[オンラインセミナー] コロナ19と新世界秩序シリーズ10. 新時代の米韓協力と北朝鮮

YouTubeリンク : https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R6Cv-OMkW_4

東アジア研究院（院長 ソン・ヨル）は、ブルッキングス研究所の東アジア政策研究センターと共に、「コロナ19と新世界秩序」シリーズの第10回オンラインセミナー「新時代の米韓協力と北朝鮮」を開催しました。2021年5月に発表された米韓共同声明は、域内安全保障問題の解決のために米韓協力を強化するという内容を盛り込み、米韓パートナーシップ拡大の新時代を開きました。本セミナーでは、米韓両国の専門家が、北朝鮮の非核化問題の現状、米韓終戦宣言協力の見通し、韓国と米国の対北朝鮮政策、そして2022年の大統領選挙と対北朝鮮政策への示唆などについて深く議論しました。

日時: 2021年12月2日（木）22:30-23:30 (KST)

発表者: スー・キム（ランド研究所研究員）、キム・ジナ（韓国外国語大学教授）、ファン・ジファン（ソウル市立大学教授）、スー・ミ・テリー（ウィルソン・センター韓国歴史センター長）

司会者: アンドリュー・ヨ（ブルッキングス研究所韓国講座教授）

開会挨拶: ソン・ヨル（EAI院長、延世大学教授）

北朝鮮との適切なバランスの取り方:

対北朝鮮政策の見通し

I. 米韓関係と対北朝鮮政策

北朝鮮の非核化問題の現状

• 非核化合意に向けた米国と北朝鮮の間の努力は膠着状態に陥っている。金正恩委員長が核保有を体制生存のための不可欠な要素と見なしていることから、北朝鮮は核開発への投資を続ける可能性が高い。
• スー・キム（Soo Kim）ランド研究所研究員は、米国が交渉への意思を継続的に伝えるべきであり、金正恩が最終的に生存のために交渉を選択するように仕向けるためには、金融制裁、北朝鮮の対外的な評判の失墜（人権侵害、食糧問題など）、米国同盟の強化などの形で伝えるべきだと述べている。
• キム・ジナ韓国外国語大学教授は、北朝鮮が対話再開に無反応で一貫する場合、バイデン大統領は変化を追求する代わりに現状維持を選択するだろうと述べている。キム教授は、このような状況は関連国をして危機管理よりも軍備管理をより説得力のある選択肢として選択する可能性を高めると付け加えている。
• キム・ジナ教授は、北朝鮮が朝鮮半島で新たな均衡を追求する場合、軍事力近代化に注力し、「ティット・フォー・タット（tit-for-tat）」競争を選択する可能性が高いと述べている。北朝鮮は核・ICBM実験中断に対する既存の約束から逸脱せず、不必要な拡大解釈を避けるものと見られ、安定性-不安定性のパラドックスに対する懸念を生じさせている。

米韓終戦宣言協力の見通し

• ウィルソン・センター韓国歴史センター長のスー・ミ・テリー（Sue Mi Terry）博士は、終戦宣言に言及し、現在米韓両国は意向が一致していないと主張する。終戦宣言の草案には、本宣言が南北間の休戦状態に影響を及ぼさないことを示唆する条項が含まれると予想されるが、北朝鮮が非核化への意思を全く示していないという点で、米国国内の支持を得るのは容易ではないと見られる。
• スー・ミ・テリー博士は、バイデン大統領が終戦宣言を推進するためには、米韓同盟が以前のように強固に維持されることを強調することで、米国国民を安心させる必要があるだろうと付け加えている。
• スー・キム研究員は、米国が終戦宣言を議論する意向があるにもかかわらず、北朝鮮のミサイル試射と核開発、韓国の指導体制交代の過程で、終戦宣言が今この時点で持続可能かどうかに疑問を持たなければならないと述べている。スー・キム研究員は、今回の終戦宣言が米韓関係を弱体化させ、朝鮮半島内の在韓米軍の存在に疑問を呈する根拠として作用するリスクについて付け加えている。

「戦略的忍耐（strategic patience）」への回帰？

• キム・ジナ教授は、戦略的忍耐への回帰は良い選択肢ではなく、現状維持がすなわち安定保障を意味するわけではないと述べている。信頼醸成に向けた会談の不在は、軍拡競争を国家行動方針として選択する根拠となり得る。キム教授は、新政府が北朝鮮との対話を継続できる制度的装置を 마련しない場合、北朝鮮が朝鮮半島の動向を注視するだろうと述べている。
• スー・キム研究員は、現在の状況が金正恩政権に有利であり、米国が再び優位に立つ上で、首脳会談や交渉は役立たないだろうと述べている。米国は依然として北朝鮮との外交に対する意思を示すべきだが、過去の米国の関与政策を通じて金正恩政権が時間を稼ぎ、より大きく、より有能な核兵器を生産できる機会を作り出してきたという点も考慮すべきである。

II. 2022年大統領選挙と対北朝鮮政策への示唆

李在明（イ・ジェミョン）候補と尹錫悦（ユン・ソンニョル）候補間の対北朝鮮政策の違い

• ファン・ジファンソウル市立大学教授は、李在明候補の対北朝鮮政策は「平和優先政策」と表現できる一方、尹錫悦候補の政策は「強硬政策」と見なされ、両候補とも前任者の政策を継承する可能性が高いと説明する。李在明候補が開始する対北朝鮮政策は、北朝鮮政権の崩壊や不安定化が朝鮮半島平和や統一に直接つながるわけではないという信念に基づき、朝鮮半島の平和を取り戻すことに焦点が当てられている。一方、尹錫悦候補の政策は、北朝鮮が核を放棄するように圧力をかけ、制裁に対する米韓間の調整を行うことに焦点が当てられている。
• ファン教授は、両陣営間の米日同盟維持において、米韓同盟の役割をどのように認識するかにおいて違いがあるかもしれないが、両候補とも米韓同盟の重要性には共感していると付け加えている。
• スー・ミ・テリー博士は、両候補の当選のいずれも機会と挑戦課題を提示すると述べている。李在明候補が当選した場合、米韓間の異論が伴うと予測されるが、北朝鮮が交渉の扉を開けば機会が生じる可能性がある。一方、尹錫悦候補が当選した場合、南北関係に否定的な影響を与える可能性がある。

次期政権の国内外政策課題

• スー・ミ・テリー博士は、米韓同盟の側面から韓国が直面する最も大きなリスクは「遺棄（abandonment）対罠（entrapment）」であり、韓国が米中競争の中でこれをどのように乗り越えるかが核心だと述べている。テリー博士は、韓国は主要貿易国である中国と対峙すると同時に、北朝鮮問題も取り扱わなければならず、そのためには自国の方向性を自ら設定する用意があると見ている。
• ファン教授は、次期韓国大統領が直面する国内政策環境は不利にならざるを得ないと述べている。彼は、政治的指向と世代間の違いの両面から、政治的二極化が国内政策環境の最大の問題点だと指摘している。
• ファン教授は、中国問題に関して、次期大統領選挙でどの候補が当選するかにかかわらず、中国に対する政策は似たものになるだろうと主張する。韓国の外交政策の枠組みは、米韓同盟の強化と韓中パートナーシップ関係の改善に合わせられている。韓国の対中政策が敵対的な方向へ傾いていないため、ある程度の政策的柔軟性を示す余地が残されていると強調している。

III. 発表者および司会者略歴

■ ファン・ジファンソウル市立大学国際関係学科教授。主な著作に「The Paradox of South Korea’s Unification Diplomacy: Moving beyond a State-Centric Approach」、「The Two Koreas after U.S. Unipolarity: In Search of a New North Korea Policy」、「The Political Implications of American Military Policy in Korea: Learning from Theoretical and Empirical Evidences」などがある。主な研究分野は南北朝鮮関係と外交政策である。ソウル大学で学士号と修士号を取得し、コロラド大学（University of Colorado）で政治学博士号を取得した。

■ キム・ジナ韓国外国語大学LD学部教授。韓国国防研究院で北朝鮮軍事研究室長を務め、延世大学国際大学院で兼任教授として国際関係理論と人道的介入の講義を担当した。統一省、国家安保室、外交部で政策諮問委員および評価委員として活動しており、青瓦台情報公開委員会審議委員、韓米連合司令部政策諮問委員、国務調整室国政課題評価委員を務めた。延世大学国際大学院で修士号、米国タフツ大学（Tufts University）フレッチャースクールで国際関係学博士号を取得した。

■ スー・キム（Soo Kim）ランド研究所（RAND Corporation）研究員、アメリカン大学（American University）兼任教授。主な研究分野は朝鮮半島、ロシア、インド太平洋戦略、近接同位競争、意思決定、宣伝、などである。過去に米国中央情報局（CIA）、国土安全保障省（DHS）で勤務した。ジョンズ・ホプキンス大学国際大学院（SAIS）で国際関係戦略学修士号、イェール大学でフランス語学士号を取得した。

■ スー・ミ・テリー（Sue Mi Terry）ウィルソン・センター韓国歴史センター長。米国中央情報局（CIA）のシニアアナリストおよび戦略国際問題研究所（CSIS）のシニアフェローを務めた。タフツ大学フレッチャースクールで国際関係学修士号（2008）を取得した。米国タフツ大学（Tufts University）フレッチャースクールで国際関係学修士号および博士号を取得し、ニューヨーク大学で政治学学士号を取得した。

■ アンドリュー・ヨ（Andrew Yeo）ブルッキングス研究所韓国講座教授、カトリック大学政治学科教授、アジア学所長。最近の著書に「State, Society and Markets in North Korea」がある。ノースウェスタン大学で心理学および国際学学士号を、コーネル大学で行政学博士号を取得した。

■ 担当および編集 イ・スンヨン EAI研究員

    問い合わせ: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 205) | slee@eai.or.kr

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greetings everyone i am yo son president of the east east asia institute eai and ayonse university professor uh it is a great honor to invite distinguished panelists and guests to this webinar titled north korea in a new era of u.s south korea partnership co-hosted with with the center for east asia policy studies at brookings institution two institutions actually have developed partnership over the years including an online conference held last november i mean november last year under the title

of new prospects for u.s south korea cooperation in an era of u.s china's strategic competition which actually featured a member scholars from each side this time we come to discuss north korea in a new era again of expanded u.s south korea partnership here the goals and tasks of the alliance partnerships are increasingly complex and multi-dimensional the relationships are extended from the peninsula to the regional affairs and from the military traditional security to a wide range of issues including

trade advanced technology climate change and the pandemic under the changing dynamics of alliance relationship in these areas this uh seminar will discuss uh the two countries navigating their strategic interest on the denuclearization of north korea uh impacts of uh the u.s china strategic competition uh on the denuclearization ef efforts and the prospects uh for um rok us alliance and north korean policy uh in the context of the upcoming rok presidential election um with uh the great interest um and excitement to the discussion uh

let me introduce to you today's moderator dr andrew ya andrew uh is sk kf chair in korean studies at the brookings institutions center for east asia study east asia policy studies he is also a professor of politics at the catholic university of america in washington dc and the author of the forthcoming book state society and markets in north korea uh from the cambridge university press um andrew has worked uh closely with the eai for many years and i'm excited he landed in brookings and i hope that we work even

closer together and we feature four excellent scholars in the area of north korean affairs miss sue kim dr gina kim dr chihuan huang and dr sumi terry thank you so much for sharing your time with us and let me further uh give a an individual introduction of today's speakers first miss sue kim who is a policy analyst and a rand corporation and a junk professor at american university she has previously uh served as an analyst in ncia and also work uh at the department of homeland security uh she's

an expert uh on korean peninsula her research interests also um covers russia uh america's indo-pacific strategy uh propaganda and the intelligence community uh next we have dr gina kim who is a professor uh in the division of language and diplomacy at hanguk university of foreign affairs um previously she was chief of uh north korean military depart division at the korea institute for defense analysis kaida and adjunct professor of the yonsei university's graduate school of international studies

that i belong to and dr kim is an expert on u.s north korean relations nuclear non-proliferation and northeast asian security affairs and next doctor chihuan huang who is a professor of international study international relations at the university of seoul he is one of the leading scholars in the field of security studies in korea dr huang has published a wide range of articles including the paradox of south korea's unification diplomacy and the two koreas after us unipolarity and many more and finally um

dr sumi terry uh director of the hyundai motors hyundai motor korea foundation chair center for korean history and public policy at wilson center she's a leading expert on north korea worked formally as a senior fellow with the korean chair at csis and a senior analyst on korean issues at cia her latest article is north korea's nuclear family how the kim's got the bomb and why they won't give it up uh appeared that the 14 affairs this year so with this uh great lineup uh andrew now uh the floor is yours

thank you dr son and good morning or evening to our global audience and thank you once again dr sun for your opening remarks i also want to thank eai for organizing and hosting this webinar jointly with the center for east asia policy studies at the brookings institution our partnership allows us to draw insights from experts in korea and the united states ensuring wider and more balanced perspectives on the u.s south korea alliance we only have a short one hour so i want to jump right into our topic for today

north korea and a new era of u.s south korea partnership and to maximize our time with our distinguished guests i'll just mention that our webinar is organized into two halves or two interrelated mini panels in the first half we'll be joined by miss suk kim from the rand corporation and dr gina kim from hanguk university of foreign studies to discuss the moon invited administration's current efforts to pursue negotiations including the much discussed end of war declaration and then in the second half dr jiwan

fang from the university of seoul and dr sue terry from the wilson center so i almost said csis again uh so dr sue terry from the wilson center will address north korea policy in the context of upcoming south korea elections and a new current government next year so we'll be talking about uh north korea policy in the current context and then moving forward with the next south korean government as well as other issues that might pertain to the u.s south korea alliance so without further ado let me first turn

to sue kim from rand to address our opening set of questions sue can you give our audience here a rundown on the current status of where we're at regarding steps towards denuclearization on north korea and while we're there how would you evaluate the biden administration's approach to north korea thus far sure thank you andrew uh good morning d.c and good evening to our colleagues in seoul um just to get the ball rolling i'll be touching upon nuclear talks from north korea by the administration's

approach to kim jong-un thus far and finally our approach to this topic du jour and war declaration so where are we when it comes to the nuclear talks um two years actually three have passed since trump and kim have been they walked away from the hanoi summit with a no deal and of course north korea has been diligently pursuing its nuclear weapons development and missile delivery systems so i would say that the threat is actually an immutable constant and we know that kim jong-un is going to continue to invest hundreds of millions

if not billions of dollars in perfecting and diversifying his nuclear weapons program he's not going to be easily deterred so long as the weapon system remains inherently tied to the regime's existence and of course kim's survival and even if the united states and south korea their military capabilities are superior and more advanced than north korea's the lethality of the dprk's nukes and missiles as well as i would say the intent to use them towards the region and the united states is an issue that's going to be

underscored and i think equally worrisome is the dprk's proliferation of illicit activities so we're talking about the the steadily expanding creep um the criminal creep in cyberspace uh human rights violations and other behaviors that actually go against the the grain of international norms and you want to see resolutions that become more and more ingrained and deep seated into the dprk's being so this makes it all the more challenging for us to tackle the dprk problem beginning with of course the

nuclear weapons so in this respect the sooner we can address the nuclear issue the better obviously but right now we've not heard of any contact between the united states and the dprk negotiators but i don't think this is such a bad thing um rather than laying out all of our cards before the north koreans to clinch an agreement we should continue to indicate the willingness to dialogue while also applying the the appropriate inducements to bring the north koreans back to the negotiating table and by inducements

ideally it would be less in the form of concessions that reward and validate kim's behavior but more squeezing the kim regime financially through sanctions uh reputationally by exposing and shaming kim's crude divides of human rights and diplomatically by strengthening our alliance strategy towards the dprk and also the broader regions that ties together to leave kim essentially with no choice but to negotiate for survival and lately two topics have been dominating the discourse in seoul and one of course is the uh the upcoming

elections and two the end of war declaration so the timing and rationale for the the declaration it seems to be more along the lines of like grafting peace onto reality that that seems a little bit distant from being fertile when it comes to a declaration in addition to weapons testing pyongyang doesn't seem to have an appetite for this proposal which could of course be part of the strategy it makes seoul more anxious and and more insistent and urgent to bring a declaration into fruition and washington for its part

has been expressing willingness to discuss this topic but i think we should ask ourselves here whether the declaration now amid the the ongoing testing you know his determination to keep his nuclear weapons and at the cusp of a leadership transition in south korea is actually going to be sustainable so both from an implementation implementation perspective as well as the potential security alliance and regional applications of a precipitous dash to on the end of ward declaration doesn't seem to be

well timed so the fact of the matter is both proponents and opponents of the end of our declaration they're well aware of the fact that this is going to have broader implications so this is not merely a symbolic document it's it's not going to you know place it it is going to place the korean peninsula and the broader northeast asia region on a different trajectory so it spells implications for the alliance which rests on the foundations of you know the common north korean threat um but it's seeking to also advance

beyond um to work together on the shared political and ideological values among common regional threats including china's aggression and new challenges including supply supply chain disruptions pandemic etc etc so i think for north korea the end of our declaration is going to help kim inch closer towards other milestones including the estrangement of us rok relations um the overall reduction if not expulsion of us fk troops from the peninsula which consequently is going to weaken seoul's foothold and and the place it's

going to place seoul under a firmer north korean hand it's going to reverse the political economic and social progress it's made over the past seven decades so there's a lot to think about and what the end of what declaration in one hand and then the nuclear weapons and the other i think it's going to make him even more strongly positioned to subdue the cell so this is a good place for me to pause and i'll look forward to my co-panelists and i look forward to the discussion thanks so much sue and you preempted me

because i was going to ask a follow-up question about whether the end of war declaration has helped build any momentum towards korea peace but it sounds like you think in some ways it may have an opposite effect of even perhaps destabilizing the region so i know uh are some of our listeners may have questions on that or different views um but yes let's let's move on now to dr gina kim uh gina so let me turn now to you to offer a few remarks you know president moon has clearly signaled his interest in engaging north korea and the

biden administration has also stated it's pr that it's prepared to meet north korea anytime and anywhere what is the motive though behind kim jong-un's critical stance towards biden and moon's efforts for resuming talks because it sounds like uh president moon for sure and even the biden administration are open to some sort of negotiations but kim jong-un has really given uh both governments the cold shoulders so could you uh could you maybe describe what you think is happening behind uh behind north korea

and their rationale all right um i would like to thank the brookings and eai for giving me this opportunity to share my thoughts with other distinguished experts on korean peninsula issues well many scholars present skeptical views on the reversal of the nuclear program of the dprk because its nuclear armament aims to improve self-defense externally and to cement its authority internally so in particular experts on nuclear arms control argue that the dprk lacks a reason to choose denuclearization

in addition to that the means of pressure are quite limited besides the leadership in pyongyang cannot be entirely immune from the political cost of high profile meeting that failed once clearly the dprk is seemingly refraining from taking steps that could lead to escalated tension on the korean peninsula however the fact that the dprk remains unresponsive to the continued message of resumption of dialogue from the biden administration as you said raises some concerns among many of the parakeet watchers

in the absence of a response from the dprk the by the administration will prefer in the long run to maintain the status go instead of offering drastic incentives to negotiations with the dprk and in my opinion if this situation continues the idea of crisis management through arms control instead of the denuclearization of the korean peninsula will become increasingly persuasive that's something the dprk may want to wait and see moreover in a situation where competition between the u.s and china is

intensifying the motivation for the dprk and china to tighten their strategic relations will certainly increase this will raise alarm at least among south koreans about losing leverage on north korea and seoul will try actively engaging with pyongyang then either way the dprk will not think that it is losing a game to keep the size of the wind steps so small and rigid um which will give the dprk a bargaining advantage the dprk will pretend that it is not really bothered by any cost caused by no agreement

if the dprk pursues a near-term interest in revitalizing economy conditions then its immediate goal is to return to the talks with the intention to discuss what was previously offered by the north koreans in february 2019 that is partial sanctions relief in exchange for partial declaration of its nuclear program and the dprk's strategy will be avoiding unnecessary tensions on the korean peninsula and obviously action for action is a principle that the dprk has adhered to for many many decades if the prk believes that it can model

through then it is likely to seek a new equilibrium on the korean peninsula through military modernization in a tit-for-tat rivalry with south korea in this case the dprk will also avoid unnecessary escalation but there will be a much concern about the instability instability paradox to complete the pre-planned research and development cycle the dprk will need testing new weapon system before deployment for technical reasons the peer case strategy to up the ante to achieve political compromise and to be

recognized as a nuclear weapon state will be the worst case scenario in my mind then pyongyang need to speed up efforts to demonstrate credible deterrence capabilities but this strategy is not without risks confirming its commitment to invest more in force enhancement well helps the leadership in pyongyang increase the audience cost internally and therefore demonstrate externally that north koreans are not in position to make compromise or flexibly negotiate with the the u.s however escalation to a degree

in which pyongyang can increase just attention just enough to get international attention in a way not to upset beijing and moscow will be the challenge for the dprk currently the moon administration has confirmed many times that it would pursue at least the minimum goal with which is recreating the condition for starting a dialogue within the term it seems that um the south korean government worries that time is running out and therefore tries to push hard to declare and end the war on the korean

peninsula that does not have any legal implications in the expectation of creating a momentum for talks so the question is and i i also wonder if we have any alternative option right now obviously acknowledging north korea as a de facto nuclear weapon states will be a potential blow to the geneva agreement six party talks and related inter-korean agreements because all of these are based on 1991 joint declaration of the denuclearization of the korean peninsula well returning strategic patience may

not be a good idea because the perceived status quo does not necessarily mean stability because in the absence of talks on confidence building measures the arms race can be a natural course of action between the two koreans in south korea's presidential election is coming and a new government will need time to review the previous dprk policy then the dprk may want to test the water and refrain from making any suggestions for further dialogues if we don't have any institutional mechanism to continue

talks with the dprk separately from domestic political events however there will be a rough road if we link end of war declaration with denuclearization only then the dprk will resist it and the dprk set the precondition of declaring and end the war that is resolving the issue of u.s hustle policy well because the term house policy includes comprehensive issues political economic and military so we need to think ahead how to tighten the linkage of key issues that all concerned parties intend to address

well um i'll stop here and look forward to further discussions thank you okay excellent now sue and gina it seems like you know both of you are pretty you're more between skepticism and optimism you're more on the skeptical end if i were to ask whether the moon government will be able to make any progress towards korea peace before the end of end of term um but i wanted to pick up on a thread that you guys uh both addressed uh directly for gina and indirectly for soon it's this idea of strategic

patience and as we all know for north korea in the land of lousy options on north korea it some think that strategic patience at this time may actually be better than pushing for uh engagement but gina you just mentioned that strategic patience may not be may not be ideal because it could we might end up leading to an arms race so in your case it sounded like you were leaning towards the argument that perhaps strategic patience is all that we can do for now because um you know again because there aren't

great options and now is just not the time to really push for something like the end of war declaration so if i could just have either of you follow up a bit on on whether you think the strategic patients given the risks that are involved with it if this is if this is really the only option that we have or if there's some something else that we should be we should be trying and i think that's where the end of war declaration comes in it is uh i have my own uh views on this but i i'll put those aside but i was wondering if

you could say something about strategic patients being the only option or whether we should try to push ahead with engagement so i don't know who wants to go first maybe maybe i'll go back to sue sure so i think when i guess the point of my talk was that you know we're not just sitting and not doing anything it's just that the more we try to push things when things are not conducive to a not even a friendly agreement but just a productive set of talks with north korea and negotiations that are going to

be constructive i just don't see that being there not just from the perspective of north korea but also from the perspective of the south korean government again the atmospherics are not really appropriate to to to call an end of war to to the korean war and and to build the steps toward the two koreas peacefully coexisting when kim jong-un actually has the weapons in place and when he doesn't have the intention to to be friendly what are we trying to get in return um we're just going to be allowing things between the united

states and south korea to be further divided uh where we're going to there's just a lot of factors that i don't think we're considering because we're thinking about this political goal um which is going to leave whichever administration comes in with with a bigger set of problems to handle so i think when it comes to strategic patients it's not about just sitting and not doing anything you can you can signal just look just like what we're doing we're signaling willingness to dialogue and we're also keeping a

watchful eye on what north korea is doing and responding in ways that are not going to put the united states and south korea in a position where we're jeopardizing we have to basically be dragged into negotiations without really knowing what we're going to want to expect from north korea and also what we're willing to give and take and i think that's the problem that i see uh before i turn to gina i would also like to encourage audience members if you have a question you can use the q a function to to ask a question but uh

since we i don't see any uh anything in there right now gina if i can turn to you and if i could just add one uh question to to this chain of thought but you had also mentioned arms control um as uh as an alternative and i know that that's not something that you uh that you advocate especially if we think about the risks of of proliferation uh but despite those risks should do you think there should be more serious attention uh to that option given the impasse of looking at arms control as an intermediate step so i'll also throw

that question in there so gina to you yeah um currently the biden administration is left with how to break the deadlock on the korean peninsula and um in my opinion the dprk policy of the u.s show some flexibility regarding how to negotiate but not what to negotiate with the dprk and even president trump could not change uh basic demands priorities and terms of the trade-off and certainly north korea will know it as long as china is helping north korea i think um north korea can buy time um so uh how to make a breakthrough um

the thing is well declaring the end of war is very much different from signing a peace treaty perhaps north korea wants a legally binding document to end the armistice treaty not a political statement because north korea emphasizes irreversible matters um but the south korea what what south korea is trying to pursue at this moment is not a treaty but a decoration with some symbolic meaning if the armistice treaty is replaced by a peace treaty then it'll become a dead letter and in the case the basis for the

existence of the u.n command on the korean peninsula and the unc real basis in japan becomes questionable because the unc is based on our mystic treaty by the way so it'll be a big challenge to the u.s and um and south korea uh considering the the allied defense posture in this region therefore i think uh we have to have a uh have to consider condition-based phased approach toward north korea we can talk about the contents of the peace treaty but we can sign it later once north korea completes a

denuclearization there are many creative ways to approach and um dprk is uh highly likely to seek a long-term survival strategy of bandwagoning with china instead of embarking on denuclearization negotiations with a political risk so alternative solution as i told you to the problem is exchanging a condition based rewards such that the dprk can perceive the benefits of denuclearization through a thorough verification mechanism that reduce the possibility of defection from an agreed framework by raising the cost of

non-compliance and in the long run um the two couriers can talk about confidence building and even arms control perhaps we can start talking about operational com arms control then uh move on to discussing structural arms control all this can be included in in a big package of phase a condition based phased uh implementation by both sides in my opinion okay thanks gina so it does seem like arms control it's if it's carefully put as part of a conditioned um effort may there may be a possibility

for that option and of course uh arms control is not the final goal you wanted them move towards denuclearization so uh so those are some thoughts i have one just a final uh final question before we move on to to the second half of our but but gina in your i believe it was in in the comments that you had had sent me it sounded like with the pandemic um you know once once the pandemic is over yo kim jong-un has his own timeline and he may just resume the timeline for whatever goals that he wants to achieve

is is it uh looking at this from from from the regime's perspective do you think it's better off to try to have some kind of agreement or negotiation while in some ways north korea is very weak they're weakened because of covet 19 because of the border lockdowns and does that give the u.s and south korea any leverage while they're in that state but the earlier there was talks about offering vaccines or some kind of humanitarian assistance — so it is opportu is there a better opportunity now during the pandemic to

try to engage north korea or would it make more sense to wait when when the pandemic is over knowing that north korea is not really willing to do uh do much or come out of its shell well now what nurse curry is suffering from it's not just a pandemic its food security situation is really dark dire this year and in order to actually revitalize its economy north korea these foreign assistance as well and all this should be done — can be done during the pandemic or after the pandemic there should be a strategic

decision — made that should be made by the leadership in permanent but i think what north korea is doing is uh just uh looking at the right time for opening up the uh opening up uh for uh having another round of dialogue because it seems to me that at least in the eyes of the north koreans in pyongyang a lot of uncertainty is there as as i told you the presidential election in south korea will be another variable — in mind — of the north koreans so we have to — wait and see okay great — i'm so in the interest of time i'm going

to move move on to the second half of our panel where we discuss u.s south korea cooperation and north korea policy under the next south korean government so as as most of our listeners know there's an election a major election coming up next march — in south korea so let me turn to dr jihuan fong who's in seoul to give us a rundown of how the two major south korean presidential candidates might approach north korea so g1 — if if we can turn to you how would you describe to u.s policy makers the

main differences between the two major south korean presidential candidates it would be and regarding north korea policy so — dr pong okay okay okay yeah okay thank you — thanks — andrew and thanks for — having me here — actually let me — speak about the — the presidential election and — north korea are policy — first you know the — the basically two major south korean — presidential candidate you know the jiameong and yung seongyeon i think have they have almost almost the same the position from their the predecessors

you know that yam from tim dejung nom muhan and the current president — the moon jae-in and the young from — the the the president his predecessors the — the imminent back and the — and their policies you know north korea policies are based on — their the ideological differences i think — between the conservative and the progressive — the candidate the izam young i think the support — supports the engagement policy toward north korea and i think — he can be described — regarded as his his policy as a peace

first policy i mean — that is to — the focusing on the bringing peace back first on the korean peninsula — just as the kim de jung nomihan and the mundane current president moon jae-in you know supported and also i think the injurement belief that the collapse of the instability of the north korean regime would neither directly lead to unification — nor the peace on the korean peninsula so they he insisted that the benefit of the engagement and peace building — policy and mechanism outweigh

— the coast but — conversely the candidate — yoon sang yeah i think support — the sanctioned regime on north korea and i think we may — describe his policy as — the hotline policy you know — that the to focusing on the — putting on pressure to — the you know the pressure to enforce — the pyongyang the kim jong-un to give up its nuclear weapons program so his policy may be also be the the regarded as is the unification of the policy of the sanctioned regime — policy and that argues that he argues

that the unification will lead to peace — just as the two previous — the conservative lead — the president — immun back and back — pursued so — yosemite — appears to believe that the united states and south korea should cooperate — to keep sanctions — keep going and pressure — sanctions and pressure — keep going and to in order to enforce pyongyang to back down so even if the the headline policy by him may destabilize the north korean domestic — situation — to the point of the collapse —

but the easement you know — they appear to believe that the sanctions may — destabilize the north korean domestic — situation and may be very dangerous and even — you know the leading to the humanitarian disaster and the systemic — dysfunction so the south korean — people — he believes that should work on a long-term engagement strategy toward pyongyang by lifting — of course the conditions based — sanctions and the promo by promoting the korean economic — corporation — so he believes that

the invocation comes you know and the comes only gradually you know only by when the piece is brought back first to the korean — peninsula but — the candidate you sang yeah you know — the beliefs that — like — many many from the conservative groups — in his — party the people's — power party believe that the only — you know unification — will that — you know spell — the disaster but solve many you know in the immediate — problems such as the nuclear issues and the internal — chaos and humanitarian

crises — etc and it will — he believes that the you know produce the massive economic and social benefit of the korean — peninsula and also the northeast asia so it seems to me that we are more likely to see — you know the the their policy to be repeated in the — dear future the actually just just like we have seen — in the previous you know the presidential — the election because we already have seen that there there has been a really a serious debate between the conservative groups and — the progressive —

— groups of how to you know the deal with the north korean — issues but — i think they — agreed to the how to — you know the — the get support from the united states because in that sense — the young sangria and vision are not really different — because both of them you know the stresses the the importance of you know the — the strengthening — the the korea u.s alliance — in dealing with the — the the north korean — issue — although they may be some — you know — may have some difference in you know the — the how to

combine the — the korea us — the — relations and the cooperation — including the trilateral relations with — the u.s korea and — the japan — but mostly i think — their approach to the alliance issues is really — dissimilar — and also but somewhat — different in the dealing with the north korean issues but the mostly i think they agreed to — those issues that about the how to — you know improve the — the cooperation between u.s and south korea on the north korea policy let me stop here

okay thanks jihan — i'm going to — turn to dr suteri just in the interest of time but — jihan went just to get you thinking during the moderate discussion you know what kind of policy environment domestic policy environment will the next south korean president face in dealing with north korea issues because i think that's something that maybe those in washington or in the united states don't really understand the policies domestic policy space in south korea and what especially if there's an engagement approach so if you could just

think about that but right now let me turn to dr sue terry to give us some perspective from washington just in light of what — um jihan was saying sue what challenges or opportunities will the biden administration face on north korea policy if either the main conservative or progressive candidate wins the election in march so sue over to you yes thanks andrew — this is really an interesting race because we have two non-traditional candidates — and they don't really have foreign policy experience or or

— so that's gonna be interesting on the north korea question specifically — let me talk about it beyond first — as dr huang said you know egypt is obviously expected to continue the ruling party's current focus on engagement with north korea — and lee has said that his approach to north korea would be practical without ideological considerations at least he says this right — and you know the word practical is fine since the body administration says their approach is also practical but but what i'm concerned about is

even now to be very candid — i don't think washington and solo are exactly on the same page in in their approach to north korea even though they say they are coordinating very very closely and they are to their credit — still they're not exactly on the same page i mean just take this end of war declaration that you guys just finished talking about — the moon administration has asked the budget administration to consider it so the by the administration said okay we will since you're a close ally and you're asking us to consider it

to break this current impasse with north korea — and supposedly their draft is in the final stage of the coordination and negotiation with washington so be too much as well which is interesting to me by the way because we're closely coordinating but we have no idea what the north koreans are going to say — but still — and the draft is going to it's expected to include all kinds of clauses about how this is not going to affect united nations command not going to impact u.s versus korea they're going to water down

彼らの言語ではあるが、北朝鮮にとっての魅力は低下するだろう。私にとって、バイデン政権はこの問題を同盟管理上の演習として捉えており、本気で取り組んでいるわけではない。彼らはそれに引きずられているようなもので、実行はしているが、やはり同盟管理上の演習に過ぎない。北朝鮮がこれを受け入れる可能性は低いと考えており、国内での販売も難しいだろう。なぜなら、北朝鮮は

非核化に向けて一歩も進んでおらず、最近の実験キャンペーンを考慮すると、北朝鮮はミサイル兵器の多様化に努めている。現時点で北朝鮮が何もしていないのに平和宣言をすれば、バイデン政権は共和党から北朝鮮に対して融和的だと非難されるだろう。したがって、再びリー氏が

当選した場合、ワシントンとソウルの間で足並みが揃わないことが主な課題となるだろう。李氏が大統領になれば、バイデン政権よりも北朝鮮に対して前向きで、北朝鮮を受け入れることに意欲的になるだろう。過去1年間にも、ワシントンは、例えば北朝鮮への宣伝ビラ散布を犯罪とする韓国の法律に不満を示していた。これは単なる一例に過ぎない。しかし、それが

課題となる。機会という点では、北朝鮮が交渉や対話への復帰、ワシントンとの何らかの取引に関心があるならば、機会は存在すると考えている。なぜなら、誰もがそれに賛成するだろうからだ。ソウルがそれに反対することはないだろう。したがって、それは潜在的な機会となり得る。そして、尹氏の下では北朝鮮との関係悪化を回避できるかもしれない。より緊密な連携の可能性はあると考えている。

尹氏は文政権の終戦宣言推進を批判しており、現在の「より強硬な」北朝鮮政策からの転換を示唆している。黄博士が述べたように、より強硬な政策が予想されるが、最終的な政権が、ソウルが北朝鮮の人権侵害についてより声を上げること、あるいは中国の北朝鮮制裁違反への関与についてより声高に発言することに、問題はないと考えている。尹氏はまた、米韓の拡大抑止を強化すると誓約しており、これは米国にとって朗報である。米韓同盟の強さなどについて。

リスクとしては、尹氏の下では南北関係が悪化し、エスカレートする可能性がある。例えば、2010年は天安沈没事件や延坪島砲撃事件など、南北朝鮮にとって特に困難な年であった。したがって、それらは

大統領選挙とその結果に関して、考慮すべき課題と機会の一部である。ありがとう、スー。そして、視聴者の皆様、テリー博士または黄博士への質問があれば、質問と回答のチャットボックスに遠慮なく質問をお寄せください。しかし、ジハンさん、韓国国内の政策環境に戻り、韓国大統領が北朝鮮の核問題や平和関連の問題に対処する際に、どのような国内政策環境に直面しなければならないかについて、簡単にコメントをいただけますか？

来年の韓国の大統領選挙後の政策環境は、韓国大統領にとってあまり好ましいものではないだろう。なぜなら、まず第一に、韓国国内には非常に深刻な政治的二極化が存在するからだ。アメリカ合衆国と同様に、

アメリカにはブルーアメリカとレッドアメリカがあるように、韓国にも保守的な韓国と進歩的な韓国がある。そして、大統領候補のいずれも、来年3月の選挙で圧勝するとは思えない。そのため、政治的二極化は、大統領候補が

北朝鮮問題や核・平和関連の問題に対処することを非常に困難にするだろう。第二の問題は世代間のギャップである。韓国には深刻な世代間ギャップがある。30代、40代の韓国国民は政権を支持する傾向が強いが、50代、60代は保守的な

候補者を支持する傾向が強い。しかし、重要なのは、20代の韓国国民である。韓国での調査によると、MGM世代の選択が次期大統領選挙の結果を決定する上で非常に重要である。しかし、彼らは北朝鮮問題への関心が低い。彼らは、仕事を得ることやソウルでアパートを買う方法に、より関心がある。なぜなら、韓国の国内経済状況は

その世代にとってあまり好ましくないからだ。したがって、これら2つの問題は、来年、北朝鮮や平和関連の問題を扱う上でも非常に重要な問題となるだろう。来年の政策環境は、次期韓国大統領にとってあまり良くないだろう。ありがとう、ジハン。そして、スー、北朝鮮に多くの焦点を当ててきたが、もちろん北朝鮮問題は、東アジアやインド太平洋という、より広範な文脈の中に存在する。そこで、まずテリー博士に戻り、北朝鮮を超えて、より広範なインド太平洋地域に関する他のどのような問題が、今後も米韓同盟にとって重要であり続けるかについて、お伺いしたい。

アンドレア、まず第一に中国、中国、中国だ。そして、韓国が米中競争をどのように乗り越えるかだ。韓国人にとって、歴史的に見て、米国との同盟における二大懸念は、見捨てられるか、巻き込まれるかのどちらかだったと言えるだろう。そして、彼らの悪夢は、この米中競争がさらに悪化し、台湾海峡などで紛争が起きた場合、それは韓国にとってまさに悪夢シナリオだ。したがって、中国は同盟関係において非常に大きな要因となるだろう。

もちろん、第二に、日本との関係も重要だ。過去数年間、韓国と日本の関係は悪化しており、バイデン政権はこの関係を改善したいと考えている。ここで、尹氏または李氏を見ると、尹氏の立場は、米国にとってより好ましいように思える。PPPと尹氏は、関係を修復したいと述べており、少なくとも試みると述べている。尹氏は、中国に対してより批判的であり、

米国との同盟をより重視し、日本との関係修復も図っている。しかし、これは、韓国が中国と日本にどのように対処するかが、興味深い点となるだろう。尹氏はまた、中国の人権侵害や香港、新疆ウイグル自治区について懸念している文大統領のヘッジングアプローチを批判している。韓国のクアッド参加についても言及があったが、私はまだ聞いたことがない。したがって、これらは米国にとって関心のある問題となるだろう。

私たちはすべてを見ている。李候補が中国大使と会談し、中国との関係について話しているのを見た。これらはすべて、米国にとって重要になると考えている。しかし、率直に言って、尹氏と李氏の両候補の外交経験の不足は、バイデン政権にとって懸念事項となる可能性がある。

米国の関心を引くであろう事柄が出てくるでしょう。私たちはあらゆることを注視しています。例えば、李知事と駐韓中国大使の会談、そして中国との関係について語られたことなどです。これらはすべて、私にとって重要だと考えられます。率直に申し上げますが、以前にも指摘したように、尹候補と李候補の外交政策経験の不足は、懸念材料となるかもしれません。

3月に当選する大統領候補が誰であれ、米国は韓国が中国に対してできることには内在的な限界があることを知っている。なぜなら、韓国は日本と米国を合わせたよりも多くの貿易を中国と行っているからだ。そして、韓国は北朝鮮との関係の文脈でも中国と対峙しなければならない。したがって、韓国大統領が中国に対峙する上で、依然として限界があるだろう。

韓国は北京の駒になりたくなく、技術的、経済的政策、そして戦略的にも独自の道を切り開きたいと考えている。したがって、私たちは、これらは私たちが非常に注意深く見守るであろう他の問題の一部である。スー、ありがとう。そして、外交経験の不足が懸念事項となる可能性があるというあなたの言及は興味深い。ワシントンにいる私たちにとって、スーと私、私たちは

選挙に向けて身構える必要があるだろう。米韓同盟と外交政策の問題について、状況を把握するために、韓国からDCへの旅行が増えるだろう。しかし、ジハンさん、北朝鮮以外のより広範な問題で、米韓同盟にとって関心のあるものはありますか？もちろん、テリー博士は中国、中国、中国と言及したが、それはバイデン政権にとっても全く同じだ。しかし、再び国内政治に言及すると、中国のような問題について、韓国国内政治に、より収束があるだろうか？韓国人も中国を警戒している、あるいは懸念していることを示す世論調査を見たことがある。そして、それが例えばユ・ジンミョン氏のような人物の中国へのアプローチに影響を与えるかどうかはわからない。

ジハン、何か考えは？世論調査によると、2015年までは韓国国民の中国に対する態度は非常に肯定的だった。私が覚えている限りでは、韓国国民の約3分の2が中国に対して好意的なイメージを持っていた。しかし、THAAD問題の後、韓国国民の中国に対するイメージは悪化し、非常に悪化した。韓国国民のイメージは、北朝鮮や日本と同程度に低いかもしれない。したがって、そのような世論は、ユ・ミョンオールドまたは

どちらの候補者にとっても、中国に対する政策に大きな影響を与える可能性がある。しかし、私は少し異なる意見を持っている。なぜなら、誰が権力を握っても、中国に対する政策は非常に似通ったものになるだろうと考えているからだ。なぜなら、金大中、盧武鉉、文在寅といった進歩的な政権も、韓国政府の外交政策の枠組みは、常に韓国・米国同盟を強化し、同時に韓国・中国パートナーシップを改善することであったからだ。

そして、尹氏も最近、中国に対して好ましくない発言をしたことで、中国とトラブルを起こしている。しかし、彼も最近、駐韓中国大使と会談し、韓国・中国問題について話し合った。したがって、私は、ユ・ミョンとユ・ミョンが中国問題への対処において、 real difference を見ない。

中国問題は韓国にとって real challenge であることは知っているが、韓国政府が東アジアで、次期大統領選挙後に、操業する余地があると考えている。ありがとう、ジハン。そして、バイデン政権は、米中競争において、韓国からの支持と協力を期待していることは確かだ。したがって、それは米韓同盟に直面するもう一つの大きな問題となるだろう。

中国問題についてですが、中国問題が韓国にとって現実的な課題であることは承知しています。しかし、韓国政府が東アジアにおいて、次期大統領選挙後に、どのような戦略的余地を持って行動できるか、その余地はあるはずだと考えます。ありがとうございます、ジハンさん。バイデン政権は、米中競争に関して、韓国からの支持と協力を期待することになるでしょう。これもまた、直面する大きな問題の一つです。

さて、北朝鮮について話し合うことから始め、インド太平洋のより広範な問題で終わったが、私たちは時間切れになったようだ。特に北朝鮮に関しては、簡単な答えはないと思うが、スー・テリー博士、チョン・ファン博士、ジナ・キム博士、スー・キム氏に感謝したい。彼らは、北朝鮮、インド太平洋、そして米韓同盟に関して、私たちがどこにいるのか、そして何を期待できるのかを、よりよく理解するのに役立った。閉会する前に、簡単なアンケートにご協力いただければ幸いです。アンケートの回答は、今後のウェビナーを計画するために使用されます。EAI、東アジア研究所、ブルッキングス研究所を代表して、韓国とインドネシアの視聴者の皆様に、こんばんは。米国の皆様には、こんにちは。ご参加いただき、ありがとうございました。次回は、できれば対面でお会いできることを楽しみにしています。ありがとうございました。

ありがとうございます。さようなら。

ありがとうございます。さようなら。