[Smart Q&A: Hwang Ji-hwan] North Korea's Rocket Launch and Prospects for the Korean Peninsula Nuclear Issue

YouTube Link: video.eai.or.kr/120403_smarthjh_k.flv

Professor Hwang Ji-hwan holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Colorado at Boulder and is currently a professor in the Department of International Relations at the University of Seoul.

North Korea's Rocket Launch Announcement and Strategic Calculations

"The need to internally promote the successful fulfillment of Kim Jong-il's last wishes ahead of the 100th anniversary of Kim Il-sung's birth."

"Confidence stemming from the judgment that the U.S. will ultimately have no choice but to negotiate to resolve the uranium enrichment program issue."

"The calculation that discussions on denuclearization will take place after leadership changes in the Six-Party Talks member states in the latter half of the year."

Following the third round of North Korea-U.S. talks in Beijing in late February, North Korea showed gestures that seemed to indicate preconditions for denuclearization, thereby increasing the possibility of resuming the Six-Party Talks. However, in mid-March, it suddenly announced plans to launch the "Kwangmyongsong-3" long-range rocket. This is reminiscent of the precedent where, despite a thaw in inter-Korean relations following President Obama's expression of willingness to engage with North Korea after his election victory in the U.S. presidential election in November 2008, North Korea proceeded with the launch of the "Kwangmyongsong-2" in April 2009, followed by a second nuclear test in May.

This behavior by North Korea can be seen as primarily driven by domestic political factors. North Korea has stated that both the North Korea-U.S. contact and the rocket launch were part of Kim Jong-il's last wishes. Particularly, with the significant event of the 100th anniversary of Kim Il-sung's birth on April 15th approaching, the Kim Jong-un regime needs to widely promote internally the successful fulfillment of Kim Jong-il's last wishes.

Second, confidence derived from the successful development of the uranium enrichment program is also a significant background factor. North Korea's plutonium nuclear facilities, which caused international concern during the first and second North Korean nuclear crises, are now obsolete and no longer pose a serious threat. However, with North Korea revealing its uranium enrichment program in November 2010, which is technically more difficult to detect and easier to use for manufacturing nuclear warheads compared to its plutonium program, the international community, including the United States, has been compelled to address this issue in some way. Therefore, North Korea appears to be calculating that even if inter-Korean relations become strained in the short term due to the rocket launch, North Korea-U.S. dialogue will inevitably resume in the long term.

Third, in terms of timing, the major powers involved in the Six-Party Talks are currently facing leadership transitions, making it difficult for them to take decisive action regarding the North Korean issue. North Korea seems to have set a course to seriously discuss denuclearization issues after the next leadership in these countries has been determined.

Leadership Transitions in Major East Asian Powers in 2012 and Prospects for the Korean Peninsula Nuclear Issue

"China will maintain its strategy of managing the Korean Peninsula issue through North Korean stability."

"The U.S. will respect South Korea's North Korea policy within the framework of the ROK-U.S. alliance."

"South Korea's future North Korea policy will be the most crucial variable in the development of the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue."

China views the stability of the North Korean regime as key to the stability of the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia. Its prompt recognition and support of the Kim Jong-un regime following Kim Jong-il's death in December last year can be understood in this context. Therefore, China is expected to maintain its stance of resolving the North Korean nuclear issue under conditions of North Korean regime stability and to adopt a lukewarm attitude regarding the current rocket launch issue.

In the case of the United States, with President Barack Obama's re-election considered likely, North Korea policy is not expected to change significantly. The Obama administration has consistently supported the South Korean government's North Korea policy within the framework of the ROK-U.S. alliance, and this basic direction is likely to be maintained.

Therefore, the most crucial variable in the future development of the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue will be the North Korea policy of South Korea's next administration. Having experienced both the gains and losses of the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun administrations' "engagement policy" and the strengths and weaknesses of the Lee Myung-bak administration's "principled North Korea policy," South Korea's next administration, regardless of which political force takes power, is likely to determine its North Korea policy direction somewhere between these two existing spectra.

Challenges for South Korea's North Korea Policy

"The next administration should consider policy continuity for effective outcomes."

"Internal discussions on North Korea's national strategy in the Kim Jong-un era will proceed; South Korea must prepare for North Korea's policy shift."

The effectiveness of any policy is realized only when continuity is maintained. Therefore, completely abandoning the previous government's policies is never a desirable choice. The next administration should adopt an approach that considers "engagement" within the framework of "principles," rather than outright rejecting the Lee Myung-bak administration's North Korea policy.

Furthermore, consideration must be given to an aspect that has been overlooked in South Korea's North Korea policy thus far: a policy that 'responds to North Korea's own decisions and changes.' The Kim Jong-un regime has rapidly stabilized by settling upon the system that Kim Jong-il established during his lifetime. However, just as Kim Jong-il maintained his regime by building a unique ruling system distinct from Kim Il-sung's, the Kim Jong-un regime will need to establish a Kim Jong-un-style system, differentiated from the Kim Jong-il era, to fully usher in the Kim Jong-un era in the future. To this end, North Korea is expected to actively engage in internal discussions regarding its state strategy for the Kim Jong-un era for the time being, and this will present a golden opportunity for the South Korean government to fundamentally alter the dynamics of the North Korea issue.

In this context, it could be argued that the next administration should proactively pursue an inclusive North Korea policy that empowers reformist forces within North Korea. However, as South Korean society has not yet reached an internal consensus on the desirable direction for its North Korea policy, such a preemptive and inclusive policy is unlikely to be a realistic option. Therefore, the next administration needs to prepare a menu of North Korea support policies in anticipation of North Korea's potential shift from "military-first" (선군) to "economy-first" (선경) and pursue its North Korea policy in a manner that responds to North Korea's changes.

The East Asia Institute (EAI) has been selected as a core research institution for the MacArthur Foundation's "Asia Security Initiative" program and receives financial support. EAI has been conducting Smart Q&A, a video interview series with domestic and international experts, aiming to provide timely and in-depth analysis of current issues through question-and-answer sessions with experts in relevant fields. This manuscript was compiled by Researcher Kim Yang-gyu (EAI Center for Asian Security Studies) and Team Leader Kim Ha-jeong (EAI Center for Asian Security Studies) based on interview content. The opinions expressed are those of the individual experts and do not necessarily reflect the views of the East Asia Institute. Please cite the source when quoting from Smart Q&A.