[Smart Q&A: Jeon Jin-ho] One Year After the Fukushima Nuclear Accident and Northeast Asian Nuclear Safety Cooperation

YouTube Link: video.eai.or.kr/120319_smartjjh_k.flv

Professor Jeon Jin-ho holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Tokyo and is currently a professor in the Department of International Cooperation at Kwangwoon University.

Implications and Lessons Learned One Year After the Fukushima Nuclear Accident

“Japan is attempting to shift its power supply policy, which was heavily reliant on nuclear power, in the wake of the Fukushima nuclear accident.”

“Lessons from the Fukushima Nuclear Accident: Reconsideration of nuclear power expansion policies is necessary; if nuclear power is essential, the development of safer nuclear power technologies is required; the necessity of international cooperation regarding nuclear accidents has emerged; establishing a system for rapid information sharing and response following nuclear accidents is needed.”

“A shift in South Korea's existing consumption-oriented energy discourse is needed. In particular, the industrial structure with high energy consumption must be improved.”

One year has passed since the nuclear accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant. An area exceeding 12 times the size of Yeouido has become uninhabitable. Recent public opinion surveys in Japan indicate that 80 percent of the entire population opposes the use of nuclear power. Considering that Japan currently relies on nuclear power for approximately 30 percent of its total electricity supply, and renewable energy accounts for less than 4 percent, this trend of moving away from nuclear dependency clearly demonstrates the profound impact of the Fukushima nuclear accident.

The Fukushima nuclear accident leaves several questions and lessons. 1) Should South Korea, China, and Japan continue their nuclear power expansion policies? 2) If nuclear power is essential, how can nuclear safety be ensured, and where can possibilities for new nuclear power methods (e.g., nuclear fusion instead of fission) be found? 3) How can the sharing of regional/international experiences in responding to nuclear accidents be guaranteed? 4) How can a response system be established to prevent the concealment of information and enable the rapid sharing of appropriate information following a nuclear accident?

The Fukushima nuclear accident, in particular, highlights the need for a change in South Korea's energy discourse. South Korean society has pursued policies while maintaining a consumptive energy discourse focused on the production and procurement of energy necessary for industrial development. From 1990 to 2010, while South Korea's GNP approximately tripled, total energy consumption increased fivefold, with industrial energy consumption increasing ninefold. This signifies that South Korea's industrial structure has grown while consuming a large amount of electricity. Now, consideration must be given to an industrial structure that reduces electricity consumption. The energy discourse must also focus on eco-friendly energy production and energy consumption control, striving to improve the existing high-energy consumption structure.

Status and Challenges of Nuclear Safety Cooperation Among Northeast Asian Countries

“Current nuclear safety cooperation among South Korea, China, and Japan remains at a very rudimentary level of cooperation regarding nuclear technology.”

“Cooperative commitments and institutionalization among South Korea, China, and Japan must be established first, including sharing of reactor information, establishing initial accident response manuals, and building immediate cooperation frameworks among the three countries in the event of a major nuclear accident.”

Despite the fact that the damages from nuclear accidents easily transcend national borders, becoming regional/international issues, cooperation for nuclear safety among the major Northeast Asian countries has been virtually non-existent. Considering that if current nuclear policies continue, the three countries of South Korea, China, and Japan will possess approximately 150 nuclear reactors in 20 years, multilateral cooperation for nuclear safety among Northeast Asian countries is urgently needed. The Fukushima nuclear accident may serve as a catalyst for such cooperation.

Following the Fukushima nuclear accident, at the trilateral summit of South Korea, China, and Japan held in Japan, the three countries reached a principled agreement to strengthen cooperation on nuclear safety. Furthermore, cooperation in the form of the 'Northeast Asian Nuclear Safety Regulators Meeting' is underway. However, the current Northeast Asian Nuclear Safety Regulators Meeting remains at a very rudimentary stage of cooperation regarding nuclear technology.

Therefore, cooperative commitments and institutionalization among the countries must be established first within a broad framework, such as 1) sharing of reactor information among South Korea, China, and Japan, 2) establishing initial accident response manuals, and 3) building immediate cooperation frameworks among the three countries in the event of a major nuclear accident. Within this institutional framework, technological development and exchange for the prevention of nuclear accidents should proceed.

Nuclear Security Summit and South Korea's Tasks

“The Nuclear Security Summit should be institutionalized as a regime that addresses both nuclear security and nuclear safety issues simultaneously.”

“Through the Nuclear Industry Summit, a discourse that prioritizes nuclear safety in the operational principles of nuclear power plants needs to be formed and declared.”

The Nuclear Security Summit was initiated with the goal of ensuring the secure management of nuclear materials, and it can be considered to have achieved certain results, including declarations from countries promising to curb the use of highly enriched uranium and to return and dispose of unused uranium. The 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit should continue efforts to disseminate the achievements of the 2010 summit.

However, for the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit to hold unique significance, it is necessary to reflect the changes in the nuclear security landscape following the Fukushima nuclear accident on the agenda. Most countries express greater concern about nuclear safety issues arising from nuclear accidents than about security threats from nuclear terrorism. For the Nuclear Security Summit to be sustained rather than being a one-time event, it needs to respond to the shared threat perception of member states. Therefore, it is desirable to institutionalize the Nuclear Security Summit as a regime that addresses both nuclear security and nuclear safety issues simultaneously. Efforts should be made to create such an opportunity during the upcoming Seoul meeting.

Although the '2012 Seoul Nuclear Industry Summit' is scheduled to be held as a side event of the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit to discuss nuclear safety issues, discussions involving only the nuclear industry may remain focused on representing the industry's role and interests. Tokyo Electric Power Company, the operator of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, had concealed numerous minor accidents, and these actions and practices were directly reflected in the response to last year's catastrophic nuclear accident, further exacerbating the damage. Recent allegations of concealment regarding the Kori Nuclear Power Plant power outage in South Korea suggest that the South Korean nuclear industry may repeat Japan's failure. Therefore, through the Seoul Nuclear Industry Summit, a discourse that prioritizes nuclear safety in the operational principles of nuclear power plants needs to be formed and declared.

The East Asia Institute (EAI) is a core research institution for the 'Asia Security Initiative' program funded by the MacArthur Foundation. EAI conducts Smart Q&A through video interviews with domestic and international experts, aiming to provide timely and in-depth analysis of current issues through question-and-answer sessions with experts in related fields. This manuscript was compiled from interview content by Research Fellow Kim Yang-gyu (EAI Center for Asian Security Studies) and Team Leader Kim Ha-jeong (EAI Center for Asian Security Studies). The opinions expressed are those of the individual experts and do not represent the views of the East Asia Institute. Please cite the source when quoting from Smart Q&A.