[Special Report on the New Administration's Foreign Policy Recommendations] ④ Composite North Korea Strategy and the Reconstruction of Inter-Korean Relations

I. North Korea's Foreign Strategy and Inter-Korean Relations

1. North Korea's Foreign Strategy

North Korea pursues a new Cold War world order. Since Kim Jong Un, General Secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea, first mentioned the new Cold War at the Supreme People's Assembly in 2021, he stated at the 8th Central Committee's 11th Plenary Meeting on December 2024 that 'the growth and leap forward of the forces for self-reliance are becoming prominent, while the position of the hegemonic forces is rapidly weakening and declining.' This worldview posits a clash between the 'hegemonic forces' centered around the United States and the 'forces for self-reliance' rallying anti-US forces.

North Korea desires to build blocs similar to the Cold War era. It seeks to expand cooperation with Russia and ultimately solidify a bloc including China to find its survival and development within it. If successful, sanctions against North Korea would become meaningless, economic development could be pursued within the bloc, and nuclear possession could eventually be de facto tolerated.

The declaration of inter-Korean relations as those between two hostile states is an extension of this strategy. It is an attempt to clearly define the axes of a new Cold War between the US-Japan-ROK and China-Russia-DPRK by designating the Republic of Korea not as a people of the same ethnicity and a subject of unification, but as an adversary expressing hostile ideologies.

Therefore, future approaches to US-DPRK relations and denuclearization negotiations are expected to be based on a new Cold War framework, different from the past. Instead of slogans like improving US-DPRK relations and establishing a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula, as included in the US-DPRK Singapore agreement announced in June 2018, North Korea may solidify the US's position as an adversary and pursue 'nuclear disarmament' in a manner similar to that between the US and the Soviet Union. This would be akin to negotiations during the Cold War to prevent accidental conflicts and nuclear escalation in a structured state of military confrontation between the US and the USSR. North Korea may pursue a 'negotiation framework that solidifies the new Cold War structure' rather than negotiations seeking normalization of US-DPRK relations and peace on the Korean Peninsula by eliminating military confrontation.

The improvement of relations with Russia is also interpreted as a concrete attempt to build a new Cold War system. The 'Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership' signed between Russia and North Korea in June 2024 is considered to be the de facto restoration of the 'Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance' signed during the Soviet era in 1961. Along with the 'Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance' signed with China in 1961, which remains in effect, North Korea appears to be binding China and Russia.

Although recent inconveniences in North Korea-China relations have been expressed, the fundamental dynamics of the bilateral relationship will not disappear. China must consider North Korea an asset to counter strategic competition with the US and the ROK-US alliance, and North Korea cannot escape its dependence on China in both economic and security aspects. As strategic competition between the US and China intensifies, and if the Trump administration attempts substantial engagement with North Korea, rapid improvements in relations, including summit meetings between North Korea and China, could occur, as evidenced by the dynamics of 2017-18.

2. Inter-Korean Relations

The theory of two hostile states, proclaimed by Kim Jong Un in late 2023 and early 2024, stating that 'North-South relations are no longer relations between同族 (compatriots) or同質 (of the same kind), but relations between two hostile states, two belligerent states in a state of war,' remains valid. The ROK has been confirmed as a target for 'conquest' to 'complete the conquest of the entire territory of South Korea,' rather than a people to be unified. This is judged to be a choice for high-intensity internal cohesion to block the spread of South Korean culture within North Korea and prevent ideological erosion. Furthermore, the reality that the discourse of 'Our Nation Together' (우리민족끼리), attempted under the guise of peaceful unification, can no longer gain consensus in South Korean society likely influenced this decision. Kim Jong Un's statement, 'The heinous ambition of the puppets to collapse our system and regime is no different, whether they claim to be 'democratic' or wear the mask of 'conservative',' is a declaration that North Korea will not engage regardless of the nature of the South Korean government. Subsequently, North Korea's severance of ties with South Korea through the demolition of the Donghae and Gyeongui lines and its refusal to communicate regarding the return of North Korean residents who drifted to South Korea, underscore that complete severance with South Korea is not a short-term choice.

South Korea's perception of North Korea is also far from favorable regarding this shift in North Korea's policy. In surveys of favorability towards neighboring countries, North Korea, along with China, is perceived as the least favorable. Reflecting this, domestic preference for unification continues to decline: among those in their 20s, the response rate for 'unification is very necessary' or 'unification is somewhat necessary' has shown a continuous downward trend from 48% in 2018, 41.7% in 2019, 35.3% in 2020, 27.8% in 2021, 27.4% in 2022, 28.2% in 2023, to 22.4% in 2024 (Survey on Unification Consciousness by the Institute for Peace and Unification Studies, Seoul National University).

Within South Korea, a 'two-state theory' for North and South Korea, which could align with North Korea's proclaimed theory of two hostile states, has also been proposed. Although criticized by the mainstream political circles of both ruling and opposition parties, the argument that 'North and South Korea should pursue peaceful coexistence based on a two-state theory that mutually recognizes each other's existence' has been raised before. This confirms the need for a re-examination of South Korea's North Korea and unification policies and the securing of domestic consensus.

II. Composite North Korea Strategy

The aforementioned foreign strategy and inter-Korean relations of North Korea still borrow from the 'Line of Strengthening the Three Revolutionary Capabilities' proposed by Kim Il Sung at the 8th Plenary Meeting of the 4th Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea on February 27, 1964. To strengthen revolutionary capabilities within North Korea (northern half), it seeks to fundamentally block South Korean influence by proclaiming the theory of two hostile states, while simultaneously consolidating military superiority by enhancing nuclear and conventional capabilities. Strengthening revolutionary capabilities within South Korea (southern half) aims to create internal conflict within South Korea regarding North Korea policy, thereby deriving policy directions favorable to North Korea. Strengthening international revolutionary capabilities aims to build a new Cold War bloc while simultaneously undermining the ROK-US alliance. Therefore, the response of the new South Korean administration must be based on a thorough understanding of North Korea's strategy and intentions.

The policy objective is to support the current Kim Jong Un regime's transition from prioritizing nuclear weapons (선핵, seonhaek) to prioritizing economic security and then denuclearization (비핵안보·선경, bihaek-anbo, seongyeong). In the diagram above, this is represented as guiding the transition from the 'deterrence phase' (quadrant 2) to the 'trust phase' (quadrant 1).

Currently, North Korea is developing both high-yield strategic nuclear weapons and low-yield tactical nuclear weapons, cultivating the capability to strike the US mainland, South Korea, Japan, and Guam. In particular, North Korea is demonstrating its willingness and capability to escalate conflicts using nuclear weapons even in conventional warfare situations and to conduct preemptive strikes. Kim Yo Jong's remarks in April 2022, as reported by KCNA on April 5, 2022, stating that 'nuclear combat power will be mobilized to seize the initiative in the early stages of war, burn out the enemy's will to fight, prevent a protracted war, and preserve its own military strength,' and Kim Jong Un's 'Second Mission of Nuclear Weapons' remarks on April 25 of the same month, exemplify this. The public announcements of the 'State's Maximum Nuclear Crisis Situation Alert, 'Hwasan Alert'' in April and May 2024, and the 'State Nuclear Weapons Comprehensive Management System, 'Nuclear Trigger'' in May 2025, indicate the ongoing process of completing its nuclear posture.

Therefore, a composite North Korea strategy requires active deterrence against North Korean nuclear weapons as a priority. Even for a transition to phase 2, deterrence against North Korean nuclear weapons must be strengthened to reduce their military and political utility. The most realistic approach in the current situation is to further institutionalize the tailored extended deterrence developed by South Korea and the United States. The ROK and the US must maintain the highest level of cooperation as an alliance to develop extended deterrence.

The 'Joint Guidance' endorsed by the ROK-US Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG) last year and ratified by the leaders of both countries must be continuously implemented. This guidance includes not only deterring North Korean nuclear weapons but also responding to them, integrating the nuclear and conventional response capabilities of South Korea and the United States ('Conventional & Nuclear Integration: CNI'), and maintaining the highest level of combined readiness for responding to North Korean nuclear weapons during peacetime. Furthermore, the ROK and the US must evolve their operational plans, which have been limited to conventional provocations by North Korea, to include responses to North Korean nuclear weapons. Only when this institutionalization of extended deterrence is completed can arguments for independent nuclear armament within South Korea and the redeployment of US tactical nuclear weapons to the Korean Peninsula be countered. Independent nuclear armament is impossible without the consent of the United States and, from the perspective of ultimately choosing military means over diplomatic solutions for North Korean denuclearization, it makes the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula a distant prospect. The redeployment of tactical nuclear weapons also faces strong opposition from residents in the deployment areas if placed in South Korea, has limited military utility, and is likely to face strong opposition from China.

Second, South Korea must support North Korea in abandoning its 'nuclear-first' policy and choosing economic security and denuclearization (비핵안보·선경). To this end, US-DPRK denuclearization negotiations must first yield results. North Korea's pursuit of an alternative economic model while envisioning a new Cold War system has limited realism. Unlike during the US-Soviet Cold War, decoupling between the US and China into separate blocs is impossible. Furthermore, there is an absence of ideological homogeneity, including the final stage of human development, as seen during the US-Soviet Cold War. The Trump administration pursues 'America First,' while China, Russia, and North Korea share only authoritarian characteristics under the banner of anti-US sentiment and political systems. Considering that even during the era of communist ideology, relations between the Soviet Union, China, and North Korea were marked by repeated conflicts and cooperation without mutual trust, building a solid bloc as North Korea desires is difficult. South Korea must cooperate with the United States, Japan, and the international community to ensure North Korea fully recognizes these limitations. In particular, cooperation with China and Russia should be sought to induce North Korea's policy shift. North Korea's nuclear weapons create tension in the Indo-Pacific region, necessitating strengthened military responses, which is not beneficial for China and Russia; they must be persuaded of this.

Furthermore, US-DPRK negotiations must produce substantive results, not just symbolic gestures. The most important principle is to maintain the goal of complete denuclearization of North Korea. If this goal is lost, North Korea will de facto become a nuclear-weapon state, and the political and diplomatic means for North Korean denuclearization will disappear, likely leaving only military confrontation. Therefore, a roadmap must be established that includes phased denuclearization measures and corresponding measures, encompassing the goal of North Korean denuclearization. However, it must be remembered that the complete denuclearization of North Korea and the corresponding complete lifting of sanctions will be an arduous process. The overly optimistic denuclearization discourse that emerged during the so-called Korean Peninsula Peace Process of 2018-19 should be avoided. Based on accurate information, South Korea must carefully assess possibilities and limitations and develop a joint plan for North Korean denuclearization with the United States.

South Korea must also show proactivity in dialogue with North Korea. Even while maintaining deterrence against North Korea, efforts for engagement must be made simultaneously. Breaking free from the pattern where past South Korean governments, progressive ones opting for engagement and conservative ones for deterrence alone, must ensure that both deterrence and engagement operate concurrently within the same phase. To this end, humanitarian aid to North Korea should continue, separate from political and military situations, and indirect support through international organizations should be activated. Since the possibility of North Korea accepting dialogue with South Korea is very low, unilateral offers of dialogue may provoke backlash. Therefore, efforts should begin in areas where both North and South Korea can find common ground. The temporary suspension of loudspeaker broadcasts could lead to a cessation of North Korea's balloon launches and noise broadcasts in frontline areas, and a proposal for mutual restraint regarding unmanned aerial vehicles, in respect of the Armistice Agreement, is necessary.

However, given North Korea's declaration of the theory of two hostile states, the possibility of it responding to dialogue, regardless of the nature of the new South Korean administration, is very low. In such a situation, efforts solely for the improvement of inter-Korean relations may provoke North Korea's antipathy and create cracks in cooperation with the US, Japan, and other countries, thus requiring a cautious approach.

Third, international cooperation is needed to guide North Korea towards a phase of trust. Particularly, as the global order undergoes visible changes, the North Korean issue is becoming linked with major global agendas. North Korea's participation in the Russia-Ukraine war has connected Europe and the Korean Peninsula. The Russia-Ukraine war is no longer a distant conflict but has become South Korea's problem. Trump's America also faces a situation where the North Korean issue must be resolved alongside the process of ending the Russia-Ukraine war and establishing the post-war order. As US-China conflict intensifies, and particularly as military competition, including nuclear weapons, escalates, the US will increasingly perceive the North Korean issue in relation to China. For instance, the modernization of nuclear weapons, which the Trump administration is strengthening in its second term as it did in its first, is a response to China's nuclear capability enhancement, but it also affects deterrence and readiness against North Korea. However, excessive expectations of China are unwarranted. Given that China has made no mention of North Korean denuclearization in recent years, it must be recognized that there are limitations to relying on China for denuclearization.

The changes to the international order brought about by generative AI and the emergence of new geopolitics are highly likely to lead to a transformation of existing military and diplomatic strategy paradigms. In particular, as surveillance, reconnaissance, and strike capabilities related to nuclear weapons are rapidly advancing with the utilization of generative AI, North Korea's nuclear weapons may lose their utility. Considering these aspects comprehensively, there is a need to change the international response to the North Korean issue. For instance, in line with the new geopolitics brought about by technological change, we need to consider measures such as adapting the framework of dialogue and North Korea policy, which have been confined to inter-Korean relations, to various combinations like South Korea-Russia, South Korea-US-Russia, or South Korea-Japan-China, or addressing issues by differentiating them by agenda. Through this, if North Korea is made to recognize that its possession of nuclear weapons and the strategic value thereof can never be sustained, it could provide an incentive for North Korea to enter a phase of engagement and trust. Ultimately, South Korea must resolve the North Korean issue by architecting a new order on the Korean Peninsula and in the Indo-Pacific region.

Finally, we must pursue unification, the ultimate goal, through trust. Since North Korea has declared 'the abandonment of unification' and proclaimed itself as two hostile states, creating an environment for unification has become more difficult than before. However, South Korea must pursue Article 4 of its Constitution, which states, 'The Republic of Korea shall pursue unification and shall formulate and implement a policy for peaceful unification based on the basic principles of the liberal democratic order.' It cannot be denied that unification is the ultimate solution to the North Korean issue. However, unification should be pursued not through unilateral methods such as artificial regime change in North Korea, but as a natural outcome achievable through long-term mutual trust-building. In the same vein, we must also avoid the perception that coexistence, exchange, and eventual unification between South and North Korea will be possible through North Korea policies that maximally accommodate North Korea's demands. Kim Jong-un's hostile two-state theory aims for a complete severance of relations with South Korea, and thus, South Korea's unilateral engagement and demands for dialogue can be considered an act that undermines North Korea's policy. Furthermore, we must respond to the declining public opinion in South Korea regarding unification over time. We need to seek ways to restore support for unification, which is being negated from both the perspective of legitimacy and feasibility. Primarily, the unification ecosystem needs to be revitalized. The human and institutional aspects have weakened due to the prolonged period of strained inter-Korean relations. Manpower training programs have been suspended, and related fields are being closed down, leading to a general limitation of unification capabilities. Efforts are required to revitalize these aspects.

It is necessary to develop a complex unification vision that goes beyond the existing linear unification theory. We must present a vision for the unification of the Korean Peninsula towards the future, tentatively titled the 'Korean Peninsula Unification 2050 Vision.' This vision should encompass unification concepts for the 21st century, moving beyond the discussions of division and unification from the 19th and 20th centuries. Beyond the existing discourse of security and prosperity in unification, we must depict the future of Korean Peninsula unification, including governance, based on diverse domains such as the environment, culture, and information and knowledge. In particular, a unification vision that incorporates the paradigm shift brought about by generative AI, as discussed earlier, is needed. For example, we can ask the question of what North Korea's economic order will be like in 2050. It is highly likely that a situation will arise where the economy cannot be developed in parallel with the nuclear-first policy as it is now, so we should envision an economic model that transcends this. As unification theory has been confined to existing frameworks and has not progressed, we must envision unification through co-prosperity, where the South and North avoid mutual destruction and move beyond coexistence to develop together, through a long-term unification vision. ■

■ Park Won-gon_Director of the EAI Center for North Korean Studies. Professor of Political Science and International Relations at Ewha Womans University.

■ Managed and Edited by:Song Chae-rin, EAI Researcher

    Inquiries and Editing: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 211) | crsong@eai.or.kr