[Trump's Second Term and Korea's Nuclear Option] IV. Lessons from the India-Pakistan Nuclear Confrontation for South Korea's Nuclear Armament Debate

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I. Introduction

The international community is currently facing an era of complex multiple crises, where emerging security threats such as pandemics, climate change, cyber, and economic security overlap with traditional security concerns. These include Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the war between Hamas and Israel, the recent India-Pakistan clashes, and ongoing conflicts in regions like Ethiopia, the Sahel, and Myanmar. Numerous potential conflict zones, including the Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea, and the Korean Peninsula, also harbor persistent crises. Among these multifaceted threats, the most concerning is the re-emergence of nuclear weapons as a significant potential threat in international relations. During the Cold War, the existential competition between the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, cast a global shadow of fear over a potential World War III, which could escalate into nuclear war. In the post-Cold War era, a considerable reduction in nuclear arsenals led many to dismiss the dangers of nuclear weapons as an uncomfortable memory of the past, overshadowed by emerging security threats like ethnic conflicts, terrorism, and climate change. While the potential threat of nuclear weapons was not entirely eliminated during the Second Nuclear Age, marked by nuclear competition between India and Pakistan and nuclear development efforts by countries like North Korea and Iran, its magnitude was incomparable to the First Nuclear Age, dominated by US-Soviet nuclear confrontation.

However, nuclear weapons have recently re-emerged as a central discourse in international security. The most significant catalyst was Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Russia's armed invasion, backed by its nuclear arsenal, sent shockwaves across the globe, and Russian high-ranking officials, including Putin, repeatedly threatened the possibility of nuclear weapon use when facing unfavorable situations, heightening international tension. China, which had maintained a relatively moderate nuclear doctrine and a relatively small nuclear arsenal for a long time since its first nuclear test in 1964, has recently accelerated the rapid qualitative and quantitative growth of its nuclear weapons. This has placed a significant burden on the United States, which must now deter not only Russia but also two nuclear superpowers, thereby fueling a nuclear arms race among major powers. As the second term of Trump began, European and Asian allies were deeply shocked by President Trump's pro-Russian push for a ceasefire in the Russia-Ukraine war, forcing them to question the security strategy based on extended deterrence that the US had provided for decades. Consequently, many technologically and economically advanced nations have openly expressed the need for their own nuclear armament (Panda, Narang, and Vaddi 2025).[1]South Korea, where public opinion for indigenous nuclear armament has consistently been high, is recently being discussed as the most likely next nuclear power. Furthermore, the rapid advancement of cutting-edge technologies such as AI, space, and quantum computing has brought about revolutionary developments in the military field, but it has also increased negative aspects such as difficulties in command and control, misperception, and the potential for rapid escalation. We have now entered the Third Nuclear Age, where the importance of nuclear weapons in national security is highlighted, leading to the horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons, and an increased possibility of nuclear use due to potential conflicts between nuclear-armed states (Panda 2025; Wolfsthal, Kristensen and Korda 2025; Rose 2025).

Meanwhile, in South Asia, a region many experts had feared had the highest possibility of nuclear weapon use, military clashes have reignited between India and Pakistan after a period of relative quiet. Following a terrorist attack in Pahalgam, Indian-administered Kashmir, on April 25, 2025, the Modi government in India strongly accused Pakistan of being behind the attack and launched an offensive against Pakistan on May 7. Pakistan, which had vehemently denied any connection to the terrorist group, counterattacked, leading to a brief but intense military confrontation until a ceasefire was achieved on May 10. While this clash followed the familiar pattern of an Indian counterattack after a terrorist attack and a Pakistani counter-response, the types of weapon systems used and the locations of military targets indicated a higher level of military action than before, causing international concern.

The ongoing military confrontation and persistent nuclear crises under the nuclear shadow between India and Pakistan, in the current Third Nuclear Age, offer significant implications for the Korean Peninsula, where North and South Korea remain in confrontation. In South Korea, calls for nuclear armament have consistently garnered over 60-70% public support, and interest in indigenous nuclear armament has intensified as North Korea's nuclear capabilities advance and confidence in extended deterrence wanes under the Trump administration.[2]

South Korea's possession of nuclear weapons is argued to be the most effective deterrent against the North Korean nuclear threat (and by extension, China). In this context, the South Asian case, where territorial division and hostile confrontation have persisted for over 70 years, can provide valuable lessons for the Korean Peninsula. Has the possession of nuclear weapons by both India and Pakistan made them safer? Can strategic stability be considered maintained between the two countries, given that they have avoided escalation to nuclear use despite numerous crises and clashes? Would military conflicts between the two countries have been less frequent if neither possessed nuclear weapons? This article analyzes the nuclear development and subsequent military confrontation and clashes between India and Pakistan to explore the lessons that the India-Pakistan nuclear confrontation case can offer to South Korea's nuclear armament discourse. First, it examines the reasons why India and Pakistan pursued indigenous nuclear armament and how they sought to achieve their security objectives through the development of nuclear command and control systems, nuclear doctrines, and nuclear postures after acquiring nuclear weapons. Most importantly, it analyzes cases of military confrontation and clashes after both countries acquired nuclear weapons to ascertain how nuclear weapons have (or have not) contributed to their security. The article concludes by presenting the practical lessons that the India-Pakistan case offers to South Korea's nuclear discourse, focusing solely on the security gains and losses of nuclear armament, and refraining from discussing issues such as economic sanctions or the decline in international credibility resulting from withdrawal from the NPT.

II. Nuclear Development and Confrontation between India and Pakistan

1) Nuclear Development in India and Pakistan

India and Pakistan fought their first war immediately after gaining independence from Britain in 1947, and subsequently engaged in three more wars, primarily over Kashmir, along with countless crises and minor military clashes. India, in particular, suffered a humiliating defeat in the 1962 Sino-Indian War, which arose from border disputes. Following China's nuclear test in 1964, there were calls for indigenous nuclear weapon development, particularly from the opposition. However, leaders like Prime Minister Nehru, who abhorred weapons of mass destruction due to his adherence to non-violent resistance, actively promoted the development of atomic energy for the scientific advancement of a newly independent, impoverished nation, but firmly rejected weaponization. After systematically accumulating the necessary atomic technology, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, seeking to assert India's self-reliance and capabilities against the pressures of major powers during the third Indo-Pakistani War in 1971, conducted a peaceful nuclear explosion in 1974, surprising the world. Nevertheless, the Indian government remained uninterested in diverting this technology for nuclear weapons, and the military's influence was negligible. However, news of Pakistan's dedicated pursuit of nuclear weapons and the persistent tensions with nuclear-armed China prompted India to accelerate its nuclear development in the 1980s, reportedly achieving nuclear capability around 1990 (Kim Tae-hyung 2019, Chapter 4).

In Pakistan's case, from the early days of independence, the hostile relationship and ongoing conflicts with its larger neighbor, India, compelled it to make vital efforts to form alliances with major powers. The United States, which had a distant relationship with India, which espoused non-alignment, became a strong partner, and after the Sino-Indian War, Pakistan also maintained close ties with China. However, during the humiliating defeat in the third Indo-Pakistani War in 1971, which led to the secession of East Pakistan as Bangladesh, Pakistan received no aid from either the United States or China. Although debates surrounding nuclear development existed in the 1960s, with arguments for indigenous nuclear armament arising to counter India, which was superior in conventional forces and overall national strength, the leadership and people of Pakistan, having lost significant territory and population due to the 'betrayal' of trusted major powers, came to agree that indigenous nuclear armament was the only way to counter India, which held a conventional superiority (Kim Tae-hyung 2019, Chapter 5).

As both nations vigorously pursued nuclear armament, their confrontation became intertwined with nuclear weapons. In the early 1980s, both countries, referencing Israel's successful airstrike on the Osirak nuclear facility in Iraq, considered preventive strikes against each other's nuclear facilities, heightening tensions. The Reagan administration, which was focused on countering Soviet forces in Afghanistan at the time, tacitly condoned Pakistan's nuclear program while being aware of it (Ahmed 1999, 187-8) and approved the sale of F-16s to Pakistan. The sale of F-16s amplified India's concerns about a preventive strike from Pakistan, and Pakistan also frequently reported the possibility of a preventive strike from India (Akhtar and Neog 2024, 3). India's Indira Gandhi government planned a joint airstrike with Israel on Pakistan's Kahuta centrifuge facility but abandoned it under pressure from the United States, which had discovered the plan in advance. The US assured Pakistan that it would be immediately informed if an Indian airstrike was imminent (FH Khan 2012, 219-220).

Both countries endured difficult times, contemplating and preparing for the possibility of a preventive strike from the other. Ultimately, both nations agreed on the need to prevent the catastrophic consequences of attacking each other's nuclear facilities, leading to an agreement in 1988 to prohibit attacks on each other's nuclear installations. However, tensions and conflicts between the two countries persisted, culminating in the Brasstacks crisis in 1987, triggered by a large-scale Indian military exercise. At this time, Pakistan had already made its nuclear program public to deter India, and when tensions reignited with the large-scale uprising in Indian-administered Kashmir during the 2001 Kashmir crisis, Pakistan readily brought up the option of nuclear use, warning India and strongly pushing for US mediation (Ahmed 1999, 189).

By this period, around 1990, both countries were considered to possess sufficient nuclear capabilities. In May 1998, Prime Minister Vajpayee of India, shortly after returning to power, conducted a surprise nuclear test. Shocked by this, Pakistan, despite strong US pressure involving both carrots and sticks, responded with its own nuclear tests three weeks later, plunging the world into shock. Both countries faced international economic sanctions. Although the sanctions period of about a year and a half did not last long, the suffering endured by the public was considerable, especially given the already difficult economic situation.

2) Nuclear Confrontation between India and Pakistan After Nuclear Development

Less than a year after Pakistan's nuclear tests, driven by the adventurism of its military, the two countries clashed again in the Kargil region of Kashmir. The outbreak of the Kargil War, the second war between nuclear-armed states, caused the international community to greatly fear escalation to nuclear use. Both countries closely monitored the possibility of escalation, exercising restraint in the use of weapons or crossing the Line of Control, but it is known that Pakistan, in particular, considered the possibility of nuclear use. The mediation of US President Clinton played a decisive role in ending the Kargil War (Rej 2019; Tellis, Fair, and Medby 2001).

As emerging nuclear powers, both countries needed to develop nuclear doctrines, nuclear postures, solidify nuclear command and control systems, and secure nuclear weapons and delivery systems that aligned with their objectives to clearly define the purpose of possessing nuclear weapons. India's nuclear doctrine, announced in 1999 and reaffirmed in 2003, emphasizes credible minimum deterrence and no-first-use. India also adopts an assured retaliation nuclear posture. For India, nuclear weapons are the ultimate means of deterring war, aiming to secure deterrence by vowing retaliation that the adversary cannot endure after a nuclear attack. Pakistan, although it has not officially announced a nuclear doctrine, also pursues credible minimum deterrence, believing that ambiguity in nuclear strategy is necessary to maximize deterrence effects and therefore does not commit to no-first-use. Initially, Pakistan adopted a catalytic posture, seeking to induce strong mediation from third countries, particularly the US, during crises. However, after losing confidence in US intervention, it shifted to an offensive asymmetric escalation posture, declaring its resolve to use nuclear weapons if necessary during crises, thereby attempting to de-escalate crises (Narang 2017, Ch. 3, 4).

The development and deployment of strategies, doctrines, and delivery systems related to nuclear weapons by both countries have continuously evolved through a process of action and reaction. Following the attack on the Indian Parliament by militants sponsored by Pakistan in December 2001, India launched Operation Parakram, mobilizing a large number of troops to the border areas. Pakistan responded in kind, leading to a prolonged standoff lasting over ten months. As this military operation concluded without significant results, the Cold Start doctrine was proposed within India as a more effective response. This plan involved Indian forces rapidly advancing into Pakistani territory to retaliate against terrorist attacks sponsored by Pakistan, and then withdrawing before Pakistan could consider using nuclear weapons. This proposal sparked debate within India regarding its effectiveness and feasibility. While contemplating countermeasures against Cold Start, Pakistan found itself lacking adequate conventional defense capabilities against a surprise attack from India, which held conventional superiority. Consequently, Pakistan shifted its nuclear doctrine to full-spectrum deterrence, publicly declaring its readiness to use nuclear weapons even in response to limited conventional attacks. To this end, it conducted test firings of the 60 km-range Nasr missile in 2011 and is believed to have subsequently deployed it (Ahmed, Hashmi & Kausar. 2019). Meanwhile, following the terrorist attacks in Mumbai in 2008, which resulted in significant casualties and property damage, including numerous foreign nationals, India considered various forms of military retaliation but ultimately exercised restraint. The strong criticism from the Indian public over the lack of response was palpable. Modi of the BJP, a hardline Hindu nationalist party, who came to power after winning the general election in 2014, had promised a strong response against Pakistan.

Following a terrorist attack on an army base in Uri, Indian-administered Kashmir, in 2016, which resulted in 19 deaths, Indian Prime Minister Modi ordered special forces to cross the Line of Control and conduct a surgical strike on terrorist training camps in Pakistani-administered Kashmir. Regardless of the operation's success, this demonstrated a willingness for physical retaliation, a departure from previous strategic restraint. In February 2019, after a suicide bombing attack by terrorists affiliated with a Pakistan-backed militant group in Pulwama, Indian-administered Kashmir, killed 40 police reservists, the Indian government mobilized its air force to bomb the terrorist base in Balakot, crossing the border into Pakistan rather than the Line of Control. As India thus deliberately escalated vertically and horizontally, Pakistan retaliated the next day by attacking targets in Indian-administered Kashmir across the Line of Control. During this exchange, an aerial battle occurred between the air forces of the two countries for the first time since the third Indo-Pakistani War in 1971, resulting in the downing of one Indian MiG-21. The pilot survived and returned safely to India, and no further escalation occurred, bringing the situation to a close. However, during the crisis, Pakistan convened its National Command Authority (NCA) and did not fail to warn the media of what this signified. Prime Minister Modi, campaigning for the general election at the time, also vowed military retaliation, stating that if the downed Indian pilot did not return safely, it would be a "night of murder." Regarding the role of the United States at the time, then-Secretary of State Pompeo claimed in his memoirs that active US intervention and mediation prevented the catastrophe of nuclear conflict.[3]

The retaliatory actions and counter-retaliations by both countries, unlike before, pursued deliberate escalation, causing global tension. India officially justified its actions as preemptive strikes against non-military targets (terrorist facilities) based on accurate intelligence. However, by attacking Pakistani territory, it also demonstrated the possibility of strategic and political escalation. Pakistan's air force responded with deliberate escalation, indicating that both countries attempted intentional escalation. Many experts assessed that the crisis was resolved purely by luck, highlighting the precariousness of the situation at the time. After the crisis resolution, both countries claimed victory to defend their actions (Pehahi 2019; Dalton 2019; Rej 2019).

The strong response to the Pulwama terrorist attack significantly contributed to the BJP's landslide victory in the general election. The Modi government, already pursuing strong anti-Muslim and anti-Pakistan policies based on Hindu nationalism, used its election victory to abrogate Article 370 of the constitution in August, shortly after the election, thereby revoking the autonomous status of Indian-administered Kashmir, which had been promised at the time of its accession to India in 1947. Kashmir, the only Muslim-majority region within India, was divided into two Union Territories, Jammu and Kashmir, and Ladakh, and incorporated under direct federal rule. The backlash from Kashmiris, stripped of their autonomy, was fierce, and Pakistan strongly protested, calling it a violation of the Simla Agreement signed in 1972. The Modi government used police and military forces to strongly control regional dissent and imposed controls on media and the internet. The Modi government attempted to appease public sentiment by investing in tourism and building infrastructure for the economic development of Kashmir. While tourism in Kashmir increased, dissatisfaction with the Modi government persisted due to restrictions on political autonomy and high youth unemployment. As border disputes with China intensified, diverting significant military forces to the border regions, and discontent with the federal government grew, attacks by armed groups noticeably increased in 2024 (Ganguly 2024). Furthermore, tensions escalated as benefits previously enjoyed by Kashmiris in areas such as housing and education were eliminated, and migration from other regions was encouraged, leading to concerns about a high possibility of crises caused by armed groups (Bhasin 2024).

Experts were particularly concerned about the significantly increased possibility of escalation if another crisis were to occur between India and Pakistan, triggered by an attack from an armed group. This concern is based on the high likelihood that both countries may have drawn dangerous and incorrect lessons from the Pulwama and Balakot incidents, such as 'crossing the opponent's red lines carries little risk of retaliation,' and 'escalation is less dangerous than thought.' This would make deterrence even more difficult and make it harder to predict how a conflict would unfold and conclude if it occurred. The next crisis might not be as fortunate. Furthermore, Prime Minister Modi, having received strong domestic support through his firm response, which contributed significantly to his election victory, faces immense pressure to employ even stronger military force and retaliate at a higher level in the next conflict due to this commitment trap. Although the Indian military demonstrated a strong will for retaliation during the Balakot airstrike, the actual impact was minimal, rendering its deterrent effect on Pakistan negligible. Pakistan's mobilization of its air force and downing of an Indian fighter jet immediately after Balakot suggests the possibility of bolder actions from Pakistan in the future.[4]

Moreover, the fact that both countries engaged in preparations related to nuclear weapons during the crisis suggests the possibility of rapid deployment and positioning of nuclear weapons in the next crisis. This implies that deterrence against the adversary's next move will become extremely difficult, significantly weakening crisis stability and making escalation control even more challenging (Pegahi 2019; Dalton 2019, Narang 2019; Lalwani 2020).

3) Pahalgam Terror Attack and India-Pakistan Clash

On April 22, 2025, a terrorist attack occurred in Pahalgam, shattering the illusion of peace and economic prosperity in Kashmir that Prime Minister Modi had so diligently cultivated (Ganguly 2025). The killing of 26 Indian tourists, specifically Hindu men, by a militant group in Pahalgam, a renowned tourist destination in Indian-administered Kashmir, sent shockwaves and intensified demands from the Indian public for strong retaliation.

The Indian government vowed retaliation, identifying Pakistan as the perpetrator behind the terrorist group, while the Pakistani government vehemently denied any involvement with the group and declared its firm resolve to counter any use of force by India (Sharp 2025). Both countries also implemented a series of confrontational measures, including border closures, expulsion of diplomats, suspension of visa issuance, and trade embargoes, leading to a rapid deterioration of bilateral relations. Furthermore, the Indian government announced its intention to abrogate the Indus Waters Treaty, signed in 1960 with the sponsorship of the World Bank, which had endured through wars and numerous crises. This move threatened control over the river systems flowing towards Pakistan, which relies on the Indus River for 80% of its water resources. Pakistan responded by warning that any artificial restriction on the Indus River's water resources would be considered an 'act of war' (Hamza 2025). The Pakistani government also threatened to abrogate the Simla Agreement, signed after the third Indo-Pakistani War in 1972, which recognized the Line of Control in Kashmir and agreed to peacefully resolve conflicts over Kashmir. Minor clashes between the armies of both countries were continuously reported along the Line of Control, and diplomatic efforts were intensely pursued by both nations to solidify their positions and gain international support. Prime Minister Modi announced that he had granted the Indian military full discretion to operate against Pakistan, while Pakistani officials issued warnings of imminent attacks and vowed resolute responses. Given that Prime Minister Modi had gained significant political advantage from his strong responses to terrorist attacks in 2016 and 2019, and was riding a wave of fervent anti-Pakistan nationalist sentiment, it seemed inevitable that he would launch a strong military response. However, the Modi government and the Indian military's overconfidence in escalation dominance, doubts about the effectiveness of military retaliation, the negative impact of technological advancements, the potential for escalation due to the offensive doctrines of both nations, and the indifference of the United States, which had previously played an active role in mediation, all contributed to experts' significant concerns about the possibility of the conflict escalating into a more severe crisis (Singh 2025a; Shapoo 2025; Altaf and Javed 2025).

Amidst this continuous escalation of tensions through words and actions, India launched Operation Sindoor in the early morning of May 7, announcing the destruction of nine terrorist bases in Pakistan and Pakistani-administered Kashmir using air-launched surface-to-air missiles, and the killing of numerous terrorists (Patil and Rawat 2025; Gupta 2025). Pakistan accused India of causing numerous civilian casualties, including the destruction of homes and mosques, and claimed to have shot down five Indian fighter jets. On May 10, Indian missile and drone attacks targeted areas near Rawalpindi, including Nur Khan Air Force Base, which is close to the capital Islamabad and hosts military and administrative facilities, further provoking Pakistan. Hours later, Pakistan launched Operation Bunyan-um-Marsoos using fighter jets, missiles, and drones, announcing attacks on Indian targets such as BrahMos cruise missile bases and S-400 air defense missile bases (Sharp 2025). As retaliatory attacks and counter-retaliations between India and Pakistan continued, both sides used fighter jets, missiles, and drones to attack each other's military bases, including airfields, resulting in increased material damage and casualties. Compared to the Indian responses following similar terrorist attacks in 2016 and 2019, the scale and scope of this armed conflict were significantly different, heightening concerns about escalation and the possibility of nuclear use. The United States, which had previously actively intervened in mediating India-Pakistan disputes, showed disinterest in mediation, with Vice President Vance stating, 'This is none of our business.' This lack of US engagement amplified concerns about escalation. However, after Pakistan's National Security Council (NSC) convened, signaling its nuclear readiness, the US government changed its stance and actively intervened. Through the mediation of the US and the international community, both countries agreed to a ceasefire on May 10, successfully extinguishing the immediate fire. Like in 2019, both nations claimed victory, but complacency is still premature (Clary 2025).[5]

This armed conflict also marked the first time that AI-based weapon systems, including drones, were extensively used in a conflict between the two nations. The Indian military utilized IAI Searcher and Heron drones imported from Israel for reconnaissance. It also employed Harpy and Harop suicide drones (loitering munitions), also imported from Israel, for airstrikes. Specifically, Harop drones were reportedly used to strike Pakistani military facilities, while Harpy drones were used for suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD). Drones, a joint product of India and Israel, were reportedly used in the early stages of the operation to strike terrorist infrastructure. Pakistan is known to have used hundreds of drones, imported from China and Turkey, as well as domestically produced or jointly manufactured ones, in swarm formations. In the future, drones, which pose less risk to personnel, can conduct long-range precision strikes, and are perceived as having a lower risk of escalation, may be used more extensively in conflicts between the two nations, potentially exacerbating the stability-instability paradox. Furthermore, depending on how drones are used and how the opposing nation perceives their use, the widespread deployment of drones may not significantly aid in escalation control. Therefore, relying on drone usage in conflicts between nuclear-armed states under the guise of reducing escalation risks could lead to unintended escalation (Haltiwanger 2025; Basrur 2025; Dass and Basit 2025).

Most importantly, there are widespread concerns that armed conflict between the two nations could easily reoccur, and if it does, the possibility of escalation to nuclear use will increase, with weapon systems being employed at higher levels of the escalation ladder than before, whether intentionally or not. In this recent conflict, India sought to demonstrate its military superiority through strong retaliation against Pakistan. According to India, it effectively destroyed intended targets such as terrorist training camps and Pakistani air force bases, and its air defense systems, including the S-400, neutralized most of Pakistan's counterattacks. However, India did not deny Pakistan's claim of shooting down five Indian fighter jets, and conflicting claims of military achievements are common. Nevertheless, after the ceasefire, Prime Minister Modi announced a 'new normal' where any terrorist attack would be considered an act of Pakistan, and targets located deep within Pakistani territory would be considered legitimate targets for retaliation (Tarapore 2025; Vohra 2025a). This aims to hold Pakistan accountable for the actions of terrorists and impose significant costs, thereby preventing future terrorist activities. However, many assessments suggest that, just as the retaliatory attacks in 2016 and 2019 failed to deter terrorism, this strong military action will have little effect in preventing similar terrorist attacks in the future.new normalFurthermore, Prime Minister Modi stated that India would not be influenced by 'nuclear blackmail' and would carry out necessary military actions, even when Pakistan signaled nuclear readiness by convening the NCA during the conflict. This approach, which involves retaliating at a higher level than before in similar future situations, could dangerously approach Pakistan's nuclear use threshold. Both countries believe they emerged victorious from this conflict and may harbor confidence in their ability to control escalation in future conflicts, potentially leading them to engage in even more intense military actions than in May 2025. Notably, the fact that this military clash, despite involving weapon systems at a significantly high level of the escalation ladder, ended long before reaching a full-scale ground war between the two nations, could instill a false sense of confidence. Moreover, both countries' hardline leaderships will face strong pressure to use more powerful and higher-level force in the next crisis due to the commitment trap. In a situation where weapon systems can reach their targets much faster due to technological advancements, the pressure from ultranationalist and jingoistic media and public opinion will make it even harder for leaders to control the path to escalation (Mallah 2025; Shah 2025; Tarapore 2025; Cervasio and Wheeler 2025; Singh 2025b). Pakistan, while officially claiming military victory, is known to have suffered significant actual damage, potentially exploiting loopholes in India's 'quid pro quo plus' doctrine, and may further refine and strengthen its 'quid pro quo plus' doctrine (Syed 2025).

Pakistan also considers its firm resistance against India, which is objectively superior in military power, as a significant achievement, regardless of the extent of military damage. Politically fragmented, economically dependent on IMF assistance for survival, and socially plagued by internal terrorism, separatism, and security issues, Pakistan faced widespread public discontent towards its political leadership. However, the confrontation with India unified the entire nation. The role and authority of Army Chief Munir, who holds de facto power, were further strengthened, and he was promoted to full general for the first time for his contributions during the recent conflict. Many assess that Pakistan has become bolder following this armed conflict (Jamal 2025a), as the Pakistani military has now clearly demonstrated its raison d'être to the public, escaping past criticisms (Fair 2025). With an overwhelming 96% of respondents believing Pakistan won the conflict, public approval of the military, which wields absolute influence in Pakistan, surged, with 93% of respondents evaluating the military favorably in a post-ceasefire poll (Jamal 2025b). General Munir, who was criticized for emphasizing the 'Two Nations Theory,' the ideological foundation of Pakistan, a week before the terrorist attack, and for justifying the integration of Indian-administered Kashmir with Pakistan, led the operation with a strong religious fervor, unlike his moderate predecessor, and claimed victory based on identity legitimacy, earning recognition from the Pakistani public (Vohra 2025b; Fair 2025). In this context, it is unlikely that the Pakistani military will cease its asymmetric offensive using militant groups, as India desires.nuclear blackmailFurthermore, given that both countries achieved significant military, political, and social successes in this armed conflict, India's deterrence is unlikely to be effective. The international community must watch with increasing anxiety as the cycle of attacks, counterattacks, and further counterattacks escalates to more dangerous levels. The excessive confidence of both India and Pakistan, coupled with the declining role of third countries (especially the US) in timely intervention and mediation, presents a deeply concerning situation regarding the mindset of the leaderships and the nuclear postures and deployments of their militaries.commitment trapIn a situation where the time to reach targets has significantly shortened due to technological advancements, the pressure from ultranationalist and jingoistic media and public opinion will compel both countries' hardline leaders to use more powerful and higher-level force in the next crisis, making escalation control even more difficult (Mallah 2025; Shah 2025; Tarapore 2025; Cervasio and Wheeler 2025; Singh 2025b). Pakistan, while claiming military victory, is known to have suffered significant actual damage, potentially exploiting loopholes in India's 'quid pro quo plus' doctrine, and may further refine and strengthen its 'quid pro quo plus' doctrine (Syed 2025).quid pro quo plusdoctrinequid pro quo plusdoctrine

Pakistan also considers its firm resistance against India, which is objectively superior in military power, as a significant achievement, regardless of the extent of military damage. Politically fragmented, economically dependent on IMF assistance for survival, and socially plagued by internal terrorism, separatism, and security issues, Pakistan faced widespread public discontent towards its political leadership. However, the confrontation with India unified the entire nation. The role and authority of Army Chief Munir, who holds de facto power, were further strengthened, and he was promoted to full general for the first time for his contributions during the recent conflict. Many assess that Pakistan has become bolder following this armed conflict (Jamal 2025a), as the Pakistani military has now clearly demonstrated its raison d'être to the public, escaping past criticisms (Fair 2025). With an overwhelming 96% of respondents believing Pakistan won the conflict, public approval of the military, which wields absolute influence in Pakistan, surged, with 93% of respondents evaluating the military favorably in a post-ceasefire poll (Jamal 2025b). General Munir, who was criticized for emphasizing the 'Two Nations Theory,' the ideological foundation of Pakistan, a week before the terrorist attack, and for justifying the integration of Indian-administered Kashmir with Pakistan, led the operation with a strong religious fervor, unlike his moderate predecessor, and claimed victory based on identity legitimacy, earning recognition from the Pakistani public (Vohra 2025b; Fair 2025). In this context, it is unlikely that the Pakistani military will cease its asymmetric offensive using militant groups, as India desires.[6]Two Nations Theory

Given that this armed conflict yielded significant military, political, and social achievements, India's deterrence is unlikely to be effective. The international community must watch with increasing anxiety as the cycle of attacks, counterattacks, and further counterattacks escalates to more dangerous levels. The excessive confidence of both India and Pakistan, coupled with the declining role of third countries (especially the US) in timely intervention and mediation, presents a deeply concerning situation regarding the mindset of the leaderships and the nuclear postures and deployments of their militaries.

III. Lessons from the India-Pakistan Nuclear Confrontation for South Korea

Applying the case of nuclear development and confrontation between India and Pakistan to the Korean Peninsula is a meaningful endeavor for South Korea, which has a strong interest in indigenous nuclear armament, given North Korea's existing nuclear weapons and its qualitative and quantitative enhancement of nuclear missile capabilities. First, we must consider the objectives of acquiring nuclear weapons and meticulously examine what delivery systems should be possessed and how many nuclear warheads should be produced to achieve these objectives. Furthermore, we must intensely consider how to construct a nuclear command and control system. Most importantly, based on the India-Pakistan case, we must soberly assess the time, process, costs, and obstacles and threats that must be overcome to achieve the intended objectives of acquiring nuclear weapons. Above all, in light of the India-Pakistan case, we must coolly determine whether South Korea's indigenous nuclear possession will truly enhance our security in our geopolitical context.

1) The Path to Nuclear Armament

Is South Korea's objective for possessing nuclear weapons limited to deterring North Korea's nuclear threat? Or is it to deter multiple adversaries, including China? The choice of objective will significantly influence the number of nuclear warheads and delivery systems required. In Pakistan's case, the objective and reason for possessing nuclear weapons were specifically tailored to deterring India from the outset. Although not officially declared, when considering Pakistan's nuclear doctrine as credible minimum deterrence for deterring India, Pakistani officials believed that possessing 60-70 nuclear warheads would be sufficient for deterrence against India (Tasleem 2016). For India, the primary driver for nuclear development was China, which inflicted a humiliating defeat in the 1962 border war and succeeded in its nuclear test in 1964. Although US pressure was a significant factor, the presence of China cannot be ignored as a background to India's peaceful nuclear test in 1974. Even during the 1980s and 1990s, when India experienced several crises and nuclear competition with Pakistan, the potential threat from China significantly influenced India's nuclear development and posture. The recent intensification of border disputes with China and deepening strategic competition have spurred India's development of long-range strategic weapons like the Agni-5 and the creation of an Integrated Rocket Force composed of various types of new stand-off conventional missiles (Bommakanti 2023; Das 2024). A 2019 paper simulating a nuclear war scenario between India and Pakistan predicted that India would reserve a significant number of nuclear weapons, keeping in mind its confrontation with China, rather than using them against Pakistan (Robock, et al. 2019).

How many nuclear weapons would be appropriate for South Korea? Even if limited to deterring North Korea, approximately 50 warheads, the estimated number North Korea possesses as of 2025, would be necessary (Kristensen, et al. 2025).[7]If China is also included as a target for deterrence, the number would increase significantly. The issue is that acquiring this number of weapons will require considerable time, cost, and effort.

For India and Pakistan, it is generally known that they possessed nuclear capabilities around 1990 and conducted nuclear tests in May 1998, respectively. Despite consistently increasing their nuclear arsenals competitively since then (27 years have passed since the 1998 nuclear tests, and it is now 2025), both countries possess approximately 170-180 nuclear weapons each (Kristensen et al. 2025). How many years would it take for South Korea to possess about 50 nuclear weapons? Considering the absence of enrichment and reprocessing facilities and the difficulty of securing uranium, it would require considerable time even with maximum effort.

The problem is that during the period of striving to manufacture nuclear weapons, strong deterrence, including the possibility of a preemptive strike from surrounding hostile nations, is anticipated (window of vulnerability) (Dalton and Perkovich 2024). A preemptive strike from North Korea or China would be difficult to defend against with our own strength alone. Debs and Monteiro argue that even if a state with the technical and economic capacity and security reasons pursues nuclear development, it must effectively overcome interference from hostile nations, and in this regard, the role of allies is crucial (Debs and Monteiro 2016, 37-45). Would the United States, to facilitate South Korea's nuclear development, provide a defensive shield at the risk of conflict with China and North Korea? One of the primary reasons for South Korea's independent nuclear armament was distrust in the US nuclear umbrella guarantee and, furthermore, concerns about abandonment. It is questionable whether the US would undertake such a level of risk for a South Korea that might not greatly need the alliance with the US after possessing its own nuclear weapons (Dalton and Perkovich 2024).[8]

2) Nuclear Posture and Nuclear Command and Control After Nuclear Armament

Even if nuclear weapons are successfully produced and deployed after much difficulty, it is unlikely that a stable balance of terror, based on a secure second-strike capability similar to the US-Soviet relationship during the Cold War, will be established between North and South Korea. Both the US and the Soviet Union possessed thousands, or even more, nuclear weapons, ensuring a secure second-strike capability. Their territories were thousands of kilometers apart, with no territorial disputes, and conflicts between them generally occurred in regions distant from their vital national interests, in the form of proxy wars. The situation that would arise if both North and South Korea, located on the Korean Peninsula, possessed nuclear weapons is far more likely to resemble present-day South Asia than the US-Soviet Cold War. Both the Korean Peninsula and the Indian subcontinent were part of a single political entity for a long time before being divided and gaining independent partition after World War II, leading to continuous confrontation and conflict over border disputes and territorial recovery. In South Asia, nuclear weapons have emerged as a major variable in these confrontations since the 1990s. India and Pakistan, after their 1998 nuclear tests, formalized their nuclear weapon possession and developed their nuclear doctrines, postures, and command and control systems. As we have confirmed in the previous section, the continuous clashes between the two countries, with repeated actions and reactions, have led to their nuclear doctrines becoming increasingly offensive. Unlike the early stages of nuclear weapon possession, after the Kargil War and the 2001 Indian Parliament attack crisis, India's formulation of the Cold Start Doctrine, Pakistan's response of transitioning to full-spectrum deterrence and the development/deployment of the Nasr short-range tactical nuclear missile, and the ambiguous but significantly low nuclear use threshold,[9]India's moves to change its no-first-use nuclear principle and efforts to enhance counterforce capabilities, which contradict its assured retaliation nuclear posture, have repeatedly occurred, continuously weakening crisis stability and strategic stability between the two countries.

If South Korea were to possess nuclear weapons, what kind of nuclear doctrine, posture, and command and control system should it establish and develop? It is highly likely that South Korea would realistically adopt a doctrine of credible minimum deterrence, similar to India and Pakistan. If so, what about the nuclear posture? Like other nuclear-armed states, South Korea would have to make every effort to enhance the survivability of its nuclear weapons from the outset of possessing a small number of them. In addition to increasing the number of nuclear weapons, delivery means must also be selectively considered. Given the extremely short operational depth and the fixed deployment of nuclear weapon delivery systems in the form of surface-to-surface ballistic missiles, they could be vulnerable to preemptive strikes by the adversary. Therefore, to enhance survivability and multiply second-strike capability, significant efforts must be made to secure a submarine platform (SLBM) (Dalton and Perkovich 2024). However, this presents a problem: besides the fact that securing a sufficient quantity of nuclear-powered submarines equipped with SLBMs for efficient operations would take an enormous amount of time, it would inevitably lead to the issue of delegating nuclear command and control authority. That is, rather than ensuring the safety of a small number of deployed nuclear weapons or preventing unauthorized launches (negative control), the importance of ensuring that nuclear weapons reliably function to deter North Korea (positive control) may become paramount, thus increasing the incentive to delegate nuclear control authority. This inevitably implies an increased possibility of nuclear weapon use.

Furthermore, North Korea already possesses a considerable number of nuclear weapons, and South Korea is in a position of trying to catch up. For a significant period, South Korea will have no choice but to attempt to deter North Korean nuclear weapons with a small arsenal. In the event of a contingency, North Korean nuclear missiles could reach major South Korean targets within minutes, forcing South Korea to keep its small nuclear arsenal on hair-trigger alert, ready for Launch on Warning (LOW), an extremely precarious situation.use it or lose itThe pressure of 'use it or lose it' would be immense, placing an enormous burden on the nuclear command and control system.

For these reasons, South Korea is likely to inevitably adopt an asymmetric escalation posture, which keeps the possibility of nuclear weapon use significantly open for a considerable period and does not require a secure second-strike capability or an equivalent number of warheads.[10]Although there is debate about North Korea's nuclear posture, many argue it is asymmetric escalation. If both countries facing each other with nuclear weapons adopt highly offensive asymmetric escalation postures, the tension will be considerable. That is, crisis stability is likely to remain significantly weakened until South Korea possesses a satisfactory (?) number of nuclear weapons.[11]South Korea's nuclear use conditions (threshold) may also be set at a low level, albeit ambiguously,escalate-to-deescalaterequiring an offensive stance, which would further exacerbate crisis stability.

3) Stability-Instability Paradox

The concept of the stability-instability paradox, raised in the early to mid-1960s during the intense nuclear competition between the US and the Soviet Union, refers to a situation where the stability at the nuclear (strategic) level, achieved by two confronting nuclear-armed states possessing sufficient second-strike capabilities, paradoxically leads to increased instability at lower levels of conflict between them, i.e., limited conflicts. However, despite the occurrence of crises and limited conflicts, the situation does not escalate to full-scale war or nuclear use between the two states.

Many experts have viewed South Asia, where India and Pakistan confront each other, as a region where the stability-instability paradox is actually realized. This is because following the nuclear capabilities of both nations, the Kargil War broke out in 1999 due to Pakistan's aggression, and subsequent terrorist attacks by Pakistan-backed militants occurred multiple times, yet the crises were resolved without serious escalation.[12]More recently, India, after being attacked by Pakistan-backed militants, has increased the level of physical retaliation, moving away from its previous strategic restraint, demonstrating an applied case of the stability-instability paradox. In retaliation for the 2016 attack, it conducted a localized strike using special forces; in 2019, it launched airstrikes into Pakistani territory using fighter jets; and in the 2025 retaliation, it actively utilized various standoff weapon systems, including cruise missiles and suicide drones. While showing caution against escalation by not using ground forces and crossing borders, the adopted weapon systems and targets clearly demonstrated a start at a higher rung of the escalation ladder compared to previous instances (Stimson Center 2025). Statements from Indian high-ranking officials, including Prime Minister Modi, convey confidence that further escalation would not occur despite such attacks. However, this confidence in escalation control based on the stability-instability paradox rests on a very concerning premise, and it is uncertain whether further escalation will be appropriately controlled if retaliation occurs at a higher level than in May 2025 during the next crisis. Furthermore, despite strong responses, it is difficult to see that the restoration of deterrence, as proclaimed by Prime Minister Modi, has occurred, given Pakistan's very confident stance.

How would the stability-instability paradox be realized on the Korean Peninsula? Until now, the parties confronting each other with nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula have been the United States and North Korea. In South Asia, the US is a powerful third party capable of mediating and controlling conflicts between the two nations, but on the Korean Peninsula, it is a direct party to the nuclear confrontation. It is difficult to find examples of the stability-instability paradox on the Korean Peninsula thus far. North Korea's nuclear missile tests and cyber offensives are clearly provocations, but the 'instability' generally assumed in the stability-instability paradox involves kinetic actions resulting in casualties, thus the Korean Peninsula has been a region distant from the stability-instability paradox (Kim Tae-hyung 2024, 30-35). However, the situation could change significantly if South Korea becomes a direct party to the nuclear confrontation with North Korea. While India must disperse considerable military power to counter China, resulting in a relatively small difference in conventional military strength between the two nations confronting each other near the India-Pakistan border, the conventional power gap between South Korea and North Korea on the Korean Peninsula is substantial. Due to this clear disparity in conventional forces, the damage North Korea, being in the relatively weaker position, would suffer in the event of a military conflict would be much greater.

In response to North Korean provocations, South Korea might attempt retaliation at a relatively high rung of the escalation ladder, similar to India. However, unlike South Asia, where the stability-instability paradox is mutually realized with comparable nuclear capabilities, South Korea, being significantly inferior in nuclear power, may find it difficult to retaliate beyond a low level against North Korea, which possesses numerous tactical nuclear weapons.[13]This also makes the relationship between South Korea and the United States crucial, whether it remains an alliance after South Korea's nuclear armament. North Korea is currently developing and deploying tactical nuclear weapon systems of various types and forms (Kim Tae-hyung, Kim Bo-mi 2023, 13-18).

Furthermore, the issue of whether the objective inferiority in conventional forces will truly deter North Korean provocations must be approached cautiously. The perception of 'victory-defeat' or a 'worth fighting for' situation by the North Korean leadership, similar to the Pakistani military, may differ significantly from general assumptions.[14]Therefore, it is possible to act boldly despite accepting a certain level of damage and claim victory regardless of the scale of damage. For South Korea, enduring such damage would be difficult. If North Korea infringes upon the NLL and attacks islands in the West Sea, how and to what extent would South Korea retaliate? If North Korea counterattacks, to what level is South Korea prepared to use military force? Such situations require not only firm resolve but also a thorough and dispassionate analysis and judgment of various environmental conditions, including the possibility of escalation.

One of the most important lessons we can learn from the India-Pakistan nuclear confrontation in relation to the stability-instability paradox is whether nuclear weapon possession has indeed enhanced the security of both nations. Have India and Pakistan achieved the objectives for which they acquired nuclear weapons, overcoming numerous difficulties and resistances? While it is impossible to speculate (counterfactual) on how disputes and confrontations between the two countries would have unfolded without nuclear weapons, scholars are divided on whether the introduction of nuclear weapons has exacerbated or mitigated the frequency and intensity of conflicts between them. Kapur argues that the number of confrontations and crises between the two countries increased nearly fourfold during the period 1990-2002, after acquiring nuclear weapons, compared to the pre-nuclear period of 1972-89 (Kapur 2007, 27). In contrast, Saira Khan argues for the war-mitigating effect of nuclear weapon possession, stating that while there were three wars and seven crises between India and Pakistan from 1947 to 1986, there were only four crises after that period until 2004 (2005, 162-3).

However, numerous crises and conflicts have occurred in the 21st century, beyond the periods covered by both studies. If nuclear weapons had not existed, would the conflicts of the 2000s have escalated into war between the two countries? This is a difficult question to answer. However, it is a fact that armed conflicts have continuously occurred between the two countries, regardless of nuclear weapon possession. In the conflict of April 2025, India demonstrated an attitude of readily using advanced weapon systems under the pretext of retaliation. Did the 'nuclear shadow' enable India's strong response?

Regardless, armed conflicts and disputes have frequently occurred between the two countries, irrespective of nuclear weapon possession, and nuclear weapons appear to be ineffective in preventing the occurrence of armed conflict itself. Is there still a reason to possess nuclear weapons if they play a limited role in deterring or preventing armed conflict? If one side does not possess nuclear weapons, will it be unilaterally victimized? Reflecting on the Russia-Ukraine war, there are many arguments that if Ukraine had not made the mistake of abandoning the nuclear weapons inherited from the Soviet Union, trusting the Budapest Memorandum of 1994, Putin would not have dared to invade. Even if Ukraine had continued to possess nuclear weapons, would an offensive in the eastern regions have occurred, even if not a large-scale attack on Kyiv? If such an attack had occurred, would nuclear-armed Ukraine have used nuclear weapons? Would the possibility of such nuclear use have acted as a deterrent to Putin's actions? Despite frequent threats of nuclear use by Putin and other high-ranking Russian officials in the Russia-Ukraine war, the confrontation between Russia and NATO, including the US, has largely been characterized by creativity, boldness, and patience in using conventional forces, with nuclear weapons acting as a significant background pressure. In particular, Ukraine, with increased support from Western countries, has been advancing offensives, disregarding Russia's nuclear threats, including the advance into Kursk (Avey 2025). In late May, Ukraine launched Operation Spider's Web, attacking several air force bases deep within Russian territory with drones and destroying dozens of strategic bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons. Despite strong public opinion within Russia calling for nuclear retaliation, the actual retaliation was carried out with conventional forces (Lanversin 2025). In this context, what is the role or utility of nuclear weapons?

On the Korean Peninsula, even after South Korea possesses nuclear weapons, bold and high-level offensives and conflicts against each other could occur as if nuclear weapons did not exist. In particular, as demonstrated in the India-Pakistan armed conflict and the Russia-Ukraine war, drones, which are cheap, efficient, and carry a low risk of escalation, can be used aggressively on a wide scale, and defense against them or post-incident response is challenging. In the case of India and Pakistan, the advent of nuclear weapons has not resolved the instability between the two countries at all and has, in fact, exacerbated limited conflicts at lower levels. On the Korean Peninsula, apart from the Cheonan incident and the Yeonpyeong Island shelling in 2010, there have been almost no physical military conflicts, but South Korea's nuclear possession could instigate them. Similar to South Asia, the possession of nuclear weapons by both sides on the Korean Peninsula may alleviate concerns about escalation to full-scale war that could lead to nuclear weapon use between the two countries. However, it could lead to a situation where the country must continuously endure low-level disputes and military conflicts, which did not exist before, and face the nightmarish prospect of a dangerous move to higher rungs of the escalation ladder each time. This ultimately means approaching nuclear use through inadvertent escalation. Furthermore, even if South Korea responds decisively and boldly with military force to low-level provocations by North Korea, it is difficult to expect, as in the South Asian case, that such a response will restore deterrence and eliminate North Korean provocations. In other words, the hope that possessing nuclear weapons will create a balance of terror, leading to a stable, albeit uncomfortable, relationship between the two sides, is likely to remain just a hope.

While deterrence from North Korea, including preemptive strikes, and low-level provocations are anticipated, it is also entirely possible that South Korea, as a newly nuclear-armed state, could become more aggressive and emboldened (Horowitz 2009; Bell 2021), pursuing a tougher policy. If both countries, backed by nuclear weapons, act offensively with a (mistaken) confidence in escalation control, what will happen to the security situation on the Korean Peninsula? Will we witness a continuation of military conflicts, even if at a limited level, that are far more unstable than before?

Until now, North Korea has always been the villain, the predator, and the aggressor unfairly provoking South Korea. After independent nuclear armament, can South Korea confidently remain the defender, enduring damage and exercising restraint, as it has been?

4) Relations with Neighboring Countries and Great Powers on the Korean Peninsula

In the case of India and Pakistan, the presence of a third party like the United States played a crucial role. Although it sometimes led to considerable disappointment and betrayal, especially after both became nuclear-armed states, US intervention and mediation during conflicts played a decisive role in de-escalating crises. Despite its initial stance, the US is assessed to have played an active role in brokering a ceasefire in the May conflict after Pakistan's nuclear signaling. The US continues to act as a catalytic element for Pakistan in mitigating nuclear crises. However, on the Korean Peninsula, the US has been a party to the conflict for a long time, not a mediating third party. Even if the relationship with the US is no longer an alliance after South Korea achieves nuclear-armed status, it is difficult to expect the US to play a 'neutral' third-party mediator role similar to that in South Asia in the event of a crisis between North and South Korea. This role would be too burdensome for any country other than the US. As mentioned earlier, the extent to which the US would actively intervene and mediate in the event of a nuclear crisis between North and South Korea after South Korea's nuclear possession involves various variables, and if it is determined that the US will intervene in some way, North Korea might be more inclined to provoke offensively without concern for escalation.

One of the reasons why the India-Pakistan nuclear confrontation has become more complex and difficult to resolve recently is the competitive relationship among the great powers surrounding the two countries. In particular, as India strengthens its relationship with the US and Pakistan with China, the deepening US-China rivalry has a significant impact on India-Pakistan relations. Furthermore, China's rapid efforts to increase its nuclear capabilities not only alarm the US but also have considerable repercussions on India's strategic calculations.

There have been many analyses suggesting that the nuclear structure in South Asia is already causing a trilemma (FH Khan 2022; Sood 2022).[15]India's primary reason for nuclear development was China, not just Pakistan, and India faces the formidable task of deterring both Pakistan and China simultaneously. India's nuclear power development, which is increasingly focused on responding to China's recent efforts to qualitatively and quantitatively enhance its nuclear arsenal and develop corresponding weapon systems, may, regardless of India's intentions, provoke Pakistan and elicit a counter-response. The Integrated Rocket Force (IRF) currently being established by India, focusing on short- and medium-range missiles to counter China's significantly superior conventional ballistic missile forces, is testing various missile systems and preparing to deploy them under the IRF. Among these, the BM-4 conventional ballistic missile has a similar appearance and performance to the new Agni-P missile, which can be equipped with nuclear weapons, thus potentially provoking Pakistan significantly, regardless of India's intentions (Haider 2025).

If South Korea were to possess nuclear weapons, a trilemma involving North Korea, South Korea, and China could emerge around the Korean Peninsula. If the US is also included in this dynamic, it would become a quadrilemma. Unlike a situation with two nuclear-armed states, a trilemma or quadrilemma, in a context of already severe distrust and misperception, could significantly worsen crisis stability and accelerate a nuclear arms race, rapidly increasing the likelihood of a considerable weakening of overall strategic stability. We have already witnessed efforts to strengthen the deterrence of the ROK-US alliance against North Korea in East Asia contributing to China's hardline response. If South Korea becomes part of this complex dynamic, the security environment in East Asia is likely to deteriorate further.[16]Even excluding the possibility of nuclear armament by nuclear powers Russia and Japan, a trilemma or quadrilemma situation is sufficiently complex and unstable. Wolfsthal, Kristensen, and Korda (2025) lament that the relationships among the existing nine nuclear states already create a 'nine-body problem' that is difficult to explain or resolve.

South Korea's independent nuclear armament could also provoke Japan's nuclear armament. Japan, the only country in the world to have been attacked by nuclear weapons, still harbors strong antipathy towards nuclear weapons. However, it possesses sufficient materials and facilities to manufacture nuclear weapons in a short period, and if changes in the surrounding security environment compel a decision, it could pursue nuclear weapon acquisition. Would Japan's nuclear armament be advantageous for South Korea's security? Could cooperation between nuclear-armed South Korea and Japan serve as a mechanism for regional security balance against North Korea-China (-Russia)? Can we overcome a five-body problem or a six-body problem? The increase in the number of nuclear-armed states and the number of nuclear weapons will increase the likelihood of miscalculation, misperception, and accidental incidents.

IV. Conclusion

Given the escalating threat of North Korean nuclear missiles and the diminishing confidence in US extended deterrence, the growing interest in independent nuclear armament in South Korea is a natural phenomenon. However, it is crucial to soberly assess the pros and cons of hopes for enhanced security through a vague balance of terror, considering their realism and feasibility.

This article sought to draw lessons by analyzing the case of nuclear confrontation between India and Pakistan, which shares many similarities with the Korean Peninsula. From a military security perspective alone, setting aside issues of economy, international standing, and the NPT, South Korea's nuclear possession appears to have more disadvantages than advantages. While South Korea's independent nuclear armament might be effective in preventing a full-scale invasion and war by North Korea, similar to the South Asian case, it is highly likely to exacerbate security dilemmas, continuously increasing tension, crises, small-scale armed conflicts, and ultimately the possibility of nuclear weapon use. South Asian security experts have already warned against South Korea's consideration of nuclear armament for similar reasons (Akhtar 2023; O'Donnell 2023; J Panda 2023; Westmyer and Joshi. 2013). For countries bordering each other, militarily confronting each other, and with an even shorter operational depth than South Asia, the potential disadvantages of both possessing nuclear weapons are likely to far outweigh the advantages in terms of external security, and the likelihood of achieving the intended purpose of acquiring nuclear weapons appears very low.

One of the lessons that can be learned from the India-Pakistan case regarding North Korea policy is the necessity of practical confidence-building measures (CBMs), even if not large-scale nuclear arms control. The communication channel established between the Directors General of Military Operations of both armies is reported to have played a role in reaching a ceasefire in the May conflict. In March 2022, a BrahMos missile from India was accidentally fired into Pakistani territory, causing a communication issue that posed serious challenges to crisis management mechanisms and crisis stability between the two countries (Korda 2022). Even if crises occur between adversarial nations, a system must be in place to prevent crises from escalating into conflict. In inter-Korean relations, where even a hotline is absent, efforts must be made to enhance crisis stability, starting with rudimentary CBMs. The Korean Peninsula currently has a structure with low crisis stability and difficulty in controlling escalation (Bell and Mcdonald 2019), so this point must be kept in mind for any security enhancement efforts, including future independent nuclear armament.■

—— V. References ——

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[1] In Europe, Germany has changed its attitude towards nuclear weapons to a negative one, while Poland is openly calling for the production or deployment of nuclear weapons, and France has offered to provide extended deterrence to European countries with its nuclear weapons. These proposals have sparked much debate regarding their feasibility and effectiveness (Ataman 2025; Benner 2025; Lewis 2025; Bell and Hoffman 2025; Vaddi and Narang 2025).

[2] Prior to the second Trump administration, the Washington Declaration in April 2023 established the Nuclear Consultative Group between South Korea and the United States, further solidifying extended deterrence institutionally. However, it is difficult to consider these measures as having dispelled fundamental skepticism about extended deterrence. This illustrates the difficulty in gaining allies' trust in extended deterrence (Lee et al. 2024; Panda 2025, 131-136).

[3] There are also many critical views of Secretary Pompeo's claims regarding the role of the United States (Biswas 2025).

[4] Pakistan also experienced retaliatory attacks from India in 2016 and 2019, subsequently announcing a new military doctrine of “quid pro quo plus” to respond to such attacks with equivalent or greater force, thereby revealing an upgraded form of full-spectrum deterrence.

[5] India and Pakistan also have markedly different stances on the US-brokered ceasefire. Pakistan's Prime Minister Sharif expressed gratitude to President Trump for being the first to announce a ceasefire between the two countries. However, India did not acknowledge US mediation, stating that its own strong offensive effectively pressured Pakistan into a ceasefire. This exemplifies India's tendency to pursue autonomous diplomacy, particularly concerning the Kashmir issue, by consistently emphasizing the bilateral nature of India-Pakistan relations (Ethirajan 2025).

[6] The Two Nations Theory is a theory advocated by Muslim leaders such as Jinnah during the independence movement in the 1930s. It argued that the Indian subcontinent comprised two distinct 'nations'—Hindus and Muslims—with different religions, traditions, histories, and cultures. Therefore, upon gaining independence from Britain, Hindus and Muslims should each establish their own nation-states, forming the basis for the establishment of Pakistan.

[7] Naturally, North Korea will increase its nuclear arsenal further as South Korea possesses 50 warheads.

[8] It is uncertain whether the United States will remain a steadfast ally to a nuclear-armed South Korea. While some argue that South Korea's nuclear capabilities will be necessary to counter China, the US strategic stance towards alliances, including the alliance with South Korea, could change.

[9] Pakistan's conditions for nuclear weapon use are fourfold: the Pakistani military suffers significant casualties (military threshold); the Indian military penetrates deeply within Pakistan's borders to an unacceptable degree (territorial threshold); Pakistan's political stability and regime survival are severely threatened (political threshold), particularly due to Indian actions in Balochistan, which Pakistan considers a vulnerable region; or Pakistan's economy faces collapse due to Indian pressure and encirclement, including the blockade of Karachi, Pakistan's major port (economic threshold). This indicates that Pakistan's nuclear use threshold (red line) is set quite low and ambiguously.

[10] There is also a possibility of concluding with a catalytic nuclear posture, whether intended or not. One of the reasons for nuclear proliferation in South Asia was to secure independence from major powers, but in reality, especially from Pakistan's perspective, active US intervention and mediation have always played a crucial role. The situation for South Korea could unfold similarly after nuclear armament. Of course, unlike South Asia, it is difficult to predict what choice the United States would make in a nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula, where the possibility of confrontation with China is much higher. Furthermore, as in Pakistan's case, if US intervention is certain, North Korea might actively exploit this, believing the US would prevent escalation, and proceed more aggressively.

[11] During the Cold War, NATO in Europe and Pakistan in South Asia adopted offensive nuclear postures, threatening the use of (tactical) nuclear weapons early in a conflict due to their conventional force inferiority. In the case of the Korean Peninsula, South Korea, which is attempting to arm itself with nuclear weapons, is overwhelmingly superior in conventional forces but will remain at a significant disadvantage in nuclear capabilities for a considerable period. It is reasonable to assume that in such circumstances, the side with the nuclear disadvantage will adopt an offensive nuclear posture.

[12] Many view the conflict situation in South Asia as a prime example of the stability-instability paradox, but this view is not without controversy. There are numerous factors that cast doubt on the fundamental premises of the stability-instability paradox, such as whether the strategic stability between the two countries can truly be considered stable, and the excessive importance of the role of third parties (the United States) (Kim Tae-hyung 2024, 11-25).

[13] This also raises the question of whether the relationship between South Korea and the United States would remain an alliance if South Korea were to arm itself with nuclear weapons. North Korea is currently developing and deploying tactical nuclear weapon systems in various forms and methods (Kim Tae-hyung, Kim Bo-mi 2023, 13-18).

[14] North Korea's extreme mindset of 'we all die together' could evolve into a unique theory of victory, instilling strong determination and reckless resolve, thereby encouraging adventurous actions (Jackson 2019, 36-7).

[15] Recent attention has focused on China's rapid growth in nuclear capabilities, leading to the 'two peer problem' where the United States must contend with two nuclear superpowers, or the great power trilemma. Many scholars fear that, by analogy with the three-body problem in astrophysics, a relationship that is stable between two entities can become rapidly unstable and unpredictable when a third is introduced, a dynamic they fear may emerge in relations between great powers (Kim Tae-hyung 2023).

[16]Even excluding the nuclear armament possibilities of nuclear powers Russia and Japan, the trilemma or quadrillema situation is sufficiently complex and unstable. Wolfsthal, Kristensen, and Korda (2025) lamented that the relationships among the current nine nuclear states already create a nine-body problem that makes any explanation or solution difficult.

■ Kim Tae-hyung_Professor, Soongsil University

■ Responsible for and edited by:Kim Chae-rin, EAI Research Assistant; Sung Ye-na, Intern Scholar

    Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | crkim@eai.or.kr