[Online Seminar] COVID-19 and the New World Order Series 10: ROK-U.S. Cooperation and North Korea in a New Era

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R6Cv-OMkW_4

The East Asia Institute (EAI) (Director Yeo-Won Son) and the Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution co-hosted the tenth online seminar in the “COVID-19 and the New World Order” series, titled “ROK-U.S. Cooperation and North Korea in a New Era.” The ROK-U.S. Joint Statement released in May 2021 opened a new era of expanded ROK-U.S. partnership by addressing the need to strengthen ROK-U.S. cooperation to resolve regional security issues. In this seminar, experts from both South Korea and the United States engaged in in-depth discussions on the current status of the denuclearization issue with North Korea, the prospects for cooperation on a ROK-U.S. end-of-war declaration, ROK-U.S. policy toward North Korea, and implications for the 2022 presidential election.

Date & Time: December 2, 2021 (Thursday) 22:30-23:30 (KST)

Speakers: Soo Kim (Policy Analyst, RAND Corporation), Kim Jinah (Professor, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies), Hwang Jihwan (Professor, University of Seoul), Sue Mi Terry (Director, Hyundai Motor-Korea Foundation Center for Korean History and Public Policy, Wilson Center)

Moderator: Andrew Yeo (Korea Chair, Brookings Institution)

Opening Remarks: Yeo-Won Son (Director, EAI; Professor, Yonsei University)

Striking the Right Balance with North Korea:

Prospects for North Korea Policy

I. ROK-U.S. Relations and North Korea Policy

Current Status of the Denuclearization Issue

• Efforts between the United States and North Korea to reach a denuclearization agreement have stalled. Given that Chairman Kim Jong Un views nuclear armament as indispensable for regime survival, North Korea is likely to continue investing in nuclear development.
• Soo Kim, a policy analyst at the RAND Corporation, stated that the United States must continuously signal its willingness to negotiate, and this must be conveyed through financial sanctions, damaging North Korea's international reputation (human rights abuses, food shortages, etc.), and strengthening U.S. alliances, to ultimately compel Kim Jong Un to choose negotiation for survival.
• Professor Kim Jinah of Hankuk University of Foreign Studies commented that if North Korea remains unresponsive to resuming dialogue, President Biden will likely opt for maintaining the status quo rather than pursuing change. Professor Kim added that such a situation increases the likelihood that relevant parties will choose arms control over crisis management as a more persuasive option.
• Professor Kim Jinah suggested that if North Korea pursues a new equilibrium on the Korean Peninsula, it is likely to focus on military modernization and adopt a "tit-for-tat" competition. North Korea is expected to deviate from its previous commitment to halt nuclear and ICBM tests, avoiding unnecessary escalation, which raises concerns about the paradox of stability-instability.

Prospects for ROK-U.S. Cooperation on an End-of-War Declaration

• Dr. Sue Mi Terry, Director of the Hyundai Motor-Korea Foundation Center for Korean History and Public Policy at the Wilson Center, argued that the ROK and the U.S. are currently not aligned on the issue of an end-of-war declaration. While the draft declaration is expected to include provisions suggesting it will not affect the armistice status between North and South Korea, it is unlikely to gain support within the United States given North Korea's lack of demonstrated commitment to denuclearization.
• Dr. Sue Mi Terry added that for Biden to pursue an end-of-war declaration, he must reassure the American public by emphasizing the continued robustness of the ROK-U.S. alliance.
• Soo Kim, a policy analyst, stated that despite the U.S. willingness to discuss an end-of-war declaration, questions must be raised about its sustainability at this juncture, given North Korea's missile tests, nuclear development, and the ongoing leadership transition in South Korea. Soo Kim further elaborated on the risks that this end-of-war declaration could weaken ROK-U.S. relations and serve as a basis for questioning the presence of U.S. Forces Korea on the peninsula.

Return to "Strategic Patience"?

• Professor Kim Jinah argued that a return to strategic patience is not a favorable option, and maintaining the status quo does not necessarily guarantee stability. The absence of talks on confidence-building measures could serve as a basis for choosing an arms race as a course of national action. Professor Kim stated that if the new government does not establish institutional mechanisms for continued dialogue with North Korea, North Korea will observe the dynamics on the Korean Peninsula.
• Soo Kim stated that the current conditions are favorable for the Kim Jong Un regime, and summit talks and negotiations will not be helpful in regaining the upper hand for the United States. While the U.S. must still demonstrate its commitment to diplomacy with North Korea, it must also consider that past U.S. engagement policies have allowed the Kim Jong Un regime to buy time and create opportunities to produce larger and more capable nuclear weapons.

II. Implications of the 2022 Presidential Election for North Korea Policy

Differences in North Korea Policy between Candidates Lee Jae-myung and Yoon Suk-yeol

• Professor Hwang Jihwan of the University of Seoul explained that Candidate Lee Jae-myung's North Korea policy can be characterized as a "peace-first policy," while Candidate Yoon Suk-yeol's policy is considered a "hardline policy." Both candidates are likely to inherit policies from their predecessors. Candidate Lee's North Korea policy focuses on restoring peace on the Korean Peninsula, based on the belief that the collapse or instability of the North Korean regime will not directly lead to peace or unification. In contrast, Candidate Yoon's policy focuses on pressuring North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons and coordinating sanctions with the ROK-U.S. alliance.
• Professor Hwang added that while there may be differences in how the two camps perceive the role of the ROK-U.S. alliance in maintaining the ROK-U.S.-Japan alliance, both candidates agree on the importance of the ROK-U.S. alliance.
• Dr. Sue Mi Terry stated that the election of either candidate presents both opportunities and challenges. If Candidate Lee Jae-myung is elected, disagreements between the ROK and the U.S. are anticipated, but opportunities may arise if North Korea opens the door to negotiations. Conversely, the election of Candidate Yoon Suk-yeol could negatively impact inter-Korean relations.

Domestic and Foreign Policy Tasks for the Next Administration

• Dr. Sue Mi Terry explained that the greatest risk facing South Korea in terms of the ROK-U.S. alliance is "abandonment versus entrapment," and how South Korea navigates this within the context of U.S.-China competition is key. Dr. Terry believes that South Korea will have to deal with China, its major trading partner, while also addressing the North Korea issue, and is willing to set its own direction for this purpose.
• Professor Hwang stated that the domestic policy environment facing the next South Korean president is bound to be unfavorable. He pointed out that political polarization, both in terms of political orientation and generational differences, is the biggest problem in the domestic policy environment.
• Professor Hwang argued that regardless of which candidate wins the next presidential election, the policy toward China will likely remain similar. South Korea's foreign policy framework is centered on strengthening the ROK-U.S. alliance and improving ROK-China partnership relations. As South Korea's policy toward China has not tilted towards hostility, there remains room for a degree of policy flexibility.

III. Biographies of Speakers and Moderator

■ Hwang JihwanProfessor of International Relations at the University of Seoul. His major works include "The Paradox of South Korea’s Unification Diplomacy: Moving beyond a State-Centric Approach," "The Two Koreas after U.S. Unipolarity: In Search of a New North Korea Policy," and "The Political Implications of American Military Policy in Korea: Learning from Theoretical and Empirical Evidences." His primary research areas are inter-Korean relations and foreign policy. He holds bachelor's and master's degrees from Seoul National University and a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Colorado.

■ Kim JinahProfessor in the Division of Language and Diplomacy at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies. She previously served as the Head of the North Korean Military Research Division at the Korea Institute for Defense Analysis (KIDA) and as an adjunct professor at Yonsei University's Graduate School of International Studies, where she lectured on international relations theory and humanitarian intervention. She has served as a policy advisor and evaluator for the Ministry of Unification, the National Security Council, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as a review committee member for the Presidential Committee on Government Information Disclosure, a policy advisor for the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command, and a national project evaluation committee member for the Prime Minister's Office. She holds a master's degree from Yonsei University's Graduate School of International Studies and a Ph.D. in International Relations from the Fletcher School at Tufts University.

■ Soo KimPolicy Analyst at the RAND Corporation and Adjunct Professor at American University. Her primary research areas include the Korean Peninsula, Russia, Indo-Pacific strategy, near-peer competition, decision-making, and propaganda. She previously worked for the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). She holds a Master of Arts in Strategic Studies from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and a Bachelor of Arts in French from Yale University.

■ Sue Mi TerryDirector of the Hyundai Motor-Korea Foundation Center for Korean History and Public Policy at the Wilson Center. She previously served as a Senior Analyst on Korean issues at the CIA and as a Senior Fellow with the Korean Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). She holds a Master of Arts in International Relations from the Fletcher School at Tufts University (2008) and a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science from New York University.

■ Andrew YeoKorea Chair at the Brookings Institution, Professor of Politics at the Catholic University of America, and Director of Asian Studies. His recent book is "State, Society and Markets in North Korea." He holds a Bachelor of Arts in Psychology and International Studies from Northwestern University and a Ph.D. in Government from Cornell University.

■ Responsible for and EditingLee SeungyeonEAI Research Fellow

Contact: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 205) | slee@eai.or.kr

Video Transcript

Greetings everyone. I am Yeo-Won Son, President of the East Asia Institute (EAI) and Yonsei University Professor. It is a great honor to invite distinguished panelists and guests to this webinar titled "North Korea in a New Era of ROK-U.S. Partnership," co-hosted with the Center for East Asia Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution. These two institutions have developed a partnership over the years, including an online conference held last November, titled "New Prospects for ROK-U.S. Cooperation in an Era of U.S.-China Strategic Competition," which featured scholars from each side. This time, we come to discuss North Korea in a new era of expanded ROK-U.S. partnership. Here, the goals and tasks of the alliance partnerships are increasingly complex and multi-dimensional. The relationships extend from the peninsula to regional affairs, and from traditional military security to a wide range of issues, including

trade, advanced technology, climate change, and the pandemic. Under the changing dynamics of alliance relationships in these areas, this seminar will discuss how the two countries are navigating their strategic interests on the denuclearization of North Korea, the impacts of U.S.-China strategic competition on denuclearization efforts, and the prospects for the ROK-U.S. alliance and North Korean policy in the context of the upcoming ROK presidential election. With great interest and excitement for the discussion,

let me introduce to you today's moderator, Dr. Andrew Yeo. Andrew is the KF Chair in Korean Studies at the Brookings Institution's Center for East Asia Policy Studies. He is also a professor of politics at the Catholic University of America in Washington D.C. and the author of the forthcoming book "State, Society and Markets in North Korea" from Cambridge University Press. Andrew has worked closely with the EAI for many years, and I'm excited he landed in Brookings, and I hope that we work even

closer together. We feature four excellent scholars in the area of North Korean affairs: Miss Sue Kim, Dr. Jinah Kim, Dr. Jihwan Hwang, and Dr. Sue Mi Terry. Thank you so much for sharing your time with us. And let me further give an individual introduction of today's speakers. First, Miss Sue Kim, who is a policy analyst at the RAND Corporation and an adjunct professor at American University. She has previously served as an analyst in the CIA and also worked at the Department of Homeland Security. She's

an expert on the Korean Peninsula. Her research interests also cover Russia, America's Indo-Pacific strategy, propaganda, and the intelligence community. Next, we have Dr. Jinah Kim, who is a professor in the Division of Language and Diplomacy at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies. Previously, she was Chief of the North Korean Military Division at the Korea Institute for Defense Analysis (KIDA) and an adjunct professor at Yonsei University's Graduate School of International Studies,

that I belong to. And Dr. Kim is an expert on U.S.-North Korean relations, nuclear non-proliferation, and Northeast Asian security affairs. And next, Dr. Jihwan Hwang, who is a professor of International Relations at the University of Seoul. He is one of the leading scholars in the field of security studies in Korea. Dr. Hwang has published a wide range of articles, including "The Paradox of South Korea's Unification Diplomacy" and "The Two Koreas after U.S. Unipolarity," and many more. And finally,

Dr. Sue Mi Terry, Director of the Hyundai Motor-Korea Foundation Chair Center for Korean History and Public Policy at the Wilson Center. She's a leading expert on North Korea, worked formerly as a Senior Fellow with the Korean Chair at CSIS and a Senior Analyst on Korean issues at the CIA. Her latest article, "North Korea's Nuclear Family: How the Kims Got the Bomb and Why They Won't Give It Up," appeared in Foreign Affairs this year. So, with this great lineup, Andrew, now the floor is yours.

dr sumi terry uh director of the hyundai motors hyundai motor korea foundation chair center for korean history and public policy at wilson center she's a leading expert on north korea worked formally as a senior fellow with the korean chair at csis and a senior analyst on korean issues at cia her latest article is north korea's nuclear family how the kim's got the bomb and why they won't give it up appeared that the 14 affairs this year so with this uh great lineup uh andrew now uh the floor is yours

thank you dr son and good morning or evening to our global audience and thank you once again dr sun for your opening remarks i also want to thank eai for organizing and hosting this webinar jointly with the center for east asia policy studies at the brookings institution our partnership allows us to draw insights from experts in korea and the united states ensuring wider and more balanced perspectives on the u.s south korea alliance we only have a short one hour so i want to jump right into our topic for today

north korea and a new era of u.s south korea partnership and to maximize our time with our distinguished guests i'll just mention that our webinar is organized into two halves or two interrelated mini panels in the first half we'll be joined by miss suk kim from the rand corporation and dr gina kim from hanguk university of foreign studies to discuss the moon invited administration's current efforts to pursue negotiations including the much discussed end of war declaration and then in the second half dr jiwan

fang from the university of seoul and dr sue terry from the wilson center so i almost said csis again uh so dr sue terry from the wilson center will address north korea policy in the context of upcoming south korea elections and a new current government next year so we'll be talking about uh north korea policy in the current context and then moving forward with the next south korean government as well as other issues that might pertain to the u.s south korea alliance so without further ado let me first turn

to sue kim from rand to address our opening set of questions sue can you give our audience here a rundown on the current status of where we're at regarding steps towards denuclearization on north korea and while we're there how would you evaluate the biden administration's approach to north korea thus far sure thank you andrew uh good morning d.c and good evening to our colleagues in seoul um just to get the ball rolling i'll be touching upon nuclear talks from north korea by the administration's

approach to kim jong-un thus far and finally our approach to this topic du jour and war declaration so where are we when it comes to the nuclear talks um two years actually three have passed since trump and kim have been they walked away from the hanoi summit with a no deal and of course north korea has been diligently pursuing its nuclear weapons development and missile delivery systems so i would say that the threat is actually an immutable constant and we know that kim jong-un is going to continue to invest hundreds of millions

if not billions of dollars in perfecting and diversifying his nuclear weapons program he's not going to be easily deterred so long as the weapon system remains inherently tied to the regime's existence and of course kim's survival and even if the united states and south korea their military capabilities are superior and more advanced than north korea's the lethality of the dprk's nukes and missiles as well as i would say the intent to use them towards the region and the united states is an issue that's going to be

underscored and i think equally worrisome is the dprk's proliferation of illicit activities so we're talking about the the steadily expanding creep um the criminal creep in cyberspace uh human rights violations and other behaviors that actually go against the the grain of international norms and you want to see resolutions that become more and more ingrained and deep seated into the dprk's being so this makes it all the more challenging for us to tackle the dprk problem beginning with of course the

nuclear weapons so in this respect the sooner we can address the nuclear issue the better obviously but right now we've not heard of any contact between the united states and the dprk negotiators but i don't think this is such a bad thing um rather than laying out all of our cards before the north koreans to clinch an agreement we should continue to indicate the willingness to dialogue while also applying the the appropriate inducements to bring the north koreans back to the negotiating table and by inducements

ideally it would be less in the form of concessions that reward and validate kim's behavior but more squeezing the kim regime financially through sanctions uh reputationally by exposing and shaming kim's crude divides of human rights and diplomatically by strengthening our alliance strategy towards the dprk and also the broader regions that ties together to leave kim essentially with no choice but to negotiate for survival and lately two topics have been dominating the discourse in seoul and one of course is the uh the upcoming

elections and two the end of war declaration so the timing and rationale for the the declaration it seems to be more along the lines of like grafting peace onto reality that that seems a little bit distant from being fertile when it comes to a declaration in addition to weapons testing pyongyang doesn't seem to have an appetite for this proposal which could of course be part of the strategy it makes seoul more anxious and and more insistent and urgent to bring a declaration into fruition and washington for its part

has been expressing willingness to discuss this topic but i think we should ask ourselves here whether the declaration now amid the the ongoing testing you know his determination to keep his nuclear weapons and at the cusp of a leadership transition in south korea is actually going to be sustainable so both from an implementation implementation perspective as well as the potential security alliance and regional applications of a precipitous dash to on the end of ward declaration doesn't seem to be

well timed so the fact of the matter is both proponents and opponents of the end of our declaration they're well aware of the fact that this is going to have broader implications so this is not merely a symbolic document it's it's not going to you know place it it is going to place the korean peninsula and the broader northeast asia region on a different trajectory so it spells implications for the alliance which rests on the foundations of you know the common north korean threat um but it's seeking to also advance

beyond um to work together on the shared political and ideological values among common regional threats including china's aggression and new challenges including supply supply chain disruptions pandemic etc etc so i think for north korea the end of our declaration is going to help kim inch closer towards other milestones including the estrangement of us rok relations um the overall reduction if not expulsion of us fk troops from the peninsula which consequently is going to weaken seoul's foothold and and the place it's

going to place seoul under a firmer north korean hand it's going to reverse the political economic and social progress it's made over the past seven decades so there's a lot to think about and what the end of what declaration in one hand and then the nuclear weapons and the other i think it's going to make him even more strongly positioned to subdue the cell so this is a good place for me to pause and i'll look forward to my co-panelists and i look forward to the discussion thanks so much sue and you preempted me

because i was going to ask a follow-up question about whether the end of war declaration has helped build any momentum towards korea peace but it sounds like you think in some ways it may have an opposite effect of even perhaps destabilizing the region so i know uh are some of our listeners may have questions on that or different views um but yes let's let's move on now to dr gina kim uh gina so let me turn now to you to offer a few remarks you know president moon has clearly signaled his interest in engaging north korea and the

biden administration has also stated it's pr that it's prepared to meet north korea anytime and anywhere what is the motive though behind kim jong-un's critical stance towards biden and moon's efforts for resuming talks because it sounds like uh president moon for sure and even the biden administration are open to some sort of negotiations but kim jong-un has really given uh both governments the cold shoulders so could you uh could you maybe describe what you think is happening behind uh behind north korea

and their rationale all right um i would like to thank the brookings and eai for giving me this opportunity to share my thoughts with other distinguished experts on korean peninsula issues well many scholars present skeptical views on the reversal of the nuclear program of the dprk because its nuclear armament aims to improve self-defense externally and to cement its authority internally so in particular experts on nuclear arms control argue that the dprk lacks a reason to choose denuclearization

in addition to that the means of pressure are quite limited besides the leadership in pyongyang cannot be entirely immune from the political cost of high profile meeting that failed once clearly the dprk is seemingly refraining from taking steps that could lead to escalated tension on the korean peninsula however the fact that the dprk remains unresponsive to the continued message of resumption of dialogue from the biden administration as you said raises some concerns among many of the parakeet watchers

in the absence of a response from the dprk the by the administration will prefer in the long run to maintain the status go instead of offering drastic incentives to negotiations with the dprk and in my opinion if this situation continues the idea of crisis management through arms control instead of the denuclearization of the korean peninsula will become increasingly persuasive that's something the dprk may want to wait and see moreover in a situation where competition between the u.s and china is

intensifying the motivation for the dprk and china to tighten their strategic relations will certainly increase this will raise alarm at least among south koreans about losing leverage on north korea and seoul will try actively engaging with pyongyang then either way the dprk will not think that it is losing a game to keep the size of the wind steps so small and rigid um which will give the dprk a bargaining advantage the dprk will pretend that it is not really bothered by any cost caused by no agreement

if the dprk pursues a near-term interest in revitalizing economy conditions then its immediate goal is to return to the talks with the intention to discuss what was previously offered by the north koreans in february 2019 that is partial sanctions relief in exchange for partial declaration of its nuclear program and the dprk's strategy will be avoiding unnecessary tensions on the korean peninsula and obviously action for action is a principle that the dprk has adhered to for many many decades if the prk believes that it can model

through then it is likely to seek a new equilibrium on the korean peninsula through military modernization in a tit-for-tat rivalry with south korea in this case the dprk will also avoid unnecessary escalation but there will be a much concern about the instability instability paradox to complete the pre-planned research and development cycle the dprk will need testing new weapon system before deployment for technical reasons the peer case strategy to up the ante to achieve political compromise and to be

recognized as a nuclear weapon state will be the worst case scenario in my mind then pyongyang need to speed up efforts to demonstrate credible deterrence capabilities but this strategy is not without risks confirming its commitment to invest more in force enhancement well helps the leadership in pyongyang increase the audience cost internally and therefore demonstrate externally that north koreans are not in position to make compromise or flexibly negotiate with the the u.s however escalation to a degree

in which pyongyang can increase just attention just enough to get international attention in a way not to upset beijing and moscow will be the challenge for the dprk currently the moon administration has confirmed many times that it would pursue at least the minimum goal with which is recreating the condition for starting a dialogue within the term it seems that um the south korean government worries that time is running out and therefore tries to push hard to declare and end the war on the korean

peninsula that does not have any legal implications in the expectation of creating a momentum for talks so the question is and i i also wonder if we have any alternative option right now obviously acknowledging north korea as a de facto nuclear weapon states will be a potential blow to the geneva agreement six party talks and related inter-korean agreements because all of these are based on 1991 joint declaration of the denuclearization of the korean peninsula well returning strategic patience may

not be a good idea because the perceived status quo does not necessarily mean stability because in the absence of talks on confidence building measures the arms race can be a natural course of action between the two koreans in south korea's presidential election is coming and a new government will need time to review the previous dprk policy then the dprk may want to test the water and refrain from making any suggestions for further dialogues if we don't have any institutional mechanism to continue

talks with the dprk separately from domestic political events however there will be a rough road if we link end of war declaration with denuclearization only then the dprk will resist it and the dprk set the precondition of declaring and end the war that is resolving the issue of u.s hustle policy well because the term house policy includes comprehensive issues political economic and military so we need to think ahead how to tighten the linkage of key issues that all concerned parties intend to address

well um i'll stop here and look forward to further discussions thank you okay excellent now sue and gina it seems like you know both of you are pretty you're more between skepticism and optimism you're more on the skeptical end if i were to ask whether the moon government will be able to make any progress towards korea peace before the end of end of the term um but i wanted to pick up on a thread that you guys uh both addressed uh directly for gina and indirectly for soon it's this idea of strategic

patience and as we all know for north korea in the land of lousy options on north korea it some think that strategic patience at this time may actually be better than pushing for uh engagement but gina you just mentioned that strategic patience may not be may not be ideal because it could we might end up leading to an arms race so in your case it sounded like you were leaning towards the argument that perhaps strategic patience is all that we can do for now because um you know again because there aren't

great options and now is just not the time to really push for something like the end of war declaration so if i could just have either of you follow up a bit on on whether you think the strategic patients given the risks that are involved with it if this is if this is really the only option that we have or if there's some something else that we should be we should be trying and i think that's where the end of war declaration comes in it is uh i have my own uh views on this but i i'll put those aside but i was wondering if

you could say something about strategic patients being the only option or whether we should try to push ahead with engagement so i don't know who wants to go first maybe maybe i'll go back to sue sure so i think when i guess the point of my talk was that you know we're not just sitting and not doing anything it's just that the more we try to push things when things are not conducive to a not even a friendly agreement but just a productive set of talks with north korea and negotiations that are going to

be constructive i just don't see that being there not just from the perspective of north korea but also from the perspective of the south korean government again the atmospherics are not really appropriate to to to call an end of war to to the korean war and and to build the steps toward the two koreas peacefully coexisting when kim jong-un actually has the weapons in place and when he doesn't have the intention to to be friendly what are we trying to get in return um we're just going to be allowing things between the united

states and south korea to be further divided uh where we're going to there's just a lot of factors that i don't think we're considering because we're thinking about this political goal um which is going to leave whichever administration comes in with with a bigger set of problems to handle so i think when it comes to strategic patients it's not about just sitting and not doing anything you can you can signal just look just like what we're doing we're signaling willingness to dialogue and we're also keeping a

watchful eye on what north korea is doing and responding in ways that are not going to put the united states and south korea in a position where we're jeopardizing we have to basically be dragged into negotiations without really knowing what we're going to want to expect from north korea and also what we're willing to give and take and i think that's the problem that i see uh before i turn to gina i would also like to encourage audience members if you have a question you can use the q a function to to ask a question but uh

since we i don't see any uh anything in there right now gina if i can turn to you and if i could just add one uh question to to this chain of thought but you had also mentioned arms control um as uh as an alternative and i know that that's not something that you uh that you advocate especially if we think about the risks of of proliferation uh but despite those risks should do you think there should be more serious attention uh to that option given the impasse of looking at arms control as an intermediate step so i'll also throw

that question in there so gina to you yeah um currently the biden administration is left with how to break the deadlock on the korean peninsula and um in my opinion the dprk policy of the u.s show some flexibility regarding how to negotiate but not what to negotiate with the dprk and even president trump could not change uh basic demands priorities and terms of the trade-off and certainly north korea will know it as long as china is helping north korea i think um north korea can buy time um so uh how to make a breakthrough um

the thing is well declaring the end of war is very much different from signing a peace treaty perhaps north korea wants a legally binding document to end the armistice treaty not a political statement because north korea emphasizes irreversible matters um but the south korea what what south korea is trying to pursue at this moment is not a treaty but a decoration with some symbolic meaning if the armistice treaty is replaced by a peace treaty then it'll become a dead letter and in the case the basis for the

existence of the u.n command on the korean peninsula and the unc real basis in japan becomes questionable because the unc is based on our mystic treaty by the way so it'll be a big challenge to the u.s and um and south korea uh considering the the allied defense posture in this region therefore i think uh we have to have a uh have to consider condition-based phased approach toward north korea we can talk about the contents of the peace treaty but we can sign it later once north korea completes a

denuclearization there are many creative ways to approach and um dprk is uh highly likely to seek a long-term survival strategy of bandwagoning with china instead of embarking on denuclearization negotiations with a political risk so alternative solution as i told you to the problem is exchanging a condition based rewards such that the dprk can perceive the benefits of denuclearization through a thorough verification mechanism that reduce the possibility of defection from an agreed framework by raising the cost of

non-compliance and in the long run um the two couriers can talk about confidence building and even arms control perhaps we can start talking about operational com arms control then uh move on to discussing structural arms control all this can be included in in a big package of phase a condition based phased uh implementation by both sides in my opinion okay thanks gina so it does seem like arms control it's if it's carefully put as part of a conditioned um effort may there may be a possibility

for that option and of course uh arms control is not the final goal you wanted them move towards denuclearization so uh so those are some thoughts i have one just a final uh final question before we move on to to the second half of our but but gina in your i believe it was in in the comments that you had had sent me it sounded like with the pandemic um you know once once the pandemic is over yo kim jong-un has his own timeline and he may just resume the timeline for whatever goals that he wants to achieve

is is it uh looking at this from from from the regime's perspective do you think it's better off to try to have some kind of agreement or negotiation while in some ways north korea is very weak they're weakened because of covet 19 because of the border lockdowns and does that give the u.s and south korea any leverage while they're in that state but the earlier there was talks about offering vaccines or some kind of humanitarian assistance — so it is opportu is there a better opportunity now during the pandemic to

try to engage north korea or would it make more sense to wait when when the pandemic is over knowing that north korea is not really willing to do uh do much or come out of its shell well now what nurse curry is suffering from it's not just a pandemic its food security situation is really dark dire this year and in order to actually revitalize its economy north korea these foreign assistance as well and all this should be done — can be done during the pandemic or after the pandemic there should be a strategic

decision — made that should be made by the leadership in permanent but i think what north korea is doing is uh just uh looking at the right time for opening up the uh opening up uh for uh having another round of dialogue because it seems to me that at least in the eyes of the north koreans in pyongyang a lot of uncertainty is there as as i told you the presidential election in south korea will be another variable — in mind — of the north koreans so we have to — wait and see okay great — i'm so in the interest of time i'm going

to move move on to the second half of our panel where we discuss u.s south korea cooperation and north korea policy under the next south korean government so as as most of our listeners know there's an election a major election coming up next march — in south korea so let me turn to dr jihuan fong who's in seoul to give us a rundown of how the two major south korean presidential candidates might approach north korea so g1 — if if we can turn to you how would you describe to u.s policy makers the

main differences between the two major south korean presidential candidates it would be and regarding north korea policy so — dr pong okay okay okay yeah okay thank you — thanks — and thanks for — having me here — actually let me — speak about the — the presidential election and — north korea are policy — first you know the — the basically two major south korean — presidential candidate you know the jiameong and yung seongyeon i think have they have almost almost the same the position from their the predecessors

you know that yam from tim dejung nom muhan and the current president — the moon jae-in and the young from — the the the president his predecessors the — the imminent back and the — — and their policies you know north korea policies are based on — their the ideological differences i think — between the conservative and the progressive — the candidate the izam young i think the support — supports the engagement policy toward north korea and i think — he can be described — regarded as his his policy as a peace

first policy i mean — that is to — the focusing on the bringing peace back first on the korean peninsula — just as the kim de jung nomihan and the mundane current president moon jae-in you know supported and also i think the injurement belief that the collapse of the instability of the north korean regime would neither directly lead to unification — nor the peace on the korean peninsula so they he insisted that the benefit of the engagement and peace building — policy and mechanism outweigh

— the coast but — conversely the candidate — yoon sang yeah i think support — the sanctioned regime on north korea and i think we may — describe his policy as — the hotline policy you know — that the to focusing on the — putting on pressure to — the you know the pressure to enforce — the pyongyang the kim jong-un to give up its nuclear weapons program so his policy may be also be the the regarded as is the unification of the policy of the sanctioned regime — policy and that argues that he argues

that the unification will lead to peace — just as the two previous — the conservative lead — the president — immun back and back — pursued so — yosemite — appears to believe that the united states and south korea should cooperate — to keep sanctions — keep going and pressure — sanctions and pressure — keep going and to in order to enforce pyongyang to back down so even if the the headline policy by him may destabilize the north korean domestic — situation — to the point of the collapse so

but the easement you know — they appear to believe that the sanctions may — destabilize the north korean domestic — situation and may be very dangerous and even — you know the leading to the humanitarian disaster and the systemic — dysfunction so the south korean — people — he believes that should work on a long-term engagement strategy toward pyongyang by lifting — of course the conditions based — sanctions and the promo by promoting the korean economic — corporation — so he believes that

the invocation comes you know and the comes only gradually you know only by when the piece is brought back first to the korean — peninsula but — the candidate you sang yeah you know — the beliefs that — like the many many from the conservative groups — in his — party the people's — power party believe that the only — you know unification — will that — you know spell — the disaster but solve many you know in the immediate — problems such as the nuclear issues and the internal — chaos and humanitarian

crises — etc and it will — he believes that the you know produce the massive economic and social benefit of the korean — peninsula and also the northeast asia so it seems to me that we are more likely to see — you know the the their policy to be repeated in the — dear future the actually just just like we have seen — in the previous you know the presidential — the election because we already have seen that there there has been a really a serious debate between the conservative groups and — the progressive — the

— groups of how to you know the deal with the north korean — issues but — i think they — agreed to the how to — you know the — the get support from the united states because in that sense — the young sangria and vision are not really different — because both of them you know the stresses the the importance of you know the — the strengthening — the the korea u.s alliance — in dealing with the — the the north korean — issue — although they may be some — you know — may have some difference in you know the — the how to

combine the — the korea us — the — relations and the cooperation — including the trilateral relations with — the u.s korea and — the japan — but mostly i think — their approach to the alliance issues is really — dissimilar — and also but somewhat — different in the dealing with the north korean issues but the mostly i think they agreed to — those issues that about the how to — you know improve the — the cooperation between u.s and south korea on the north korea policy let me stop here

okay thanks jihan — i'm going to — turn to dr suteri just in the interest of time but — jihan went just to get you thinking during the moderate discussion you know what kind of policy environment domestic policy environment will the next south korean president face in dealing with north korea issues because i think that's something that maybe those in washington or in the united states don't really understand the policies domestic policy space in south korea and what especially if there's an engagement approach so if you could just

think about that but right now let me turn to dr sue terry to give us some perspective from washington just in light of what — jihan was saying sue what challenges or opportunities will the biden administration face on north korea policy if either the main conservative or progressive candidate wins the election in march so sue over to you yes thanks andrew — this is really an interesting race because we have two non-traditional candidates — and they don't really have foreign policy experience or or

— so that's gonna be interesting on the north korea question specifically — let me talk about it beyond first — as dr huang said you know egypt is obviously expected to continue the ruling party's current focus on engagement with north korea — and lee has said that his approach to north korea would be practical without ideological considerations at least he says this right — and you know the word practical is fine since the body administration says their approach is also practical but but what i'm concerned about is

even now to be very candid — i don't think washington and solo are exactly on the same page in in their approach to north korea even though they say they are coordinating very very closely and they are to their credit — still they're not exactly on the same page i mean just take this end of war declaration that you guys just finished talking about — the moon administration has asked the budget administration to consider it so the by the administration said okay we will since you're a close ally and you're asking us to consider it

to break this current impasse with north korea — and supposedly their draft is in the final stage of the coordination and negotiation with washington so be too much as well which is interesting to me by the way because we're closely coordinating but we have no idea what the north koreans are going to say — but still — and the draft is going to it's expected to include all kinds of clauses about how this is not going to affect united nations command not going to impact u.s versus korea they're going to water down

their language but then it's going to reduce its attractiveness to North Korea, right? Um, so to me, the Biden administration is doing this more as an alliance management exercise, not really going full force with it. Um, they're sort of kind of being dragged to it, and they are doing it, but it's again, to me, it's more of an alliance management exercise. They know this is not North Koreans are probably not going to accept this, and they also know that it's going to be difficult to sell domestically in the U.S. given that North

Korea has not made a single step towards denuclearization. And given the recent testing campaign, uh, the North Koreans were, you know, with their in their effort to diversify their missile arsenal. So the peace declaration at this point, when North Koreans haven't done anything, could leave the Biden administration, um, you know, the Republicans are going to accuse the Biden administration for being soft on North Korea and so on. So, um, again, I, I, and so I think that's going to be a main challenge with Lee, if he gets

elected again, being on the same page between, between Washington and Seoul. Um, President Lee, if he's, he will get elected, I think would be more forward-leaning on North Korea, more eager to accommodate North Korea than the Biden administration. Um, and you've seen this in the past year, uh, Andrew, uh, you know, Washington was unhappy with this legislation they came out of South Korea criminalizing this, uh, propaganda leaflets balloon towards North Korea, for example. That's just another example. Um, but that's, so that's going to be the

challenge. In terms of opportunity, I do think that, um, if North Korea is interested in negotiation and coming back to dialogue and having any kind of deal with Washington, then, you know, there is an opportunity because everybody will be for that, right? There's Seoul is not going to put a, uh, pause to that. Um, in terms, so I think that could be a potential, um, opportunity, and maybe a worsening of relationship with North Korea could be avoided under Yoon. Um, I do think there is a possibility for closer coordination.

Yoon has criticized the Moon administration's drive for this end-of-war declaration. He has signaled that he's going to have a break from this current approach, uh, more hard-line in a way policy towards North Korea is expected, as you heard from Dr. Hwang. Um, but I do think that final administration is going to be okay with that, okay with Seoul being less muted about North Korea's human rights abuses, um, or being more vocal about China's role in North Korea sanctions violations, uh, and so on. Um, so, and, you know, Yoon has vowed to

strengthen U.S.-ROK extended deterrence, which is good news to the U.S. Um, you know, and so the strength of the U.S.-ROK alliance and all that. Um, oh, the one risk though, um, I was, because you asked me to think about the opportunities and challenges, one risk obviously under Yoon would be that North-South relationship could deteriorate and escalate. And we saw this, uh, for example, 2010 was particularly a difficult year, uh, between the two Koreas with the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong shelling and so on. So I do think those

are sort of, um, some of the challenges and opportunities you can think about with, with, you know, with the presidential election and the outcome. Okay. Thanks, Sue. And again, for our audience, if you have a question for Dr. Terry or Dr. Hwang, feel free to add, ask your question in the question and answer chat box. But, uh, Jihan, if we can go back to the domestic policy environment in South Korea and what the South Korean president has to deal with, uh, when it comes to North Korea, nuclear issue, and peace-related issues, could you just give us a

brief, uh, comment about what, what that policy landscape looks like? What challenges the next South Korean president may face in trying to address, uh, North Korea or inter-Korean peace? Okay. I think that the policy landscape in South Korea next year, I mean, after the presidential election, uh, will not be very favorable to the Korean president, uh, because, you know, first of all, there is a very serious, you know, the political polarization, uh, inside South Korea. Uh, you know, just like the, the United States, the

uh, you know, the blue America, America, and the, the, the red America. Uh, and also like the United States, in South Korea, there is a conservative South Korea, progressive South Korea. And then I don't think the any presidential, uh, the candidate will win a landslide victory, uh, even if he, uh, wins the election next, uh, March. So, uh, the kind of the political polarization will make it, uh, makes it very difficult for the any, you know, uh, the, uh, presidential, uh, the candidate

whoever wins the election to, uh, make it very difficult to, you know, the, uh, deal with the North Korea issue, and also the nuclear and all the peace-related, uh, issue. The second, uh, the issue is about the generation, generation gap. You know, uh, there is a very serious, you know, generation gap in South Korea. Then, uh, mostly in the, the Korean people in their 30s and 40s are more likely to support the, uh, regime, while the, uh, the, the fifties and, uh, sixties are, uh, more likely to, uh, the support, uh, the young, uh, the conservative, uh

candidate. But the thing is that what matters, uh, is that the, the Korean people in, uh, their, the 20s, you know, the, the research saying about the, uh, in Korea, uh, that the MJ, MGS, the, uh, generation choice is really important in deciding the, the outcome of the next presidential, uh, election. But the thing is that they are not really interested in the dealing with North Korean issues. They are, uh, more interested in, uh, the getting a job and how to, uh, buy your apartment in Seoul, because, you know, that the Korean, the, the domestic, uh, the economic

situation, uh, is not really, uh, favorable, uh, to, uh, do, to that, uh, generation. So I think that those two, uh, the issues are really, uh, important issues in next year, even, uh, when we deal with North Korea and, uh, the peace, uh, related, uh, things, uh, the next year. Uh, so I think that the land, the political landscape next year, uh, will not be, not really good for, uh, the next Korean, uh, president. Thank you. Okay, thanks, Jihan. And, uh, you know, I know we've been focusing a lot on North Korea here, but of course, North Korea, the

North Korea issue exists within a broader, uh, context within East Asia and within the Indo-Pacific. So I wanted to first go back to, uh, Dr. Terry, and just ask you, you know, moving beyond North Korea, what other issues concerning the broader Indo-Pacific region will remain important to the U.S.-South Korea alliance moving forward? Well, Andrea, I think, you know, you know, first and foremost is China, China, and China, um, and how South Korea would navigate that U.S.-China competition, conflict. I think it's fair to say, I think for the Koreans

just historically, the two big fears in terms of alliance with the U.S. have always been either abandonment or entrapment, right? And their nightmare scenario is this U.S.-China competition deteriorate further and potentially, if there's ever a conflict like in the Taiwan Strait, this is truly a nightmare scenario for the Koreans. So I think China is going to be a huge factor, uh, to consider in the, in terms of alliance relationship. Um, of course, the second, um, is also, I think, ties with Japan. Um, you know, you know, there's

no South Korea-Japan ties have worsened, um, in the past few years, and the Biden administration wants to really improve this. And here, I think when you look at Yoon or Lee, I mean, you know, Yoon's position, at least, uh, is more favorable, uh, well, it sounds good, better to the United States, right? Because the PPP and Yoon have been, um, saying they want to restore ties or they will try at least. You know, I think have said something like restore ties. So Yoon has been more critical of Beijing, uh, in terms of just the two candidates, while

being more vocal about allies with the U.S. and also restoring ties with Japan. Um, but this, I think, is going to be, uh, just both how the South Koreans deal with China and Japan are going to be, uh, interesting to watch. Um, Yoon also has been critical of President Moon's hedging approach, who is concerned about China's human rights abuses in Hong Kong and Xinjiang. Um, they also talked about, you talked about South Korea joining Quad. Uh, I have not heard, uh, Yoon talking about this. Um, and so, you know, I think these issues are

going to be some things that, that, that's going to be of interest to the United States. Um, you know, we watched everything, right? We saw that, you know, um, candidate Lee meeting with China's ambassador to South Korea and talking about ties with China. So these are all, I think it's going to be important for us. But to be very candid, I'll just make this point, um, I brought up this, um, point earlier by Yoon and both candidate Yoon and candidate Lee's lack of foreign policy experience, I think that might be of a concern to the Biden

administration. And on China, you know, whichever presidential elect candidate wins in March, we do know the U.S. acting knows there's this intrinsic limit, uh, to what South Korea can do with China because the fact that we're not changed is that South Korea, there's more trade with China than it does with the U.S. and Japan combined, and South Korea still has to deal with China in the context of its relationship with North Korea and so on. So there are still going to be limits on how far a South Korean president can go

really in confronting China. Um, that says South Korea does not want to be a pawn either with Beijing and wants to chart its own course, uh, in technological and competition economic policy, and as well strategically. So, um, we're seeing, but these are some of these other issues that, that there will be watching very closely. Thanks, Sue. And it's interesting that you mentioned that, uh, the lack of foreign policy experience might be of some concern, and so at least for those of us in Washington, Sue and myself, I guess we

should brace ourselves as we get towards elections. Uh, there'll be more trips from South Korea coming into DC just to get the lay of the land on U.S.-South Korea alliance and foreign policy issues. But, Jihan, I want to also turn to you, if you had any thoughts about what broader issues or concerns beyond North Korea may be of interest to the U.S.-South Korea alliance? And of course, Dr. Terry mentioned China, China, China. That's absolutely the same thing for the Biden administration. Um, but again, if I were to bring up domestic

politics, you know, is there more convergence in South Korean domestic politics on some of these issues like China? I know we've seen poll numbers indicating that South Koreans are also wary or concerned, very, very negative perceptions about China. And I don't know if that would change someone like Yu Jin-pyong's position on, on how he approaches China. So, uh, Jihan, any thoughts there? Uh, okay. You know, that poll number shows that until 2015, the South Korean people's, you know, attitude towards China was very favorable. You know, that, I think

as far, uh, as I remember that, maybe the almost a two-thirds of the Korean people have the favorable, you know, the images of China. But after the THAAD issue, uh, the South Korean, uh, people's, you know, the image of China was getting worse, much worse. You know, to the to the point of like the, you know, the Korean people's, you know, image of maybe the North Korea or the Japan, which is, which is, uh, very low. Uh, so maybe that kind of the public opinion may affect really greatly, uh, to the both the, uh, Yoon, uh, and

Lee's amounts, you know, policy toward, uh, the China. But, uh, I think I have a little, uh, different, you know, the opinion, uh, because, uh, you know, whoever, uh, takes power, I think, uh, there are polish, uh, China would be really, uh, similar because, uh, you know, that throughout the, uh, the consultative and the progressive, uh, the government, like the Kim Dae-jung, Roh Moo-hyun, and all, and also, uh, in the, the South Korean government, all the South Korean government, you know, foreign policy, uh, the framework was to how to, you know, that the

uh, strengthen the Korea-U.S. alliance and also to improve the, the Korea-China, uh, the, the partnership simultaneously. So, uh, and also Yoon also, you know, had recently had trouble with the China by saying some kind of unfavorable, uh, things too about China. But, uh, he also, you know, recently met with the Chinese ambassador, ambassador to Korea, this thing timing, and talked about Korea-China, uh, the issue. So I don't see any real difference between the, uh, the Yoon and Lee, and how to deal with the

Chinese issue. Uh, I know that China issue is a real challenge to Korea, but I think there is some kind of, uh, the strategic room for the Korean, uh, the government to maneuver, be maneuvering, uh, in East Asia in the, uh, after the next presidential election. Okay. Thanks, Jihan. And, uh, you know, certainly the Biden administration is going to be looking towards South Korea for, uh, for their support, their cooperation when it comes to U.S.-China, U.S.-China competition. So it's going to be another big issue that that faces the

U.S.-South Korea alliance. Now, so we, we began with, you know, talking about North Korea, and we ended with broader issues in the Indo-Pacific. But, you know, we were actually out of time. I think it was a very, uh, very, uh, compact, compact webinar, and there really are no easy answers when it comes to especially North Korea. But I do want to thank Dr. Sue Terry, Dr. Chuan Hwang, Dr. Jihun Kim, and Ms. Sue Kim for helping us better understand where we're at and what we might expect in regards to North Korea and the Indo-Pacific and the U.S.-South Korea

alliance. Before we close, I'd appreciate if you could fill out a brief survey before exiting the webinar. The survey responses will be used to plan future webinars catered to the interests of the public. On behalf of EAI and on behalf of the East Asia Institute and the Brookings Institution, I'd like to say good night to our audience in Korea and Indonesia, and good day to everyone in the United States. So thanks again for joining us and look forward to seeing, uh, seeing everyone hopefully in person the next time. Thank you.

Thank you. Bye.