YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KG8KnCe5QfY

The East Asia Institute (EAI) held the sixth session of its online seminar series, "COVID-19 and the New World Order," titled "The Present and Future of ROK-US Regional Cooperation: How to View the Quad." Due to its strong image of "China hedging," many countries have adopted a passive stance towards Quad participation, and numerous conflicts have arisen within the Quad itself. To encourage broader participation, Quad member states must strengthen cooperation on various non-traditional security issues beyond defense. This seminar engaged in in-depth discussions on the challenges facing the Quad, the Quad from the ROK-US perspective, and South Korea's policy direction for maintaining friendly relations with both the US and China.

• Date: Thursday, May 6, 2021, 9:00–10:00 (KST)
• Presenters: Evan Feigenbaum (Vice President, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), Sohn Sung-hwan (Former Ambassador to Russia), Park Jae-jeok (Professor, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies)
• Moderator: Ma Sang-yoon (Professor, Catholic University of Korea)
• Opening Remarks: Sohn Yul (Director, EAI; Professor, Yonsei University)

Summary:

Implications of the Quad (Quad Plus) and South Korea's Policy Direction

I. The Durability of the Quad

Conceptualizing the Quad's "Role" and "Function"

• Over the past two decades, multilateral cooperation mechanisms or regional forums in Asia have served as mechanisms for addressing key issues within the region. Evan A. Feigenbaum, Vice President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, emphasized that the discourse within Asian policy reveals an overemphasis on 'form' driving 'function' through urgent issues and existing economic alliances in Asia, explaining the inefficiencies of these mechanisms. For instance, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) do not include India and the United States, clearly illustrating the argument that "form leads function" in Asian policy.
• The Quad, a small security network across Asia, is gradually becoming more formalized through meetings and discussions of various joint initiatives. Feigenbaum analyzes that the Quad could fail due to the perception that its formalization will lead to successful solutions for network-related issues, similar to past failures of network coalitions. Whether cooperating states can function as a robust center for a resilient regional architecture is a key challenge in demonstrating the alliance's capabilities. In this regard, Feigenbaum argues that the Quad needs to demonstrate its utility by shifting its focus to functional actions within the alliance on the most pressing issues in Asia.
• However, this does not mean the Quad must function as an alliance solely for short-term cooperation, necessarily discussing each issue with different member states. Quad members must share common understandings and take the lead in developing problem-solving capabilities for other cooperating states. Urgent issues such as climate change, counter-narcotics, maritime capacity building, and infrastructure problems cannot be resolved by Quad members alone and inevitably require the participation of more countries.

The Quad's Purpose: Countering China vs. Promoting Regional Cooperation

• The Quad is characterized as a security network that counters and deters China, and as a product of US strategy connecting US-led alliances and security partnerships. However, perceptions of the Quad's identity differ among its member states.
• Professor Park Jae-jeok explains that the Quad faces a "Quad dilemma." The US seeks to maintain the Quad as a tool for deterring China, but can only achieve this objective by operating the Quad in a manner that conceals this purpose. In reality, the Quad is not a cohesive multilateral alliance. India and Australia are reluctant to see the Quad perceived as a mechanism for deterring China.

II. South Korea's Position on Quad Plus Participation

How Can South Korea Maintain Balance Between the US and China?

• South Korea's ambiguous stance on the US-China competition has yielded limited success. Professor Park Jae-jeok and Ambassador Sohn Sung-hwan stated that the current political environment has made it clear that South Korea must establish appropriate principles for policy formulation amidst US-China competition.
• Ambassador Sohn Sung-hwan emphasized that "non-participation in the Quad is not an option" and suggested that South Korea should openly embrace the emerging multilateral cooperation structures promoted by the US in the region. In this regard, Ambassador Sohn metaphorically describes South Korea's position between the US and China. Noting that the US is an ally and China is a partner falling short of an ally, he argues that if the US is pulling South Korea towards the 3 o'clock direction and China towards the 9 o'clock direction, South Korea should choose a policy course closer to 1 or 1:30 o'clock.
• The current mechanisms in South Korea's foreign policy discussions have failed to produce consistent policies. Policy decisions have been swayed by pressure from China and the US. Such intentional direction-setting would help build healthier relations with China and the US.
• Professor Park Jae-jeok explains that if South Korea chooses not to participate in the Quad, it will be relegated to a secondary position within the US-led alliance network. Conversely, if South Korea chooses to participate in Quad Plus, it will unnecessarily provoke China and hinder China's engagement on the North Korean nuclear issue. However, Professor Park argues that the Quad and Quad Plus are merely two of many mechanisms for regional security in Asia and have been overemphasized. For example, South Korea has participated in ASEAN+3, which includes China, despite the absence of the US. Considering this, South Korea should not feel pressured to refuse joining Quad Plus due to China's absence.
• He emphasizes that South Korea should approach the Quad issue from the perspective of strengthening US security networks, such as the ROK-US-Japan security cooperation network, which contributes to the US-led Quad strategy. By solidifying this, South Korea can claim to have taken a cooperative stance.
• Professor Park Jae-jeok also stresses that South Korea should publicize its participation in Quad Plus, as this will enable cooperation with China on Northeast Asian issues through appropriate coordination with Quad member states.

Implications for the Future of the ROK-US Alliance

• Since President Biden took office, the focus of key issues between South Korea and the US has been bilateral. The US currently views Asia through the prism of US-China relations, but it should prioritize Asian policy before focusing on China. This also applies to how the ROK-US relationship is viewed.
• Quad Plus is still an informal organization, and the US has not requested South Korea's participation in Quad Plus. It is predicted that the US will seek the restoration of ROK-Japan relations to strengthen the ROK-US-Japan alliance as a cornerstone of Quad Plus, but the possibility of the US requesting South Korea's participation in the Quad is low.

Non-Traditional Security Domains

• Considering the diverse interests among participating countries, the Quad is concerned with collective action in functional areas and non-security domains. Professor Park Jae-jeok emphasizes that the Quad is plural, not singular, in terms of the diverse interests and positions of its member states.
• Professor Park stresses that there is a subtle difference between participating in and not participating in the Quad, and that one must be very discerning in choosing areas of cooperation. For example, joint initiatives with the US in maritime capacity building, providing transport and Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets, could give China the impression that South Korea is actively cooperating with the US. However, this often leads to arms exports to the recipient country, creating a significant economic incentive for South Korea to participate in maritime capacity building.
• South Korea can justify its participation by actively engaging in Quad Plus, which focuses on non-traditional security issues. Ambassador Sohn Sung-hwan argues that South Korea can cooperate with the Quad in economic, health, environmental, and humanitarian issues in the initial stages, and can play a constructive role within the Quad to prevent it from evolving into an extreme anti-China alliance.
• Professor Park Jae-jeok added that there are nine potential ways to expand Quad Plus beyond existing Quad meetings. The methods he listed include formal meetings between top policymakers, infrastructure investment (post-COVID economic reconstruction), maritime capacity building, vaccine expert groups, climate change, key emerging technologies, supply chain diversification, norms declarations, values/democracy, and participation in existing Quad military exercises.
• Vice President Feigenbaum also presented several significant challenges that South Korea may face. These include supply chain resilience, cross-utilization agreements for data access and transfer, combating disinformation, public health and biomedical sharing, and diversifying the use of green bonds and green credit products.

III. The Future of the Quad Framework

Challenges for the Quad: Lack of Cohesion and Inclusivity

• It is too early to predict the future of the Quad and Quad Plus, as they are still in the developmental stage, according to Vice President Feigenbaum. It is also difficult to predict the Quad's power or influence in the short term, as its agenda does not reflect the interests of key regional players. Furthermore, the Quad and Quad Plus are inherently limited due to the slim possibility of establishing collective security with India.
• The current lack of agreement among Quad countries on the utilization of data access and transfer models also indicates a lack of cohesion among regional countries. The absence of non-security cooperation is pointed out as a problem, and it is explained that without cooperation, the possibility of international alliances will also be limited.
• Nevertheless, Professor Park Jae-jeok argues that the Quad should be maintained because it can accumulate experience and trust in cooperation, and can quickly shift to traditional security agendas when necessary.

The US Role in Asia

• Feigenbaum predicts that the US will remain the primary provider of security in Asia, unless China and Japan cooperate to build a security system. However, it is necessary to recognize that US leadership in the region is based on both security and economy, not solely on security.
• However, the US's economic influence in the Indo-Pacific region is gradually declining. While the absolute amount of US investment is increasing, the relative amount is decreasing. This suggests that US influence is waning. The US needs to consider re-establishing itself as a standard-setting nation. If the Quad can fulfill this role and the US can apply various standard-setting agendas through the Quad, it could regain its status as a standard-setting nation. This is expected to address the issue of the mismatch between the Quad's security and economic strategies. ■

IV. Biographies of Presenters and Moderator

• Evan Feigenbaum_ Vice President at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, former James R. Schlesinger Distinguished Professor of National Security Affairs (2019-2020) and current Senior Fellow at the University of Virginia's Miller Center of Public Affairs. He holds a Ph.D. in political science from Stanford University and has worked in government, think tanks, the private sector, and across three regions in Asia. From 2001 to 2009, he served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs (2007-2009), Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Central Asian Affairs (2006-2007), Director for East Asian and Pacific Policy Planning (2001-2006), and advisor on China to Robert B. Zoellick, then Under Secretary of State. His books include "The United States in the New Asia" and "China's Techno-Warriors: National Security and Strategic Competition from the Nuclear to the Information Age."
• Sohn Sung-hwan_ Currently a visiting professor at the Korea National Diplomatic Academy and former Ambassador to Russia. He holds a bachelor's and master's degree in international relations from Seoul National University and studied Russian at the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center (DLI) in California, USA. He earned a Ph.D. in political science from the Russian Academy of Sciences' Institute of World Economy and International Relations. He served as a diplomat for 35 years, with extensive experience in US affairs and North Korean nuclear issues. He held positions such as Director-General of the North American Affairs Bureau at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Chief Delegate to the Six-Party Talks, Minister-Counselor at the Embassy of the Republic of Korea in the United States, and Head of the Korean Peninsula Peace Regime Negotiation Office at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. He received the Presidential Award for his work in Northern Diplomacy and the Minister of Foreign Affairs Award for an outstanding report. His books include 'A New Report on Russia' and 'A Proposal for Upgrading Korean Diplomacy.'
• Park Jae-jeok_ Professor at the Graduate School of International and Area Studies, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies. He holds a Ph.D. in international relations from the Australian National University. He has served as a visiting professor at the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security and a research fellow at the Korea Institute for National Unification. His research areas include US-led security networks in the Indo-Pacific region, regional security order, minilateral security cooperation, the US-Australia alliance, and Australian security policy.
• Masang YunProfessor of International Studies at Catholic University of Korea. After completing his bachelor's and master's degrees in Diplomacy at Seoul National University, he earned a Ph.D. in International Politics from the University of Oxford in the UK for his research on U.S. domestic political intervention surrounding the issue of democracy in South Korea during the 1960s. He was appointed Director-General of Policy Planning at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2016. He served as Dean of the Office of International Affairs at the Catholic University of Korea and was selected as a visiting scholar at the Brookings Institution and the Woodrow Wilson Center in the United States. His main research areas include U.S. foreign policy, ROK-U.S. relations, and the diplomatic history of the Cold War. His recently published papers include “The Space of Liberal Democracy: Focusing on Sasanggye in the First Half of the 1960s,” “ROK-China Relations and the Korean Peninsula—Historical Trends Since the 1970s,” “From Enemy to Implicit Ally: The U.S. Approach to China in the Early Détente,” and “The Decision to Deploy the ROK Forces to Vietnam and the Role of the National Assembly.”

• Managed and Edited by: Youn Ha-eun, EAI Research Fellow
• 문의: 02 2277 1683 (내선 208) hyoon@eai.or.kr

Video Script

hello and welcome to east asia's online seminar uh i'm your son president of east asia institute eai today's topic is present and future of rok us regional cooperation perspectives on quad this is part of the series uh the post-corona world order series uh today's topic what uh quadrilateral security dialogue is a mini lateral security network across the region that draws lots of attention to these days as its role and function have been hotly contested for example as a as a china balancing coordination

i mean coalition versus a functionally oriented one um that uh deals with the challenges uh ranging from uh security i mean non-traditional security uh issues from economic to the pandemic accordingly and uh more than ever the positioning of south korea vis-a-vis the court is hotly contested within the policy circle in in this country as we will discuss today uh the quad actually is still uh in the making so uh the issue for for example our south korea whether uh the country enters the quad or not

must move beyond an immediate cost-benefit analysis of entry but to be projected in a broader and longer-term perspective considering the future of quad uh great power rivalry and south korea's long-term foreign policy to discuss this topic today uh i'm honored and and and pleased to be able to host excellent panelists from the united states and korea we feature three speakers our first speaker is dr evan feigenbaum who is vice president for studies at the carnegie institute for international peace he is also a

practitioner senior fellow at the miller center of public policy at the university of virginia with phd in chinese politics are from stanford his career has been spent you know government services think tank private sector and three regions of asia from 2001 to 9 he served at the u.s state department as deputy assistant secretary of state for south asia and deputy assistant secretary of state for central asia and the member of the policy step uh planning staff with uh principal uh responsibility for east asia and the

pacific um and he's been uh he was an advisor on china to uh deputy secretary of state robert selig he is the author of three books and many monographs including uh united states in the new asia and china's techno warriors as well as numerous articles and essays uh so uh thank you uh so much for joining us uh our second speaker uh is ambassador uh sungla um a career diplomat and i should say that a foremost strategic thinker within the ministry of foreign affairs he served in the ministry for 35 years and most recently he was the

ambassador to russia he served as a director general for the north american affairs bureau uh chief negotiator in the six party talks and a special representative for the korean peninsula peace and security affairs his you know major publications include a russia report and proposal to upgrade korean diplomacy a phd in political science he is currently a visiting uh professor at the korea national diplomatic academy uh thank you so much for uh you know joining i'm sharing this time uh with us and our

third speaker uh is professor jejuck park a professor at the graduate school of international and area studies uh at the hanguk university of foreign studies dr park is is a phd at uh from uh australia national university and he worked as a visiting professor at the institute of foreign affairs and national security and a research fellow uh former research fellow at the korean institute for national unification he's an active member of eai with research including u.s led alliance network in the region regional security order

australian security politics and u.s north korean relations last but not least professor sanyon ma at of catholic university of korea is moderating today's panel dr ma served uh foreign ministry as director general for uh policy planning from 2016 to 19.

um he was a visiting fellow at brookings and a public policy scholar at the woodrow wilson center before and he served as a dean of international affairs at the catholic university of korea his main interest of research in closed east asian politics u.s foreign policy diplomatic history and the history of cold war with that well before passing the mic to the moderator let me express my gratitude to the ministry of foreign affairs rok for sponsoring this event then let me pass the mic to sanyon mar who is coming uh very soon

hello everyone good morning and good have good evening i i'm very much honored to moderate this very important session today the quad is kind of a hot uh potato in a foreign policy discussion in seoul and i think in washington as well we have three distinguished panelists to present their views on hard and related issues uh without further ado i will ask uh dr evan feigenbaum to present their his view i'll give him about 13 minutes first well thanks everyone and uh good to see everyone in seoul obviously i miss korea i miss all my

many friends but it's good to be with you uh virtually and i'm grateful to the east asia institute for sponsoring this and for inviting me to join you um let me let me just start by telling you what i think the key problem is not just for the quad but for asian geometry of all kinds and to put it simply it's this too much form too little function or to put that a little differently the key problem as i see it over two decades of forming pan-asian and trans-pacific groups of all kinds varieties and sizes

is that the form of the thing which is to say holding meetings issuing joint statements formalizing a process has tended to predominate and so the groups that have formed including but not limited to the quad too often find themselves meeting regularly but then groping for purpose and there's an irony in that because we often hear that asia unlike europe has too little architecture but my own view is that the region in fact has too much architecture but mostly of the wrong kind it's got a lot of

variable geometry but not a geometry that's been especially purposeful and certainly not always effective now the problem at least analytically i think seems pretty simple that too many groups too often fail to pool the efforts of those with the greatest capacity in a focused and problem-solving endeavor and so what we've ended up with is a lot of emphasis on what i would call variable geometry the geometry of bilaterals or trilaterals or quadrilaterals or sometimes more than quadrilaterals accompanied by

a two easy presumption including by the way here in the united states that if you just formalize a group and you pull up seats around a table somehow you will get meaningful solutions to asia's most pressing problems but the fact is that at least in my experience the reverse has often been true and so in too many of the pressing crises that we've seen since the 1990s from the east timor crisis to the avian influenza epidemic to the myanmar cyclone and even frankly in the asian financial crisis uh

formalized groups have played either too little or too ineffective or in some cases no problem-solving role at all and so instead what we end up with is what i would call ad hoc regional coalitions often assembled by the united states that have helped to spur collective action so with that as context that brings me to the quad because as i see it we now risk with the quad falling into the same trap and this is an argument that i've been making in washington on the american end now that would be ironic because it is

not in fact how the quad grouping began uh after all in 2004 17 years ago the initial informal quad which is to say a quad with a lowercase letter q instead of a formalized capital letter q launched a joint response to a very tangible very definable functionally specific and urgent crisis which was the 2004 indian ocean earthquake and tsunami and so that group provided rapid and effective relief to injured and displace people all around the indian ocean rim but remember that that group had no formal meetings

it did not hold summits it did not issue joint communiques it did not have a secretariat in fact it celebrated its incredible success how by putting itself out of business and disbanding after nine days so today by contrast when i look at the quad that's emerging it is rapidly becoming much more formalized uh it's turning into a quad with as i said a capital q it holds meetings it's discussed a variety of joint initiatives but the group as i said has in my view too often grow for purpose and instead of a lowercase q

quadrilateral that responds jointly to specific challenges the four have been united at least in the last few years largely by their shared suspicion of the rise of chinese power in particular and the fact that they meet and get together to discuss it so the true test for the quad therefore will be whether the group can work together as what i would call the firm core of an elastic regional architecture in other words a group that works jointly and not just alone as a spur to regional collective

action on an array of specific and real-world functional challenges by increasing areas of alignment and cohesion with a larger community of potential problem-solving partners now that is not the same thing to my mind as what people are calling quad plus quad plus with a capital q and a capital p which again to me is much more focused on the form than on the function rather if you focus on the function it means reconceptually reconceptualizing the quad as kind of the core of a set of ad hoc coalitions that bring in a

changing cast of partners where needed depending on the issue and depending on who has the capacity and the will to help solve an actual functional problem now there are a lot of problems like that in the indo-pacific and we can talk about that and the quad summit in my view made a good start the one that president biden convened by picking out a few of those issues supply chain resilience uh vaccine distribution climate change and green technology and there's a pretty good set of other examples in the region of how

mission-focused groupings that begin in an informal but as i said function specific way then grow over time the best example of that i think is the way that the so-called comprehensive and progressive trans-pacific partnership began if you remember it began with another group of four first movers within the larger apec forum brunei chile new zealand and singapore because they sensed correctly that other countries might have an interest in liberalizing trade but we're not yet ready to move and so the four as first movers became a

kind of spur to subsequent regional collective action with others by pushing forward a positive original agenda not just a negative one and then inviting others to subsequently join so that brings me to my conclusion and then i'll stop now in the quad case what that means is that the issue to me is not so much whether korea would join in the sense of joining a standing group which is the way you framed it but rather whether and how on specific issues and functions the four will find the wherewithal and

the will to reach out to korea and then whether in turn korea wants to be the driver on specific functions lending its very considerable capacity and will to the quad effort on some of those challenges and sometimes spurring the quad to action so illustratively those that best implicate the interest and capacity of korea i think are maybe these five one supply chain resilience two the governance of cross-border data access and transfers three countering disinformation for sharing public health and biomedical

best practices and sometimes not so best practices and then fifth scaling green technologies and diversifying the use of green bonds and other green credit products so to conclude the bottom line for me is this if it's going to endure which it may not and if it's going to meaningly solve meaningfully solve problems which it yet may not the quad ultimately needs to figure out how not just at one summit but on a sustained basis to shift its focus from form to function because if other countries in asia

starting with but not limited to korea view it as little more than a talk group to discuss the risk posed by china's rise while occasionally holding joint military exercises i personally think it's unlikely that anybody else in the region will see the utility two to three years hence or view it as a model for their own choices and conduct so my view is it needs to be as i said the firm core of an elastic architecture that is function specific and that looks for areas of alignment and cohesion and

if it does that that's the best interest that's the best path in my view for advancing the functional interest of the quad but also promoting development in the indo-pacific and that i think that's where korea's opportunity is um and that's frankly where the multilateralism in the region needs to go in time so why don't i stop there and i hope that's a basis for you poking at me a little bit i'll stop okay very good thank you very much uh for sharing your uh invaluable thought i think uh you're uh raising questions

about the nature of the quad is very important and i think we can follow up in the in the following uh discussions as well okay now we will move on to ambassador sungla we ambassador we thank you mr moderator allow me to uh begin with a broader perspective on the subject before i zoom in on the quad issue korea has taken an ambiguous position amid the u.s china competition for a long time which has led the u.s and china to try to pull korea on their side whenever an issue arises korea takes sides with the u.s or

china on a case-by-case basis as a result the u.s has grown dissatisfied with its stance of allies south korea china has raised expectations that it can pull korea further the third episode is a graphic example of this phenomenon now that the u.s china competition is an overall and overwhelming external environment in asia it is becoming more and more difficult for korea to settle on an etiquette ambiguous uh behavior the situation requires korea to settle on an on a guiding principle for policy

options between the u.s and china that would prevent korea from facing intensified push and pull from the u.s and china that would also help korea develop a healthy relations with the us as well as china on top of that a carefully designed guiding principle would enhance the soul's bargaining position vis-a-vis washington over peninsular issues now seoul is trying to talk the biden administration into flexibility to restore the u.s north korea diagonal if seoul works out a principle on policy direction between the u.s and

china that could reduce in induce a good will from washington seoul's argument on the north korea related issue would be more persuasive to washington's year the first thing to keep in mind when korea tries to set the principle between the us and china is that the u.s is an ally and china is a partner that falls short of an ally the next thing to consider is the united states is much closer to korea than china in terms of value the last thing to consider is the geopolitical reality surrounding

the peninsula so etiquette stands for seoul will be one that is closer to washington but not too distant from beijing figuratively speaking if the u.s tries to pull korea in the direction of three o'clock and china tries to pull korea in the direction of nine o'clock korea should choose a policy line closer to the ally the u.s at one o'clock or 1 30.

it does not necessarily mean that korea should choose either the us or china but rather the coordinate and direction of its own this work will give korea's policy consistency and predictability uh thus stabilizing source of relations with china and the u.s that said let's talk about uh quad keeping in mind the one o'clock or 130 direction i would advise that korea should remain basically open to emerging multilateral architecture promoted by the united states in the region of course there is a cost of joining

quad considering the negative stance of the chinese toward quad however there could be a more cost of being out of quad so non-participation in part is not an option of career therefore it is appropriate for korea to work with quad one way or another it's worth noting that japan australia and india are all participating in what even though they have different coordinates and positions between the us and china because of the differences among the participants quad focuses on collective actions in

functional and non-security areas such an approach seems to be useful to gain wider support and participation further if quad maintains the current form of the loose forum the chinese reaction would be unmanageable having said that i would suggest that korea could be either a second-year participant in the format of quad plus or work with a quad on a thematic basis in the initial stage korea can work with quad on economic health environmental humanitarian issues as to the cost of the chinese reaction

korea could manage it by making a constructive role within quad so the quad will not evolve in the extreme direction of an anti-china alliance in the same vein korea has to participate in the emerging economic architecture in the region it is not a good thing that south korea did not participate in the tpp recently president moon jae-in said korea should take part in the cptpp it is related but still a good judgment however korea needs to make its own efforts to prevent such an organization from pursuing excessive

anti-china solidarity let me stop here thank you thank you very much ambassador we uh members ambassador we talked about the the one o'clock or 130 stands with regard to the quad and other regional competition issue between washington and beijing i think this is another very important and very interesting point that it can follow up in the later discussion our third panelist is uh professor jajok park professor park and now flow is yours thanks uh professor mark and i'd like to thank eai for inviting

me to this important event now given the time constraint of eight minutes i'll like uh i'd like to get down to my presentation without any further ado as uh two previous speakers presented we can't deny that quad is an element of china containment also in our claim that at the same time quad is a product of u.s strategy of linking among u.s ladder alliances and security partnerships therefore if south korea would not participate in quad plus south korea would become a second-year ally within the network while japan

will remain as a part of its core group you know we all know that japan has been enhancing security cooperation with some european states like uh great britain and france as well as other quad members u.s india and australia on the other hand if south korea would participate in the quad plus that the current south korean government is concerned that south korea would unnecessarily provoke china as a result of which china might not be cooperating with south korea on resolving the north korean nuclear crisis therefore south korea

should work very fine line between participation and making reservation and participating in the quad class that said a good news is that quad plus is not singular but plural as previous two speakers presented now since november of 2017 when president trump announced the u.s in the pacific strategies there have been a dozen other official quad meetings said at each of the meetings the quad states discussed not only freedom of navigation in south tennessee but also uh such functional issues as infrastructure building maritime

capacity building maritime domain awareness cyber security so on and so forth so then so forth also quad quads does not necessarily mean that all the four states all the four quad states should be involved two or three of the quad states can work with other non-quad members therefore given the variety of issues and the various combination of participating states quad plus for sure is not singular but plural it is wrong to describe quad plus as south korea in south korea joining the quad as fifth members

so in the in my talking points i submitted to eas i listed i listed nine potential of part plus and i discussed these quotes and benefits associated associated with each of them the nine uh quad potential problems are official meetings among highlighting officers for the second infrastructure investment slash post-kobe economic reconstruction third maritime capacity building slash maritime domain awareness for vaccine export group five climate change six critical and emerging deter technology seven codeplus to diversify

supply chain eight quad plus declare universal norms values and democracy nine chord plus to add participants in the existing quad related military exercises so given the time constraint i would not discuss each of them but i would like to make a three points the first point is that quad and quad plus are just one of the many mechanisms for regional security in this region china is also engaged in mini security cooperation example is rick russia china russia india and china also china has been exploring the

possibility of trilateral or quadrilateral security cooperation among china russia india iran and pakistan and also south korea has been participating in asean plus three in which china is present but u.s is not present therefore you know south korea should not feel compelled to shun thought plus just because china is not present the second point i would like to make is that south korea should publicize south korea's participation in various called plus tomorrow now south korea's good record of participating in

cod plus would enable south korea to engage with china in northeast asia so for example south korea and the united states has been have been coordinating on their investment for infrastructure building in the in the in the pacific in the context of final nexus between south korea's new southern policy and united states indo-pacific strategy since south korea has been cooperating with the united states in infrastructure investment south korea was able to join china's bri conditionally if south korea had not cooperated

coordinated with the united states in in in infrastructure building if n and south korea joined had joined the china's pri the united states would have perceived or misperceived that uh south korea trying to uh till toward the chinese strategic orbit likewise in the case of maritime capacity building if south korea in a coordinates with quad members for maritime capacity building in the region that will enable south korea to engage with china in northeast asia even security wise south korea can conduct joint military

exercises with china in lucis asia under the name of responding to non-traditional security issues the third point i'd like to make is that we should approach the quad and quad plus from the angle of strengthening u.s led security network in that sense you know restoring the south korea japan united states trilateral security cooperation should be considered as south korea effort to contributing the u.s quad plus strategies now by strengthening it south korea can claim that can claim to the united states that uh

south korea indeed cooperate with the united states with respect to the quad and the quad plus so given the time constraint i stopped here and looking for the our discussion okay thank you very much professor park uh prophet park professor bach uh raised uh an issue of uh the quad plus and he emphasized that quad plus is not a singular one rather it is a more uh plural one and and and in which there are uh many rooms uh for cooperation that uh south korea can part take part in okay uh i'd like to thank all of the uh

presenters uh for sharing their insightful insights with us and now i'd like to begin addressing some of the questions that our audience raised during the seminar and invite our speakers to respond to them uh our first question to the panelists is the the relationship between the issues of quad and south korea and united states uh alliance how those two are uh linked and uh with regard to that uh additional question is how the quality issue will be featured in the upcoming uh the the summit between president

biden and president moon jae-in scheduled in uh later this month i think all of the the participants may address the questions why don't mr feigenbaum start with well i'm not uh so i would i was going to suggest some luck take this one i mean i i um i think the principal issues for the visit for president moon are largely bilateral in nature i think there's a lot of work actually that needs to be done on the alliance and particularly with the new administration and it's important to to shore up some of to shore up and

and address some of the issues that have emerged over the last couple of years um so to my mind that's really where the priority needs to be uh and then of course the new administration is about to announce the results of its north korea policy review um and that'll feature heavily in the discussion i don't think the quad will be front and center notwithstanding the attention we're giving to it now and i don't think the central issues between the us and korea right now really involve uh multilateral architecture in the

region i think the priority is and should be on the alliance itself the united states frankly it the u.s phase we could talk about this later if you'd like but i think the united states faces a broader set of structural challenges in the region that it's adjusting to and part of the problem it has now is that it's viewing asia increasingly through the prism of u.s china relations and of its issues with china rather than the other way around whereas my former boss rich armitage used to say the former deputy secretary

said if you want to get asia right sorry if you want to get china right and you're american you need to get your asia policy right but over the last few years increasingly the us has made relationships policies and initiatives in asia derivative of its agenda and priorities with china and i think it would be a mistake uh to look at the us korea bilateral in that context and so my view is that's really where the hard work has to be on the upcoming visit okay thank you very much uh ambassador we what do you think about

the questions um let me put these two questions together and try to answer all together because these two issues are linked in one way or another let me begin with uh biden administration's uh major concern in asia biden administration is trying to rebuild america's leadership in asia and the the main focus of this to policy is uh on china in order to lead competition with china in its favor the united states is trying to um build up alliance relationship and refresh alliance relationship among them uh rob us alliance

so in the upcoming summit meeting between president moon jae-in and president joe biden the u.s will try to strengthen bilateral alliance with south korea and the ultimate direction beyond this effort is to to strengthen its asia policy to be more precisely speaking a china policy and quad in american strategic thinking is a part of its asia policy or china policy so quad is in the american thinking is related to the iraq u.s alliance and that could be a subject of discussion in the upcoming summit

if not the the key agenda items what i want to say is that the quad issue will be handled in the upcoming summit by the united states in the context of asia policy china policy and a rough u.s alliance issue that is why i'm suggesting that korea has to settle specific directions in the course of u.s chinese competition if not that will weaken the korea's bargaining position with the united states more specifically in the upcoming uh u.s summit meeting thank you all right uh professor park your turn

uh yes uh South Korea's official position has been so far that the U.S. has never asked South Korea to join the club. Plus, I don't think in the upcoming summer meetings between President Biden and President Moon, I don't think President Biden would ask South Korea to join the Quad Plus. Indeed, Quad Plus is not a formal institution, as uh Dr. Feigenbaum uh commented. Quad Plus is Quad is in the process of being formalized, but yet Quad does not is not a formal institution, so that I don't think the U.S. can uh can

join South Korea. So, the U.S. can access Korea during the Quad Plus. That said, again, I think we should approach the Quad while the Quad Plus with a larger angle of us linking among the U.S.-led alliances and security partners. So, very likely that at the upcoming summit meeting, President Biden would ask President Moon Jae-in to restore the relationship between South Korea and Japan, so that are strengthening the trilateral security cooperation between Japan and the United States and South Korea. So, we should understand this

as a part of, you know, Quad Plus. Thank you. Okay, here is our second question from the audience. There's a suggestion that South Korea may take part in cooperation with Quad in the field of non-security cooperation, trying to avoid getting into the security agenda. Do you think this is possible, and and in what kind of an areas are promising for and South Korea's participation? I think some of the questions are already addressed by uh Professor Park, so I would like to ask uh Professor Park to speak first.

Now, there again, I mean, there are functional areas uh South Korea can uh participate in without walking on eggshells around China. It's like infrastructure building and maritime capacity building, vaccine, climate change. Those are functional areas. Now, in case of the climate change, in a President Xi Jinping agreed to participate in the conference organized by the United States. But there are areas of between traditional security and non-traditional security issues. A I think they did the casing point in maritime capacity building because U.S.

has been providing uh not only uh used ships and uh airplanes but also ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets to regional states. If South Korea joins them in providing them to regional states, China might think that South Korea has been fully cooperating with the United States. But the thing is that South Korea also has huge economic interests in contributing to maritime capacity building because, you know, it often leads to South Korea's export of arms to to regional states. So, again, so there are areas South

Korea can participate in without walking on eggshells around China, and you know, there are areas that South Korea should be cautious. So, South Korea should be very selective in this, right? So, Professor Park suggested there there can be a kind of selectivity that South Korea uh can uh get into uh cooperation with Quad. Uh uh Ambassador We, uh do you do you agree with him? With uh does the the opinion from Professor Park? Yes, I agree with Professor Park and further with uh Evan, Mr. Evan Feigenbaum. Both presenters suggested

a very useful and nitty-gritty area of non-traditional cooperation. I believe there are many, many issues for Korea to work with Quad in various forms, particularly non-security areas are less sensitive and more useful to begin with. The key question here is whether uh the region could work out a collective action platform that can deal with potential problems the region requires to face. In that sense, Quad with non-security area cooperation is a good platform for for the country in the region, right? Uh the same question to Mr. Feigen-

baum. Well, I think all three of us are agreeing. I mean, obviously, there's a basis for functional cooperation in Korea, and some of those functions ought to be part of it. And the reason for that, as I said, is very simple. I mean, there there's not really a single functional problem in Asia that only those four countries in the Quad can solve working by themselves. Climate change, you need other players. Counter narcotics, you need other players. Maritime capacity building, you need other players. Infrastructure, the operations

that matter are addition and multiplication, not subtraction and division. So, actually, you want more players in. So, I think the rationale is there. I think the problem is twofold. One, even among the Quad, there are areas that ought to be ripe for cooperation, but there actually isn't cohesion even among the four. Give an example, I talked about cross-border data access and transfers. You know, increasingly, we're moving toward a digital economy. People in Korea understand that very well. And on issues like data localization

where India increasingly is trying to localize all data, but also on cross-border data access and transfers, even among the Quad countries, there are distinctive models and there's no agreement. You may recall that Prime Minister Abe introduced the so-called Osaka Initiative, which was a cross-water data initiative in the G20 context when Japan was in the G20 chair. Who refused to sign up to it? India refused to sign up to it, and another member of the team, free and open Indonesia, also refused to sign up to it.

So, the first problem is there's insufficient cohesion even on some of the non-security issues that ought to be promising and that are going to be front and center. The second problem is that there's already an existing architecture in some of these economic areas. You just look at trade. For the next generation, regional trade and investment standards are going to be set by two agreements: the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, the RCEP, and the CPTPP, the Comprehensive and Progressive TPP, that don't include who doesn't include

India or the United States in either agreement. So, for all the talk about an Indo-Pacific from the United States as the basis of American strategy in the region, in the economic area, at least, trade and investment standards are being set through agreements that don't include the largest economy in the Indo and also don't include the largest economy across the Pacific. So, what is it to talk about an Indo-Pacific when both the Indo and the Pacific are out? Really, Asia needs to be really at the center of that conception. So, I think

that's that's what I mean in my setup remarks when I talk about form driving function. We need to think functionally about this, and the challenge is first to try to forge cohesion, second to pick the players in a way that reflects capacity and will, and third, my view is really to focus on standard setting in the infrastructure area. For instance, if you're a recipient country, you don't necessarily want just a Chinese package or then a U.S., Indian, Japanese package. You want multiple packages because, as I said,

addition and multiplication are the name of the game. So, the issue there, I think, is really to forge common infrastructure standards, standards around finance, standards around environmental provisions, standards around things like environmental impact assessment. So, that's the kind of thing that the Quad can do in partnership with other major donors and and financiers, and Korea, as Professor Park said, is that it has a major role to play there. So, that's the challenge, but that's also where Korea can play

and I think uh that's why I said a firm core of an elastic architecture provides a good basis for some ad hoc functional cooperation. Okay, we have uh 10 minutes left. I think we can deal with one or two questions more. Let me ask a question to Dr. Feigenbaum first and and and to uh Dr. Park. Uh, what will be the future of the Quad? I think uh Quad is still in the process of evolution. Well, there are many discussions whether or not Quad is a kind of coalition of countries to mainly uh contain China or not, or as you just suggested,

Quad can be a kind of vehicle for corp to promote corporations among the regional countries. What direction do you think Quad will be taking uh in the future, and what will be the end state of uh the Quad uh in in in in 10 years' time? Uh, Dr. uh Park, first. Uh, let's make uh two points on that question. First is now, what I call the Quad Quad dilemma is that the United States wants to maintain it as a China containment, but the dilemma is that in order to maintain a China, in order to retain it as a China containment mechanism,

the United States should operate it uh in a way that not to be perceived as a China containment. You know, as uh Dr. uh Feigenbaum uh pointed out, it's very incohesive, mini-lateral cooperation among the four states. So, India and the U.S. area would like to see I would like to make Quad to be perceived as a China containment, so that uh the U.S. is going to activate many, a number of Quad Plus uh based up for the cooperation on non-functional issues. That's my first point. The second point is that Quad and Quad Plus in 10 years would be just

one of again, many, many uh regional mini-lateral security cooperation. I think uh Quad uh and Quad Plus have been uh highlighted out of our out of proportion uh now. So, we should pay, I would say, less attention to Quad or Quad Plus, but we should approach this in a larger context of U.S. strengthening U.S.-led mini-lateral alliances and security partnerships. All right. Thank you very much. Uh, related question to Mr. Feigenbaum. Uh, you have uh suggested that the Quad should be more like an ad hoc coalition of

among among uh countries rather than being a more formalized uh platform. But then how, how can those uh countries, you know, with an ad hoc uh nature, uh can coordinate their uh, you know, uh directions uh as a kind of a common entity? Well, I think you heard me a little bit wrong. I don't mean that the foursome itself will be ad hoc. That's why I called it the firm core of an elastic regional function-specific architecture. So, my thought is that the four ought to have some cohesion, but then strive to be first

movers working with other rotating coalitional partners depending on the function to actually develop some tangible problem-solving capacity. And I think that goes to your last question that Professor Park addressed, because if I, I think it's too early to say what it's going to be. You know, I think it's still evolving, and I think American thinking about it is still evolving. If two years from now, it's just a group of four that gets together and whines about China, it's not going to amount to much. First of all, because that region doesn't

implicate, that agenda doesn't implicate the interests of much of the region, and I'm thinking here particularly about the ASEAN countries, except in specific and distinctive ways. And second, because there's really no basis for collective security within the in the traditional sense of collective security, um, that kind of NATO sense of collective security. So, if you think about it that way, it'll be intrinsically self-limiting. And I think frankly, the problem the United States has is that it's in danger of becoming what I sometimes call

the Hessians of Asia. I don't know if you know the Hessians, but the Hessians were the German mercenaries that the British used in the American Revolution. They were kind of a security provider. The American role as a security provider in Asia is assured over the long term because until there's collective, there's no basis for collective security until China and Japan have a French-German kind of moment. And until that time, the United States was, is, and as far as I can see, is going to continue to be a major security provider

for many, many countries in the region. But U.S. leadership and role in the region shouldn't just be premised on a security pillar; it needs an economic pillar too. And the U.S. role as a demand driver compared to 10, 15, 20 years ago is shrinking. You know, U.S. trade investment is growing in absolute terms, but it's shrinking in relative terms, which means the U.S. needs to lean on its other traditional economic role, which is as a standard setter. But the U.S. has lost that function. It's withdrawn from the TPP, it's not coming

back. Um, and so the U.S. needs to rediscover its role as a standard-setting nation. And that's why I said, to the extent that the Quad can play that role and the U.S. can inject a standard-setting agenda in that on infrastructure, on investment, on environmental standards, it actually has the potential to reinvigorate its role in the region in ways that I think would be far-reaching and enduring and and and address some of that problem of uh the mismatch between security and economics in its strategy. But I think it's too early to say how

that's going to evolve, and I think the thinking about the Quad is very much encoded at this point. All right. Thank you very much. My our last question to Ambassador We, uh, related to the previous ones. Uh, what kind of Korea's national interest can be served by taking uh, as you just mentioned, one o'clock and 1:30 kind of position or stand between China and the United States? What kind of concrete national interest of Korea will be served by taking one o'clock or 1:30 position or stance? Right. The reason why I

suggested that kind of figurative comparison is that figurative comparison gives us very simple and precise directions. If we talk of one o'clock direction as our policy guideline, um, the reaction that participation in the Quad is not a good idea cannot be made because we are leaning slightly toward the ally. In that case, the initial reaction to Quad would be, let's study if there is any area of possible cooperation or let's study if there's any way for Korea to work with the Quad uh without having that kind of guiding

directions, Korea is swayed between China and the United States depending upon the issues in a big way. Once again, if I go back to the figurative comparison, we took ten o'clock direction when we handled the THAAD issue, and then we move to the two o'clock direction, and then back to eleven o'clock, and so on and so forth. That leads us to unhealthy relationships with China and the U.S. because both sides try to strengthen their pressure to pull Korea to their side. So, some kind of guiding principle will help us.

Some may argue that other countries like Japan or Australia or India haven't suggested anything like this, but they have their own coherent, consistent policy directions between the U.S. and China. I would counter-argue this way: Japan may take a twelve o'clock direction figuratively between Beijing and Washington. Australia now somewhere around 2:30. India 12:30.

In those countries, there haven't been any such suggestions to go in that direction of 2 o'clock, 2:30, or 12:30, but the national discussion on this particular issue works out the kind of general consensus. But in case of Korea, our process of national discussion over foreign policy and national security is flawed. Our mechanism cannot work out proper, consistent, coherent policy directions. In our mechanism, depending upon the situation, policy choices will be swayed by the strength of pressure from the other capitals

for example, from Beijing or from Washington. So, for that matter, we need an artificial direction to prevent extreme sway, to prevent inconsistency. Okay. Thank you very much, Ambassador We, and uh Dr. Feigenbaum and Professor Park. We are running out of time now, and I'd like to uh wrap up now. Thank you for the panelists to sharing for sharing their very insightful insights and valuable opinions with us. We truly appreciate your efforts and hoping to host you again in the near future. And before you leave, all the audiences

are asked to fill out a brief survey about the seminar. Your feedback will be very helpful to improve our webinar in the future. The survey can be found in the public poll option below. Thank you all for joining us today, and we look forward to other EAI online seminars in the future. Thank you very much. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Moderator, and participants. Thanks very much. Good to be with you. Do do do do do.

Attachment: TheQuadandaPathforSouthKorea.pdf