[EAI Online Seminar] COVID-19 and the New World Order 2. Post-COVID-19 Asia-Pacific Order: A No-Win US-China Competition, Middle Power Solidarity, and Multilateral Solutions

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1ISuzALd920

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The East Asia Institute (EAI) held the second session of its online seminar series, "COVID-19 and the New World Order," titled "Post-COVID-19 Asia-Pacific Order." At this session, Professor T.J. Pempel from the University of California, Berkeley, Professor G. John Ikenberry from Princeton University, Professor Evelyn Goh from the Australian National University, and Professor Jaesung Lee (Director of EAI) from Seoul National University discussed the future of the Asia-Pacific order, including the new phase of COVID-19 and US-China competition, post-election US strategy in the Asia-Pacific, and the role of middle powers.

• Date: Friday, June 19, 2020, 9:00–10:40 (KST)
• Speakers: T.J. Pempel (Jack M. Forcey Professor of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley), G. John Ikenberry (Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs, Princeton University), Evelyn Goh (Shedden Professor of Strategic Policy Studies, Australian National University), Jaesung Lee (Director of EAI Center for National Security Studies; Professor of International Relations, Seoul National University)
• Moderator: Suk-Jong Lee (Senior Fellow at EAI; Professor of Public Administration, Sungkyunkwan University)

Who is the winner in the US-China competition amid the COVID-19 crisis?

• The strategic competition between the United States and China, which has been intensifying across various fields such as trade and technology, has worsened due to the COVID-19 pandemic. As COVID-19 spread globally, both the US and China suffered significant economic and political blows. While the US historically maintained its hegemonic leadership by emphasizing multilateralism and alliances during global crises like the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the 2008 financial crisis, its unilateral response to the COVID-19 pandemic has diminished its leadership role and accelerated the decline of its hegemonic leadership.
• Professor John Ikenberry assesses that the US is facing internal divisions due to the failures in its COVID-19 response and the George Floyd incident, and is incapable of responding to the crisis. Professor T.J. Pempel notes the declining US standing in Asia, as evidenced by Asian countries considering 'travel bubbles' that exclude US airlines, despite successful COVID-19 responses in these nations. Professor Ikenberry predicts that in East Asia, the US will coexist with China as two leading powers, with the US's credibility declining and China leading the regional economy.
• Meanwhile, China, despite its successes in domestic epidemic control, leveraging the pandemic to enhance its regional influence, and strengthening its control over Hong Kong, cannot be considered a true winner in the US-China competition. Professor Jaesung Lee argues that while China has provided health-related public goods to the international community during the COVID-19 pandemic and is engaging in competition by mobilizing material resources and power, it is not prepared to present a new international order with its available resources. Although the global pandemic has clearly been an opportunity for China, it is too early to announce its status as a potential hegemon to the international community. Ultimately, we must consider not just which country will hold hegemonic status, but how great powers will fulfill their roles in the international community.

United States Election, Shrinking US Regional Role Recovery Will it be?

• Professor John Ikenberry evaluates the US presidential election of November 3, 2020, as one of the most significant events in American history since the election of Lincoln in 1860. A crucial issue is how the next US administration will define its role in the international community, balancing a role based on national interests with the role of a hegemonic power that dominates international relations. If President Trump is re-elected, it is estimated that it would take a generation to reverse the erosion of the foundations of public goods. Biden, as a contrast to Trump's political beliefs, symbolizes a multilateral America. While Trump's actions cannot be entirely erased, a Biden administration will strive to return the US to its pre-Trump era.
• Professor T.J. Pempel agrees with the opinion that a Biden administration would be more receptive to a multilateral approach in the Asia-Pacific region than the current Trump administration. He emphasizes the importance of the Asia-Pacific region and suggests that policies similar to the Obama administration's Asia policy are likely, with an emphasis on multidimensional economic, diplomatic, and educational regional policies. However, the challenges facing the US are not merely a "Trump problem" that can be solved by a Democratic victory. Professor Pempel argues that the current US situation is not an issue of Trump himself but a logical outcome of extremism within the Republican Party, which has become a party symbolizing plutocracy and populism. The Republican Party implements tax cuts and deregulation for the wealthiest 1-2% while also pursuing welfare policies for evangelical Christians, thus reinforcing an 'a la carte multilateralism' agenda. In this context, there is no singular grand strategy for the US, and policies of the Republican and Democratic parties must be questioned individually. Furthermore, the overarching "singular grand strategy of the US" has effectively been lost, which will ultimately constrain US foreign policy.
• Regardless of who wins the election, domestic economic recovery will be a primary policy agenda for the United States. Professor John Ikenberry diagnoses that Biden's top priorities will be strengthening US alliances and recovering the US economy, followed by policies towards China. To build international coalitions and fulfill the role of a global leader, it is crucial to find solutions for domestic divisions and rebuild economic capacity. Professor Evelyn Goh agrees with Professor Ikenberry, arguing that the US must recover its domestic economy to engage in techno-nationalist competition with China in the Asia-Pacific and must continue to develop cutting-edge technologies.
• From a foreign policy perspective, Professor T.J. Pempel explains that the US's tough stance on China is a campaign tactic of the Trump administration and arguably its only strategy in its diplomacy with Asia. Professor John Ikenberry asserts that even if Biden wins, China containment will continue, and an ideological competition will unfold between the principles of US liberal democracy and China's assertive authoritarianism. Biden will emphasize agendas such as human rights, democracy, freedom of the press, and individual rights, seeking to rebuild alliances and renew US-led partnerships. Professor Ikenberry advocates for an alliance of liberal democratic countries, including South Korea and Australia, to restore liberal and multilateral order.
• Professor Evelyn Goh points out the "uncomfortable situation" where China is making significant efforts to court regional countries without success, while regional countries are requesting US leadership, but the US remains mired in self-centeredness and unilateralism. The next US administration must first prioritize domestic economic recovery, second, recognize that East Asian countries cannot escape China's shadow indefinitely, unlike the US, and third, make efforts to establish crisis management mechanisms between the US and China, similar to those during the Cold War.
• Professor Jaesung Lee discussed the importance of how the new US administration will define its role in the international community, balancing a role based on national interests with the role of a hegemonic power. It has become clear that in the fundamentally changing world order of the 21st century, no single country can assume the role of hegemon. It is crucial for the US to redefine its role to facilitate meta-governance, enabling all countries to pursue global governance together, rather than attempting to maintain its previous hegemonic role.

Put to the Test

• Professor John Ikenberry pointed out that while the US-China competition amid the global pandemic has aspects of a confrontation between democratic and authoritarian governments, the issue is not so simple as to be definitively categorized. Just as there are democratic countries struggling with epidemic control, such as the US and Brazil, and the UK, alongside successful cases like South Korea and New Zealand, democratic governments operate in diverse forms, leading to different approaches to epidemic response. In contrast, while authoritarian regimes like China can respond swiftly to certain issues during crises such as pandemics, this does not mean that democratic governments lag behind authoritarian regimes. Authoritarian regimes may show speed in problem-solving, but they can also block media and information flow and implement national lockdowns during crises. These measures are unhealthy, and ultimately, open systems under the rule of law with civil society, and pluralistic governments where media and information sharing are guaranteed, will gain consensus. Democracies with electoral systems can legally eliminate societal ills and start anew. In these countries, leaders can be replaced through elections if they are unsatisfactory. To date, these countries have demonstrated the legitimacy and sustainability of their systems. While many democratic governments have shown shortcomings in their epidemic control processes recently, in the long term, the success stories of democratic governments over more than 200 years will serve as an advantage in demonstrating the robustness of the system.
• Professor Jaesung Lee views the so-called liberal international order not as something created by the United States, but as one formed with the support of US allies and other middle powers. These countries preferred an order centered around US leadership over the disorder defined by unpredictable geopolitical competition and the absence of multilateral agreements, and overt power politics. The most crucial factor for the US to maintain its leadership is whether it will allow middle powers to play a co-architectural role. This goes beyond mere followership; only by building an inclusive and sustainable architecture at both global and regional levels can the US gain the support of middle powers in Asia.
• The liberal international order was a package that included a clear strategy for addressing security threats, support programs for allies, and a firm ideological vision for the future. As the US-China competition divides the region, the regional order is likely to become increasingly retaliatory. Establishing multilateral mechanisms to prevent economic warfare and geopolitical coercion is crucial for maintaining the liberal order. The US needs to consult with its allies and strategic partners on how to prepare for non-liberal actions such as geopolitical coercion and retaliation.

US-China Strategic Competition Amid Multilateralism's Necessity

• During the SARS outbreak in 2003 and the swine flu pandemic in 2009, the US and China cooperated on a multilateral basis in the East Asia region. However, in the current COVID-19 crisis, the US and China are weaponizing the pandemic for their own interests. As the decline of US hegemonic leadership accelerates due to the COVID-19 pandemic, there is a possibility that a counter-movement against efforts to rebuild multilateral cooperation will emerge in the US in the long term.
• Professor T.J. Pempel assessed that President Trump is attempting to influence the global liberal order, Asia-Pacific economic cooperation, and security cooperation among allies in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. He diagnosed that while Asian countries are moving away from embedded mercantilism and pursuing closer economic cooperation, multilateralism, and expanded market openness for over 30 years while easing security tensions, the US is exhibiting unilateralism, a "America First" policy, xenophobia, and nationalism, and is showing aversion to multilateral approaches to Asian issues.
• Professor Jaesung Lee also observed that the US has reduced its leadership role by turning to unilateralism and distrusting multilateralism in its response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Since the post-Cold War era, crises have occurred approximately every decade: 9/11, the 2008 financial crisis, and the COVID-19 pandemic. In response to 9/11 and the 2008 financial crisis, the US led the "coalition of the willing" and the G20, where the role of alliances was crucial. In contrast, the Trump administration, in response to the third global crisis, COVID-19, criticized the World Health Organization (WHO) and eventually announced its withdrawal, shifting blame to China.
• To cope with future crises, the US needs to take on the role of meta-governance, establish a comprehensive supply mechanism for international public goods, promote multilateralism, and persuade China through joint leadership.

Intensifying US-China Competition Amid the Asia-Pacific Middle powers Role

• Professor John Ikenberry posited that due to the interdependence between the two great powers, the United States and China, the Asia-Pacific region would not be dominated by any single great power, and a situation where the influence of both countries coexists would persist. Within this context, he suggested that such a 'dual hegemony' could provide leverage for middle powers such as South Korea, Japan, ASEAN, Australia, and India, enabling them to influence regional balance-of-power politics.
• Professor T.J. Pempel noted the ongoing discourse surrounding the 'Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy (FOIP)' as a framework to unite regional countries based on the values of democracy and open market economies. This discourse persists amidst the strengthening regional influence of middle powers like South Korea, Japan, and Australia, evidenced by their participation in economic agreements such as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), as well as their investments in infrastructure and development.
• Professor Evelyn Goh suggests that alternatives to mitigate US-China competition can be found not in a third great power or a bloc of nations, but in a pluralistic regional environment where diverse actors and dialogue channels coexist. In this regard, she views middle powers in the region, including South Korea, Australia, Japan, and Indonesia, as capable of playing roles such as pursuing substantive cooperation with various countries, building institutional frameworks and capacities, fostering domestic stability and economic potential, and monitoring the stability of adjacent regions.
• South Korea has demonstrated an active stance in middle power diplomacy, notably through its participation in MIKTA and other middle power consultations. Professor John Ikenberry observed that South Korea possesses the potential to lead cooperation in areas such as economy, sustainable development, environment, and security, and to spearhead cooperation among liberal democratic nations as a model country in its COVID-19 response. ■

■ T.J. Pempel_ Jack M. Forcey Professor of Political Science at the University of California at Berkeley. He earned his Ph.D. from Columbia University. He is a member of the Japan-U.S. Friendship Commission and an active participant in the Northeast Asian Cooperation Dialogue. From 2002 to 2006, he served as Director of the Institute of East Asian Studies and held the Il Han New Chair of Asian Studies at UC Berkeley. He also concurrently served as the Boeing Professor of International Studies in the Jackson School of International Studies at the University of Washington. His main research areas include Asian and international finance, and the decline of security bipolarity. His books include Remapping East Asia: The Construction of a Region; Regime Shift: Comparative Dynamics of the Japanese Political Economy (both by Cornell University Press); Security Cooperation in Northeast Asia and The Economic-Security Nexus in Northeast Asia (both by Routledge). He also edited Two Crises; Different Outcomes (Cornell University Press), which examines Asia's experiences during the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis and the 2008-09 global financial crisis. He was scheduled to publish Region of Regimes: Prosperity and Plunder in the Asia-Pacific in 2021 and has authored approximately 120 articles and contributions.

■ G. John Ikenberry_ Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University. He received his Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Chicago. He is a co-director of Princeton's Center for International Security Studies and a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. He is also a Global Eminence Scholar at Kyung Hee University. His books include A World Safe for Democracy: Liberal Internationalism and the Crises of Global Order (Yale, 2020), Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American System (Princeton, 2011), and Crisis of American Foreign Policy: Wilsonianism in the 21st Century (Princeton 2009). His book After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars (Princeton, 2001) received the Schroeder-Jarvis Award for the best international history/politics book from the American Political Science Association in 2002. He has authored over 130 articles and contributions and served as the 72nd Eastman Visiting Professor at Balliol College, Oxford. Notably, in a recent survey of international relations (IR) scholars, Professor Ikenberry was ranked 10th among the top IR scholars for research output over the past 20 years and 8th for the most interesting research output over the past 5 years.

■ Evelyn Goh_ Shedden Professor of Strategic Policy Studies at the Australian National University. She earned her Ph.D. in International Relations from the University of Oxford. She serves as the Director of Research at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre and Chair of the Graduate Research and Development Network on Asian Security (GRADNAS). She previously held faculty positions at Royal Holloway University of London, the University of Oxford, and the Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore. Her publications include The Struggle for Order: Hegemony, Hierarchy and Transition in Post-Cold War East Asia (Oxford University Press, 2013); ‘Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia: Analyzing Regional Security Strategies’, International Security 32:3 (Winter 2007/8):113-57; and Constructing the US Rapprochement with China, 1961-1974 (Cambridge University Press, 2004). She also edited Rising China’s Influence in Developing Asia (Oxford University Press, 2016). Her most recent publication is Re-thinking Sino-Japanese Alienation: History Problems and Historical Opportunities (Oxford University Press, 2020).

■ Chung Jae Sung_ Director of the EAI National Security Research Center and Professor at Seoul National University. He received his Ph.D. in Political Science from Northwestern University and serves as a policy advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Unification. His primary research areas include international political theory, international relations history, the ROK-US alliance, and Korean Peninsula studies. His major books and edited volumes include "Threats of War and Peace Between North and South Korea" (co-authored), "Is Politics Moral?", and "East Asian International Politics: From History to Theory."

■ Lee Sook-Jong_ Senior Fellow and Director at EAI, Professor at Sungkyunkwan University. She earned her Ph.D. in Sociology from Harvard University. She has served as a research fellow at the Sejong Institute, a visiting fellow at the Brookings Institution, a lecturer at Johns Hopkins University, President of the Association for Modern Japanese Studies, a policy advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and President of EAI. Her recent edited volumes include Transforming Global Governance with Middle Power Diplomacy: South Korea’s Role in the 21st Century (editor), Public Diplomacy and Soft Power in East Asia (co-editor), "The Second Act of Globalization: Korean-Style Globalization and New Concepts" (co-editor), and "Conditions for Presidential Success in 2017" (co-editor).

Media Coverage

"If Trump is re-elected, it will take another generation for the US to find its role."

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Video Script

Hi and welcome to East Asia Institute, a webinar you host. Your Zone, President of EAI. It is my pleasure to welcome all of you to today's seminar that discusses order transformation in the Asia-Pacific, great power competition, and middle power roles in the region. I'm very pleased to report that at this moment, some 300 people are connected from 13 different countries. That includes not just, you know, Asia-Pacific, but also countries like in Austria, Portugal, and Kenya. So thank you so much for joining us. And also, we feature

four great scholars: T.J. Pempel of UC Berkeley, Evelyn Goh of Australian National University, Chesham Chan of Seoul National University, and John Ikenberry of Princeton University. Our presentation will last for about 100 minutes, and this webinar will be recorded, and we'll be sure to share it on our YouTube channel and the website. Before we begin, I have an acknowledgement. This virtual seminar series has been and will be supported by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, South Korea, and DSL, which is a financial

support group for the EAI. I would like to thank you for your support. With that, I'm pleased to hand it over to today's moderator, Sook-Jong Lee, who is a Sungkyunkwan University professor and a senior fellow of EAI. Actually, my predecessor, she served as the president of EAI for the past decade, and she is the leading expert in democratic cooperation in Asia, East Asia international relations, and public opinion survey. This is so germ from Seoul, Korea. And first of all, I'd like to congratulate the president, Sonia, for hosting this

excellent and very timely webinar. In this month's already four great speakers are mentioned, so I we're not going to repeat their great achievements. And then, however, because I had to show them in individually, let me call their names. Our first speaker is Professor T.J. Pempel, who is the Jack M. Forcey Professor of Political Science in UC Berkeley. Welcome, Professor Pempel. Are you doing very nicely? Like ever, Ruby's Bellick? Yeah, it's it's very international living on the scholar because we all read the here, it's very

East Asian regionalism. Now, second speaker is again, internationally well-known scholar in high field, Professor John Ikenberry, who is the Albert Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs in Princeton University. Professor Ikenberry, high grade bookshelf. Oh, okay. And our third speaker is Professor Evelyn Goh, who is the Shedden Professor of Strategic Policy Studies at the Australian National University. Come on, Evelyn. Hi. Thank you. Tom, thank you very much. Our last speaker is

Professor Sanjay Sanjay Singh Chang, who is a professor of Political Science and International Relations at Seoul National University, and also he is chairing the National Security Research Center of East Asia Institute. Thank you so much. Thank you. Yeah, I'm very honored and to moderate the discussion with you all great scholars. And because we have a lounge of discussion under the big team, so each speaker may have about three to four minutes. But don't try to speak four minutes, it's strange. Maybe it's good to speak about three minutes. And then I

will give you a very short follow-up questions. And then we have many attendees from all over the world to hear the opinions of great scholars like you. So we'll have a Q&A session at the end. But the attendees, participants, audience, you don't have to wait until the end of this webinar. You can just, you know, write up whatever questions you have. Okay. So without further ado, let us start our first round of discussion on US-China strategic competition amidst COVID-19. Well, already the US-China strategic

competition has been rising before the pandemic, right? And then there was a lot of competition in terms of trade and also technology like artificial intelligence, big data, and many things. And it seems like this COVID-19 had accelerated strategic competition between the two, the US and China. Well, I think I'm observing all these competitions into several angles. In terms of the pandemic itself, the US was hit hard, its worst, and that is leading to the political unrest, especially after the killing of George Floyd. In China,

flattened COVID-19 quite successfully, and the our Chinese are rallying around Xi Jinping with national pride. And if you look at the economic things, I think the Chinese economy was hit harder compared to the US economy if we look at the first quarter of this year's economic performance. If you look at the diplomatic war that the America is condemning China for being responsible for this pandemic, the disseminations, and they even are saying that they're gonna sue China to get the compensation. Of course, it's not possible

because of sovereign nations in the indemnity. Oh, and China is reacting to the USA with very assertive and aggressive warrior diplomacy and with the mask diplomacy and has bri and whatever you call, to Middle Eastern and African countries. So all these things, we'd like to hear your assessment whether the US is losing and economically, politically, even diplomatically, and then whether it's copy the 19, it's gonna accelerate the decoupling between the USA and China. So let me invite Professor Kemper

for comparison of the two countries to the COVID-19 with their responses to the SARS epidemic in 2003 and the swine flu in 2009. In both of these cases, the United States provided considerable help to China. The Chinese and US cooperation was extensive. It extended to building up China's health facilities in cooperation with the United States. Both countries cooperated across all of East Asia for a truly multilateral approach. What we've seen with COVID-19, of course, is two countries that have essentially

weaponized the pandemic for their own national interests. Interestingly enough, in my view, while China was very slow to respond at the local level in dealing with this, soon after the national government became involved, the Chinese response was essentially national government control. It was based on science and technology, and it was also oriented toward dealing globally and regionally with the crisis. So China managed to mobilize 40,000 troops to shut down these parts of the city, extended huge supplies of medical

equipment to the rest of the world. It erected two large temporary hospitals to cope with a crisis. It imposed strict social distancing rules, cooperated with the World Health Organization and the United States in sharing the sequence, the genetic sequence of COVID-19, and agreed to WHO request to send investigators to China. In contrast, the Trump administration ignored the virus for a good eight weeks while Trump himself was out holding campaign rallies and denying that the crisis was anything more than an

extended version of the flu. When the shutdown actually began, the effort was made to paint the Chinese response as inadequate and that China was the one behind this. And the United States essentially ignored the outbreak and the warnings of science. And as a consequence of this and a consequence of its anti-government policies, the Trump administration had decimated the country's scientific, healthcare, and diplomatic apparatus, rundown stockpiles of protective equipment, disdained technical expertise, all as part of a

coordinated assault on state effectiveness that relied exclusively on the states to deal with the virus and basically refused available testing from the WHO, insisted that states lead the response, encourage citizens to so-called liberate state capitals from CDC-inspired shutdowns, and of course, sought to brand the virus as the COVID instead of the COVID-19 virus, the branding is the Wuhan virus, and to paint China as enemy. So in all of these ways, the responses of the two countries were quite different. And not surprisingly, he

confirmed cases in China are up to 83,000 with fewer than 5,000 deaths in comparison to the United States with over 2 million cases and nearly a hundred, over 117,000 deaths. So in all of these cases, the US has been suffering. They've now run up with three trillion dollar enhancement to its national debt, all of which, it seems to me, makes it clear which country is benefiting from their responses to the crisis. And it seems to be one way to look at this is the very interesting proposal that a number of

Asian governments have now had with regard to air transport. They would like to create a safe bubble or a COVID bubble in which they would allow transportation and air travel among those countries in Asia that have dealt with the crisis. But absolutely none of them would allow US planes into or out of the countries. So it seems to me that going forward, China is clearly a country to have benefited the most from this crisis and its response to it, whereas the United States has been clearly a failure. Thank

you, Professor Pempel. So you are suggesting China has benefited from this pandemic crisis. However, some people are thinking if you look at the August on markets in the USA and also the potential to grow in American government, American dollars, and it is a huge financial influence. So do you think that in the long term, maybe by the end of this year and next year, how do we compare economic recovery between USA and China right now? I guess my quick response would be to say that the United States is enjoying a stock market

recovery, and we've seen something close to a V-shaped recovery in the stock market. But the real economy is suffering something in the order of 40 million lost jobs, numerous retail establishments will never open again. We're looking at 20% plus unemployment, and that's the real economy. And it seems to me that going forward, this is not going to change dramatically until we get some version of a vaccine or a very good antiviral. And to the best of my knowledge, this is not likely to happen for at least a year. China having

controlled the virus to a much greater extent has, I think, the capacity to keep its economy going much more effectively than the United States will at this point. So my sense is that the United States economy is going to be in a much worse position than that of China, despite the fact that they can print dollars and that, you know, they have a great deal of financial leverage in the world. But I think the long-run impetus of this is to enhance the power of China, reduce the power of the United States. Okay. And then let me by the Professor I

Ikenberry, Professor Ikenberry has been known to be a strong advocate for the international, the liberal international order. I'm sure he has many things to say. Okay, Professor Ikenberry, thank you very much. Well, it's great to be here and to see my friends on the screen and join this discussion. Let me just say a little bit about how I think the overall US-China relationship may be impacted by the COVID virus and in the broader kind of global context and make three points. Number one, even without the

virus, US-China relations are entering a period of winter, really an ongoing increase in rivalry, competition, enmity, and it's likely to occur, it to continue for some time. And that's partly because there are deep reasons why US and China are are butting heads and will increasingly over the next decade. One is simply the power transition that we're all aware of, the the the fact that in East Asia, we are moving over the course of several decades from an older hegemonic configuration of order with the US at the lead to a more

bipolar, more balance of power system. And it's even more complicated than that, in that China is kind of the center of the region economically, and the US remains very important in terms of security alliances. And then also making that underlying relationship even more fraught is that increasingly China is partly because of the virus, but even before this, under President Xi, stepping forward and articulating a more Chinese, anti-liberal, anti-Western, anti-democratic vision of the future. So what that all means is

that the relationship and the competition is becoming more ideological. It's not just great powers that are competing because of power and interest. There is there's an increase in a sense that the two countries are representative or models. And that I think maybe we'll talk a little bit about that later on, but there are implications that that has that I think we're just beginning to to try to think about. My second point is is this simply that the COVID virus, that pandemic is illuminating and accelerating these trends. And so we are

seeing it before our eyes in real-time, a continuation of of a kind of return to nationalism, nationalist populism, anti-globalist calls for strategic decoupling, and all of this in the context of strategic rivalry among great powers. So I think we're going to see more of that, more walls, more decoupling, more movement away from the kind of high age of interdependence that we've lived through through the 1990s and into the last decade. Then finally, my third point would be, and this is relevant to TJ's point

about the US performance in this crisis, and it has been quite miserable. And I think the United States, in in some sense, for the first time since 1945, this global crisis is a crisis where the United States has not stepped forward and said, we are a global leader, and we are going to organize a coalition of states to tackle this problem. And that's new. And that I think tells the world something about the future and about the uncertainties of American power and leadership. And therefore, it will have not just implications for how each of our

countries separately are together tackle the a virus, but how countries think about their long-term strategic relationships and how much you tie it to the United States, what is the value and and certainty of alliances. And then finally, I'll just end by saying there is a little bit of a silver lining here, and that is that people are are now, I think, having more explicit and sweeping discussions about international order, regional order, and international order. So there's more on the table and there's operative fluidity, if you will, to

diplomacy and possibilities. Now, in the short run, that means more nationalism, more anti-globalism, more enmity. But in the longer term, like in the 1930s and 40s, there will inevitably be, I I believe, through the study of patterns of history, be a counter movement by internationalists in different countries that see the ultimate solution to these problems of modernity, such as the virus, that can only be solved by international cooperation. Can I ask a follow-up question? You mentioned about this sweet international order, maybe it can be

disordered, and then you said there will be more alternative efforts will align up. And some people are talking about the divide all over Europe, but in Asia, we didn't have like a European solidarity, not to the parity of European Union. So can Asian countries can do something in this coming fluid or disordered author in our region? Well, I think the answer is yes. I think that there's a real opportunity here for countries, what would I think maybe we're going to talk about later on, middle countries and their possibilities for cooperation to

create alignments that can be useful in solving problems that are regional and global. I think that's there's a real upside potential there for South Korea, Japan, Australia, countries kind of in-between China and the United States to to to play a role. And I think it's partly because, in my view, I don't think China is doing very well either. So I don't I'm not pleased with the United States response, and there may be there will be an election, the US I think will rebound politically from this. But I think neither country is really showing

great leadership. And so I think there really is an opportunity for countries to - to both work together inside of this system, but also to use their collective leverage to tilt and bargain with the two superpowers - to both create coalitions of the willing and to put pressure on them to step forward in new ways. Thank you, Ikenberry. And then let's invite Professor Hinkle from Australia. Evelyn, three points as well to follow on from what TJ and and John have said. To begin with, I think I, you know, follow up with John's point about

China's greater economic role in the region as compared to the US's security role. I guess I I would put those two things together a bit more and think about that economic security nexus in relation to both their roles. And the US is not just the military power of in the world or in Asia. Its hegemony is absolutely underpinned by economic power and and its vital role in the international economy. As we go forward in the post, you know, dealing with COVID, for me, the most important aspect of the competition between the US and China

is actually the question of how COVID will affect the relative and absolute economic recovery capacities and economic reforms necessary in both economies. In the US case, being a military power and being committed to projection elsewhere in the world absolutely depends upon a continuing economic capacity at home in the United States. This is important both socially as well as economically to keep the ability to commit to other parts of the world. China, on the other hand, of course, is not just an economic power

particularly in Asia anymore all those of us in Asia know this you know and we've seen it with kovat right China is absolutely essential to both creating security and insecurity in the region it is also absolutely essential for ensuring that we can actually have security in the region so I think the two things are bit sort of more tied up than that this segues into my second point which you know sukjong and her very useful preparatory questions asked you know which country do we see is winning this virus accelerated

competition and I see a very curious sort of uncomfortable tie between the US and China right now I don't think either is doing well just as John said we see China pouring effort treasure and might into the contest but it cannot yet win the supporters that it wants not least in its own region in contrast the US has desperate supporters not just in this region but everywhere else in the world just yelling for its leadership but Washington often doesn't even seem to be aware that there is actually a game

afoot so when there's very uncomfortable tuition of that sort of asymmetry on both sides the third point I'd made to keep this conversation going in to push it forward a little bit more I think is this question of what are the alternatives if we have this rather uncomfortable competition in a tie between the US and China are there alternative forces that can unite the world alleviate this contest and I'd say we should probably give up the idea that old-fashioned realist idea that the world cycles

through a succession of great power hegeman's that pass the baton on from one to the other I don't think we're going to see a third party great power or even a grouping of states rising as an alternative force to us-china competition at least I hope not because this type of scenario is usually accompanied by systemic war and this again exactly how the United States found itself unwillingly a global power in 1945 so I think we should look instead more openly to everyone I think the alternative forces that can

alleviate these destructive dynamics will be found I think in a mixture of actors and avenues transnational economic channels coalition's of like-minded governments different coalition's or different like-minded governments with different things alliances among civil society activists from different parts of the world students young people global policy entrepreneurs intellectuals etc I think it's going to be that sort of pluralist forces that will offer alleviation for this contest thank you Elina can I ask this follow-up questions

we've been talking a lot about decoupling of the DJ and China and there is a very skeptical perception from the the market whether is it possible from the forum individual phone respected so politically the the President Trump can say a lot about decoupling but in the market it is very difficult for business to follow the kind of a political discourse second if decoupling is really happening who is winning with losing because China is more dependent on trading with the USA rather than the other way around but at

the same time the domestic demand inside China is replacing the export demand as well so from your perspective if whether decoupling is possible and it is possible and who will have a more economic at this mister Vantage um I think be coupling as always possible most things are possible it's a matter of how much cost you are able and willing to bear so if you look at the debate amongst economists right now it seems to be a sort of idea that we might get you know the confluence of two dynamics going on here one is the

necessary rethinking about things like supply chains in the corporate world we're necessarily going to see a shortening of supply chains particularly in the Asian region where this is possible where you know regional economies have a certain degree of centralized control that that allow governments to very effectively put forward keraton mistakes that can reorient eight corporations and businesses choices in a short amount of time so we'll see the changing and shortening of supply chains anyway that

coupled with the impetus shall we call that I call it that for decoupling between the us-led and Chinese nets economy you know international economies may create its own dynamics certainly in this part of the world that I think will lead us to what at least a more plural economic order if not an absolute be coupled one so I think we will find individual economies including Korea Australia and other economies in the region you know seeking more diverse options for how they produce which consumers

they want to aim for so there's certainly going to be that claw realization and whether or not we end up with a binary decoupling we'll have to see but I think the realization is definitely on the cards Thank You Emily and professor Cheng Jun you waited long but I'm sure you it was very insightful assessment about this competition please thank you I agree to the view that copied 19 crisis was a excellent to the already existing us-china rivalry but what I observed me what is interesting is that the decrease of

multilateral options for American strategic thinking when he go back to the unipolar history we just started in 1991 if we count the breakup of the former Soviet Union now we have 13th anniversary of post-cold war which is unipolarity and there was a great debate about sustainability of Unicode already and during that period I think we had three crises in every every decade actually in the first one 9/11 second 2008 economic recession now called it crisis for the former two crises United States try to multilateral options such

as the Coalition of the Willing or to training with the help of alliances but now we have very much unilateral options for United States not just the States but also for China all the countries the thing is that I think American strategic thinkers think that multilateral options are not that much beneficial to American interests so the question is is any polarity and multilateralism compatible as time goes by because too much burden is on the American side so even though we have the China originated virus but if we think the

virus originated for example in European Ally I think United States response was the same much in your lateral response so how can receive this multilateral options from this international order the second point is that this is a relative loss game because as many competitions a relative came China is trying to gain more influence in many countries these material powers such as you know medical equipment isn't one but I think China is not ready to use its material power for its diplomatic influence because even though China is

providing international security-related I mean health-related collective goods but still there is a lot of conditions for China to augment this influence so it's London is not really like in such a collective goods it's a kind of semi in a public goods or club goods so the chance is there because United States is withdrawing from the status of global leadership but it's truly for China to prepare to present yourself as quite ready as a very candidate third point is the Bastille I think there are a lot of

opinions both inside China and the United States to emphasize the benefits of mutual cooperation if you read articles and newspapers from China for example there are many people who think that the cooperation with nightsticks is too important so from domestic interests President Xi and President Trump says that the responsibility is on the other side but I think we have to emphasize underlying trance that mutual cooperation is too important and that hope for the future my follow-up questions to Professor xx

sang it says during this pandemic America it's not only USA and I was a many European countries label the Chinese responded the authoritarian model but Hoshi logged on and also punishing the whistleblowers and so forth so relating to this to the etiological communication professor I can various mentioned it seems like China is not gaining them match it and this Chinese model of flattening copy the 90s I'd like to hear your opinion on this and second one is who's gonna rescue he wanted a car order do you have

a high expectation to in European countries and then shoot it went the European continent to sustain the multilateral international order yes so the cognate crisis was presented in two aspects first one is model competition between Chinese model and so-called democratic model and the competition about the hegemonic status or the leadership there could be some criticism against how China dealt with the crisis especially inside United States there was a Pew Research poll a couple of weeks ago and the Americans do

not think that Chinese response was affected we have the trade-off between his efficiency and human rights that's in some sense inevitable I think more importantly is how China United States tried to build a global consensus to deal with this virus crisis in that sense you're both China guys it didn't succeed that much so rather than criticize the individual countries response to the crisis I think how these two great powers dealt with the crisis from the international level is more important the second norm based

order I think there is still a loop because now we have a decline phase of United States hegemony maybe we'll bounce back and there was a severe competition between US and China but if you look at for example the shangri-la addressed by the US Secretary of Defense last year there was a face of norm-based competition so competition is fine or conflict is inevitable the thing is that how we manage the conflict based on the norms and that norms is not just made by United States we call the order us-led a

liberal international order but there was a role for the followers shifts so there are many countries and participants so how we can make this order more inclusive by allowing more countries participate in this competition so I think not just between United States and China as you said in European countries is very important in a nation the third party countries will be also important Thank You professor Chang thank you okay let's move on to the second big copy that is the post-election US strategy and the next

American government Asia policy I know is we have a election in actually American election on November 3rd November 3rd and then there is a lot of saying Blaney I think that Joe Biden is likely to be likely who knows and then there is a different assessment about the next administration's a people are saying whoever gets elected the America will be very busy they are going to concentrated that they are resources domestically auto-recovery so they're there within the American position to engage internationally already present

from had decided to withdraw nine thousand and five hundred American soldiers stationed in Germany and the friends 20 ties has been written so Asia is watching with the great anxiety present from has already pushed Korea and Japan their conventional ally is over the cost of stationing American armies in these countries so however if you look at the recent tensions in our region we had auto crash which in India and in China killing more than 20 Indian soldiers and in South Korea is in over the several days the North Korea blew up

the liaison office in custom and they are going to rebuild her eyes DMZ areas there are many tensions rising up in the asia-pacific can Asian countries trust the continuous American commitment for the peace and security of asia-pacific region and we've seen the President Obama the rebalancing strategy and present rompers the in in the Pacific strategies but yester Anja's sound like team might progressive people to to share your your your ideas on this question okay keeping with everybody else's commentaries and sticking to

three points I have basically three points that I want to make but the first point I want to make is that Trump's behavior in Asia with regard to unilateralism xenophobia America first anti-science etc etc has largely pulled the United States out of the kinds of multilateral organizations and multilateral engagement that I think Asia lunk came to depend on in terms of relying on US leadership and of course China is now being painted as the enemy and this represents a striking contrast to I think long-standing US policy of

trying both to engage and at the same time to contain or to hedge against China's rise the Trump administration is painting China as an existential threat this was true in a pen speech in 2018 in the national security strategy announcement in the efforts to reel able the Cova 19 virus as the Wuhan virus so I would see this as essentially an electoral ploy by the Trump administration to paint China as the bad guy with a black hat and our cowboy movies in a way that have since the United States from engagement with China

and more complex way but I think it's also important to recognize that the it's not just been China that has been subject to Trump's attacks the tariffs or is of course fell on Japan and Korea with steel and aluminum tariffs well before they hit China and Korea and Japan were pressed for renegotiating their trade deals with the United States and as you said both countries are being pressed very heavily to triple or quadruple or quintuple there are financial contributions to the United States for the stationing of American

troops in our countries and the United States has in effect ignored its allies and disdained its allies while embracing dictators across the East Asia whether it's Kim Johan or Xi Jinping or Rodrigo Duterte or general Kryon chan-ocha in Thailand all of this essentially has pulled us out of multilateral approaches and pulled it out of a multi-dimensional approach to foreign policy if there's any strategy at all to the Trump administration's foreign policy with Asia it has been the advancement of military confrontations with China but

that's really only one facet of what's interesting about the region the second point I want to make though and I think this is important is that this is not just a trump problem that will be solved by the next election if it went to the Democrats I think the United States over the last 25 years has seen the evolution of the Republican Party in a direction that's made it impossible for anyone to talk meaningfully about the United States as having an overarching grand strategy behind which most politicians from both parties can night

instead what we've had is a Republican Party that has pulled very heavily in a direction of a combination of plutocracy and populism plutocracy for the top one or two percent of the American rich who benefit from tax cuts and deregulation along with gaining the voting support of people who are evangelical Christians who are United around social issues who are interested in in opposition to dealing with anything that challenges fossil fuels and replaces them with alternative sources of energy and the

consequence of this is that the Republican Party as a whole has been singularly devoted to cutting the size of government cutting the size of expertise opposing multilateralism except in what George Bush once referred to as a lot a la carte multilateralism and basically the end of this has been also a reduction dramatically in the economic profile of the United States so the United States has been suffering dramatically in terms of its overall competitiveness around the globe the United States now ranks 10th globally in

its economic competitiveness the United States has weakened its science and technology lead it's falling behind in many areas behind China and behind other advanced countries we have a very weak infrastructure and I think in many ways we've seen the decline in the US appeal of higher educational institutions for Asians wanting to come to study more of them are going to Australia New Zealand to Western Europe etc and all of this I think is to take the United States much more fundamentally out of a

multi-pronged engagement with Asia so American engagement with Asia it seems to me has to be thought of as something more than simply a military presence there and I would simply point out that right now the Pentagon over the last three or four years has run a series of tabletop exercises involving various scenarios of conflict with China the United States military now has a perfect record it is not one one of those controversies China wins all so the United States within Asia militarily is in a much

weaker position to provide the kind of assistance that I think many of its allies would really like so to get to the heart of your question about a Biden administration it does seem to me that we would likely see a swing back to something analogous to what the Obama administration was trying to do in Asia which is to say to give a higher priority which is to say that to make it a more multi-dimensional a more economically and diplomatically and educationally focused policy with Asia one in which the TPP was very central to

this and in which that would provide for what evylyn go was talking about as a pluralistic engagement of twelve different countries that don't ordinarily fall into the same category with one another but to engage them on writing rules of trade and investment that would pose a challenge to China but would also hold out a carrot to China if character if China wanted to be engaged with the rest of the region economically we have a very strong incentive to change some of its mercantilist policies at home in a way that would move it much

more close to the goals and the patterns of the TPP so I think a Biden administration would be much more receptive to the kind of multilateral approaches that are being taken in East Asia East Asian Institute's the East Asian the East Asian summit Chiang Mai the the APEC enhancing APEC and engaging with Asia in ways that would bolster the voices of its Asian allies many of whom have interests that are congruent with that of the United States but not necessarily overlapping a hundred percent but I guess the last point that

I would make in this regard as I would anticipate that a Biden administration would not necessarily see China as a country solely to be confronted but as one that needs to be dealt with in a mix of managerial diplomacy that would involve cooperation on the kinds of things that led to the Iran nuclear deal cooperation on Somali piracy on global warming things of this sort on a pandemic and there are bases for US and China to cooperate that would make the United States approach much more favorable to that of other countries in

Asia because I think the last thing countries in Asia want to see is a bifurcated fight between our schism between China and the United States with us doing security China doing economics and the country is being forced to make a choice between their economic interests in their security interest us have the capacity to play both roles in the region I would hope that the find administration would not only deal with its domestic economy by boosting science boosting technology moving into higher tech providing for a more advanced

economy that the United States could then use to engage with Asia but also keeping the military presence alive in ways that would reassure its Asian allies Thanks thank you can tell we don't have much time left I will move to our second speaker I promise I can very and you can address the same questions but I particularly like to hear from you your comments about Professor penpals saying that the America doesn't have a grand strategy to asia-pacific region mainly because of all this domestic political constraints I'd like to hear

your opinion on that please go ahead thank you very much well I'll make three points first of all on the election I do think this is a very important election one of the most important in my lifetime some people have said since 1860 which of course was the election of Abraham Lincoln which initiated the the War Between the States this is and and Maeda it was decisive in shaping how America would look for the next decades and decades and I think that's true in this case as well maybe not quite as existential but in this case

there really will be two different Americas that will be in front of the American voters and I do think if Trump had a second term America first would would truly upend in a you know in a way that would take a generation to return to put back together an American foundation for doing well and doing good in the world I do think that that NATO could unravel truly in a second term and I think the Alliance's in East Asia would follow and become increasingly more formal less real hedging and and this kind of eight

what would be eight years of a self harm of jeopardizing and undermining the an American created order would be both shocking damaging and difficult to reverse I think that Biden rejects all of what Trump believes in and he's a multilateral us he's he's clearly somebody who would try to steer the u.s.

back there's a question of how far back you can go no one can erase the memory of a Trump even if he only has one term but it does matter for Trump II and foreign policy to be repudiated which could happen there's a kind of dialectical dynamic and world politics we're in this national populist phase but we're probably going to in that phase with strong consensus in major parts of the world that it wasn't very successful so there will be a kind of possibility for leadership swinging back the second point is about Biden and I I

think that when it comes to Asia policy it's not that there will be a kind of an end to trumpian focus on criticizing China I think China will be seen as a challenger and this in this sense I think TJ and I maybe disagree a little bit I think if you were to ask those who are going to be foreign policy leaders and a Biden administration they would say that top three priorities are focus on the American economy and make it more productive and make it more prosperous for working people focusing on inequality building up an economy

that can sustain an internationalist coalition what the world is being destabilized by an America that's that's by bipolar and unstable and so that domestic dynamic is externalizing itself to the world and until it gets put back in place the US can't really be an effective global leader and the world itself will not be a settled place but I do think even if Biden is successful it will be the economy secondly it will be rebuild the alliances and the third will be a certain counterpoint to China and

as I said I think there is a pretty bunch of bipartisan consensus in Washington foreign policy community which I'm to some extent a minority outsider in my current views there's there is a my majority view that that china is increasingly a challenge and that that goes with that that the engagement strategy pursued by every American and president since the end of the Cold War Republican and Democrat has not worked so Biden's foreign policy is going to proceed on the premise I would argue that that we can't do things to

draw China into our world and make it more open and accountable that we're going to have to live with a China that's increasingly proposing an alternative future with a non demo kradic non-liberal form of capitalism so engagement failed and if you look at the Kurt Campbell and Jake Sullivan their Foreign Affairs article from last fall it was entitled competition without catastrophe and it was an argument for pretty assertive competition creating a multilateral structure around China so that the rule makers on international

cooperation on regulatory rules on all these different the infrastructure of international relations is is developed by like-minded liberal democracies not all of them like America but but emphasizing principles of international relations and governance transparency openness free flow of information and so forth so I do think we're going to swing back to a more ideological competition with China because I think China is eager for that and I think that it doesn't have to be all bad I think the US did some of the greatest things that

did both in the world and domestically when it saw a competitive ideological challenger Soviet Communism Nazi fascism Imperial Germany in each of these three cases Woodrow Wilson FDR and post-war American presidents brought their principles out of America and to the world because they saw that there was an alternative that was out there threatening liberal democracy finally if I have a couple more minutes or in another minute I just say that I think that there are some counter forces that are going to limit the competition

between US and China there are some pressures that go the other direction and I'll just mention three very quickly one is simply that China to the extent it is hot and assertive as a rising power it is going to alienate its neighbors we call this the problem of self encirclement but that rising states inevitably face countries on their neighborhood worried about more Chinese power second the United States cannot be a hot aggressing power either because frontline allies don't want to have to choose between China in the United

States they want both and if the US looks like it's you either have to be our ally or China's ally they will not want to make that choice from Singapore to Northeast Asia and then finally the problems of interdependence there will be things that China in the United States and everybody else will have to work together on but my final message is simply that the future of multilateralism in my view is partly going to be driven by whether the liberal democracies the g7 or the d10 the democracy 10 which would include

Australia and South Korea can come together in a post trumpet trump era and drive the agenda for rebuilding multilateralism from climate change to arms control to the w-h-o so I think the democracies have to be united and selectively work with China to rebuild that order and I think they're there that they're their stakeholders and constituencies or who are dying to do that thank you we heard very passionate assessment from two great American scholars so now let's turn to Ilene and Tessa but since we

cannot even studied three say 1/3 kitchens from now on I like to add speakers just be more quickly if link can you yes sure um perhaps I can make a yeah just some brief points um let's look at this from the non-us point of view perhaps of a regional point of view what would be a more rational and workable US strategy towards the region regardless of who the next president is and I believe that you know saw the problems in Asia to do with US leadership are going to still be there regardless of who the next president is my suggestions

essentially resolved into two one is obviously as both American speakers have already said absolute priority has to go towards recalling the domestic political economy in the u.s. without that basis Asia has no grounds for expectation of any kind of continued reliability in American engagement or commitment to this region so that economic priority I think from regional points of view is absolutely central secondly a slightly more challenging one if we think about US leadership in the region it seems to me that what the US

will need to do is to have to walk and chew gum in quite a different way we're at a juncture now where I think the next US leadership is going to have to think about how to mesh three issues in leading in the region first of all you know to be able to deal with the idea that we're inevitably going into a kind of regional order in which there is going to be conflict or crises or tensions at the very least with China on a permanent basis this means that we've got to read resurrect some kinds of cold

war crisis manage cold war type crisis management limitation of conflicts type bilateral agreements between the US and China you know at the very least to prepare for greater incidences at sea in the air etc in regional theaters so that's you know stuff that we don't like to think about because apparently the Cold War is over but that's the functional area that's got to be absolutely thought about and resurrected in a clear fashion at the same time though there is still the need to think about how the us-led parts of

the order in the china inclined parts of the order would have to reach some kind of restricted but still functioning exchange this is not the Cold War there is no two separate spheres we are interdependent absolutely so we're going to have some degree of D company or companies for example new rules ways of doing things that still allow countries in the middle to actually have forms of regulated exchange across these two decoupled realms so quite quite new areas of thinking I think on this project at the same time there's got to

be the thought of what John's already referred to which I would paraphrase as how you would achieve us-china cooperation on shared fate issues again you know we've seen very clearly in in 2019 and 2020 that certain things cannot wait and the climate change challenge is one of these obviously pandemics as well so you know its own range of challenges which which are incredibly tough there's two good things going for the u.s. in this region I'll still reinforce eyes again that number one that remains very

very significant regional demand for US leadership in East Asia we often take this for granted it has to be said the significant demand for this secondly the US dollar has to recognize that East Asian states live permanently in China's shadow this really means that US strategic leadership must encompass an element of how to enable States in East Asia to keep supporting US leadership without forcing them to make zero-sum choices easily China I'll stop there thank you okay let's invite lemming Mike

Tyson to respond yes the coming American presidential election is critical I agree in the sense that US should redefine its role as a global leader because we are living in a period where one state cannot produce all the necessary international public goods we define hegemony as the country who can shoulder the burden of producing international public goods but now I think we are entering into the period in which which ammonium is an imposter ability because you're wasting tremendous challenges such as coffee 90s

is just one example the all the problems coming from globalization is climate change refugees all these all these things so even though United States in China achieved something like you know by gamma D or Julie Germany I think it's still fall short of the challenges so there is a theory the internship region theory that they sure make the role can reduce the transaction costs and deal with all the problems coming from the international interactions but I think as a marine growth should change so if

the United States can define its role as something like a meta-governance multilateralism. Obama said that lead from behind, but we have to step up the level of multilateralism. We cannot just go back to the multilateralism that we had in the twentieth century. The second thing is that if you look at the survey data of the American public, the millennial generation is very much skeptical about global engagement in American policy. So, if that generation becomes the the central policymaker generation, then I think it can't

American, you know, policymaker sustain that policy of global engagement, which will have a tremendous impact upon the other countries, allies in Asian countries, is wrong. Third thing, if we can have the Democratic administration, I think there should be more emphasis on the alliances, that's for sure. But if the new administration uses the alliances as countering Chinese influence because we see the older American China of the spectrum went more hawkish, then all of the Asian alliances should have a role

according to some kind of division of labor of countering China, which is another problem for, like, for South Korea, we have a, you know, close relations with China in many, in many aspects. So, emphasis on alliances is okay, but the role of alliances or alliance systems should be different. The last question is regional order in the Asia-Pacific and the role of middle powers. I think we already discussed a lot about the order in the region. So, this time I'd like to ask 30 seconds, you responded to the role of

the middle powers in Asia because I like allocated more time for Q&A sessions. The South Korea was keen about this, and then we were active in niihka with the power network. So, however, it's not easy because always between the USA and in China, we are approached by veteran contacts. So, it's difficult to respond effectively. So, I'd like to hear your, ma, concrete, concrete suggestion to little power Tunisia. Let me invite the purpose people. I said 30 or 40 seconds. Okay, I will do my best. I would say that a number of Asian

countries have already begun to step up. I think the TPP 11, or the CPTPP, is one indication of countries attempting a an economic bloc that pulls countries that are looking to, looking to cooperate greatly with one another into a into an arrangement that provides a positive incentive for China, but also provides a positive incentive for the United States. I think we've seen a number of countries like Japan, Korea, Australia doing a lot more to try and bolster their capacity to create infrastructure and to boost

infrastructure development in the weaker or less economically sophisticated parts of the region, particularly Southeast Asia, but also Central Asia. And I think the third thing that is going on is this discussion of the Free and Opening Indo-Pacific, which has the capacity to be more than simply a military arrangement and to pull together countries that have a commitment to democracy and a commitment to open trading and movement of goods and services across the Pacific. My fear is that Japan, Australia, India, and the United States as

the four countries involved in this have very different views of this FOIP and essentially now it's a concept in search of a unifying, unifying set of programs. But I think there are things going on that the Asian countries are doing for themselves, but I think as several people have said, we're still crying, they're still crying out for an American presence, which I hope would come with a with the election in November. Not quite 30 seconds, but best I can do. Thank you, Professor. I can very, very brief. I've

already made the case that there is a role, a lot of upside potential for middle power diplomacy. And I think that South Korea has a huge leadership role in this space. Remember the label Global Korea, Korea as a rising state that can build coalitions both on the economic side, with sustainable development side, environment, and and security side. So, I think there's a lot of room there. Canada, Australia. So, that's number one. Number two, I think the, as I just, one of my themes tonight has been the, the

underperformance of the cooperation among countries that consider themselves liberal democracies. So, I think there's a lot of room and huge potential upside potential if that energy could be harnessed again. And then a two final ideas for regional architecture. One is, I could imagine a because North Korea is still a dangerous country and likely to become even more so, not just in the run-up to the election, and we know that that tends to be a very dangerous moment when North Korea sets off missiles, but

beyond that, the growing danger there is possibility revisit the the five-party talks, the countries around North Korea working to create incentives for a more stable Northeast Asia centered on solving problems related to North Korea. And then secondly, I do think we have a rocky road ahead of us for US-China relations. I think it's baked into the cake, it's just going to happen. There's nothing to be the old era of of engagement. We're a long way from that, but I think that there is room for discussion of arms

control based on reciprocity and the building of some kind of strategic forum, a dialogue forum for obviously for emergency management of crises, but but more generally to exchange ideas, to identify areas of cooperation, to discuss interests and perspectives. I think that's likely to come after the boiling point reaches and there's a little bit of a off the boil now, let's talk. And so I think there's, I think the region could be in the next ten years could be a place where there can be some creative diplomacy tied to multilateral

multilateral institutions. Thank you. Let's go to evening and bling, you, you in Australia. Australia is our centigrade meter power in our region. So, what's your response? Thank you. I don't speak for Australia. I don't speak for any particular country. I begin with the observation that, you know, we have a certain idea of middle powers in our heads, and if we look at around the Asian region, there's actually two types of middle powers, right? There's the middle powers who are committed allies, Australia, Korea amongst them, and then

there the middle powers which are in Southeast Asia, Indonesia, for example, which are very different breed and think about these things very differently. So, my, you know, going from there at I give this generic advice to to omit middle powers. First of all, let's get used to it. The region's going to be a very uncomfortable place. It already is, and it will get more uncomfortable. Secondly, I think we need to learn to think about ourselves as operating in the world without sides, even if you are that category of middle power that is

actually in an alliance. Thirdly, we need to think of ourselves as working in a world in which you at some point I'm going to have to make some choices and are going to have to stand up for some values. This one obviously is, you know, targeted at the non-aligned middle powers, and I think the world has both these aspects to it, which is why it's uncomfortable. In general, I think that middle powers in in this part of the world can try to do two things. Let me use an ecosystem analogy. When we think about ecosystems in a strategic way, we

tend to focus just on the apex predators, the great powers. Let's think about the, you know, parts of the ecosystem that we pay a lot less attention to, which is where middle powers operate. On the one hand, let's think about the activities of bees, which as I think most of us know by now, bees are essential to the survival of any ecosystem because they cross-pollinate, they, you know, they do essential services. And I think middle powers need to work on that aspect of what they can contribute to the system, cross-cutting

collaboration, not only with each other and not only with one side, Democratic or otherwise, but across a variety of other states and axes. Secondly, think about trees. Trees that individually are, you know, individual organisms, but together make up forests and their own sub-ecosystems. And these might be what we would think of as the institutional frameworks and capacity that the region might have. And of course, within these middle powers, other non-great powers are absolutely essential. So, I think those are the tools, sort of broad areas of

functions that middle powers are going to find much more room for maneuver and much more need for maneuver in this uncomfortable world that we operate in. I'll just stop. Thank you, Professor. I'm sure. Yes, briefly. Two things. I think the US-China rivalry is just beginning. We will have a long series of competition in many areas. And middle powers in East Asia, what they are afraid of most is retaliation. So, I think we are having more and more retaliation-based order. How can we mitigate? How can we minimize the harm coming from the

retaliation from great powers, probably from the United States? And is it not exerting retaliation, but simply withdrawing vapors? Is that also a Humphrey effect on the other countries? So, I think there are many like-minded countries and like-situated countries in East Asia. So, we should make a coalition of minimizing the harms and possibly or hopefully deterring economic retaliation or to economic, you know, partitioning coercive measures from other countries. But I am afraid that those type of economic warfare is expanding in East

Asia in general. So, how to minimize that? It's a short-term, you know, task for middle powers. The second one is a long-term, buy more positive one, because as I said, you know, USA, China cannot dominate all multilateralism. So, we have to actively participate in the designs of multilateralism in Asia. But, you know, both countries are suggesting or defending many ideas from your side. For example, economic prosperity network, which we don't know very much about, is still unclear. We don't know what kind of issues are there. As you said, we're

decoupling issues, all those things. So, I guess that it will be better if we have a prior consultation and cooperation in making those, you know, architectures of East Asian multilateral institutions. Then there will be a role of co-architects for East Asian countries as a middle powers here. Now, I collected questions from people participating in this webinar. I can identify three questions. The let's go for the first one. Evil sivle diem, he has asked, the US push to ecological competition with China

over such as ballet and they push European countries and all sports edition countries. Is it working? Exactly? Or this kind of touch to line up economical, it will continue over the years? So, who can address this issue? DJ, you want to do that? I'd love to do it if I could get clear on the question. Your mic was cutting in and out, and I'm not sure I really understood the gist of the question. Okay, I think this is one of the difficulties with the US-China relationship, and that is the fact that there is this techno-nationalist

competition going on, particularly around something like 5G. The United States's is the US companies are further behind Chinese companies like Huawei in the 5G competition. And I think this poses a real problem for the United States, as do a whole host of advanced technologies, whether we're thinking about electric cars, whether we're thinking about solar power, whether we're thinking about artificial intelligence, whether we're thinking about facial recognition. And this goes to the point that I think I

was making, John was making earlier, which is to say that the United States, if it's going to play in this game, needs to get its own domestic economy into a place where it is once again have the cutting edge of many of these new technologies. I think on the question of Huawei, we've unfortunately seen with this Trump administration, and I hate to keep making this sound like this is a course in American democratic domestic politics, but the Trump administration basically did not impose sanctions on CTE

a Chinese company that had clearly violated a whole host of sanctions against in dealing with with Iran. Sanctions against Huawei were backed off basically because Trump was doing his best to get Xi Jinping on his side for the election and given by soybeans and wheat. But the US is clearly going to be facing a high-level competition with China on these new advanced technologies, and it seems to me that is an area where the United States is going to have to get its domestic house and its domestic economic

order set up in order to deal more effectively because China is moving ahead on an awful lot of these areas. Thank you, Professor Temple. And let me ask this question to Professor Ikenberry. This is about democracy. You talked already about ideological competition or value competition between USA and China. Weathers the global pandemic, how the democracy is working in this ideological competition? Whether the many Asian countries, they like - they like, they respect all these democratic values, at the same time, they are not talking

openly in criticizing any human rights violations by China, like the Hong Kong security law and in many issues. Yes, that's a great question. And we are going through a period that will extend into the next year of of seeing how different countries with different kinds of governments cope with this new pandemic. And I think unbalanced, what we know is the, we'll call it in the national populous states, those that have had kind of boastful leaders who don't really haven't built their governments around expertise and and professional civil

service and science-based policy have done very poorly. Brazil, the United States, and and I would say United Kingdom, for example. And so, but some democracies have done quite well, including South Korea and New Zealand and other countries. So, I think there's a lot of a lot of different types of governments that that are more differentiated than simply democracies are non-democracies. I think in the long term, China has an a kind of authoritarian state-centered system or can do certain things very quickly. They

can shut things down, but they can also shut down news and the flow of information, which in the end is not good for any of us. So, there is, there will be certain conclusions drawn that will be critical of both, both types. I think in the end, open systems with civil societies, with pluralistic governments where the rule of law, where transparency and information flow, that in the long term, those kinds of governments have have done the best. They've been the most legitimate and they've been the most resilient. And the other thing about

electoral democracies is you can throw the bad guys out, you can start fresh. And if a particular American leader can't get along with it with another leader, another democracy, if you wait two or three years, you will have different people in those positions. So, there is a kind of value there that that I think over two hundred years, you can see the see a democratic advantage, even though you can also see the their vulnerabilities that are are on display very painfully today. Thank you. Aibileen, can I ask this questions? We

talked a lot about the weakening global organizations, right? And the this could be the 19th Wisp and any also contributed to further weakening globalization. However, the many countries are trying to help each other. So, how do you see the relationship between the laconic globalization and possible increasing regionalization or regionalism? Okay, I think Asia is reasonably well-placed in this regard. Asian economic regionalism, particularly, has been, you know, on the rise and has seen increased activism, particularly

since the 1997 Asian financial crisis, when this region really learned the lesson of self-help and the necessity of having regional safety nets in addition to external ones. So, we're fairly well-placed for that. Having said that, though, the Asian economic and political and security systems are incredibly open to the rest of the world as well. So, there's a limit to how much, you know, regionalism would be able to replace the benefits of, you know, being globally open for for this region. So, I think, you know, to some

extent, we will, we should expect to see in the coming era strengthening regionalism, particularly in our part of the world, but that cannot come at the expense of continually still leveraging access to markets, you know, supply chains, etcetera, in other parts of the world. So, it's, it's going to have to go hand in hand. And obviously, any decline in global openness is going to be bad for Asian producers, particularly in the short to medium term. So, it's going to be a bit of a trade-off, but I see no option except

that Asian economies, particularly must double down on regional on their regional emphasis, certain for the short term. Thank you. Let me ask Professor Transistor used to have written a lot about the middle power diplomacy of South Korea and also the South Korea's efforts to create a mythical networks. But whether always Havas acute issues posed by North Korea, whether it be the next phase of South Korea's middle party promising in the future? Well, middle power diplomacy does not exclude any particular great power. You

know, middle powers plan it. I think is to deal with great power politics itself, not any specific great power. So, we need an active participation and help from great powers. For South Korea, we are dealing with many security issues, for example, inter-Korean relations. But from the great power perspective, the development of WMDs and nuclear and missiles from North Korean society is just a matter of non-proliferation or global nuclear security orders. For South Koreans, the deep root of that problem is the political one, how to deal with

inter-Korean relations and find the right place for North Korea in the future, North Korea, Northeast Asia international politics. So, China denies they should understand the position of those middle powers who are who has been entangled in many different situations. Actually, it's a task of post-colonial one. You know, Sukjong talked about, you know, Indian Chinese border, which is a remnant, the legacy of the imperial powers in delineating their borders in a certain fashion. So, when we middle powers deal

with a difficulty, good questions. I think we have to facilitate a deep understanding from great powers and try to make a some kind of arrangement or regime in which middle powers and great powers can understand each other and go deeply into the essence of the all the problems in the region. Thank you so much. I think the time is running out, so we had to end this fascinating webinar. And thank you, Professor Temple, Professor Eikenberry, Professor Ko, and Professor John for sharing your insightful thinking's

on these very important issues. And and audience, we have identities at 300 great. And and before you leave, we would like to ask you to fill out some brief survey. Audacity to for EAI to improve the quality of next webinar. And today's webinar will be available on our website, Facebook, and that Instagram and many SNS. Stats. Thank you so much. I learned a lot. It was very enjoyable. And and you are thought leaders in the academia. And so I'd like to thank you bravely and then stay safe and stay happy. I made this

cope with 19 global crisis. Thank you very much. Thank you. Thank you very much. I my colleagues, I done glad you made it. Yes.