Smart Q&A: Ezra Vogel and Chae-Sung Chung: Deng Xiaoping and Kim Jong Un: Implications of China's Reform and Opening Up Model for North Korea in 2014

YouTube Link: video.eai.or.kr/140120_Sqa.flv

Ezra Vogel, Professor Emeritus of Harvard University (Henry Ford II Professor of the Social Sciences Emeritus), is a leading East Asia expert in American academia, renowned for his research on Eastern capitalist models integrated with Confucian ethics. He holds a Ph.D. in Sociology from Harvard University and has served as a professor at Harvard, Director of the Harvard East Asian Research Center, and Director of the Fairbank Center.

Chae-Sung Chung, Director of EAI's Center for Asian Security Studies, earned his Ph.D. in Political Science from Northwestern University. He is currently a professor in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Seoul National University.

Following the execution of Jang Song-thaek, widely known as the second-highest ranking official and a key figure in the power structure, in December of the previous year, the international community's attention was focused on the trajectory of the Kim Jong Un regime in 2014. In response, the East Asia Institute (EAI) organized a series of Smart Q&A interviews to explore North Korea's choices in 2014 and the corresponding responses from South Korea and the international community. The first interview in this series, held on January 20th, featured Ezra Vogel, Professor Emeritus at Harvard University, and Director Chae-Sung Chung (EAI Center for Asian Security Studies; Seoul National University). Professor Vogel and Director Chung discussed the factors behind the success of Deng Xiaoping's reform and opening-up policies in China and their implications for the Kim Jong Un regime in North Korea in 2014. The key points are as follows:

Factors for the Success of Deng Xiaoping's Reform and Opening-Up Policy

"Deng Xiaoping's Leadership: Extensive bureaucratic experience, pursuit of gradual change, and securing reform momentum by compromising with conservatives or tolerating minor bureaucratic corruption."

"Creation of a Peaceful External Environment: Normalization of Sino-US relations, signing of the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship, and improvement of Sino-Soviet relations."

Chae-Sung Chung (hereafter, Chung) What do you consider to be the key factors behind the success of Deng Xiaoping's reform and opening-up policy? What domestic political elements played a significant role?

Ezra Vogel (hereafter, Vogel) When reform and opening up began in China in 1978, several domestic political factors enabled it. First, after Mao Zedong's death in 1976, there was broad consensus that Mao's policy direction had been flawed. Even Hua Guofeng, Mao's protégé and successor, emphasized modernization and sought a different path from Mao. The return of many high-ranking officials purged from the central stage during the Cultural Revolution was also a significant variable. Because so many people died of starvation during the Cultural Revolution, there was widespread support across Chinese society for fundamental change.

Considering the difficulties faced by most former communist countries, such as those in Eastern Europe, Vietnam, and North Korea, in reforming their socialist systems, China's success can be considered an exception. At the time of 1978, no Western scholar predicted that communist China could grow faster and for longer than capitalist countries like South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong. The most crucial factor driving this success was undoubtedly Deng Xiaoping's leadership. Firstly, Deng Xiaoping was a seasoned bureaucrat with extensive experience in various fields. He served 12 years in the military, lived in France for five years, and experienced the coexistence of political power and market economy during a year-long stay in the Soviet Union when new economic policies were being implemented.

He also had experience governing the southwestern region of China (with a population of about 100 million) before the transition to a socialist system from 1949-52. From 1952-66, he held high positions in various departments, including economic and foreign relations, within the central government, working closely with Mao and Zhou Enlai. He met numerous communist leaders in the early 1950s and heads of state from capitalist countries after 1974. By the time he seized power in 1978, he possessed leadership experience in all aspects: military, local government, and international politics. In the United States, presidents are often elected based on their experience as governors or senators, with the former excelling in domestic governance and the latter in foreign policy. Deng Xiaoping possessed both.

Furthermore, Deng Xiaoping had the experience of "wilderness" living, as emphasized by Professor David Gergen of Harvard University. Many leaders who achieved great things in their time, such as Charles de Gaulle or Winston Churchill, experienced periods of removal from high office. Professor Gergen calls this the wilderness experience, during which leaders have the opportunity to fundamentally re-examine the policies they previously pursued. Upon their return to the political stage, they can then more forcefully advance more developed policies. Deng Xiaoping, through his wilderness experience during the Cultural Revolution, was able to meticulously review the core principles and implementation methods of the reform and opening-up policies he intended to pursue.

Secondly, Deng Xiaoping pursued gradual change, initiating de-collectivization and opening up in stages. While allowing farming on a household basis rather than collective farming, he pursued this within a socialist framework to assuage concerns from those wary of China's capitalist transformation. For example, when de-collectivization was attempted in Anhui Province, which suffered the most severe hardships due to food shortages during the Cultural Revolution, it began with allowing those on the brink of starvation to find ways to survive independently outside the collective farming system. Subsequently, the household responsibility system was gradually introduced, and after two to three years, the remarkable achievements in agricultural output from Anhui Province were publicly disseminated and expanded to other regions. It was politically very difficult to oppose this method of gradual change.

Thirdly, Deng Xiaoping expanded the base of support for reform and opening up by tolerating minor corruption among local officials or compromising with conservative forces. Due to the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution, local officials tended to be hesitant to try new things and preferred to stick to the status quo. Deng Xiaoping tolerated minor mistakes and even some corruption to encourage them to regain initiative. While this did contribute to the spread of corruption throughout Chinese politics later on, it was a necessary measure to empower local officials, who were suffering from economic hardship not unlike the general populace, to take initiative. Additionally, during the first two to three years of attempting reform and opening-up policies, the pace of opening up to the outside world was adjusted, and compromises were made with conservative political forces in many areas, allowing the previous system to remain in place. All of these contributed significantly to expanding the pro-reform and opening-up forces and securing momentum for policy implementation.

Chung Considering the domestic political costs of implementing reform and opening-up policies, it seems necessary to manage the external environment stably for successful reform. What was the external environment like for China during the Deng Xiaoping era?

Vogel One of the first things Deng Xiaoping did upon his rehabilitation in 1977 was to invite high-ranking US officials to Beijing for talks on normalizing Sino-US relations. Although extensive discussions had taken place between the US and China since Nixon's historic visit in 1972, which initiated the period of détente, the two governments had not agreed on normalization by 1977. Initially, when Deng Xiaoping attempted talks by inviting US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, there was little progress due to the domestic political situation of the Carter administration. However, as the US domestic political situation improved in the summer of 1978, Carter resumed normalization talks through Leonard Woodcock, the head of the liaison office in Beijing. The crucial issue was the US arms sales to Taiwan. Deng Xiaoping accepted Woodcock's proposal to first normalize relations and then gradually resolve the Taiwan issue, thus achieving Sino-US diplomatic relations.

With Japan, China went a step further than the existing peace treaty, signing the Treaty of Peace and Friendship in August 1978. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union continued to show moves to militarily check China through naval and air bases in Vietnam. Deng Xiaoping considered this a medium-to-long-term threat to China and sought to resolve it. When Vietnam invaded Cambodia, a Chinese ally, in late 1978, Deng Xiaoping launched the Sino-Vietnamese War in early 1979. By dispatching troops directly to Vietnam, he sent a clear message that China would not stand idly by if the Soviet Union continued to pressure China using Vietnam. However, believing that China's warning message had been sufficiently conveyed to the Soviet Union, Deng Xiaoping withdrew from Vietnam in less than a month and proceeded to improve relations with the Soviet Union. Although the subsequent Sino-Soviet talks did not lead to full normalization, they significantly reduced the possibility of war between the two countries.

Ultimately, Deng Xiaoping succeeded in establishing friendly relations with all surrounding major powers at the beginning of the reform and opening-up period. Among those who believed in socialist ideology, it was widely known that the 'inevitability of world war' among major powers had been replaced by a peaceful external environment.

North Korea's Choices in 2014

"Compared to China and Taiwan during their reform and opening periods, the current economic gap between North and South Korea is enormous, making it difficult for North Korea to pursue change with confidence."

"Compared to Deng Xiaoping, Kim Jong Un lacks experience: Jang Song-thaek's purge has caused domestic political instability, making North Korea's reform and opening up even more difficult."

"The current spread of 'Jangmadang' (informal markets) in North Korea shares similarities with the early stages of Deng Xiaoping's reform and opening up."

Chung Listening to the story of China's reform and opening up, I realize its success might be an exceptional case. First, scale seems to be an important variable. China has a vast territory, making it relatively less vulnerable to external security threats. When initiating reforms, it could experiment with policies in limited areas and then expand, allowing for gradual change. However, North Korea is a much smaller country than China, making it inherently more vulnerable to external security threats, and it is difficult to experiment with reform and opening-up policies in specific regions. How important do you think scale is in the context of socialist system reform and opening up?

Vogel It may not be just a matter of scale, but rather the relative national power gap that is more critical. Both China and South Korea are divided nations, confronting each other after a civil war. When Deng Xiaoping embarked on reform and opening up, Taiwan was experiencing much faster economic growth than China, and its foreign trade volume was significantly larger. However, China's population was more than 50 times that of Taiwan, so in terms of actual economic size, China was by no means behind Taiwan. In contrast, South Korea's population is already nearly twice that of North Korea, and the economic gap is incomparably larger. Furthermore, the United States, the world's strongest power, supports South Korea as an ally. This overwhelming inferiority makes it difficult for North Korea to confidently pursue reform and opening up. I recall hearing that when China opened its doors in the 1970s and people from Taiwan and Hong Kong began to operate in China, despite China's much larger national scale, the Chinese people felt a significant inferiority complex towards these individuals with their modernized attire and equipment, causing the Chinese government to greatly worry about the repercussions of opening up. In a similar vein, I can fully understand the fear North Korea might have regarding opening up.

Chung That is a valid point. Another aspect highlighted by China's success seems to be the importance of leadership. When Kim Jong Un first emerged as a successor, many people had expectations for change in North Korea due to his youth and his experience studying in Switzerland. In particular, Jang Song-thaek, who rose to prominence as a key figure in his support group and possessed a deep understanding of China's reform and opening-up model and a pro-China orientation, fueled these expectations. However, following Jang Song-thaek's execution late last year, voices of pessimism regarding North Korea's future have become more prevalent among experts in related fields. What are your prospects for North Korea's reform and opening-up potential going forward?

Vogel Kim Jong Un is too young and inexperienced compared to Deng Xiaoping. When Deng Xiaoping came to power, he was over 70 years old, had served as General Secretary of the Communist Party of China for over 10 years, and had held high positions in various central government ministries for a long time, thus having connections with most officials. Compared to this, Kim Jong Un, being excessively young and immature, was able to succeed in the power transition without major upheaval largely due to the patronage of Jang Song-thaek, who had assisted Kim Jong Il in consolidating his power since the 1970s. In this context, one cannot help but worry about the internal stability of the North Korean regime following Jang Song-thaek's execution. While Kim Jong Un may have achieved some success in cultivating a younger support group, purging figures like Jang Song-thaek means expelling all those who followed him or were associated with him, making significant upheaval inevitable. Given the existing issue of relative national power disparity with South Korea, internal upheaval would make it even more difficult for North Korea to pursue reform and opening up.

Chung There is also some hopeful news. Currently, many North Korean residents are watching South Korean films and broadcast videos, thus being aware of South Korea's development. It is also known that they are making a living through informal economic activities in the 'Jangmadang' (markets), which operate in a manner akin to market capitalism. There are even reports that these informal markets are currently operating under the protection of the North Korean military.

Vogel I have also heard that mobile phones are quite widespread. It will be difficult for the government to completely control the information flowing to North Korean residents. I have heard that small-scale informal markets have recently spread considerably throughout North Korean society. This may be related to the recent modest economic growth in North Korea. From the perspective of the North Korean government, these could be considered black markets, but in reality, they cannot exist without the government turning a blind eye. There is only a thin line between 'turning a blind eye' and 'permitting.' North Korea is currently allowing small-scale market economies to grow, which bears similarities to the policies Deng Xiaoping pursued in the early stages of reform and opening up. In China, starting in the early 1980s, farmers in areas surrounding regions where small markets were permitted began bringing various agricultural products to sell in the markets, and as this gradually developed in terms of both variety and volume, markets expanded to more areas. I believe a similar phenomenon is occurring in North Korea.

If the North Korean military has begun to oversee informal market transactions and profit from them, the military will likely seek to create more markets to increase revenue. The next step would be for the military to support the production of civilian goods and sell them in the market, a process that also occurred in China. Consider the example of Shenzhen, one of the first areas China opened up. During the Mao era, the Chinese government moved most of its military industrial facilities to the 'Third Front' (三线) in the deep inland rear areas, ostensibly to prepare for enemy air raids. Technicians from the Shanghai region were also largely relocated inland around the 1960s. However, when Shenzhen was opened up, the Chinese military, seeking to profit from selling goods in overseas markets, sent some technicians from the eastern coastal regions back to Shenzhen to produce and sell civilian goods such as televisions and radios. If similar changes are occurring in North Korea surrounding the Kaesong Industrial Complex, it could be considered the beginning of reform and opening up.

Future ROK and US Policies Toward North Korea

"Policies must be prepared considering both the consolidation of the Kim Jong Un regime and the possibility of sudden collapse."

"North Korea's nuclear weapons pose a serious security threat to the US in terms of nuclear terrorism: Improvement in US-North Korea relations is difficult before progress is made on the North Korean nuclear issue."

Chung There is considerable room for various interpretations regarding North Korea's future, leading to extensive discussions within South Korea. In the short term, the execution of Jang Song-thaek may have strengthened the cohesion of the political elite group centered around Kim Jong Un, potentially solidifying the Kim Jong Un regime's power base. In such a scenario, it could be important to form a strategic relationship with the consolidated Kim Jong Un regime and actively persuade North Korea to embark on the path of reform and opening up. However, in the medium to long term, a scenario of sudden collapse in North Korea due to repeated purges and resulting political turmoil is also possible. Which scenario do you believe is more likely to materialize? Furthermore, what kind of North Korea policy do you think should be pursued at this juncture?

Vogel While China's party plays a central role, the military's influence is very significant in North Korea. It is necessary to keep both possibilities open regarding the current formation of the North Korean military establishment. The military may still wield considerable influence over the Kim Jong Un regime based on strong cohesion, or it may be divided into various factions engaged in conflict and confrontation. Therefore, preparations must be made for both scenarios. In particular, in the latter case, plans must be made to prepare for a sudden collapse in North Korea, and close cooperation with the United States, China, and Japan is essential for this. For the past 130 years, South Korea has been at the center of numerous problems and conflicts in the Asian region. Especially with the rise of China, the instability of the North Korean regime could create serious problems. Therefore, it is necessary to build consensus among South Korea, the US, Japan, and China and make sincere efforts to prepare for the possibility of a sudden collapse.

Chung How do you evaluate the Obama administration's policy of "strategic patience" toward North Korea? Currently, the United States appears to be dedicating significant effort to issues in the Middle East, such as the Iranian nuclear program, and its attention to the East Asian region seems to have weakened. Do you believe the US needs to develop alternative approaches in its North Korea policy?

Vogel I believe the US policy community is large enough that while some may focus on Middle East issues, others can address East Asian issues. If Secretary of State John Kerry has to spend a lot of time in the Middle East dealing with issues like Iran, Vice President Joseph Biden can step in to resolve problems arising in East Asia. There is no need to worry excessively just because US attention is dispersed. What the US is most concerned about currently is the issue of non-proliferation. The possession of nuclear weapons by the Soviet Union is on a different level from nuclear weapons falling into the hands of terrorist groups. A nation responsible for protecting the lives and property of its entire population must exercise considerable control over the management and use of nuclear weapons. Terrorist groups are free from such obligations. Therefore, a very high level of control system must be established globally to prevent terrorist groups from acquiring nuclear weapons. In this context, the proliferation threat posed by North Korea's nuclear weapons development is a matter of grave concern for the United States. Ultimately, it is difficult to expect a proactive change in US policy toward North Korea before progress is made in the denuclearization process. Moreover, North Korea has a history of agreeing to denuclearization multiple times but failing to implement it, so the US stance of "not wanting to buy the same horse twice" will likely continue.■

The East Asia Institute (EAI) receives financial support from The John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation for its research on middle power diplomacy. EAI conducts Smart Q&A video interviews with domestic and international experts to provide timely and in-depth analysis of current issues. This manuscript was compiled by Kim Yang-gyu, a researcher at EAI's Center for Asian Security Studies, and represents the personal opinions of the expert, not the official stance of the East Asia Institute. Please cite the source when quoting from Smart Q&A.