[Trump's Second Term and Korea's Nuclear Options] III. North Korea's Nuclear Advancement: Assessment and Outlook

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I. North Korea's "New Line of Strengthening Nuclear Power"

In early 2025, North Korea has consistently mentioned a "new line of strengthening nuclear power." Starting with a statement by the Director of the Foreign Ministry's Department of External Affairs Policy on January 17, the regime has escalated its criticism of ROK-U.S. military exercises since the beginning of the year (KCNA Watch 1/17/2025), and following Chairman Kim Jong Un's remarks, it has continuously re-communicated its policy of advancing nuclear capabilities. Given that North Korea, which has been steadily advancing its nuclear capabilities, has successively declared a "new" line, there is growing interest in what changes this portends.

On February 8, North Korean Chairman Kim Jong Un, during a visit to the Ministry of National Defense on the 77th anniversary of the Korean People's Army founding, announced plans to advance nuclear capabilities, mentioning a "new plan to accelerate the strengthening of all deterrents, including nuclear capabilities." He also claimed that ROK-U.S. joint exercises led by the United States and the strengthening of ROK-U.S.-Japan cooperation are creating a military imbalance in Northeast Asia, stating, "It is the correct answer to speak in a language that only those who worship strength can understand," hinting at a military response (Reuters 2/8/2025).

In the same month, regarding the port call of the U.S. Los Angeles-class nuclear submarine Alexandria (SSN-757) at Busan Port, a spokesperson for the Ministry of National Defense stated through a statement, "Cease provocative actions that cause further instability," adding, "New measures to strengthen nuclear capabilities and self-defense clearly indicate the direction we must resolutely move in" (Reuters 2/11/2025).

Furthermore, following the joint statement issued at the ROK-U.S.-Japan foreign ministers' meeting in Munich, which explicitly stated "complete denuclearization of North Korea," Pyongyang expressed "grave concern over the adventurist actions of the U.S., Japan, and South Korea that incite collective confrontation and conflict on the Korean Peninsula and in the region," and declared, "We will consistently adhere to the new line of strengthening nuclear power declared by the head of state." It also emphasized, "We will continue to seize new opportunities necessary for the upward adjustment of strategic power" and "We will occupy a much more advantageous position in the DPRK-U.S. confrontation" (Seo 2025).

On May 8, Chairman Kim Jong Un, while directing a joint strike exercise of long-range artillery and missile systems, stressed the need to "continuously enhance the pivotal role of nuclear power in all aspects of war deterrence strategy and war execution." It was also reported that "important tasks were presented to further enhance the combat reliability of tactical nuclear weapon systems and continuously expand their operational space in a complex manner" (Reuters 5/8/2025).

Although it remains unclear what the specific details of North Korea's repeatedly emphasized new plan are and how it will be pursued, it is evident that it stems from a clear objective to pursue superiority over South Korea and the United States. While North Korea's policy of advancing its nuclear capabilities is not new, in the context of changes in the international situation surrounding the war in Ukraine and the possibility of U.S.-North Korea dialogue, an examination of North Korea's intentions and objectives, and the direction in which they will proceed, is necessary.

II. Past Precedents of the "New Line"

In North Korean society, only Chairman Kim Jong Un can declare a "new line." To date, Kim Jong Un has, on several occasions, foreshadowed a "new strategic line" for national strategy, and in the context of strengthening nuclear power, he has presented a shift in the nuclear power strengthening line through modifiers such as "new" and "significant."¹The following are representative examples to date, and it can be seen that they are linked to internal and external political events rather than technological advancements in nuclear power.²

1-① In March 2013, North Korea adopted the "Byungjin Line" as a new strategic line (Scott 2013). In the early period of Kim Jong Un's rule, with international sanctions and pressure intensifying, regime stability and economic development were major tasks. In April 2012, the constitution was amended to explicitly state its status as a nuclear-weapon state, and in February 2013, a third nuclear test was conducted. Immediately thereafter, at a plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, it was proposed to "adopt a new strategic line of parallel development of economic construction and nuclear power construction," which was officially adopted.

1-② In April 2018, it also adopted a new strategic line of concentrating all efforts on socialist economic construction. This reflected the external situation at the time, with inter-Korean and U.S.-North Korea dialogues gaining momentum. At the 3rd Plenary Meeting of the 7th Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, it was announced that a "new strategic line of concentrating all efforts on economic construction" would be adopted. This signified a shift from the previous Byungjin Line towards prioritizing economic development (The National Committee on North Korea 2018).

2-① In March 2014, North Korea's Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that it could consider "a new type of nuclear test" in response to the U.S. policy of hostility towards North Korea (Reuters 03/30/2014). At that time, President Park Geun-hye had announced a vision for peace and unification on the Korean Peninsula through the 'Dresden Declaration,' and North Korea likely judged that South Korea's unification vision could pose a threat to its regime. The intention was to escalate military tensions and strengthen internal cohesion through nuclear tests. Although actual nuclear tests did not occur until 2016, it is true that North Korea's nuclear capabilities rapidly advanced.

2-② In January 2020, Chairman Kim Jong Un himself announced the development of "new strategic weapons." At a plenary meeting of the Workers' Party, Kim stated, "The world will soon witness the new strategic weapons that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea will possess." It is analyzed that this announcement was made to respond to the U.S. policy of hostility towards North Korea and to enhance negotiating leverage after the Hanoi summit in February 2019 resulted in a stalemate in denuclearization talks. In October of the same year, North Korea unveiled the new ICBM Hwasong-16 and the new SLBM Pukguksong-4ㅅ, supporting his claims (Arms Control Association 2020).

III. What are North Korea's Intentions and Objectives?

First, it emphasizes the importance of nuclear power for the guarantee of the North Korean regime. North Korea regards its nuclear capabilities as a core guarantee for the Kim Jong Un regime. It has already demonstrated serious concern about the Libyan example, where the regime collapsed after choosing a denuclearization path at the Hanoi summit (Larison 2019), and it has likely learned lessons from the situation where Ukraine failed to deter the war (Sohn 2023). Although the United States is sending mixed messages between "Nuclear Power" and "complete denuclearization of North Korea," for North Korea, nuclear power is a core strategic asset for regime survival.

Second, it presents a strategic line for internal cohesion. To overcome difficulties caused by internal economic hardship and international sanctions and to ensure regime survival, internal cohesion must be further strengthened. Amidst the uncertainty of Trump's second term, the possibility of increased pressure on North Korea is high, making it crucial to strengthen internal cohesion by emphasizing self-reliance and a hardline stance externally. Given that the theoretical development of nuclear ideology has long occupied a central position in the narrative of "Nuclear Power of the East" and "Juche Korea," the new strategic line has a clear objective of internal cohesion (Howell 2020).

Third, it demonstrates a response to the strengthening of ROK-U.S.-Japan security cooperation. Amidst the intensifying strategic competition between the U.S. and China, security cooperation among South Korea, the U.S., and Japan is likely to deepen further even under the Trump administration. Joint military exercises among South Korea, the U.S., Japan, and allied/friendly nations in East Asia are likely to become more tightly coordinated. The North Korean leadership will interpret this as a serious pressure and military threat and will seek to utilize its nuclear capabilities in response.

Fourth, it aims to secure leverage for negotiations with the U.S. Despite its close ties with Russia, North Korea cannot completely shut off the possibility of dialogue with the United States and needs to strengthen its revisionist actions to establish a solid backing for achieving superiority on the Korean Peninsula. In particular, the actions of the U.S. and Russia surrounding the Ukraine peace negotiations are making North Korea anxious (AP News 6/5/2025). Therefore, it can be seen as a strategy to create favorable conditions by adopting a tougher and more offensive stance to maximize negotiating leverage with the U.S.

Through the declaration of a new line, North Korea can achieve several effects simultaneously. First, it signals a change in the direction and priorities of national development, implying a re-prioritization of nuclear warheads, weapon systems/delivery vehicles, and nuclear operational systems. Second, it can convey a strategic message to the international community. Third, it can demonstrate Kim Jong Un's leadership in driving national development as an innovative leader, thereby solidifying the regime's legitimacy and stability. Fourth, it signifies a shift from existing lines, showing that North Korea possesses policy flexibility and can make strategic adjustments as needed.

IV. What Does the Next Step Mean?

1) Evaluation of the "Five-Year Plan"

Since North Korea has not yet presented what the "new" line of strengthening nuclear power entails, it is necessary to first evaluate the "existing" line of strengthening nuclear power. Regarding nuclear capabilities, the "Five Major Tasks for Strategic Weapons" disclosed at the 8th Party Congress's work summary on January 8, 2021, present clear objectives for North Korea's nuclear capabilities, and it can be seen that a significant portion of these objectives has been achieved as of 2025, the target year of the five-year plan.

2) North Korea's Strategic Direction

North Korea has officially recognized its status as a nuclear-weapon state by explicitly stating it in its constitution. While there are safe analyses suggesting it is pursuing a "combination of assured retaliation and asymmetric escalation" using Vipin Narang's framework (Ham Hyung-pil 2021), as nuclear capabilities advance, clear changes in objectives and priorities can be identified. Furthermore, if North Korea's "new nuclear strategic objectives" can be anticipated, then "nuclear power enhancement objectives" can also be derived from them.

Various grounds can be identified that provide clues about the future direction of North Korea's nuclear strategy. These include: △ Kim Jong Un's emphasis on "completing war readiness," △ diversification of nuclear weapon launch platforms and methods, △ unveiling of Hwasan-31 and Haeil-1 and 2, △ simulated comprehensive tactical exercises for nuclear counterattack and simulated aerial explosions, and △ the establishment of a comprehensive nuclear weapon management system (nuclear trigger) (Cho Jang-won 2025). The changes in North Korea's nuclear strategy that can be derived from these are summarized below.

First, the strategic objective is territorial integrity through limited nuclear warfare (Kim Tae-hyun 2024). By keeping open the possibility of using tactical nuclear weapons and threatening nuclear escalation, North Korea's strategic objective is to achieve victory in a war within controllable limits and scope. Despite debates about whether Chairman Kim Jong Un's declaration of a "two hostile states" theory at the end of 2023 signaled a shift towards maintaining the status quo (Kwon Suk-do 2024; Jeong Dae-jin 2024; Lee Jung-gu 2024; Kang Hye-seok 2024), North Korea has declared through the 9th Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee in 2023 and its policy address in 2024 that "if the domestic and international environment permits, it will pursue the goal of territorial integrity on the Korean Peninsula." This ultimately means that North Korea has not abandoned its offensive objectives.

—Against the U.S.: Deter, prevent, delay, and obstruct U.S. military intervention and reinforcement during wartime by threatening escalation to full-scale nuclear war.

—Against South Korea: Achieve initiative and victory by conducting effective strike operations combining nuclear and conventional forces against key targets.

Second, it is pursuing "nuclear-combined warfare" as a strategic concept (Kim Tae-hyun 2025). To overcome the inferiority in conventional forces and war sustainability and to exploit the vulnerabilities of the ROK-U.S. alliance, it seeks to combine conventional and nuclear weapons through "integrated nuclear-conventional attacks." While the 2013 law on the status of self-defensive nuclear power assigned roles of deterrence, retaliation, and repulsion to nuclear weapons, the 2022 decree on nuclear force policy shifted to an offensive nuclear doctrine that presupposes the active involvement of nuclear weapons in conflict, such as pre-emptive nuclear strikes and pre-emptive nuclear use.

Nuclear-combined warfare includes military concepts such as △ simultaneous firing of nuclear and conventional missiles, △ simultaneous use of nuclear weapons and long-range artillery, and △ combination of nuclear attacks with cyber and electronic warfare. This is expected to yield sufficient effects for North Korea's intentions at all stages, including the initial phase of war, reinforcement of U.S. forces, reversal of the war situation, advance into North Korean territory, and pressure on the regime, and will be utilized more actively.

Third, the goal of enhancing North Korea's nuclear capabilities will be to possess over 300 nuclear warheads. If North Korea expands the role of nuclear weapons beyond deterrence and retaliation to pre-emptive use, △ optimizing the ratio of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, and △ acquiring operational capabilities to achieve objectives will be the future enhancement goals.

First, to deter U.S. military intervention and wartime reinforcement, it aims to possess a "Nuclear Dyad" of ICBMs and strategic submarines capable of striking U.S. mainland and strategic centers in the region, numbering over 100 units. Although the reliability of strategic nuclear weapons is still uncertain, the "Five Major Tasks for Strategic Weapons" presented in the five-year plan are all aimed at ensuring the reliability of strategic nuclear weapons, so it is expected that they will achieve a considerable level of reliability by the end of 2025.

Next, to gain military initiative over South Korea, it will aim to secure over 200 tactical nuclear weapons for striking key military targets. These include command facilities, air bases, ports, and other targets for strike/reserve purposes. Tactical nuclear weapons of the Scud series and KN-23 (Iskander) series are already operationally capable, and Pukguksong-1 and 2, small tactical SLBMs, Haeil-1 and 2, and Hwasal-1 and 2 are also expected to enter full-scale production.Iskander

3) New Line: Three Strategic Options

North Korea's "new line of strengthening nuclear power" is also expected to proceed in a direction that contributes to limited nuclear warfare and nuclear-combined warfare, representing a transition to the next stage from the existing five-year plan. Presenting three strategic options that North Korea can choose for strengthening its nuclear capabilities, each option has clear advantages and disadvantages considering North Korea's current situation, necessitating careful analysis.

1. Further Augmentation of Strike Systems

This refers to pursuing quantitative and qualitative enhancement of nuclear weapons by expanding the achievements of the existing five-year plan and compensating for technological deficiencies. Key tasks will include the development and mass production of new (solid-fuel) ICBMs, mass production of tactical nuclear weapons, and an increase in the number of nuclear warheads (Radio Free Asia May/14/2025). Despite North Korea's deficiencies in basic military capabilities, it has the advantage of maximizing asymmetry in military power through the augmentation of strike systems, but it still faces the weakness of difficulty in ensuring the credibility of threats to South Korea and the U.S.

2. Enhancing the Completeness of Operations for Nuclear Strikes

Assuming that the existential deterrence of strategic nuclear weapons has been secured through the five-year plan, the next step is to pursue operational completeness for conducting limited nuclear warfare on the Korean Peninsula. This requires mass production of the already miniaturized and standardized Hwasan-31, along with the development of complete operational plans for the use of tactical nuclear weapons (Tertrais 2021). This includes △ targeting, which encompasses detection, identification, decision, and strike of targets; △ force planning, which aligns targets, weapon systems, delivery vehicles, and timelines; △ weapon systems, such as reconnaissance and surveillance, nuclear warheads, delivery vehicles, and command, control, and communications (NC3), which are operationalized as a result of force planning; and △ force posture, which refers to the deployment and readiness level of forces. These must be appropriately configured.

3. Augmenting Strategic Nuclear Weapons as a Means of Pressuring the U.S.

From the perspective of negotiation strategy with the U.S., North Korea may prioritize augmenting its strategic nuclear arsenal. Assuming it has already achieved nuclear superiority on the Korean Peninsula, the objective is to secure the reliability of ICBMs and SLBMs capable of striking the U.S. mainland as a means of pressure for negotiations with the U.S. or for securing deterrence against the U.S. While the cost-benefit ratio is not high and existential deterrence is already considered secured, it can pursue leapfrog technological advancements by actively leveraging its close relationship with Russia. Re-entry technology for strategic submarines, SLBMs, and ICBMs could be the next targets.

Considering North Korea's current situation, pursuing "completeness of nuclear operations" among the three options above is expected to be the optimal approach. First, augmenting strike systems lacks differentiation from the five-year plan and existing systems, thus having limited effect for internal cohesion or external strategic messaging. Second, focusing on strategic nuclear weapons raises questions about feasibility due to dependence on Russian technology. From South Korea's perspective, if North Korea achieves completeness in tactical nuclear operations, a serious strategic imbalance on the Korean Peninsula is anticipated, warranting grave concern.

V. Realizing Nuclear-Combined Warfare through the Completion of a "Reconnaissance-Strike Complex"

If North Korea pursues "completeness of nuclear operations," it can be expected to maximize its interests. This is important not only from a strategic perspective, suggesting the possibility of pre-emptive nuclear strikes or pursuing complex deterrence effects, but also from an operational perspective, allowing for various combinations of nuclear-conventional integration (CNI). For example, it could involve conventional forces' offensive operations after a pre-emptive nuclear strike, combination with asymmetric capabilities such as cyber and special forces, or parallel negotiation warfare utilizing nuclear threats.

If North Korea pursues "completeness of nuclear operations" for conducting nuclear-combined warfare, what specific capabilities will it seek to acquire? From North Korea's perspective, since it cannot pursue completeness and superiority in all operations, it will focus on meticulously calculated strikes. Ultimately, if the focus is on the completeness of nuclear strikes, the origin can be found in the Russian military concept of a "reconnaissance-strike complex" (разведывательно-ударный комплекс, RUK) (Lester and Bartles 2018).

While the Russian reconnaissance-strike complex is a concept used for real-time strategic strikes against high-value targets, for North Korea, which has an absolute disadvantage in information and conventional capabilities, it can be considered an operational system applicable throughout warfare by linking real-time target information with strike systems. It is a system that strikes enemy targets by linking intelligence data, accurate strike systems, fire command centers, and tactical missiles, and can be combined with precision-guided munitions (such as missiles and smart weapons carried by aircraft) capable of long-range strikes.

As North Korea pursues nuclear-combined warfare, it will strive more actively to complete its "reconnaissance-strike complex." Although it may not be immediately supported by advanced weapon systems like Russia's, it can establish a direction to compensate for deficiencies through technological cooperation with Russia and enhance the interoperability between functions. This can be seen as an attempt to maximize asymmetry through nuclear capabilities and an offensive nuclear strategy, thereby maintaining relative superiority and minimizing vulnerabilities such as strategic intelligence or war sustainability.

Drawing from the Russian example, the capabilities necessary for North Korea to implement a reconnaissance-strike complex can be simplified into five categories: △ surveillance and reconnaissance, △ information processing/analysis, △ strike assets, △ logistical support, and △ command, control, and communications. As shown in the figure below, North Korea has so far focused on augmenting strike assets, centered on nuclear warheads, and possesses sufficient regional nuclear strike capabilities, excluding high-level technologies such as the ability to strike the U.S. mainland.

However, as Kim Jong Un has declared, to operate nuclear power as part of limited nuclear warfare capability, it must possess not only destructive power but also accuracy and flexibility. This means that, from North Korea's perspective, △ surveillance and reconnaissance and information processing/analysis for targeting, △ reliable command, control, and communications, and △ resilient logistical support must be guaranteed. Therefore, it can be inferred that North Korea will seek to achieve balanced capabilities (right) by prioritizing the補完 of weak areas in the current state (left).

Accordingly, the capabilities and weapon systems that North Korea will pursue in the next stage for the completeness of the reconnaissance-strike complex can be broadly outlined as follows. First, in terms of surveillance and reconnaissance, these include UAVs, reconnaissance satellites, ground surveillance radars, and electronic intelligence equipment. Second, for information processing/analysis, these include data analysis systems and automated battlefield target analysis systems. Third, in terms of strike assets, where it possesses relatively advanced capabilities, the next stage includes MIRVs, re-entry technology, precision guidance, and hypersonic missiles. Fourth, in terms of logistics, this includes mobile ammunition/fuel supply vehicles and an increase in the number of TELs. Finally, in terms of command, control, and communications, these include mobile command and control centers, high-frequency/satellite communication systems, and cyber warfare capabilities (Smith and Bernstein 2022).

VI. South Korea's Strategic Imperatives

North Korea's "new line of strengthening nuclear forces" in 2025 may not materialize immediately. Facing North Korea's nuclear threat, South Korea needs to closely examine changes in North Korea's objectives and priorities. The direction of North Korea's changes is particularly important for assessing the strategic balance and deterrence posture with South Korea. This is because if North Korea moves away from focusing on enhancing its strike capabilities and instead begins to address vulnerabilities for actual operational use, it would indicate a departure from a path of positive nuclear learning and a renewed pursuit of offensive objectives (Son Han-byeol 2023). Therefore, South Korea must consider the following to address its strategic vulnerabilities and achieve superiority in competitive spaces.

First, South Korea must secure strategic flexibility that transcends the notion of nuclear armament. While some advocate for South Korea's own nuclear armament, this approach entails significant costs in terms of effectiveness and moral legitimacy. South Korea should strategically leverage its advanced conventional capabilities and alliance-based collective deterrence system, demonstrating normative leadership as a nation that deters nuclear threats without possessing nuclear weapons. This is a strategic choice that pursues both practical security and international legitimacy, and it will form the foundation for ensuring the sustainability of South Korea's security strategy in the medium to long term.

Second, proactive military buildup considering technological advancements is crucial. As North Korea reorganizes its military with the goal of achieving 'completeness in nuclear operations,' encompassing preemptive strikes, retaliation, command and control, and logistical support, South Korea urgently needs to establish an integrated force system that goes beyond augmenting single platforms. This requires not only linking reconnaissance assets such as UAVs, satellites, and electronic warfare capabilities with long-range precision strike assets but also integrating command and control systems (C4ISR). This signifies not merely a 'preemptive strike capability' but a comprehensive, real-time response system.

Third, the ROK-US combined nuclear planning and operational system must be strengthened. In response to North Korea's operationalization of tactical nuclear weapons, institutionalizing the ROK-US Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG) is necessary to advance a 'combined planning and operational system.' This implies moving beyond mere 'information sharing' to realizing a three-stage structure of 'combined planning–combined decision-making–combined execution,' which can be institutionalized through revisions to combined operational plans and the evolution of the 'ROK-US Tailored Deterrence Strategy.' Specifically, under the concept of 'Conventional-Nuclear Integration' (CNI), a restructuring of the combined command system linked to South Korea's 'three-axis system' must be pursued concurrently (Son Han-byeol 2025).

Fourth, an integrated operational strategy encompassing diplomacy, military affairs, and unification is required. As North Korea leverages its nuclear capabilities not only as military deterrence but also as a diplomatic bargaining chip, South Korea is compelled to formulate a comprehensive strategic system that extends beyond fragmented military responses. The sustainability and political effectiveness of sanctions against North Korea, as well as the utility of strategic leverage, are all intertwined with military deterrence. It is necessary to simultaneously operate 'complex deterrence options' that include intelligence, cyber, diplomatic, and economic pressure. This represents an expanded version of the 'integrated deterrence' strategy, signifying the need to structure the complementarity and cyclicality of all national power instruments.

Fifth, the multilateral security cooperation framework must be reorganized. The reconfiguration of Russia-North Korea-China cooperation is forming a new alliance structure in the Northeast Asian order. In response, while strengthening the existing ROK-US-Japan trilateral security cooperation, South Korea must pursue a multilateral deterrence network by expanding strategic partnerships with NATO, Australia, the Philippines, and other middle powers. This will serve as a foundation for promoting the linkage of various means, not just military ones, and is particularly crucial for realizing the concept of a 'networked extended deterrence' strategy. By playing the role of a planner in the formation of multilateral alliances, South Korea can simultaneously enhance its voice on the global strategic stage and its deterrence credibility. ■

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■ Son Han-byul, Professor, National Defense University

■ Responsibility and Editing:Kim Chae-rin, EAI Research Assistant; Sung Ye-na, Intern Scholar

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