[Smart Q&A: Cho Dong-ho] The Opening of the Kim Jong-un Era in 2012 and South Korea's Choice

YouTube Link: video.eai.or.kr/120110_smartdhj_k.flv

Director Cho Dong-ho holds a Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Pennsylvania and is currently the Director of the North Korea Research Center at the East Asia Institute (EAI) and a professor in the Department of North Korean Studies at Ewha Womans University.

Prospects for the Kim Jong-un Regime in North Korea in 2012

A Prepared Kim Jong-un: "Even if Kim Jong-il had not died, 2012 would have been the inaugural year of the Kim Jong-un era."

Many point to the instability of the Kim Jong-un regime, citing the short period of time for his power succession compared to Kim Jong-il's. However, it is problematic to discuss the qualitative aspect of the Kim Jong-un regime's 'stability' solely based on the quantitative aspect of preparation time. Kim Jong-il was designated as the successor while Kim Il-sung was still healthy, allowing for gradual preparation. In Kim Jong-un's case, preparation began in 2008 when Kim Jong-il's health deteriorated, suggesting that despite the shorter period, a high-quality, accelerated curriculum was likely implemented, driven by the urgency of a leader facing his own mortality.

Notably, North Korea had been preparing to declare 2012 as the inaugural year of a "strong and prosperous nation." Following the completion of this goal, a promise of Kim Jong-il's military-first era, the transition to the subsequent Kim Jong-un era would have been naturally anticipated. Therefore, even if Kim Jong-il had not passed away, 2012 would have been the year the Kim Jong-un era truly began.

Throughout 2012, the Kim Jong-un regime is expected to focus on securing political legitimacy and consolidating its power base by emphasizing Kim Jong-il's posthumous directives and holding grand events for the 70th anniversary of Kim Jong-il's birth in February and the 100th anniversary of Kim Il-sung's birth in April. Consequently, it is unlikely that North Korea will engage in external provocations or initiate reforms and opening-up domestically in 2012, suggesting a period of short-term stability on the Korean Peninsula.

Three Reasons Why the Kim Jong-un Regime Will Be Forced to Choose Reform and Opening

The challenge lies in the Kim Jong-un regime's next steps after securing short-term stability. The Kim Jong-un regime will be compelled to choose reform and opening due to the following three pressures.

① A New Slogan is Needed - Kim Il-sung's 'Juche,' Kim Jong-il's 'Military-First,' Kim Jong-un's Only Option May Be 'Economy': North Korea's pursuit of a "strong and prosperous nation" aimed for 2012 comprises three pillars: a politically and ideologically strong nation, a militarily strong nation, and an economically strong nation. Kim Il-sung's 'Juche ideology' and Kim Jong-il's 'military-first politics' align with the political-ideological and military strength pillars of a strong and prosperous nation. To fulfill his father's legacy of a strong and prosperous nation, making North Korea an economically strong nation will be Kim Jong-un's choice. While the new slogan for the Kim Jong-un regime remains unknown, the background necessitates a slogan related to the economy.

② Domestic Situation - Expansion of Markets Leads to Economic Polarization Among Residents, Causing a Reduction in the Planned Economy. Intensifying Internal Pressure for Economic Opening: North Korea's economy has recently recorded positive growth. This growth is not attributable to the success of government policies but rather to the self-reliant efforts of its citizens and the subsequent development of markets. However, market development has led to polarization and a reduction in the planned economy, which are key factors threatening the foundation of political stability. To overcome these two challenges of polarization and the contraction of the planned sector in the near future, the North Korean regime requires substantial capital, which can only be secured through opening up. This is why the Kim Jong-un regime must consider opening its doors.

③ China's Pressure for Reform and Opening: China supports North Korea's stability because it requires a stable external environment for its own sustained economic growth. For its own interests in maintaining stability on the Korean Peninsula, China desires North Korea's economy to reach a certain level of development and stabilize as a normal state. Since 2010, China has been urging North Korea to reform and open up, while also curbing its provocative policies. It will be difficult for the Kim Jong-un regime to continue rejecting the pressure from China, its sole benefactor.

Evaluation of the Lee Myung-bak Administration's North Korea Policy and Tasks for 2012

The Lee Myung-bak Administration's North Korea Policy: "Principles Were Upheld, But There Were No Results."

With only one year remaining, the room for maneuver in North Korea policy is narrow, making significant changes in inter-Korean relations unlikely.

Evaluating the Lee Myung-bak administration's North Korea policy over the past four years, it can be summarized as upholding principles without achieving results. In contrast, the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun administrations achieved results but had issues with principles. The Lee Myung-bak administration will likely be unable to abandon the principles it has upheld over the remaining year, but it will also find it difficult to resist the temptation to achieve some results.

However, the current situations in South and North Korea clearly indicate that an obsession with results is unlikely to lead to tangible outcomes. The Lee Myung-bak administration faces the difficult situation of the Cheonan incident and the Yeonpyeong shelling, and its political room for maneuver is extremely limited, especially with declining approval ratings for the ruling party in domestic politics. North Korea has already declared that it will "not associate with the Lee Myung-bak administration" due to the condolence issue and, facing major domestic events in 2012, is in a position where focusing on external relations is difficult.

"Abandon the obsession with results and focus on laying the groundwork for the next administration. The Cheonan and Yeonpyeong issues must be resolved in some way to lessen the burden on the next government."

"Propose preemptive humanitarian aid and pursue indirect policies to ease strained inter-Korean relations, such as revitalizing the Kaesong Industrial Complex."

Therefore, during the remaining year, the Lee Myung-bak administration should focus on laying the groundwork for the next administration's North Korea policy rather than obsessing over achieving results.

The most crucial task is to resolve the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong issues within the Lee Myung-bak administration's term so that they do not continue to hinder South Korea's North Korea policy. Given the difficulty of expecting a fundamental change in North Korea's attitude on these issues, it is necessary to pursue indirect policies that can somewhat ease the strained inter-Korean relations.

For example, similar to the U.S. government's announcement of preemptive nutritional aid to North Korea, the South Korean government could proactively propose humanitarian assistance to vulnerable populations within North Korea. Support for malaria prevention in North Korean regions during the spring could also be considered, not only as a North Korea policy measure but also for the health of South Korean citizens in border areas. Measures could include exploring ways to revitalize the Kaesong Industrial Complex, which is excluded from the May 24th measures, or even allowing domestic companies to visit North Korea to inspect facilities already established there, without necessarily resuming inter-Korean trade.

Direction of the Next Administration's North Korea Policy

A 'Breakthrough' Shift in North Korea Policy is Necessary Amidst the Turbulent Northeast Asian Security Environment

"Create an environment where North Korea can decide on a path of evolution on its own."

"We must consider how to 'give well,' not just 'give away' or 'not give at all.'"

The Northeast Asian security landscape has undergone significant changes over the past 20 years. During the post-Cold War era, when the United States maintained its sole superpower status, a strategy of resolving the North Korean issue through the ROK-U.S. alliance was appropriate. However, in today's world, with China emerging as a global power, a G2 nation, following the 2008 global economic crisis, our North Korea policy needs to change.

Many perceive the North Korea policies of the Kim Dae-jung, Roh Moo-hyun, and Lee Myung-bak administrations as being at opposite ends of the spectrum. However, both policies originated from a naive expectation that the North Korean regime would easily change in response to South Korea's policies, placing them on the same continuum. North Korea has not changed, whether through aid offered with goodwill or through sanctions imposed strictly based on principles. The North Korean military-first nuclear policy was like a tattoo, impossible to remove with either sunshine or a strong wind. The lesson learned from over 20 years of North Korea policy is that changes in the hardline or conciliatory approach of South Korea's policy are unlikely to yield any progress, and ultimately, North Korea must decide to change on its own.

For the next administration's North Korea policy to evolve to the next level, it must focus on making North Korea realize that it cannot survive in the 21st century with the tattoos of the Kim Jong-il era. Emphasis should be placed on creating conditions that provide North Korea with the confidence that it can survive by choosing the path of reform and opening without nuclear weapons. This requires a cooperative North Korea policy that evolves towards supporting North Korea's self-determined path of evolution, with South Korea and the international community jointly supporting this decision. The paradigm of North Korea policy needs to advance beyond the discussion of 'giving away' versus 'not giving' to 'giving well.'■

The East Asia Institute (EAI) has been selected as a core research institution for the MacArthur Foundation's "Asia Security Initiative" program and is receiving financial support. EAI has been conducting "Smart Q&A," a video interview series with domestic and international experts, aiming to provide timely and in-depth analysis of current issues through question-and-answer sessions with experts in relevant fields. This manuscript was compiled by Kim Yang-gyu, a researcher at EAI's Center for Asian Security Studies, and Kim Ha-jung, a team leader, based on interview content. These are the personal opinions of the experts and do not represent the official position of the East Asia Institute. Please cite the source when quoting "Smart Q&A."