Smart Q&A: Park Won-gon] US Defense Budget Cuts and South Korea's Defense Policy

YouTube Link: video.eai.or.kr/130807_Sqa.flv

Professor Park Won-gon is currently a professor in the Department of International Studies at Handong Global University. Professor Park received his master's degree from Boston College and his Ph.D. in international politics from Seoul National University. He previously served as a research fellow at the Center for Security Strategy at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA).

US Defense Budget Cuts and Future Restructuring of US Defense Posture

“Amid pressure to cut the US defense budget, strategic options are being reviewed: if automatic budget cuts (sequester) are applied, up to $1 trillion could be cut over the next 10 years.”

“Choice between scale and capability: reduction in troop/force size versus investment in modernization/advanced capabilities.”

“As a trend since the end of the Cold War, the US will enhance capabilities and reduce scale: ① If Army troop strength is reduced to below 400,000, it will be impossible to operate multiple simultaneous theaters of operation. ② A reduction of 30,000 Marines will lead to a decrease in rapid deployment capabilities. ③ If 2-3 aircraft carrier strike groups are reduced, the importance of overseas US military bases will increase.”

The "Strategic Choices and Management Review" announced by US Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel on July 31 discusses the response options available to the US under pressure to cut its defense budget. The US has already committed to reducing its defense spending by a total of $487 billion over the next 10 years, but if the sequester measure is implemented, an additional $500 billion must be cut over the next decade. This amounts to a staggering $1 trillion in defense budget cuts. Secretary Hagel warned that while the previously decided reduction of $487 billion could be managed without significant difficulty as the wars in the Middle East conclude, an additional $500 billion cut would inevitably cause significant problems for the readiness of the US military. Therefore, the report released this time can be seen as having been prepared not only to review feasible options in preparation for large-scale defense budget cuts but also to serve as a warning from the US Department of Defense to the US Congress that further defense budget cuts could undermine the United States' status as a superpower.

The US Department of Defense announced that to cope with large-scale defense budget cuts, the defense posture must be reorganized by choosing between capacity and capability. As measures to reduce scale, reductions in Army and Marine Corps strength, aircraft carrier strike groups, and aging bomber fleets were proposed. It was explained that reducing capability would involve limiting the development, acquisition, and maintenance costs of advanced weapons systems that require enormous investment. Considering the "military transformation" led by then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld during the first term of the George W. Bush administration, and the new "Defense Strategic Review" announced in January 2012, titled "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense," it is evident that the US will reorganize its defense posture to enhance capabilities and reduce scale in the future.

In particular, as China is developing Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2AD) weapons systems such as missiles and submarines to prevent the projection of US forces into the East Asian region, it is inevitable for the US to develop more advanced weapons to overcome this. Therefore, in the future, the US will have no choice but to choose the direction of reducing its force size to cope with the pressure of defense budget cuts.

Among the proposed measures for scale reduction, the cuts to the Army, Marine Corps, and aircraft carrier strike groups have significant implications. First, regarding Army troop strength, a plan to reduce it from the current level of 540,000 to a maximum of 380,000 has been proposed. Reducing Army troop strength to below 400,000 signifies a strategically very important change. When the US Department of Defense announced its new defense strategic guidance early last year, it garnered significant domestic and international attention by deciding to reduce Army troop strength to approximately 500,000. The existing US defense strategy of "two simultaneous wars" assumes full-scale warfare in the Middle East and the Korean Peninsula simultaneously in case of contingency. This requires a minimum of approximately 800,000 troops, so reducing troop strength below this level effectively means abandoning this simultaneous war strategy. Therefore, it was reported that by reducing Army troop strength to around 500,000, the US would maintain a force size capable of a "1+2" strategy in the future, meaning conducting full-scale warfare in one theater while simultaneously carrying out stabilization operations or contingency response operations in two other theaters. However, if troop strength is reduced to below 400,000 as announced this time, it means that even conducting full-scale warfare in one theater will be difficult. In particular, the current operational plan to deploy 650,000 ground troops to the Korean Peninsula in case of contingency becomes even less feasible.

Second, a reduction of the Marine Corps from the current 180,000 to 150,000 troops was discussed. The Marine Corps is an offensive force and a rapid deployment force. Reducing its size means a corresponding decrease in the US military's capability to rapidly deploy to conflict zones around the world.

Third, a reduction in the number of aircraft carrier strike groups from the current 11 to 8-9 was considered. As seen in the recent wars in the Middle East, aircraft carriers serve as forward bases for operations in war zones. A reduction in their numbers means that the utilization of overseas US military bases within allied nations as staging bases will inevitably become even more important.

In summary, further defense budget cuts will lead to a reduction in force size, which means a significant limitation on the US military's ability to project power abroad. Not only will the scope of feasible operations be reduced, but the US military's capacity to respond to simultaneous conflicts occurring worldwide will also be inevitably limited. Of course, all these projections apply only if large-scale additional defense budget cuts become a reality due to sequestration measures, but it is necessary to be mindful of the possibility that the US Department of Defense may be forced into such strategic choices.

Restructuring of US Defense Posture and Changes in the Northeast Asian Security Environment

“No major issues with the US Department of Defense's force restructuring direction: a small, efficient, modular military structure.”

“Problems with the restructuring of the US military structure: ① restructuring due to budget constraints ② lack of time.”

“Increase in China's Anti-Access/Area-Denial capabilities: the US rebalancing policy will inevitably be limited in military terms.”

“Large-scale reinforcement of US ground troops in case of contingency on the Korean Peninsula is impossible: revision of operational plans is unavoidable.”

The US military's force restructuring direction of a "small, efficient, and modular military structure" is something that was attempted during the first term of the Bush administration but was temporarily put on hold due to the "War on Terror." Therefore, reorganizing defense forces in this direction is not a major issue. However, it is concerning that the current restructuring of the US military structure is not driven by adjustments in strategic concepts but is being pursued as a makeshift solution due to budget constraints. Furthermore, the fact that the restructuring must proceed immediately according to mandatory budget reduction provisions, without sufficient time, is also seen as a factor hindering smooth force structure reform.

Examining the impact of these reductions on the Northeast Asian security environment, it appears that the US's Asia-Pacific rebalancing strategy will inevitably be limited in military terms. While China is successfully strengthening its Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2AD) capabilities by increasing its defense budget, the US is facing continuous defense budget cuts. Consequently, it will become increasingly difficult for the US military to rapidly deploy and operate in the Northeast Asian region. Therefore, the US rebalancing strategy is expected to be pursued through diplomatic means, particularly by strengthening cooperation with allies, rather than through military means.

I disagree with some academic discussions suggesting that the narrowing military gap between the US and China due to US defense budget cuts and China's defense budget increases will raise the possibility of a full-scale war between the two. The likelihood of a large-scale full-scale war between the US and China is very low. Taiwan and the Korean Peninsula are the only regions where a full-scale war between the two countries is possible, and the probability of this is diminishing. If a military conflict between the US and China were to occur in the future, it would likely take the form of a contingency on the Korean Peninsula or a limited war/regional conflict surrounding the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. The US Department of Defense's focus on rapid response capabilities in its military restructuring also reflects an awareness of this situation. For China to possess military capabilities comparable to the US, it would need to secure aircraft carrier strike groups and overseas bases capable of projecting military power worldwide, both of which are extremely difficult. In particular, for China to build aircraft carrier strike groups, it requires technological expertise, operational experience, and actual combat experience, and while opinions vary among experts, it is estimated that it will take at least 15 years for China to establish just one aircraft carrier strike group.

At the Korean Peninsula level, it appears that operational plans based on large-scale reinforcement of US ground troops in case of contingency will need to be comprehensively re-examined. The US has not conducted military operations involving large-scale deployment of ground troops since the First Gulf War in 1991. As seen in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan as part of the "War on Terror," the current US military strategy involves directly striking and neutralizing enemy command and control, followed by immediate stabilization operations, utilizing air and naval power. The shift in warfare execution methods is a natural consequence, considering the enormous costs associated with maintaining, deploying, and forward-basing large ground forces, as well as the domestic political burden arising from US casualties. Therefore, it is necessary to revise operational plans that assume a full-scale war on the Korean Peninsula to reflect these changes in the US military's strategic concepts.

South Korea's Defense Policy

“Defense reform to enhance defense efficiency: urgent reform of the command structure is needed.”

“Transfer of wartime operational control (SPO) between South Korea and the US: the timing should be adjusted based on the operational capabilities of the South Korean military.”

“Adjustment of cost-sharing for defense (SMA) between South Korea and the US: transparency and post-management measures are needed.”

The reduction in the US defense budget ultimately means that the South Korean military will have to assume greater responsibility and roles. However, South Korea also faces various domestic political constraints that prevent it from arbitrarily increasing its defense budget, thus necessitating "selection and concentration."

The most urgent task is defense reform to enhance the efficiency of South Korea's defense capabilities. The core task of the defense reform pursued during the Lee Myung-bak administration was to reorganize the command structure to effectively manage overlapping force assets and operational elements between the Army, Navy, and Air Force, thereby increasing overall military efficiency. Despite the existence of numerous studies providing answers on how the command structure should be reformed, the failure to properly implement defense reform stems from a lack of political will. Considering the trend of restructuring the US defense posture, even setting aside the issue of wartime operational control transfer, the South Korean military will inevitably become the primary entity responsible for the defense of the Korean Peninsula in the future. To fulfill this role effectively, a system capable of commanding the entire South Korean military in a unified manner to conduct military operations must be established promptly.

Regarding the issue of transferring wartime operational control (SPO) between South Korea and the US, while there are various discussions about the appropriate timing, the most desirable approach is to adjust the timing based on an evaluation of the actual operational capabilities of the South Korean military. In 2012, South Korea and the US conducted an Initial Operational Capability (IOC) assessment, evaluating the unit organization, equipment, and core mission performance capabilities of the South Korean military. Currently, a Final Operational Capability (FOC) assessment is underway to evaluate the operational feasibility of the South Korean military after the SPO transfer. In this process, if there are areas where operational capabilities are not being adequately met as planned, an approach involving discussion of a deadline extension based on these findings is necessary.

In the case of the defense cost-sharing (SMA) issue, negotiations between South Korea and the US must be completed by October of this year. The main problems are the lack of sufficient transparency regarding how the defense costs borne by South Korea are used, and the inadequate post-management of how these funds have actually been utilized. Although both South Korea and the US have been aware of this issue for a long time, they have not yet implemented substantial improvement measures. It is difficult to reach a conclusion by discussing this issue properly within the remaining two months before the negotiation deadline. Therefore, it is necessary to include provisions in the SMA agreement that mandate joint South Korea-US research or long-term working-level discussions to develop improvement measures for transparency and post-management.

The East Asia Institute (EAI) is financially supported by the MacArthur Foundation. EAI has been conducting Smart Q&A, a video interview series with domestic and international experts, aiming to provide timely and in-depth analysis of current issues through question-and-answer sessions with experts in relevant fields. This manuscript was compiled by Kim Yang-gyu, a researcher at EAI's Center for Asian Security Studies, based on the interview content. The opinions expressed are those of the individual expert and do not represent the official position of the East Asia Institute. Please cite the source when quoting from Smart Q&A.