[EAI Heard Commentary] The Uncertainty of US-China Competition Caused by the COVID-19 Crisis: Where is South Korea-China Relations Headed?

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DTs8hJaGobA

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Editor's Note

The East Asia Institute (EAI, President Son Yeol) is presenting 'EAI Heard Commentary' as content to make expert commentary on major domestic and international issues more accessible and convenient. This 'EAI Heard Commentary' introduces the commentary by Lee Dong-ryul, Director of EAI China Research Center and Professor at Dongduk Women's University, who analyzed China's foreign policy amidst the global crisis triggered by COVID-19. As developed countries, including the US and Europe, struggled with epidemic prevention and control after the global spread of COVID-19, China, which faced domestic and international criticism early on due to controversies over concealment and inadequate response, is experiencing a rebound effect. China is actively working to improve its image through proactive international support and public relations campaigns, and is actively leveraging the opportunities created by the global crisis caused by the pandemic to seek its relative rise. However, the author points out that while China may gain relative benefits, it still faces limitations in establishing itself as an independent power by presenting new global standards and values. Furthermore, the author predicts that mutual distrust between the US and China will deepen due to the COVID-19 situation, leading to heightened competition and conflict. It is anticipated, however, that rather than direct confrontation, both countries will adopt strategies of securing spheres of influence through 'proxy containment and competition,' emphasizing their respective alliances and partnerships, due to domestic challenges. In this context, South Korea faces pressure for a binary choice. The author argues that South Korea must strengthen its strategic flexibility in the current transitional international order to secure its own strategic value and position.

EAI Heard Commentary Script

Hello, this is the East Asia Institute (EAI). Following the declaration of the COVID-19 pandemic, countries that seemed unshakable, including developed nations, are now struggling with epidemic control. Meanwhile, one country is showing a faster-than-expected recovery and seeking a rebound: China. In this 'EAI Heard Commentary,' through the commentary by Lee Dong-ryul, Director of EAI China Research Center and Professor at Dongduk Women's University, who analyzed China amidst the global crisis, we will explore China's future foreign policy at the crossroads of crisis and opportunity due to the COVID-19 pandemic, and forecast South Korea's response. Let's begin!

As the US and Europe, among other developed nations, have failed in epidemic control amidst the global spread of COVID-19, China is experiencing a relative evaluation effect. The backlash against the communist party system, which began to emerge after early controversies over concealment and inadequate response, appears to be transforming into increased internal cohesion, relative confidence, and support for the regime. With this positive momentum, it seems as though a dramatic turnaround is occurring, with China seizing new opportunities for relative rise amidst the global crisis. China is focusing on improving its image by diluting the narrative of responsibility for COVID-19 through fierce public relations campaigns in the international community, while actively highlighting its contributions. It is also seeking to revitalize its economic recovery by providing epidemic prevention supplies and medical aid to key partner countries. Although China is publicly offering cooperation and support to the world, the dispatch of crucial medical support teams is concentrated in pro-China countries and key partners along the Belt and Road Initiative. This suggests that China is pursuing complex strategic objectives, not only to improve its image through 'vaccine diplomacy' but also to revitalize the Belt and Road Initiative.

In fact, China's utilization of the global crisis as an opportunity for advancement is not unfamiliar to us. China has historically seized opportunities for 'relative rise' during major global crises, leading to its current position. For instance, China secured strategic time and space for its rise by capitalizing on US weakness during the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001, and the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, and indeed achieved the effect of relative rise. The current COVID-19 situation, with China's active engagement in international cooperation and support, also reveals its intention to transform the crisis caused by the pandemic into a fourth opportunity for relative rise. Having achieved relative rise by overcoming crises, China is now positioned to pursue independent rise by presenting differentiated global standards and values. However, China appears preoccupied with escaping the narrative of responsibility for the 'crisis originating from China.' Despite its unexpectedly rapid recovery, the Xi Jinping administration remains mired in domestic issues such as regime stability and economic development, failing to lead international cooperation to overcome a crisis affecting all of humanity. China has not demonstrated the capacity or willingness to present a vision that the international community can accept or to design a new international order. China still appears to have clear limitations in securing independent and absolute global leadership beyond relative rise.

Securing dominance in US-China relations is also not easy. The COVID-19 pandemic is accelerating changes in global supply chains and further eroding internationalism. Amidst this, US-China relations are likely to see weakened economic interdependence and intensified self-centeredness, leading to increased competition and conflict rather than cooperation. Even amidst the global pandemic crisis, the two great powers, the US and China, are engaged in fierce public relations battles over responsibility, rather than seeking cooperation. In this process, the US's offensive regarding the vulnerability of the communist party system is a red line that China finds difficult to accept. Through the exchange of accusations regarding COVID-19 responsibility, both the US and China have reaffirmed their fundamental differences in systems, races, and ideologies, leading to expanded mutual distrust. Distrust and antipathy towards the US within China have reached their highest point in 41 years of diplomatic relations, with some assessments suggesting that bilateral relations have reached their worst state.

Given that political leaders in both the US and China face domestic political constraints that make concessions or compromises difficult, they will likely continue their intense public relations battles. However, on the other hand, as the need for both countries to focus on domestic issues grows, it is also difficult to create situations of acute confrontation. For the Xi Jinping administration, regime security is paramount amidst political and economic challenges, making it rational to avoid expanding the front of conflict with the US. China is already finding it difficult to fulfill the terms of the Phase One trade agreement with the US due to the COVID-19 crisis. Using this as a pretext, the US is likely to continue its pressure on China in other ways and in other areas, placing China in a defensive position. What China fears most is the formation of an anti-China international coalition led by the US, which could then be used to pressure and contain China. The Trump administration, facing a presidential election, will not ease its 'blame China' offensive. However, since winning an election solely by making China a 'scapegoat' is not feasible, it will not be easy to indefinitely escalate confrontation and conflict with China. Therefore, it is likely that both the US and China will avoid direct confrontation as much as possible, and instead engage in diplomatic warfare to secure spheres of influence by rallying their respective allies and partners and putting them forward. Competition to expand spheres of influence, particularly through the Indo-Pacific strategy (FOIP) and the Belt and Road Initiative, is likely to involve a combination of incentives and pressure to draw in intermediate countries in the region.

The repercussions of the acute US-China confrontation during the COVID-19 phase on South Korea and the Korean Peninsula are likely to become more severe and unstable. The COVID-19 pandemic is an unprecedented event and highly fluid, making the post-COVID international order even more unpredictable. If the 'proxy containment and competition' between the US and China intensifies in the post-COVID-19 era, South Korea, due to its unique geopolitical location, will face the pressure of an unwanted binary choice more than any other country. While it is true that South Korea currently has few alternatives other than strengthening strategic flexibility to maximize national interests, the reality is that options are limited. Nevertheless, it is important to constantly seek new opportunities within the given circumstances. It is necessary to seize the transitional phase of the international community triggered by COVID-19 as a diplomatic golden time and strive to secure South Korea's independent strategic value and position amidst the competition of great powers.

The period of weakened or absent great power leadership due to COVID-19 may be prolonged. In such a scenario, the role of middle powers like South Korea, or alliances among middle powers, may become relatively more prominent. South Korea needs to place greater emphasis on forming alliances among middle powers and conduct its diplomatic activities accordingly, preparing for the changing circumstances. Notably, in the process of responding to COVID-19, South Korea has secured a unique asset—a 'Korean-style' response that achieved epidemic control effects while maintaining openness and transparency, differentiating itself from developed countries. By sharing this experience asset in epidemic control with the international community, South Korea should gradually enhance its strategic value and standing. Of course, overconfidence and arrogance regarding the currently popular 'Korean model' should be guarded against. South Korea needs to carefully explore its role in building cooperative mechanisms and collective solidarity within the international community, based on international attention. First, internally, South Korea must accumulate the capacity to play a certain international role even in the post-epidemic era. Second, it is necessary to refine the 'Korean model' through a collaborative approach where the private sector, particularly in healthcare and IT, takes the lead, with government support. Through this, it is a time to gradually expand the scope of epidemic control cooperation, establish an international cooperation framework, and strive to enhance South Korea's independent strategic value and standing.

It is a time when collective wisdom is more needed than ever to turn crises into opportunities for advancement. This has been Yoon Jun-il of 'EAI Heard Commentary.' ■

■ Author: Lee Dong-ryul Director of EAI China Research Center. Professor at Dongduk Women's University. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Peking University's School of International Studies, served as President of the Association for Modern Chinese Studies, and is currently a policy advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. His main research areas include China's foreign relations, Chinese nationalism, and minority issues. Recent publications include "China's Strategy and Role in the Denuclearization and Peace Process on the Korean Peninsula," "Evolution and Current Implications of China's Foreign Policy Discourse Since the 1990s," "Geoeconomic Approach and Geopolitical Dilemmas of the Xi Jinping Administration's 'Maritime Power' Initiative," "Deciphering China’s Security Intentions in Northeast Asia: A View from South Korea," and "China's Territorial Disputes" (co-authored).

■ Managed and Edited by: Yoon Jun-il, EAI Researcher

Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 203) I junilyoon@eai.or.kr

'EAI Heard Commentary' is content designed to make in-depth analyses of major domestic and international issues by experts more accessible and convenient. Please cite the source when quoting. EAI is an independent research institution, independent of any partisan interests. The claims and opinions expressed in reports, journals, and books published by EAI are not attributable to EAI and solely represent the views of the respective author.

Video Script

Hello, this is the East Asia Institute (EAI). Following the declaration of the COVID-19 pandemic, countries that seemed unshakable, including developed nations, are now struggling with epidemic control. Meanwhile, one country is showing a faster-than-expected recovery and seeking a rebound: China. In this EAI Heard Commentary, through the commentary by Lee Dong-ryul, Director of EAI China Research Center and Professor at Dongduk Women's University, who analyzed China amidst the global crisis, we will explore China's future foreign policy at the crossroads of crisis and opportunity due to the COVID-19 pandemic, and forecast South Korea's response. Let's begin!

As the US and Europe, among other developed nations, have failed in epidemic control amidst the global spread of COVID-19, China is experiencing a relative evaluation effect. The backlash against the communist party system, which began to emerge after early controversies over concealment and inadequate response, appears to be transforming into increased internal cohesion, relative confidence, and support for the regime. With this positive momentum, it seems as though a dramatic turnaround is occurring, with China seizing new opportunities for relative rise amidst the global crisis. China is focusing on improving its image by diluting the narrative of responsibility for COVID-19 through fierce public relations campaigns in the international community, while actively highlighting its contributions.

It is also seeking to revitalize its economic recovery by providing epidemic prevention supplies and medical aid to key partner countries. Although China is publicly offering cooperation and support to the world, the dispatch of crucial medical support teams is concentrated in pro-China countries and key partners along the Belt and Road Initiative. This suggests that China is pursuing complex strategic objectives, not only to improve its image through 'vaccine diplomacy' but also to revitalize the Belt and Road Initiative. In fact, China's utilization of the global crisis as an opportunity for advancement is not unfamiliar to us.

China has historically seized opportunities for 'relative rise' during major global crises, leading to its current position. For instance, China secured strategic time and space for its rise by capitalizing on US weakness during the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001, and the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, and indeed achieved the effect of relative rise. The current COVID-19 situation, with China's active engagement in international cooperation and support, also reveals its intention to transform the crisis caused by the pandemic into a fourth opportunity for relative rise.

Having achieved relative rise by overcoming crises, China is now positioned to pursue independent rise by presenting differentiated global standards and values. However, China appears preoccupied with escaping the narrative of responsibility for the 'crisis originating from China.' Despite its unexpectedly rapid recovery, the Xi Jinping administration remains mired in domestic issues such as regime stability and economic development, failing to lead international cooperation to overcome a crisis affecting all of humanity. China has not demonstrated the capacity or willingness to present a vision that the international community can accept or to design a new international order.

China still appears to have clear limitations in securing independent and absolute global leadership beyond relative rise. Securing dominance in US-China relations is also not easy. The COVID-19 pandemic is accelerating changes in global supply chains and further eroding internationalism. Amidst this, US-China relations are likely to see weakened economic interdependence and intensified self-centeredness, leading to increased competition and conflict rather than cooperation. Even amidst the global pandemic crisis, the two great powers, the US and China, are engaged in fierce public relations battles over responsibility, rather than seeking cooperation.

In this process, the US's offensive regarding the vulnerability of the communist party system is a red line that China finds difficult to accept. Through the exchange of accusations regarding COVID-19 responsibility, both the US and China have reaffirmed their fundamental differences in systems, races, and ideologies, leading to expanded mutual distrust. Distrust and antipathy towards the US within China have reached their highest point in 41 years of diplomatic relations, with some assessments suggesting that bilateral relations have reached their worst state. Given that political leaders in both the US and China face domestic political constraints that make concessions or compromises difficult, they will likely continue their intense public relations battles.

However, on the other hand, as the need for both countries to focus on domestic issues grows, it is also difficult to create situations of acute confrontation. For the Xi Jinping administration, regime security is paramount amidst political and economic challenges, making it rational to avoid expanding the front of conflict with the US. China is already finding it difficult to fulfill the terms of the Phase One trade agreement with the US due to the COVID-19 crisis. Using this as a pretext, the US is likely to continue its pressure on China in other ways and in other areas, placing China in a defensive position.

What China fears most is the formation of an anti-China international coalition led by the US, which could then be used to pressure and contain China. The Trump administration, facing a presidential election, will not ease its 'blame China' offensive. However, since winning an election solely by making China a 'scapegoat' is not feasible, it will not be easy to indefinitely escalate confrontation and conflict with China. Therefore, it is likely that both the US and China will avoid direct confrontation as much as possible, and instead engage in diplomatic warfare to secure spheres of influence by rallying their respective allies and partners and putting them forward.

Competition to expand spheres of influence, particularly through the Indo-Pacific strategy and the Belt and Road Initiative, is likely to involve a combination of incentives and pressure to draw in intermediate countries in the region. The repercussions of the acute US-China confrontation during the COVID-19 phase on South Korea and the Korean Peninsula are likely to become more severe and unstable. The COVID-19 pandemic is an unprecedented event and highly fluid, making the post-COVID international order even more unpredictable. If the 'proxy containment and competition' between the US and China intensifies in the post-COVID-19 era, South Korea, due to its unique geopolitical location, will face the pressure of an unwanted binary choice more than any other country.

While it is true that South Korea currently has few alternatives other than strengthening strategic flexibility to maximize national interests, the reality is that options are limited. Nevertheless, it is important to constantly seek new opportunities within the given circumstances. It is necessary to seize the transitional phase of the international community triggered by COVID-19 as a diplomatic golden time and strive to secure South Korea's independent strategic value and position amidst the competition of great powers. The period of weakened or absent great power leadership due to COVID-19 may be prolonged.

In such a scenario, the role of middle powers like South Korea, or alliances among middle powers, may become relatively more prominent. South Korea needs to place greater emphasis on forming alliances among middle powers and conduct its diplomatic activities accordingly, preparing for the changing circumstances. Notably, in the process of responding to COVID-19, South Korea has secured a unique asset—a 'Korean-style' response that achieved epidemic control effects while maintaining openness and transparency, differentiating itself from developed countries. By sharing this experience asset in epidemic control with the international community, South Korea should gradually enhance its strategic value and standing.

Of course, overconfidence and arrogance regarding the currently popular 'Korean model' should be guarded against. South Korea needs to carefully explore its role in building cooperative mechanisms and collective solidarity within the international community, based on international attention. First, internally, South Korea must accumulate the capacity to play a certain international role even in the post-epidemic era. Second, it is necessary to refine the 'Korean model' through a collaborative approach where the private sector, particularly in healthcare and IT, takes the lead, with government support.

Through this, it is a time to gradually expand the scope of epidemic control cooperation, establish an international cooperation framework, and strive to enhance South Korea's independent strategic value and standing. It is a time when collective wisdom is more needed than ever to turn crises into opportunities for advancement. This has been Yoon Jun-il of 'EAI Heard Commentary.'