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[Smart Q&A: Joel Wit] "Strategic Patience" Missed the North Korean Nuclear Issue: Limitations and Alternatives for U.S. North Korea Policy

Category
Multimedia
Published
March 22, 2015
Related Projects
Understanding North Korea Properly (Global NK Zoom & Connect)

YouTube Link: video.eai.or.kr/150320_sqa.flv

Joel Wit is a Senior Fellow at the US-Korea Institute (USKI) at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). He previously worked for the U.S. Department of State, serving as Senior Advisor to Ambassador Robert Gallucci from 1993-1995 and as Coordinator for the Agreed Framework in Geneva from 1995-1999. He was also a key participant in the establishment of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) following the first North Korean nuclear crisis. He has written extensively on North Korea and denuclearization and is the co-author of Going Critical: The First North Korean Nuclear Crisis (Brookings Institution Press, 2004). He currently directs 38North (http://38north.org), a website specializing in North Korea analysis under USKI.


Overview

How effective has the U.S. policy of "strategic patience" toward North Korea truly been? Joel Wit, Senior Fellow at the US-Korea Institute (USKI) at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), assesses that U.S. and allied policies toward North Korea have failed due to a lack of clear objectives and priorities. Meanwhile, North Korea has continuously developed its nuclear weapons, demanding recognition as a de facto nuclear state. Wit warns that in the worst-case scenario, North Korea could possess around 100 nuclear weapons by 2020, rendering U.S. policies predicated on the collapse of the North Korean regime ineffective. This is because while there are no signs of the Kim Jong-un regime collapsing in the short term, its nuclear weapons development is proceeding at a much faster pace. So, what policy is needed right now? Wit emphasizes that policymakers must first move beyond a simplistic dichotomy of engagement versus non-engagement when viewing North Korea policy. Effective policy can only be established when the international community clearly communicates to North Korea that it has only one choice between nuclear development and economic development. To achieve this, he points out the need to pursue a comprehensive North Korea strategy that includes strengthening the implementation of UN sanctions on North Korea's nuclear and missile development, actively engaging China's cooperation, and enhancing U.S.-ROK military deterrence capabilities. Wit acknowledges the difficulty in pursuing a consistent North Korea policy due to differing views among neighboring countries. However, he argues that the U.S. should not merely wait for North Korea, as it is doing now, but should engage in more proactive and dynamic diplomacy.

"I believe the current [U.S.] policy toward North Korea has been a series of repeated failures and disasters. The United States has so far had no impact on North Korea's nuclear and missile development, nor has it applied sufficient pressure to induce change. As a result, North Korea has been able to rapidly expand its nuclear development capabilities over the past five years and is now demanding recognition as a nuclear-weapon state."

"Effective policy requires leverage that forces North Korea to choose between nuclear weapons and economic development. We must find ways to present North Korea with a clearer set of choices."

Limitations of the U.S. Approach to North Korea's Nuclear Program

• The current North Korea policy of the Obama administration has been ineffective. The U.S. has failed to exert sufficient pressure to halt North Korea's nuclear and missile development, during which time North Korea has internally and externally declared and demanded recognition as a de facto nuclear state.

• The notion that the North Korean regime could collapse at any moment is merely a long-term illusion. While many experts have consistently underestimated the resilience of the North Korean regime, North Korea has demonstrated over a long period its capacity to overcome repeated crises.

• It is true that coordinating a unified policy toward North Korea is difficult due to the diverse interests of countries surrounding North Korea, including South Korea, Japan, Russia, and China. The problem is that these differences in perspective provide North Korea with the space to maintain its own positions.

• Denuclearization and non-proliferation cannot be approached as separate issues. As North Korea possesses more nuclear weapons in the future, the risk of nuclear proliferation increases.

Finding an Effective Policy Toward North Korea

• The U.S. needs to prioritize preventing North Korea's development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Failure to do so could lead to the worst-case scenario of North Korea possessing up to 100 nuclear weapons by around 2020, making unification in the direction desired by South Korea even more difficult.

• Track II (non-governmental) dialogues between the U.S. and North Korea should continue as they provide opportunities to understand the intentions of North Korean authorities and hear diverse internal voices. The U.S. government needs to pay more attention to these private contacts to formulate an effective strategy toward North Korea.

• North Korea views South Korea and the United States as its most direct stakeholders. North Korea does not perceive China, Russia, or Japan as security threats. The nuclear issue will never be resolved without agreement among these three parties.

• While South Korea may not be able to unilaterally lead the resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue, it needs to exercise its own leadership by advancing inter-Korean dialogue or Six-Party Talks, or by encouraging the international community to faithfully implement UN sanctions against North Korea.

• Effective policy toward North Korea must move beyond the simplistic dichotomy of engagement versus non-engagement and clearly present North Korea with the choice between pursuing both nuclear and economic development. To this end, all available means and methods must be employed, including strengthening the implementation of UN sanctions aimed at deterring North Korea's nuclear and missile development, actively seeking China's cooperation in resolving the North Korean nuclear issue, and enhancing U.S.-ROK military deterrence capabilities to prevent further North Korean provocations. This requires developing a diplomatic strategy that is far more proactive and dynamic than strategic patience... (continued)


The East Asia Institute (EAI) conducts Smart Q&A video interviews with domestic and international experts to provide timely and in-depth analysis of current issues through question-and-answer sessions with specialists in relevant fields. This manuscript was compiled by EAI Foreign Affairs and Security Team interns Kim Dayoung, Hwang Seojeong, and Ben Forney from the original interview transcript, and edited by Researcher Yoo Jaeseung. The opinions expressed are those of the interviewee and do not necessarily reflect the views of the East Asia Institute. Please cite the source when quoting from Smart Q&A.

*This text is an AI translation of an original written in Korean. Some translations or nuances may be inaccurate.

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