and not doing anything it's just that the more we try to push things when things are not conducive to a not even a friendly agreement but just a productive set of talks with north korea and negotiations that are going to

be constructive i just don't see that being there not just from the perspective of north korea but also from the perspective of the south korean government again the atmospherics are not really appropriate to to to call an end of war to to the korean war and and to build the steps toward the two koreas peacefully coexisting when kim jong-un actually has the weapons in place and when he doesn't have the intention to to be friendly what are we trying to get in return um we're just going to be allowing things between the united

states and south korea to be further divided uh where we're going to there's just a lot of factors that i don't think we're considering because we're thinking about this political goal um which is going to leave whichever administration comes in with with a bigger set of problems to handle so i think when it comes to strategic patients it's not about just sitting and not doing anything you can you can signal just look just like what we're doing we're signaling willingness to dialogue and we're also keeping a

watchful eye on what north korea is doing and responding in ways that are not going to put the united states and south korea in a position where we're jeopardizing we have to basically be dragged into negotiations without really knowing what we're going to want to expect from north korea and also what we're willing to give and take and i think that's the problem that i see uh before i turn to gina i would also like to encourage audience members if you have a question you can use the q a function to to ask a question but uh

since we i don't see any uh anything in there right now gina if i can turn to you and if i could just add one uh question to to this chain of thought but you had also mentioned arms control um as uh as an alternative and i know that that's not something that you uh that you advocate especially if we think about the risks of of proliferation uh but despite those risks should do you think there should be more serious attention uh to that option given the impasse of looking at arms control as an intermediate step so i'll also throw

that question in there so gina to you yeah um currently the biden administration is left with how to break the deadlock on the korean peninsula and um in my opinion the dprk policy of the u.s show some flexibility regarding how to negotiate but not what to negotiate with the dprk and even president trump could not change uh basic demands priorities and terms of the trade-off and certainly north korea will know it as long as china is helping north korea i think um north korea can buy time um so uh how to make a breakthrough um

the thing is well declaring the end of war is very much different from signing a peace treaty perhaps north korea wants a legally binding document to end the armistice treaty not a political statement because north korea emphasizes irreversible matters um but the south korea what what south korea is trying to pursue at this moment is not a treaty but a decoration with some symbolic meaning if the armistice treaty is replaced by a peace treaty then it'll become a dead letter and in the case the basis for the

existence of the u.n command on the korean peninsula and the unc real basis in japan becomes questionable because the unc is based on our mystic treaty by the way so it'll be a big challenge to the u.s and um and south korea uh considering the the allied defense posture in this region therefore i think uh we have to have a uh have to consider condition-based phased approach toward north korea we can talk about the contents of the peace treaty but we can sign it later once north korea completes a

denuclearization there are many creative ways to approach and um dprk is uh highly likely to seek a long-term survival strategy of bandwagoning with china instead of embarking on denuclearization negotiations with a political risk so alternative solution as i told you to the problem is exchanging a condition based rewards such that the dprk can perceive the benefits of denuclearization through a thorough verification mechanism that reduce the possibility of defection from an agreed framework by raising the cost of

non-compliance and in the long run um the two couriers can talk about confidence building and even arms control perhaps we can start talking about operational com arms control then uh move on to discussing structural arms control all this can be included in in a big package of phase a condition based phased uh implementation by both sides in my opinion okay thanks gina so it does seem like arms control it's if it's carefully put as part of a conditioned um effort may there may be a possibility

for that option and of course uh arms control is not the final goal you wanted them move towards denuclearization so uh so those are some thoughts i have one just a final uh final question before we move on to to the second half of our but but gina in your i believe it was in in the comments that you had had sent me it sounded like with the pandemic um you know once once the pandemic is over yo kim jong-un has his own timeline and he may just resume the timeline for whatever goals that he wants to achieve

is is it uh looking at this from from from the regime's perspective do you think it's better off to try to have some kind of agreement or negotiation while in some ways north korea is very weak they're weakened because of covet 19 because of the border lockdowns and does that give the u.s and south korea any leverage while they're in that state but the earlier there was talks about offering vaccines or some kind of humanitarian assistance um so it is opportu is there a better opportunity now during the pandemic to

try to engage north korea or would it make more sense to wait when when the pandemic is over knowing that north korea is not really willing to do uh do much or come out of its shell well now what nurse curry is suffering from it's not just a pandemic its food security situation is really dark dire this year and in order to actually revitalize its economy north korea these foreign assistance as well and all this should be done uh can be done during the pandemic or after the pandemic there should be a strategic

decision uh made that should be made by the leadership in permanent but i think what north korea is doing is uh just uh looking at the right time for opening up the uh opening up uh for uh having another round of dialogue because it seems to me that at least in the eyes of the north koreans in pyongyang a lot of uncertainty is there as as i told you the presidential election in south korea will be another variable uh in mind uh of the north koreans so we have to uh wait and see okay great um i'm so in the interest of time i'm going

to move move on to the second half of our panel where we discuss u.s south korea cooperation and north korea policy under the next south korean government so as as most of our listeners know there's an election a major election coming up next march uh in south korea so let me turn to dr jihuan fong who's in seoul to give us a rundown of how the two major south korean presidential candidates might approach north korea so g1 uh if if we can turn to you how would you describe to u.s policy makers the

main differences between the two major south korean presidential candidates it would be and regarding north korea policy so uh dr pong okay okay okay yeah okay thank you uh thanks uh andrew and thanks for uh having me here uh actually let me uh speak about the uh the presidential election and uh north korea are policy uh first you know the uh the basically two major south korean uh presidential candidate you know the jiameong and yung seongyeon i think have they have almost almost the same the position from their the predecessors

you know that yam from tim dejung nom muhan and the current president uh the moon jae-in and the young from uh the the the president his predecessors the uh the imminent back and the uh uh and their policies you know north korea policies are based on uh their the ideological differences i think uh between the conservative and the progressive uh the candidate the izam young i think the support uh supports the engagement policy toward north korea and i think uh he can be described uh regarded as his his policy as a peace

first policy i mean uh that is to uh the focusing on the bringing peace back first on the korean peninsula uh just as the kim de jung nomihan and the mundane current president moon jae-in you know supported and also i think the injurement belief that the collapse of the instability of the north korean regime would neither directly lead to unification uh nor the peace on the korean peninsula so they he insisted that the benefit of the engagement and peace building uh policy and mechanism outweigh

uh the coast but uh conversely the candidate uh yoon sang yeah i think support uh the sanctioned regime on north korea and i think we may uh describe his policy as uh the hotline policy you know uh that the to focusing on the uh putting on pressure to uh the you know the pressure to enforce uh the pyongyang the kim jong-un to give up its nuclear weapons program so his policy may be also be the the regarded as is the unification of the policy of the sanctioned regime uh policy and that argues that he argues

that the unification will lead to peace uh just as the two previous uh the conservative lead uh the president uh immun back and back uh pursued so uh yosemite uh appears to believe that the united states and south korea should cooperate uh to keep sanctions uh keep going and pressure uh sanctions and pressure uh keep going and to in order to enforce pyongyang to back down so even if the the headline policy by him may destabilize the north korean domestic uh situation uh to the point of the collapse so

but the easement you know uh they appear to believe that the sanctions may uh destabilize the north korean domestic uh situation and may be very dangerous and even uh you know the leading to the humanitarian disaster and the systemic uh dysfunction so the south korean uh people uh he believes that should work on a long-term engagement strategy toward pyongyang by lifting uh of course the conditions based uh sanctions and the promo by promoting the korean economic uh corporation uh so he believes that

the invocation comes you know and the comes only gradually you know only by when the piece is brought back first to the korean uh peninsula but uh the candidate you sang yeah you know uh the beliefs that uh like uh many many from the conservative groups uh in his uh party the people's uh power party believe that the only uh you know unification uh will that uh you know spell uh the disaster but solve many you know in the immediate uh problems such as the nuclear issues and the internal uh chaos and humanitarian

crises uh etc and it will uh he believes that the you know produce the massive economic and social benefit of the korean uh peninsula and also the northeast asia so it seems to me that we are more likely to see uh you know the the their policy to be repeated in the uh dear future the actually just just like we have seen uh in the previous you know the presidential uh the election because we already have seen that there there has been a really a serious debate between the conservative groups and uh the progressive uh the

uh groups of how to you know the deal with the north korean uh issues but uh i think they uh agreed to the how to uh you know the uh the get support from the united states because in that sense uh the young sangria and vision are not really different uh because both of them you know the stresses the the importance of you know the uh the strengthening uh the the korea u.s alliance uh in dealing with the uh the the north korean uh issue uh although they may be some uh you know uh may have some difference in you know the uh the how to

combine the uh the korea us uh the uh relations and the cooperation uh including the trilateral relations with uh the u.s korea and uh the japan uh but mostly i think uh their approach to the alliance issues is really uh dissimilar uh and also but somewhat uh different in the dealing with the north korean issues but the mostly i think they agreed to uh those issues that about the how to uh you know improve the uh the cooperation between u.s and south korea on the north korea policy let me stop here

okay thanks jihan um i'm going to uh turn to dr suteri just in the interest of time but uh jihan went just to get you thinking during the moderate discussion you know what kind of policy environment domestic policy environment will the next south korean president face in dealing with north korea issues because i think that's something that maybe those in washington or in the united states don't really understand the policies domestic policy space in south korea and what especially if there's an engagement approach so if you could just

think about that but right now let me turn to dr sue terry to give us some perspective from washington just in light of what um jihan was saying sue what challenges or opportunities will the biden administration face on north korea policy if either the main conservative or progressive candidate wins the election in march so sue over to you yes thanks andrew um this is really an interesting race because we have two non-traditional candidates um and they don't really have foreign policy experience or or

um so that's gonna be interesting on the north korea question specifically um let me talk about it beyond first um as dr huang said you know egypt is obviously expected to continue the ruling party's current focus on engagement with north korea um and lee has said that his approach to north korea would be practical without ideological considerations at least he says this right um and you know the word practical is fine since the body administration says their approach is also practical but but what i'm concerned about is

even now to be very candid um i don't think washington and solo are exactly on the same page in in their approach to north korea even though they say they are coordinating very very closely and they are to their credit um still they're not exactly on the same page i mean just take this end of war declaration that you guys just finished talking about um the moon administration has asked the budget administration to consider it so the by the administration said okay we will since you're a close ally and you're asking us to consider it

to break this current impasse with north korea um and supposedly their draft is in the final stage of the coordination and negotiation with washington so be too much as well which is interesting to me by the way because we're closely coordinating but we have no idea what the north koreans are going to say um but still um and the draft is going to it's expected to include all kinds of clauses about how this is not going to affect united nations command not going to impact u.s versus korea they're going to water down

其语言，但随后会降低其对朝鲜的吸引力。所以，对我来说，拜登政府这样做更多是作为一种联盟管理演习，而不是真正全力以赴。他们是被迫的，但他们确实在做，但对我来说，这仍然是一种联盟管理演习。他们知道朝鲜可能不会接受这一点，他们也知道在国内很难推销，因为朝鲜

尚未采取任何缓和措施，并且鉴于最近的导弹试验活动，朝鲜正在努力实现导弹武器库的多元化。因此，在朝鲜尚未采取任何措施的情况下，此时发表和平宣言可能会让拜登政府……共和党人会指责拜登政府对朝鲜过于软弱等等。所以，再说一遍，我认为这将是李如果再次当选的主要挑战，即华盛顿和首尔之间能否保持一致。我认为李总统如果再次当选，将比拜登政府更倾向于朝鲜，更急于容纳朝鲜。你过去一年也看到了这一点，安德鲁，华盛顿对这项取缔向朝鲜散发宣传传单的南韩立法感到不满，这只是另一个例子。但那就是

挑战。就机会而言，我认为，如果朝鲜有兴趣进行谈判、恢复对话并与华盛顿达成任何协议，那么就有机会，因为每个人都会支持这一点，对吧？首尔不会因此而暂停。所以，我认为这可能是一个潜在的机会，也许可以避免在尹锡悦执政期间与朝鲜关系恶化。我认为有可能实现更密切的协调。

尹锡悦批评了文在寅政府推动的战争结束宣言，他已发出信号，将打破目前的做法，预计将采取更强硬的对朝政策，正如黄博士所说。但我确实认为，最终，拜登政府将接受首尔在朝鲜人权侵犯问题上不那么含糊其辞，或者在中国的制裁违规方面更加直言不讳。所以，尹锡悦曾发誓要

加强美韩延伸威慑，这对美国来说是个好消息。美韩联盟的力量等等。哦，一个风险，因为你让我思考机会和挑战，尹锡悦执政期间的一个明显风险是南北关系可能恶化并升级，我们看到了2010年的天安舰事件，那一年对朝韩两国来说尤其艰难，还有延坪岛炮击事件等等。所以我确实认为这些

是您在总统选举及其结果中可以考虑的一些挑战和机会。好的，谢谢 Sue。再次感谢我们的听众，如果您有任何问题要问 Terry 博士或 Hong 博士，请随时在问答聊天框中提问。但 Jihan，如果我们回到韩国国内的政策环境，以及韩国总统在处理朝鲜核问题和和平相关问题时必须应对的问题，您能否简要评论一下政策格局是什么样的，下一任韩国总统在试图解决朝鲜或朝韩和平问题时可能面临哪些挑战？

好的，我认为韩国明年总统选举后的政策格局对韩国总统来说将不会非常有利，因为首先，韩国国内存在非常严重的政治两极分化。就像美国一样，

有蓝色的美国和红色的美国。同样，就像美国一样，韩国也有保守的韩国和进步的韩国。我认为任何总统候选人都无法在下个月的选举中以压倒性优势获胜。因此，这种政治两极分化将使任何总统候选人

无论谁赢得选举，都很难处理朝鲜问题以及核问题和所有和平相关问题。第二个问题是代际差距。韩国存在严重的代际差距。30多岁和40多岁的韩国人更可能支持进步政权，而50多岁和60多岁的人更可能支持保守派候选人。

但重要的是20多岁的韩国人。研究表明，韩国的年轻一代的选择对于决定下一任总统选举的结果至关重要。但问题是，他们对处理朝鲜问题并不真正感兴趣。他们更关心的是找到工作以及如何在首尔购买公寓，因为韩国国内经济

形势对那一代人来说并不十分有利。所以我认为这两点是明年非常重要的问题，即使我们处理朝鲜和和平相关事宜。明年的政策格局对下一任韩国总统来说真的不好。谢谢 Jihan。安德鲁，我知道我们一直专注于朝鲜问题，但朝鲜问题存在于东亚和印太地区更广泛的背景下。所以我想先回到 Terry 博士，问您，除了朝鲜之外，更广泛的印太地区还有哪些问题对美韩联盟未来仍然重要？安德鲁，我认为，首先也是最重要的就是中国，中国和中国，以及韩国将如何应对中美竞争。我认为可以公平地说，我认为对韩国人来说，

历史上，联盟的两个最大恐惧一直是被抛弃或被卷入。他们最糟糕的设想是，中美竞争会进一步恶化，如果台湾海峡发生冲突，这对韩国来说将是真正的噩梦。所以我认为中国将是联盟关系中一个非常重要的因素。当然，第二个我认为也与日本有关。您知道，

近年来，韩日关系恶化。拜登政府希望真正改善这一点。我认为，当我们看尹锡悦或李在明时，尹锡悦的立场至少对美国来说更有利，听起来更好，因为民粹主义和尹锡悦一直……一直在说他们想恢复关系，或者至少会尝试。我认为他们说过要恢复关系。所以尹锡悦对北京更加批评。就两位候选人而言，

尹锡悦更公开地与美国结盟，并恢复与日本的关系。但这我认为将是……韩国人如何处理中国和日本都将是值得关注的。尹锡悦也批评了文在寅政府的对冲策略，他担心中国在香港和新疆的人权侵犯问题。他们还谈到了韩国加入四方安全对话。我没有听到李在明谈论过这个问题。所以，我认为这些问题将是美国感兴趣的一些事情。我们关注一切，我们看到……我们看到李在明会见了中国驻韩国大使，并谈到了与中国的关系。所以我认为这些对我们来说都很重要。但坦率地说，我将提出这一点，我之前提到过，尹锡悦和李在明两位候选人都缺乏外交经验，我认为这可能会让拜登政府感到担忧。

关于中国，无论哪位总统候选人在三月获胜，我们都知道美国知道韩国对中国能做什么存在内在的限制，因为事实是我们改变不了的是韩国与中国的贸易量比与美国和日本加起来还要多，韩国仍然需要在其与朝鲜的关系背景下处理中国等等。所以，韩国总统在对抗中国方面能走多远仍然存在限制。

实际上，韩国不想成为北京的棋子，并希望在技术竞争、经济政策以及战略上开辟自己的道路。所以，我们看到……但这些是我们将密切关注的其他一些问题。谢谢 Sue。您提到缺乏外交经验可能令人担忧，这很有趣。所以，至少对我们华盛顿的人来说，Sue 和我，我们

应该为选举做准备。将有更多来自韩国的访问华盛顿，只是为了了解美韩联盟和外交政策问题的现状。但 Jihan，我也想请教您，除了朝鲜之外，还有哪些更广泛的问题或担忧可能引起美韩联盟的关注？当然，Terry 博士提到了中国，中国，中国，这对拜登政府来说绝对是一样的。但再说一遍，如果我要提出国内

政治问题，您认为韩国国内政治在这些问题上（如中国）是否存在更多共识？我知道我们看到民意调查数据显示，韩国人也对中国持谨慎或担忧态度，对中国的看法非常非常负面。我不知道这是否会改变像李在明这样的人在如何处理中国问题上的立场。所以，Jihan，有什么想法吗？

好的，您知道，民意调查数据显示，直到2015年，韩国人对中国的态度都非常有利。我记得，也许近三分之二的韩国人对中国有好感。但自萨德事件以来，韩国人的中国形象越来越差，差了很多。你知道，到了……你知道，韩国人对朝鲜或日本的看法可能非常低。所以，这种公众舆论可能极大地影响了……

无论是尹锡悦还是李在明，他们对中国的政策都会非常相似。因为，你知道，无论是保守派还是进步派政府，比如金大中、卢武铉，以及韩国政府，韩国政府的外交政策框架都是如何……

加强韩美同盟，同时改善韩中伙伴关系。所以，尹锡悦最近也与中国发生了麻烦，说了一些对中国不利的话。但他最近也与中国驻韩国大使会面，讨论了韩中问题。所以我看不出尹锡悦和李在明在如何处理中国问题上有什么真正的区别。我知道中国问题对韩国来说是一个真正的挑战，但我认为韩国政府在东亚地区有一定的战略回旋空间，在下一次总统选举之后。

好的，谢谢 Jihan。当然，拜登政府将寻求韩国在美中竞争中的支持与合作。所以，这将是面临美韩联盟的另一个重大问题。现在，我们以讨论朝鲜问题开始，以印太地区更广泛的问题结束。但我们实际上已经没有时间了。我认为这是一个非常……紧凑的网络研讨会，而且确实没有简单的答案，尤其是在朝鲜问题上。但我确实要感谢 Sue Terry 博士、黄传安博士、金智娜博士和 Sue Kim 女士帮助我们更好地理解我们目前的状况以及我们可能在朝鲜、印太地区和美韩联盟方面期待什么。

在结束之前，如果您能填写一份简短的调查问卷，我将不胜感激。调查反馈将用于规划未来迎合公众兴趣的网络研讨会。代表 EAI、东亚研究所和布鲁金斯学会，我向韩国和印度尼西亚的观众道晚安，向美国的所有观众说日安。感谢您的参与，并期待下次有机会与大家见面，也许是面对面。谢谢。

谢谢，再见。

谢谢，再见。

美韩同盟，我们从谈论朝鲜开始，最后讨论了更广泛的印太地区问题，但时间差不多了。我认为这是一次非常紧凑的网络研讨会，尤其是在朝鲜问题上，没有简单的答案。但我确实想感谢 Sue Terry 博士、Chuan Huang 博士、Gina Kim 博士和 Sue Kim 女士，她们帮助我们更好地理解我们目前的状况，以及我们对朝鲜、印太地区和美韩同盟的未来有何预期。

在结束之前，如果您能填写一份简短的调查问卷，我们将不胜感激。调查反馈将用于规划未来满足公众兴趣的网络研讨会。我谨代表 EAI、东亚研究所和布鲁金斯学会，向韩国和印度尼西亚的观众说晚安，向美国的各位听众说日安。再次感谢您的参与，并期待下次有机会与大家见面，希望是线下的。谢谢。

谢谢，再见。