[Smart Q&A: Lee Sang-hyun] Prospects for Resuming the Six-Party Talks and South Korea's North Korea Policy Direction

YouTube Link: video.eai.or.kr/130911_Sqa.flv

Senior Researcher Lee Sang-hyun is currently the Director of the Security Strategy Research Division at the Sejong Institute. Senior Researcher Lee Sang-hyun holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and previously served as the Director-General for Policy Planning at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade.

Following the visit of Wu Dawei, China's Special Representative for Korean Peninsula Affairs, to North Korea from August 26-30, China officially proposed holding a 1.5-track meeting on September 18, involving diplomats and scholars from the Six-Party Talks member states to commemorate the 10th anniversary of the talks and the 8th anniversary of the September 19 Joint Statement. However, Glyn Davies, U.S. Special Representative for North Korea Policy, visited South Korea, China, and Japan from September 10-12, reaffirming that North Korea's sincere actions toward denuclearization are a prerequisite for resuming the Six-Party Talks. Consequently, it is anticipated that not only the United States but also the chief delegates of South Korea and Japan to the Six-Party Talks will not attend the September 18 meeting, with only academic figures participating instead. In response, the East Asia Institute invited Senior Researcher Lee Sang-hyun of the Sejong Institute on September 11 for an interview regarding the differences in U.S. and Chinese positions on the resumption of the Six-Party Talks, future prospects for the Korean Peninsula, and the direction of South Korea's North Korea policy. The main points are as follows:

U.S. and Chinese Positions on the Resumption of the Six-Party Talks

"United States: The Six-Party Talks are for denuclearization, and thus can only resume when North Korea demonstrates sincere actions toward denuclearization."

"China: As the chair, China seeks to resume the Six-Party Talks promptly to strengthen its diplomatic standing."

"U.S. Policy Principles toward North Korea: ① Inability to recognize North Korea as a nuclear-weapon state; ② Inability to provide compensation solely for not engaging in 'bad' behavior or for returning to dialogue; ③ Inability to tolerate provocations against North Korea's neighbors; ④ Fundamental improvement in U.S.-North Korea relations is impossible without improvements in inter-Korean relations and the human rights situation in North Korea."

"China's Perception of North Korea is Changing: The perception is spreading that North Korea's nuclear and missile provocations negatively impact China's core national interests, making North Korea a 'strategic burden' for China."

The U.S. position on the North Korean nuclear issue has not significantly changed from the "strategic patience" policy of the first Obama administration. The U.S. continues to pursue the policy goal of Complete, Verifiable, and Irreversible Dismantlement (CVID) of North Korea's nuclear weapons and is expected to maintain a dual approach of dialogue and sanctions.

On March 7, the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations held a hearing on "U.S. Policy toward North Korea." At this hearing, Glyn Davies, U.S. Special Representative for North Korea Policy, stated that the U.S. had offered incentives to North Korea, such as improved U.S.-North Korea relations and integration into the international community, in exchange for denuclearization, but North Korea had rejected all of them and continued its threats. He also reiterated that the U.S. would continue to pursue sincere and credible dialogue to implement the September 19 Joint Statement, but would adhere to the principles that, first, North Korea cannot be recognized as a nuclear-weapon state; second, North Korea will not be compensated solely for not engaging in bad behavior or for returning to dialogue; third, provocations against North Korea's neighbors will not be tolerated; and fourth, fundamental improvement in U.S.-North Korea relations is impossible without improvements in inter-Korean relations and the human rights situation in North Korea. Meanwhile, Tom Donilon, White House National Security Advisor, summarized U.S. policy toward North Korea in a speech at the Asia Society in New York on March 11 with four principles: "First, close and expanded cooperation with Japan and South Korea; second, no compensation for North Korea's misdeeds; third, defense of the U.S. homeland and allies; and fourth, continuous encouragement for North Korea to choose a better path."

Special Representative Davies, during his visit to South Korea, stated that North Korea must clearly understand that the Six-Party Talks are "talks for denuclearization," and that the talks can only resume when the U.S. judges that there will be concrete achievements toward North Korean denuclearization. He also assessed that North Korea is currently not showing a "positive" attitude toward implementing UN Security Council sanctions resolutions and cited North Korea's "claim to nuclear-weapon state status" as an obstacle to resuming the Six-Party Talks. In other words, the U.S. has made clear its stance of rejecting "dialogue for the sake of dialogue" and is reiterating its existing position that resuming the Six-Party Talks will be difficult until North Korea takes concrete and substantial denuclearization measures.

Conversely, China hopes to resume the Six-Party Talks as it can solidify its diplomatic standing through its role as chair. For this reason, China maintains the position that the sincerity issue raised by the U.S. can also be verified through dialogue.

Regarding the future resumption of the Six-Party Talks, the important point is, first, that during the U.S.-China summit in June, both countries agreed that the North Korean nuclear issue is a significant diplomatic agenda item in their bilateral relations, that North Korea cannot be recognized as a nuclear-weapon state, and that denuclearization is an important goal of their North Korea policy. It is also reported that the U.S. and Chinese leaders discussed the impossibility of achieving North Korea's parallel pursuit of nuclear weapons development and economic development. In other words, both the U.S. and China share common ground on the goals of their North Korea policies, and the divergence lies in how to generate momentum for the resumption of the Six-Party Talks.

Second, a change is detected in China's perception of North Korea. Within China, views are divided on whether North Korea is a "strategic asset" or a "strategic burden." The view of North Korea as a strategic asset reflects China's traditional perspective, based on the idiom "lips and teeth are cold" (脣亡齒寒), implying that North Korea serves as a "buffer zone" for China's security. However, North Korea's repeated nuclear and missile provocations provide opportunities for the U.S. to actively pursue its strategic rebalancing policy in the Asia-Pacific, thereby hindering the protection of China's core national interests. This provides an incentive for China to increasingly perceive North Korea not as a strategic 'asset' but as a 'burden.' The Chinese government's tolerance of critical public opinion toward North Korea following the third nuclear test can also be seen as an indirect expression of its dissatisfaction with North Korea. Of course, the possibility of a fundamental change in China's North Korea policy in the short term is slim. However, it is important to note that differentiation in perceptions regarding North Korea policy is occurring within China, and the Xi Jinping administration is sending a kind of warning signal to North Korea.

Prospects for the Resumption of the Six-Party Talks and the Korean Peninsula Situation

"Outlook for the Korean Peninsula Situation in the Second Half of 2013: ① Resumption of the Six-Party Talks is unlikely; ② Careful attention must be paid to how the U.S.'s Asia-Pacific rebalancing policy and China's demand for a new type of major power relations will shape future trends; ③ It will be difficult for the U.S., China, and Japan to play active roles in resolving the North Korean nuclear issue."

"For South Korea, favorable conditions are being created to proactively pursue its North Korea policy."

The possibility of coordinating U.S. and Chinese positions on the North Korean issue ultimately depends on the future direction of overall U.S.-China relations. In other words, U.S.-North Korea relations are a subordinate variable of U.S.-China relations. If U.S.-China relations are smooth and dialogue proceeds well, differences in their positions on the North Korean issue can be well coordinated; however, if U.S.-China relations enter a phase of conflict, their disagreements on the North Korean issue will become more pronounced and coordination will become more difficult. Currently, U.S.-China relations involve conflicts over specific issues such as internet censorship, human rights issues represented by the Dalai Lama, and the renminbi issue, but cooperation is proceeding within a broader framework. Therefore, both the U.S. and China are likely to avoid breaking the overall cooperative framework due to specific issues and will manage the North Korean issue at a certain level.

The most important country in the issue of resuming the Six-Party Talks is the United States. North Korea developed nuclear weapons due to the U.S.'s hostile policy toward it, and therefore, it consistently maintains the position that "the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue must be resolved by the United States." In this context, dialogue between the U.S. and North Korea is undoubtedly the most crucial step in the process of resolving the North Korean nuclear issue. China can be considered the next most important actor after the U.S., as its diplomatic efforts as the chair of the Six-Party Talks will be a significant variable in resolving the North Korean nuclear issue. Japan, on the other hand, prioritizes the issue of abductees over the North Korean nuclear issue, and Russia is not actively voicing its opinions, making it difficult to expect significant roles from Japan and Russia in resuming the Six-Party Talks. Therefore, excluding the U.S. and China, South Korea is the most important actor in the upcoming phase of resuming the Six-Party Talks.

Looking at the prospects for the Korean Peninsula situation in the second half of 2013, first, the situation does not allow for optimism regarding the resumption of the Six-Party Talks. Given that the U.S. has set sincere actions by North Korea as a prerequisite for resuming the talks, it is questionable how much North Korea can accept this.

Second, examining overall U.S.-China relations, the U.S.'s Asia-Pacific rebalancing policy and China's demand for a new type of major power relations can be identified as significant trends. The U.S.'s active engagement in the Asia-Pacific region and China's request for mutual respect of core interests will be important indicators for the possibility of positive developments in the second half of 2013.

Finally, it must be noted that it is difficult for the U.S., China, and Japan to play active roles in resolving the North Korean nuclear issue. The U.S. is experiencing strategic fatigue from maintaining its policy of strategic patience for an extended period, and despite increasing its engagement in the Asia-Pacific, budget constraints due to automatic budget cuts (sequester) and increasingly serious Middle Eastern issues such as Egypt and Syria make it difficult for the U.S. to take the lead in resolving the North Korean nuclear issue. The situation is similarly challenging for China. The current Chinese government faces immense tasks of maintaining high economic growth rates while simultaneously addressing numerous domestic issues, such as distribution and political reform. Diplomatically, it is preoccupied with ongoing issues like the conflict with Japan over the Diaoyu Islands, leaving it with limited capacity to exercise leadership in resolving the North Korean nuclear issue. Japan, in the aftermath of the Great East Japan Earthquake, is pursuing a path of conservative right-wing shift in search of a breakthrough, leading to a loss of trust from neighboring countries and a near-complete loss of regional leadership. Furthermore, its continued emphasis on the abductee issue over the North Korean nuclear issue is another background factor making it difficult for Japan to play an active role in resolving the North Korean nuclear issue. Consequently, the governments of the U.S., China, and Japan are all hoping that the Park Geun-hye administration will take the lead in resolving the North Korean nuclear issue, and favorable conditions are being created for South Korea to proactively pursue its North Korea policy.

Direction of South Korea's North Korea Policy

"Current U.S. North Korea Policy Review: It will be difficult for the U.S. to move ahead of South Korea."

"If South Korea, the most important party concerned, takes the lead in improving inter-Korean relations, it can lead international cooperation."

"Policy Recommendations: ① Understand the complex nature of the North Korean issue and approach it comprehensively; ② Develop concrete action plans for the Korean Peninsula Trust-Building Process and the Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative; ③ Continuously send the message that a change in North Korea's attitude is the path to its survival."

There has long been debate regarding the balance between inter-Korean cooperation and international cooperation. Specifically, concerns have been continuously raised that if inter-Korean relations improve while there are discrepancies between South Korea and the U.S. on North Korea policy, it could create an imbalance in U.S.-South Korea cooperation and damage the alliance. In this regard, two points need to be remembered.

First, the new diplomatic team of the Obama administration's second term is not prepared to lead the resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue. Secretary of State John Kerry's diplomatic team is just settling in, and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel Russel has only recently taken office, suggesting that a review of North Korea policy is likely underway within the U.S. Department of State. While this process may lead to visible changes in the U.S.'s strategic patience policy, it is currently difficult for the U.S. to move ahead of South Korea on the North Korean issue.

Second, South Korea is the most important party concerned in the North Korean nuclear issue and inter-Korean relations. Therefore, if South Korea takes the initiative to improve inter-Korean relations, conditions can be created to lead international cooperation for resolving the North Korean nuclear issue. As mentioned earlier, since the U.S., China, and Japan are all currently in a difficult position to generate momentum for resolving the North Korean nuclear issue, South Korea needs to play a leading role to break this stalemate.

The ongoing issue of resuming operations at the Kaesong Industrial Complex does not have significant potential to conflict with the direction of international cooperation. However, if discussions on resuming Mount Kumgang tourism become more serious, there could be some issues, given that UN Security Council Resolution 2094, adopted after the third nuclear test, prohibits large cash inflows into North Korea. It is precisely for this reason that sufficient persuasion of North Korea is necessary. North Korea must be clearly informed that the pace of improvement in inter-Korean relations will inevitably be influenced by the attitude and actions North Korea demonstrates in the international community after measures to improve inter-Korean relations are taken. In other words, North Korea must be fully informed that if it engages in 'bad' behavior, such as missile or nuclear tests, after the resumption of Mount Kumgang tourism, South Korea will face significant constraints in leading international cooperation through improved inter-Korean relations.

At this juncture, all measures that the South Korean government can take, such as normalizing operations at the Kaesong Industrial Complex, resuming Mount Kumgang tourism, and holding reunions for separated families, should be actively pursued. To facilitate the resumption of the Six-Party Talks, South Korea must also contribute by creating conditions for U.S.-North Korea and Japan-North Korea dialogue and by encouraging a more constructive role from China. The more North Korea is drawn into the international community, the more constraints there will be on its actions, leading to a more fundamental improvement in inter-Korean relations. Therefore, efforts to improve inter-Korean relations and efforts to create international conditions for resolving the North Korean nuclear issue must be pursued in parallel.

In this context, the South Korean government should, first, understand the complex nature of the North Korean issue and approach it comprehensively. The North Korean nuclear issue extends beyond the issue of nuclear weapons themselves and is linked to the overall issue of North Korea. Resolving the North Korean nuclear issue does not eliminate issues such as human rights or the risk of regime collapse. Therefore, the current Park Geun-hye administration's pursuit of both the Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative and the Korean Peninsula Trust-Building Process, based on the recognition that peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula are inseparable from peace and stability in Northeast Asia, is a desirable approach. The North Korean issue should always be approached with consideration for the peace and stability of Northeast Asia as a whole.

Second, concrete action plans for the Korean Peninsula Trust-Building Process and the Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative must be developed. Thought must be given to how the policy direction, set in a desirable manner, can be concretely formulated to elicit changes in North Korea's behavior going forward. The extent to which these action plans are successfully implemented will be a crucial evaluation criterion for assessing the five-year term of the Park Geun-hye administration.

Third, it is important to continuously send the message that a change in North Korea's attitude is the path to its survival. No matter how good the policies proposed by neighboring countries may be, no progress can ultimately be made if North Korea itself does not accept them. Ultimately, the most important effort is for the international community to repeatedly emphasize that the path to North Korea's survival will open when it changes its attitude and positively considers and accepts the proposals of its neighboring countries.■

The East Asia Institute (EAI) is supported by a grant from the MacArthur Foundation. EAI conducts Smart Q&A interviews in video format with domestic and international experts, aiming to provide timely and in-depth analysis of current issues through question-and-answer sessions with experts in relevant fields. This manuscript was compiled by Kim Yang-gyu, a researcher at EAI's Center for Asian Security Studies, based on the interview content. The opinions expressed are those of the individual expert and do not necessarily reflect the views of the East Asia Institute. Please cite the source when quoting from Smart Q&A.