Smart Q&A: Park Won Gon on US Defense Budget Cuts and South Korea's Defense Policy

YouTube Link: video.eai.or.kr/130807_Sqa.flv

Professor Park Won Gon is currently affiliated with the Department of International Studies and Linguistics at Handong Global University. He holds a Master's degree from Boston College and a Ph.D. in International Politics from Seoul National University. He previously served as a Research Fellow at the Center for Security Strategy at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA).

US Defense Budget Cuts and Future Restructuring of US Defense Posture

“Under pressure to cut defense spending, the US Department of Defense is reviewing strategic options: If automatic budget cuts (sequester) are applied, spending could be reduced by up to $1 trillion over the next decade.”

“A choice between size and capability: Reducing troop and force size versus reducing investment in modernization and advanced capabilities.”

“A trend since the end of the Cold War: The US will enhance capabilities and reduce size. ① If Army troop strength is reduced to below 400,000, it will be impossible to operate in multiple theaters simultaneously. ② A reduction of 30,000 Marines will lead to a decrease in rapid deployment capabilities. ③ If aircraft carrier strike groups are reduced by 2-3, the importance of utilizing overseas US military bases will increase.”

The "Strategic Choices and Management Review" announced by US Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel on July 31 discusses the response options available to the United States amidst pressure to cut defense spending. The US has already committed to reducing defense spending by a total of $487 billion over the next decade. However, if the sequester measure is implemented, an additional $500 billion in defense spending must be cut over the next 10 years, totaling a staggering $1 trillion. Secretary Hagel warned that while the already decided reduction of $487 billion could be managed without significant difficulty as the wars in the Middle East conclude, an additional $500 billion reduction would inevitably cause substantial problems for the readiness of the US military. Therefore, the report released at this time can be seen as an effort to review practical options in preparation for large-scale defense budget cuts, as well as a warning from the US Department of Defense to Congress that further defense spending cuts could undermine the United States' status as a superpower.

The Department of Defense announced that to cope with large-scale defense budget cuts, the defense force structure must be reorganized by choosing between capacity and capability. The proposed measures for reducing capacity include cuts to the Army, Marine Corps, aircraft carrier strike groups, and aging bomber fleets. It was explained that reducing capability involves limiting the development, acquisition, and maintenance costs of advanced weapons systems that require substantial investment. Considering the military transformation led by then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld during the first term of the George W. Bush administration, the new Defense Strategic Review announced in January 2012, and the document "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense," it is evident that the US will reorganize its defense forces to enhance capabilities and reduce size in the future.

In particular, as China develops Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2AD) weapon systems such as missiles and submarines to prevent the projection of US forces into the East Asian region, the US will inevitably need to develop more advanced weapons to overcome these capabilities. Therefore, in response to pressure to reduce defense spending, the US will have no choice but to opt for reducing the size of its forces.

Among the proposed measures for capacity reduction, the cuts to the Army, Marine Corps, and aircraft carrier strike groups carry significant implications. First, regarding Army troop strength, a reduction from the current level of 540,000 to a maximum of 380,000 has been proposed. Reducing Army troop strength to below 400,000 signifies a strategically crucial change. When the US Department of Defense announced its new defense strategy early last year, it garnered considerable domestic and international attention by proposing to reduce Army troop strength to approximately 500,000. The existing US defense strategy of "two-war capability" assumes the conduct of full-scale wars simultaneously in the Middle East and the Korean Peninsula during contingencies. This requires a minimum of approximately 800,000 troops; therefore, a reduction below this level effectively signifies the abandonment of this two-war strategy. Consequently, with a reduction in Army troop strength to around 500,000, it was understood that the US would maintain a force size capable of a "1+2" strategy, i.e., conducting a full-scale war in one region while simultaneously carrying out stabilization operations or contingency response operations in two other regions. However, if troop strength is reduced to below 400,000 as announced, it implies that even conducting a full-scale war in one region would become difficult. Specifically, the current operational plan to deploy 650,000 ground troops to the Korean Peninsula in case of emergency becomes even less feasible.

Second, a reduction of the Marine Corps from its current strength of 180,000 to 150,000 was discussed. The Marine Corps serves as an offensive and rapid deployment force. Reducing its size means a corresponding decrease in the US military's capacity to rapidly deploy to conflict zones worldwide.

Third, a reduction in aircraft carrier strike groups from the current 11 to 8-9 was considered. As seen in recent conflicts in the Middle East, aircraft carriers serve as forward bases deployed to regions where war must be waged. A reduction in their numbers implies that the utilization of overseas US military bases within allied nations as staging bases will inevitably become more important.

In summary, additional defense budget cuts will lead to a reduction in force size, which in turn means a significant limitation on the US military's external power projection capabilities. Not only will the scope of feasible operations be reduced, but the US military's ability to respond to simultaneous conflicts occurring globally will also be inevitably constrained. Of course, all these projections apply only if large-scale additional defense budget cuts materialize due to sequestration measures. However, it is necessary to remain mindful of the possibility that the US Department of Defense may be forced into such strategic choices.

Restructuring of US Defense Posture and Changes in the Northeast Asian Security Environment

“No major issues with the US Department of Defense's force restructuring direction: a small, efficient, and modular military structure.”

“Problems with the restructuring of the US military structure: ① Restructuring due to budget constraints ② Lack of time.”

“Increase in China's Anti-Access/Area-Denial capabilities: The US rebalancing strategy will inevitably be limited militarily.”

“Large-scale reinforcement of US ground troops in case of contingency on the Korean Peninsula is impossible: Revision of operational plans is unavoidable.”

The US military's force restructuring direction of a "small, efficient, and modular military structure" is a concept that the Bush administration attempted to pursue during its first term but was temporarily postponed due to the "War on Terror." Therefore, reorganizing defense forces in this direction is not inherently problematic. However, it is concerning that the current restructuring of the US military structure is being driven by budget constraints, as a forced fit, rather than by adjustments in strategic concepts. Furthermore, the fact that the restructuring must proceed immediately according to mandatory budget reduction clauses, without sufficient time, will also hinder a smooth reorganization of the force structure.

Examining the impact of these reductions on the Northeast Asian security environment, it appears that the US's Asia-Pacific rebalancing strategy will inevitably be limited in its military dimension. While China is successfully enhancing its Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2AD) capabilities by increasing its defense budget, the US is facing continuous defense budget cuts. Consequently, it will become increasingly difficult for the US military to rapidly deploy and operate in the Northeast Asian region. Therefore, the US rebalancing strategy is expected to be pursued through diplomatic means, particularly by strengthening cooperation with allies, rather than through military measures.

I disagree with the argument in some academic circles that the narrowing military gap between the US and China, due to US defense budget cuts and China's defense budget increases, will raise the possibility of a full-scale war between the two. The likelihood of a large-scale, full-scale war between the US and China is very low. Taiwan and the Korean Peninsula are the only regions where a full-scale war between the two countries might occur, and the possibility is diminishing. Should a military conflict occur between the US and China in the future, it would likely take the form of a limited war or a regional conflict surrounding a sudden change of circumstances on the Korean Peninsula or the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. The US Department of Defense's focus on rapid response capabilities in its military restructuring reflects this understanding. For China to possess military capabilities comparable to the US, it would need to secure aircraft carrier strike groups and overseas bases capable of projecting military power globally, both of which are extremely difficult. In particular, building aircraft carrier strike groups requires technological expertise, operational capability, and actual combat experience; while expert opinions vary, it is estimated that it would take China at least 15 years to establish just one aircraft carrier strike group.

On the Korean Peninsula, operational plans based on the assumption of large-scale reinforcement of US ground troops in case of contingency will need to be comprehensively re-examined. The US has not conducted military operations involving the large-scale deployment of ground troops since the First Gulf War in 1991. As seen in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan as part of the "War on Terror," the current US military approach involves directly striking and neutralizing enemy command structures using air and naval power, followed by an immediate transition to stabilization operations. Considering the immense costs associated with maintaining, deploying, and forward-basing large ground forces, as well as the domestic political burden arising from US casualties, this shift in the mode of warfare is a natural consequence. Therefore, it is necessary to revise operational plans that assume a full-scale war on the Korean Peninsula to reflect these changes in the US military's strategic concepts.

South Korea's Defense Policy

“Defense reform to enhance defense capability efficiency: Command structure reform must be urgently undertaken.”

“Transfer of Combined Operational Control (OPCON): The timing should be adjusted based on the operational capabilities of the ROK military.”

“Adjustment of ROK-US cost-sharing for defense: Transparency enhancement and post-management measures are necessary.”

The reduction in US defense spending ultimately means that South Korea will have to assume greater responsibility and roles. However, South Korea also faces various domestic political constraints that prevent a reckless increase in its defense budget, necessitating a strategy of "selection and concentration."

The most urgent task is defense reform to enhance the efficiency of South Korea's defense capabilities. The core objective of the defense reform pursued during the Lee Myung-bak administration was to improve overall military efficiency by reorganizing the command structure to effectively manage overlapping force assets and operational elements among the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Despite ample research providing answers on how the command structure should be reformed, the lack of progress in defense reform stems from a deficiency in political will. Considering the trend of US defense force structure restructuring, South Korea will inevitably become the primary entity responsible for the defense of the Korean Peninsula, regardless of the issue of OPCON transfer. To fulfill this role effectively, a system must be promptly established to command the entire ROK military in a unified manner and conduct military operations.

Regarding the issue of Combined OPCON transfer, while various discussions exist concerning the appropriate timing, the most desirable approach is to adjust the timing based on an assessment of the ROK military's actual operational capabilities. In 2012, both South Korea and the US conducted an Initial Operational Capability (IOC) assessment evaluating the ROK military's unit organization, equipment, and core mission performance. Currently, a Final Operational Capability (FOC) assessment is underway to evaluate the ROK military's operational readiness after the OPCON transfer. This process requires an approach where, if certain areas are not being developed as planned, the timeline for the transfer is extended based on these findings.

In the case of defense cost-sharing, negotiations between South Korea and the US must be concluded by October of this year. The primary issues are the insufficient transparency regarding how the defense costs borne by South Korea are utilized and the inadequate post-management of how these funds have actually been spent. Despite both countries being aware of these issues for a long time, practical improvement measures have yet to be implemented. It is unlikely that these issues can be adequately discussed and resolved within the remaining two months before the negotiation deadline. Therefore, it is necessary to include provisions in the defense cost-sharing agreement that mandate joint ROK-US research or long-term working-level discussions to develop improvement measures for transparency and post-management.■

The East Asia Institute (EAI) receives financial support from the MacArthur Foundation. EAI has been conducting video interviews in the form of Smart Q&A with domestic and international experts, aiming to provide timely and in-depth analysis of current issues through question-and-answer sessions with experts in relevant fields. This manuscript was compiled by Kim Yang-gyu, a researcher at EAI's Center for Asian Security Studies, from the interview content. The opinions expressed are those of the individual expert and do not represent the official position of the East Asia Institute. Please cite the source when quoting from Smart Q&A.