Smart Q&A: Park Young-jun on the Rightward Shift in Japanese Politics and South Korea's Response Strategy

YouTube Link: video.eai.or.kr/130515_Sqa.flv

Professor Park Young-jun holds a Ph.D. in International Politics from the University of Tokyo and is currently a professor at the National Defense University's Graduate School of National Security.

Background and Future Direction of the Rightward Shift in Japanese Politics

“Background of the Rightward Shift: ① Strengthening of Japan's national power ② Emergence of politicians from the post-war generation lacking historical awareness ③ Insufficient processing of war criminals ④ Japan's national power being surpassed by China and loss of confidence within Japanese society after the Great East Japan Earthquake”

“Key Variables Determining Future Trends: ① Changes in the political landscape following the July Upper House election results ② The role of Japanese civil society ③ The stance of Western countries”

Since 1945, Japan has adopted the Yoshida Doctrine as its national strategy, maintaining a policy of adhering to the 'Peace Constitution,' relying on the 'US-Japan alliance for security,' and focusing on 'economic growth.' However, since the 1990s, as Japan's national power grew and it was increasingly called upon to play a larger role in the international community, movements emerged to depart from the Yoshida Doctrine and seek new strategies. These can be broadly summarized into three streams: liberal internationalism, the concept of a 'normal state,' and nationalism (or chauvinism).

First, liberal internationalism aims to expand Japan's role in the international community through areas like development cooperation, leveraging its economic and technological prowess, and to enhance its soft power. Second, the 'normal state' concept advocates for strengthening security capabilities commensurate with its increased economic power, similar to how Germany participates in international security alongside the United States through its membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This stream suggests revising domestic laws to allow Japan's Self-Defense Forces to actively participate in UN peacekeeping operations and similar roles. Third, nationalism is characterized by a revisionist view of history, glorifying Japan's past wartime aggression, denying the issue of comfort women, and pursuing the establishment of a hardline national security system, such as advocating for nuclear armament to counter China's rise. The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and governments led by Junichiro Koizumi, Yasuo Fukuda, and Taro Aso have supported the 'normal state' concept, while the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) and the Yukio Hatoyama administration emphasized liberal internationalism. The current trajectory of the Shinzo Abe administration can be seen as moving beyond the 'normal state' concept towards a chauvinistic national strategy.

The background of the rightward shift in Japanese politics can be summarized into four main points. First, the strengthening of Japan's national power and the search for a new national identity that accompanies it. Second, the emergence of politicians from the post-war generation. While veteran politicians who experienced World War II were highly cautious about Japan's nationalization or militarization, post-war generation politicians are free from historical guilt and even exhibit ignorance regarding history. Third, unlike Germany, Japan's processing of war criminals was insufficient. Not only was Emperor Hirohito, the greatest war criminal, not punished, but war criminals officially purged from public office in 1946 returned to Japanese politics after the 1952 San Francisco Peace Treaty and led the establishment of the LDP in 1955. This failure to properly deal with war criminals created an opening for revisionist historical views to emerge. Fourth, the expansion of anxiety and loss of confidence within Japanese society. Japan's pride was severely damaged when its GDP was surpassed by China in 2010, and subsequently, the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011 led to widespread anxiety and a loss of confidence within Japanese society. This has led to a demand for strong political leadership, becoming a factor that allows Abe's government's chauvinistic policies to gain high support.

In contrast to the rightward shift in Japanese politics, Japanese civil society continues to strongly uphold democratic values and reflect on past history. For example, opinion polls in Japan regarding Prime Minister Abe's proposed constitutional revision show opposition exceeding 50 percent, while support remains around 30 percent. This indicates that despite the Abe administration's nationalistic tendencies, a majority of Japanese society maintains a cautious stance. However, it is noteworthy that Prime Minister Abe, by initially focusing on promoting Abenomics, which involved inducing a weaker yen and largely avoiding historical issues, has successfully created signs of an economic boom unseen in Japan for the past two decades. This has led to an increase in his approval ratings, rising from approximately 59 percent at the beginning of his term to over 72 percent currently. If the Abe administration leverages these approval ratings to push forward its nationalistic agenda, including constitutional revision, the possibility of undermining sound cautious public opinion within Japanese society cannot be ruled out.

The key variables that will determine the future direction of Japanese politics can be summarized into three main points. First, changes in the political landscape following the results of the Upper House election in July. Although key figures in the Abe cabinet pursue a nationalistic agenda, voices of concern regarding the Abe administration's historical views are high within the Democratic Party, Komeito, and even within the LDP. The outcome of the July Upper House election, determining which political forces will gain greater influence, is expected to be a crucial turning point shaping the future course of Japanese politics. Second, the extent to which Japan's conscientious civil society can check the Abe administration's nationalistic tendencies regarding constitutional revision and historical issues. Third, and most importantly, the reaction of Western countries. While Western countries, including the United States, do not oppose Japan's constitutional revision or security system enhancement, they react very sensitively to historical issues such as comfort women and the Greater East Asia War of Co-Prosperity. This is because countries like the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands were direct belligerents against Japan during World War II. Therefore, the level of restraint expressed by Western political elites and opinion leaders regarding the Abe administration's nationalistic tendencies will significantly influence the future direction of Japanese politics.

Outlook for the Abe Administration's Foreign and Security Policy

“Domestic Policy: Strengthening the domestic security system”

“Foreign Policy: ① Strengthening the US-Japan alliance ② Policy to contain China ③ Building networks with South Korea, India, Australia, and Southeast Asian countries”

While the Abe administration cannot ignore the checks from Western countries, including the United States, and the voices of Japanese civil society, it is expected to fundamentally continue pursuing the foreign and security policy pledges made during the election campaign. Notably, recent opinion polls indicate that the approval ratings for political forces representing hardline conservatives, such as the LDP (47 percent) and the Japan Restoration Party (8 percent), overwhelmingly surpass that of the DPJ (7 percent), suggesting a likely victory for the LDP in the upcoming July Upper House election. This means Prime Minister Abe is highly likely to remain in power for the next three years until the next general elections for the House of Representatives (December 2016) and the House of Councillors (July 2016). This presents the Abe administration with an opportunity to maintain a consistent policy direction.

Domestically, the Abe administration is expected to focus on strengthening the domestic security system. It will pursue constitutional revision to include the Self-Defense Forces, secure the right to collective self-defense to enable substantive joint operations with the United States, and establish a National Security Council.

Externally, first, it will strengthen the US-Japan alliance. This is likely to involve joint base utilization, expanded joint exercises, and the establishment of joint US-Japan operational planning guidelines. Second, it will pursue a policy to contain China. The Abe administration perceives China's military threat as serious and emphasizes that it will not back down on territorial and maritime issues, such as the Senkaku Islands. Therefore, it will seek to establish a posture to contain China based on strengthening its domestic security system and the US-Japan alliance. Third, it will pursue network building with South Korea, India, Australia, and Southeast Asian countries. From the perspective of containing China, building a solid network with countries that share common values is essential. In particular, close security cooperation with South Korea is necessary not only for containing China but also for responding to the threat posed by North Korea.

South Korea's Response Strategy

“Firm response on territorial and historical issues”

“Economic and security cooperation with Japan is necessary; exchanges at the civil society, student, and cultural levels should be continued”

“It is difficult to devise a resolution for the current strained South Korea-Japan relations at the government level; Track 1.5 or Track 2 diplomacy should be utilized”

Despite existing conflict factors with South Korea regarding territorial and historical issues, Japan's intention to pursue active cooperation in diplomatic and security dimensions may place South Korea's policy toward Japan in a dilemma.

It is clear that the current policy of the Park Geun-hye administration toward Japan faces considerable difficulties. At this juncture, it is crucial to establish South Korea's ultimate national interests and prioritize policy objectives in foreign relations to achieve them, thereby contemplating the direction of policy toward Japan as part of subordinate strategies. The priorities for South Korea's foreign policy objectives can be stated as: first, creating conditions for peaceful unification on the Korean Peninsula through the resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue and the promotion of North Korea's reform and openness; and second, preventing conflicts among regional powers, including China and Japan, by building a cooperative order in the East Asian region, and promoting economic, social, and cultural exchanges among regional countries.

Examining President Park Geun-hye's campaign pledges, her policy toward Japan involves a firm response to historical issues and territorial/maritime disputes, while also acknowledging the need for a Northeast Asian peace and cooperation initiative to overcome the "Asia Paradox" on a regional level. This approach, consistent with previous administrations, warrants continued pursuit.

Firstly, a firm stance must be maintained on territorial and historical issues. In the case of Dokdo, given South Korea's effective control, it is advisable to take substantive measures rather than excessively highlighting the issue. Regarding historical issues, efforts should be made to correct the distorted historical perceptions of Japanese political leadership at a multilateral level. This can begin with fostering sound historical perceptions among Japanese citizens, including students, through initiatives like the China-Japan-South Korea "CAMPUS Asia" (Collective Action for Mobility Program of University Students in Asia) program, and also by accumulating academic capacity to point out Japan's flawed historical perceptions based on international joint research on the Pacific War.

However, there are numerous areas where cooperation with Japan is necessary. Despite Japan's relative economic decline, many issues require economic cooperation, as seen in the China-Japan-South Korea Free Trade Agreement (FTA). This is also true in diplomatic and security dimensions. Not only is it necessary to utilize the various dialogue channels established between North Korea and Japan to promote denuclearization and North Korea's reform and openness, but cooperation with Japan is also crucial for strengthening the South Korea-U.S.-Japan cooperation system on North Korea. Furthermore, to foster the development of South Korean culture and expand educational opportunities, it is desirable to continuously develop civil society-level cultural and student exchanges, independent of political interests.

At this moment, it is difficult for the government to devise measures to break the deadlock in South Korea-Japan relations. Therefore, it is necessary to utilize expert networks closely associated with the government (Track 2) or mixed consultative bodies of government officials and experts (Track 1.5). Rather than abandoning projects that have continued, such as the joint research for a "New Era of South Korea-Japan Relations," it is a realistic approach to lay the groundwork by sustaining them and looking ahead to the period after 2015.■

The East Asia Institute (EAI) is financially supported by the MacArthur Foundation. EAI has been conducting Smart Q&A sessions in the form of video interviews with domestic and international experts, aiming to provide timely and in-depth analyses of current issues through question-and-answer sessions with experts in relevant fields. This manuscript was compiled by Researcher Kim Yang-gyu (EAI Center for Asian Security Studies) from interview content and represents the personal opinions of the expert, not the position of the East Asia Institute. Please cite the source when quoting from the Smart Q&A.