[Smart Q&A: Jo Dong-ho] The Opening of the Kim Jong-un Era in 2012 and South Korea's Choice

YouTube link: video.eai.or.kr/120110_smartdhj_k.flv

Director Jo Dong-ho holds a Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Pennsylvania and is currently the Director of the North Korea Research Center at the East Asia Institute (EAI) and a professor in the Department of North Korean Studies at Ewha Womans University.

Prospects for the Kim Jong-un Regime in North Korea in 2012

A Prepared Kim Jong-un: "Even if Kim Jong-il had not died, 2012 would have been the first year of the Kim Jong-un era."

Many point to the instability of the Kim Jong-un regime, citing the short period of time for his power succession compared to Kim Jong-il's. However, it is problematic to discuss the qualitative aspect of the 'stability' of the Kim Jong-un regime solely based on the quantitative aspect of the 'length' of preparation time. Kim Jong-il was designated as the successor while Kim Il-sung was still healthy, allowing for gradual preparation. In Kim Jong-un's case, preparation began in 2008 when Kim Jong-il's health deteriorated, suggesting that despite the shorter period, a desperate situation for a dying person likely led to intensive, high-quality, accelerated training.

Notably, North Korea had been preparing to declare 2012 as the first year of a "strong and prosperous nation." Following the completion of the "strong and prosperous nation" promised during Kim Jong-il's military-first era, the transition to the subsequent Kim Jong-un era would have naturally been anticipated. Therefore, even if Kim Jong-il had not passed away, 2012 would have been the year the Kim Jong-un era truly began.

Throughout 2012, the Kim Jong-un regime is expected to focus on securing political legitimacy and consolidating its power base by emphasizing Kim Jong-il's posthumous directives and holding grand events for the 70th anniversary of Kim Jong-il's birth in February and the 100th anniversary of Kim Il-sung's birth in April. Consequently, it is unlikely that North Korea will engage in external provocations or initiate comprehensive reform and opening policies domestically in 2012, suggesting a period of short-term stability on the Korean Peninsula.

Three Reasons Why the Kim Jong-un Regime Will Be Forced to Choose Reform and Opening

The issue lies in the next steps for the Kim Jong-un regime after securing short-term stability. The Kim Jong-un regime will be compelled to choose reform and opening due to the following three pressures.

① A New Slogan is Needed - Kim Il-sung's 'Juche,' Kim Jong-il's 'Military-First,' Kim Jong-un's Only Option is Likely 'Economy': North Korea's pursuit of a "strong and prosperous nation" targeting 2012 comprises three pillars: a strong political ideology nation, a strong military nation, and a strong economy nation. Kim Il-sung's 'Juche ideology' and Kim Jong-il's 'military-first politics' align with the political ideology and military pillars of a strong and prosperous nation. To continue his father's legacy of a strong and prosperous nation, making North Korea an economic powerhouse will be Kim Jong-un's choice. While the new slogan for the Kim Jong-un regime remains unknown, the background strongly suggests it will be related to the economy.

② Domestic Situation – Expansion of Markets Leads to Economic Polarization Among Residents, Causing a Reduction in the Planned Economy. Intensifying Internal Pressure for Economic Opening: North Korea's economy has recently recorded positive growth. This growth is not due to the success of the North Korean government's policies but rather to the self-reliant efforts of its citizens and the subsequent development of markets. However, market development has led to polarization and a contraction of the planned economy, which are key factors threatening the foundation of political stability. To overcome these two challenges of polarization and planned economy contraction in the near future, the North Korean regime requires substantial capital, which can only be secured through opening up. This is why the Kim Jong-un regime must consider opening.

③ China's Pressure for Reform and Opening: China's support for North Korea's stability stems from its need for a stable external environment for its continued economic growth. For the sake of its own interests in maintaining stability on the Korean Peninsula, China desires North Korea's economy to reach a certain level and stabilize as a normal state. Since 2010, China has been urging North Korea to reform and open up, while curbing its provocative policies. It will be difficult for the Kim Jong-un regime to continue rejecting the pressure from China, its sole supporter.

Evaluation of the Lee Myung-bak Administration's North Korea Policy and Tasks for 2012

The Lee Myung-bak Administration's North Korea Policy: "Principles Were Upheld, But There Were No Results."

With only one year left, the room for maneuver in North Korea policy is narrow, making significant changes in inter-Korean relations unlikely.

In summary, the Lee Myung-bak administration's North Korea policy over the past four years upheld principles but yielded no results. Conversely, the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun administrations achieved results but had issues with principles. In its remaining year, the Lee Myung-bak administration will find it difficult to abandon the principles it has upheld, yet it will also be tempted to achieve some results.

However, the current situations in South and North Korea clearly indicate that an obsession with results is unlikely to lead to tangible outcomes. The Lee Myung-bak administration faces the unavoidable issues of the Cheonan sinking and the Yeonpyeong shelling, and its political room for maneuver is severely limited, especially with the ruling party's declining approval ratings domestically. North Korea, having already declared it would "not associate with the Lee Myung-bak administration" due to the condolence issue, is also in a position where it is difficult to focus on external relations while preparing for major domestic events in 2012.

"Abandon the obsession with results and focus on laying the groundwork for the next administration. To lessen the burden on the next government, the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong issues must be resolved in some way."

"Propose preemptive humanitarian aid and pursue indirect policies to ease strained inter-Korean relations, such as revitalizing the Kaesong Industrial Complex."

Therefore, in the remaining year, the Lee Myung-bak administration should focus on laying the groundwork for the next administration's North Korea policy rather than obsessing over achieving results.

The most crucial task is to resolve the Cheonan sinking and Yeonpyeong shelling issues within the Lee Myung-bak administration's term so that they do not continue to hinder South Korea's North Korea policy. Given the difficulty of expecting a fundamental change in North Korea's attitude on these matters, it is necessary to pursue indirect policies that can somewhat ease the strained inter-Korean relations.

For example, similar to the U.S. government's announcement of humanitarian nutritional aid for North Korea, our government could preemptively propose humanitarian assistance to vulnerable populations in North Korea. Support for malaria prevention in North Korean regions during the spring could also be considered, not only as a North Korea policy measure but also for the health of South Korean citizens in border areas. Measures could also be explored to revitalize the Kaesong Industrial Complex, which is excluded from the May 24th sanctions, or even allow domestic companies to visit North Korea to inspect facilities already established there, without necessarily resuming inter-Korean trade.

Direction of the Next Administration's North Korea Policy

A 'Groundbreaking' Shift in North Korea Policy is Needed in Response to the Turbulent Northeast Asian Security Environment

"Create an environment where North Korea can decide on a path of evolution on its own."

"We must consider how to give well, not just how to give or not give."

The Northeast Asian security landscape has changed significantly over the past 20 years. During the post-Cold War era, when the U.S. maintained its sole superpower status, a strategy of resolving North Korean issues through the ROK-U.S. alliance was appropriate. However, in today's world, with China emerging as a global power of G2 following the 2008 global economic crisis, our North Korea policy needs to change.

Many perceive the North Korea policies of the Kim Dae-jung, Roh Moo-hyun, and Lee Myung-bak administrations as being at opposite extremes. However, both policies originated from a naive expectation that North Korea's regime would easily change in response to South Korea's policy. North Korea has not changed, whether provided with aid out of goodwill or subjected to sanctions based on principles. Its nuclear and military-first policy has been like a tattoo, impossible to remove with sunshine or strong winds. The lesson learned from over 20 years of North Korea policy is that changes in the hardline or conciliatory approach of South Korea's policy are unlikely to lead to any progress, and ultimately, North Korea must decide to change on its own.

For the next administration's North Korea policy to evolve to the next level, it must focus on making North Korea realize that it cannot survive in the 21st century with the tattoos of the Kim Jong-il era. The emphasis should be on creating conditions that provide North Korea with the confidence that it can survive by choosing the path of reform and opening without nuclear weapons. This requires a co-evolutionary North Korea policy that guides North Korea to independently decide on a path of evolution, and where South Korea and the international community support this decision. The paradigm of North Korea policy must evolve beyond the discussion of 'giving generously' versus 'not giving' to 'giving wisely.'■

The East Asia Institute (EAI) has been selected as a core research institution for the MacArthur Foundation's Asia Security Initiative program and receives financial support. EAI has been conducting Smart Q&A interviews with domestic and international experts to provide timely and in-depth analysis of current issues. This manuscript was compiled by Kim Yang-gyu, a researcher at EAI's Center for Asian Security Studies, and Team Leader Kim Ha-jeong based on interview content. The opinions expressed are those of the individual expert and do not represent the official position of the East Asia Institute. Please cite the source when quoting Smart Q&A.