[Smart Q&A: L. Gordon Flake] Obama Administration’s “Strategic Patience” and Northeast Asian Countries’ North Korea Policy Outlook

YouTube Link: video.eai.or.kr/120727_smartgd.flv

Dr. L. Gordon Flake holds a Master’s degree from the David M. Kennedy Center for International and Area Studies at Brigham Young University. He has served as a Senior Fellow at The Atlantic Council of the United States and Director of the Korea Economic Institute of America, and is currently the President of The Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation.

Obama Administration’s “Strategic Patience”

“Obama Administration’s North Korea Policy: ① Prioritizing Cooperation with Allies ② Approaching North Korea Issues within the Framework of Northeast Asia Policy”

“‘Strategic Patience’ is a Term Describing Reality, Not a Strategy”

“Currently, There Are No Additional Appeasement Options to Offer North Korea: Difficult to Resolve Issues Without North Korean Change”

The Obama administration’s North Korea policy prioritized cooperation with allies, drawing on the experiences of previous administrations (water under the bridge). The Bush administration, during its first term, maintained a pressure-oriented stance, labeling North Korea as part of the “Axis of Evil” and stating that “evil must be defeated, not negotiated with.” However, in its second term, following North Korea’s first nuclear test, it pursued inter-Korean dialogue to resolve the issue while strengthening cooperation with its ally, South Korea. The issue was that the Bush administration, after conducting secret inter-Korean contacts, discussed cooperation with China, and only then pursued cooperation with its ally, South Korea. The Obama administration, conversely, aimed to prioritize cooperation with allies. That is, while keeping the door open for dialogue to resolve the North Korean issue diplomatically, it chose to first strengthen cooperation with its regional allies, thereby broadening the scope of cooperation with countries like China and Russia, and then approaching the North Korean issue from that foundation. This approach can be evaluated as highly successful, particularly in that the ROK-U.S. alliance became more robust than ever before.

The Obama administration sought to approach the North Korean issue within the framework of its Northeast Asia policy and did not establish a separate North Korea policy. U.S. national interests depend on peace and economic development in East Asia, and on relations with South Korea, Japan, and China. Relations with North Korea itself hold little significance for the United States, only deriving meaning from North Korea’s influence on the dynamics of the core strategic region for the U.S. The Obama administration judged that past administrations had made the mistake of focusing too much on relations with North Korea and sought to address the North Korean issue by concentrating on its Northeast Asia policy.

“Strategic Patience” is often described as a strategy, but to be precise, it is a term that describes policy reality rather than a strategy. The Obama administration judged that it would be difficult to find a breakthrough in resolving the North Korean issue unless North Korea itself chose to change, a point well summarized by President Obama’s statement in November 2010: “It is difficult to make efforts to resume the Six-Party Talks without any indication that North Korea is serious about its purpose.” The February 29th Agreement was a test case to demonstrate this seriousness, but with the rocket launch, North Korea once again failed to prove its sincerity to the international community.

Although “Strategic Patience” may be criticized as a passive policy that ceded initiative to North Korea, the important point is that the pressure to do something to prevent further deterioration of the situation could exacerbate it. The most crucial factor in pursuing policy is the possibility of its success. Any strategy pursued without confirmation of North Korea’s genuine intention to change is bound to have clear limitations. This is why all dialogues and diplomatic measures attempted by the Obama administration with North Korea were focused on discerning North Korea’s intentions.

Currently, it is impossible to offer appeasement measures to North Korea at the negotiating table. North Korea continues to violate UN Security Council Resolutions 1695, 1718, and 1874, which prohibit long-range missile launches and nuclear tests, and it denies the two UN Security Council Presidential Statements regarding missile launches and the sinking of the Cheonan. Recently, the U.S. Congress even passed a bill to prohibit food aid to North Korea. In this context, there are almost no appeasement tools available for use in negotiations with North Korea. Unless North Korea itself chooses to change and creates conditions for the international community to consider compensation measures, it will be difficult to improve the current situation.

Northeast Asian Leadership Changes in 2012 and Future North Korea Policy Outlook

“Korean Peninsula Policy is Not an Issue of Partisan Disagreement in U.S. Politics”

“Following the 2012 Leadership Changes, There Will Be No Major Changes in Northeast Asian Countries’ North Korea Policies”

Korean Peninsula policy is not an issue of partisan disagreement in U.S. politics. During the 2008 U.S. presidential election, there was no significant difference in views on Korean Peninsula policy between John McCain and the Obama campaign. The same is expected to be true between Mitt Romney and the Obama campaign in 2012. This is thought to be because the Obama campaign demonstrated a mature approach during the 2008 election process by not politicizing foreign policy, and this atmosphere has been well maintained. In the 2012 U.S. presidential election, both campaigns are expected to focus their competition on domestic economic issues rather than foreign policy.

2012 was a year when leadership changes were scheduled in Russia, China, the United States, and South Korea, and Japan was also expected to see changes in its leadership, meaning all Six-Party Talks participants, except North Korea, were anticipated to undergo significant political transformations. Interestingly, the change began first in North Korea. Following the sudden death of Chairman Kim Jong-il in late 2011, Kim Jong-un inherited the leadership. Over the past seven months, Kim Jong-un has shown various changes, not only in his attire and demeanor but also by attending performances featuring Rocky or Disney characters accompanied by his attractive wife. However, in terms of foreign policy, North Korea has not changed. It violated the February 29th Agreement by launching a long-range rocket.

For the remaining countries, no major policy changes are expected following leadership transitions. As explained earlier, regardless of who becomes president in the United States, there is little likelihood of a change in Korean Peninsula policy. In China's case, given the perception that the Six-Party Talks are a legacy of President Hu Jintao, it is questionable whether the next president, Xi Jinping, will actively pursue them as inherited. Russia's leadership change involved Putin returning to the presidency from the prime ministership, so no actual policy changes are expected. Among the Six-Party Talks participants, South Korea has the highest potential for change; however, given that perceptions of North Korea have qualitatively changed since the Cheonan sinking and Yeonpyeong shelling incidents, it will be difficult for the next South Korean administration to pursue a forward-looking engagement policy toward North Korea. Therefore, following the 2012 leadership changes, the positions of each country on North Korea issues, including the resumption of the Six-Party Talks, are not expected to change significantly, and thus, a phase of maintaining the status quo is anticipated to continue in broad terms. ■

The East Asia Institute (EAI) is receiving financial support as a core research institution selected for the MacArthur Foundation’s “Asia Security Initiative” program. EAI has been conducting Smart Q&A in the form of video interviews with domestic and international experts, aiming to provide timely and in-depth analysis of current issues through Q&A with experts in related fields. This manuscript was compiled by Kim Yang-gyu, a researcher at the EAI Center for Asian Security Studies, and Stephen Ranger, a researcher, from the interview content. The opinions expressed are those of the individual expert and do not represent the views of the East Asia Institute. Please cite the source when quoting from Smart Q&A.