[US-China Nuclear Rapprochement Special Report] ⑤ Nuclear Security Initiative for Preventing Nuclear Terrorism: US-China Nuclear Security and Safety Cooperation Strategy

I. Analysis of the Current Status of Nuclear Terrorism

(1) Background of Weakened International Cooperation in Nuclear Terrorism

The Al Qaeda terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, shattered the international community's optimism about global peace and prosperity following the deepening of globalization and the spread of democracy after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Subsequently, various international cooperation efforts were undertaken in the name of 'nuclear security' to prevent weapons of mass destruction (WMD) such as nuclear weapons from falling into the hands of terrorists, starting with the "Global War on Terrorism" initiated by the Bush administration and continuing through initiatives like the 'Nuclear Security Summit' during the Obama administration.

However, with the conclusion of the last Nuclear Security Summit in 2016, interest in international cooperation measures for preventing nuclear terrorism gradually waned. The Trump administration's strengthening of "America First" policies and containment strategies against China significantly reduced discussions on multilateral or bilateral cooperation for resolving common global issues. In particular, following the Russia-Ukraine war in 2022, as the confrontation between nations has come to be perceived as a conflict between authoritarian governments and democratic camps, international cooperation and solidarity for preventing nuclear terrorism and proliferation have been greatly weakened. Additional sanctions against North Korea for its missile test launches were not passed in the UN Security Council in May 2022 due to the opposition of Russia and China, and a presidential statement on North Korea also failed to be adopted in February 2023. The 10th Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), held in August 2022, also failed to adopt a final declaration due to Russia's objection to mentioning the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant.

While it is clear that the Trump administration and the Ukraine war have been major factors in the weakening of international cooperation on nuclear issues, the success of the US counter-terrorism efforts over the past two decades cannot be ignored as a factor in the loss of motivation for international cooperation in nuclear terrorism. Of course, IS (Islamic State) and Al Qaeda still exist, and their will to carry out mass-casualty terrorist attacks against the United States has not weakened at all. Moreover, it is true that the US counter-terrorism war has not been a great success in terms of ideology, allowing terrorist groups to successfully conduct psychological warfare and continuously recruit new members. As a result, a war of attrition continues in the Middle East, North Africa, and West Asia.

However, the US counter-terrorism war, which aimed to eliminate terrorist leaders and weaken the capabilities of terrorist organizations that could threaten the safety of American citizens, has achieved considerable physical success. The US has killed the first and second leaders of Al Qaeda, preventing terrorist organizations from having the capacity to carry out large-scale operations. Although terrorist groups are now horizontally dispersed and operate through social media, their activities have been extremely curtailed due to active US government efforts. While drone strikes have been criticized as "whack-a-mole," they can be considered successful in that they forced experienced terrorists to focus on their own survival rather than attempting terrorism (House Hearing 2017).

Nuclear terrorism, the most horrific scenario among conceivable terrorist threats, is an attack designed to inflict maximum casualties on a target country through a nuclear explosion, while simultaneously exerting immense psychological and political pressure. A study published in 2009 argued that terrorist groups could acquire the necessary equipment, personnel, and materials for a rudimentary nuclear device for $20 million, and an additional $80 million for weapons-grade nuclear material such as highly enriched uranium or plutonium (Finlay and Tamsett 2009). Known cases include attempts by the Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo in the 1990s and Al Qaeda in the 2000s to acquire nuclear weapons, and IS is known to have attempted nuclear weapons development in the 2010s.

However, the history of nuclear terrorism can be summarized very simply: "It has never happened" (Jenkins 2008). Due to strong international and national surveillance and control over nuclear materials, technology, equipment, and weapons related to nuclear weapons, the success rate of nuclear weapon terrorism is extremely low. In the current situation, where US counter-terrorism efforts have made terrorist attempts more difficult, acquiring nuclear materials to carry out terrorism has become even more challenging.

Currently, terrorist groups face difficulties in securing any of the necessary conditions for nuclear weapon development, including knowledge, nuclear materials, facilities, and funding. Acquiring technology and personnel for the acquisition and transport of nuclear materials; ensuring the safe storage and reprocessing/processing of nuclear materials; designing and developing detonation devices; and maintaining strict security throughout the entire process of concealment and transport after weaponization are all required for successful nuclear weapon terrorism. At least 20 stages of tasks are required, but it is nearly impossible for terrorist groups to secretly succeed in all of them (Mueller 2012). The most plausible scenario is receiving support for nuclear development from a nuclear-armed state or directly acquiring nuclear weapons, but even rogue states have no incentive to provide nuclear weapons or technology to terrorist groups that they cannot directly control (Mueller 2009). Concerns about the theft of so-called 'loose nukes' that are not properly secured or their acquisition from the black market are also overestimated; it should be remembered that even during the chaotic period immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union, nuclear weapons were strictly controlled and secured (Mueller 2012).

For instance, the Aum Shinrikyo cult, which, while not a nuclear power, carried out terrorist attacks using biochemical weapons, managed to secure scientists, research facilities, and nearly unlimited research funds, yet only caused seven fatalities in the Tokyo subway. Arson or firearms-based terrorism would likely have been more effective. It must also be considered that even if they succeeded in acquiring nuclear weapons, the likelihood of attempting a nuclear attack is significantly low. Nuclear weapons at a level developable by terrorist groups would struggle to inflict casualties beyond conventional weapons, and in the event of a nuclear attack, the victim nation and the international community would retaliate with such thoroughness as to obliterate the terrorist group. Therefore, nuclear weapons are by no means an attractive option compared to other terrorist methods (McIntosh and Storey 2018). Consequently, the acquisition of nuclear weapons by terrorist organizations for terrorist acts has become a reality with very low feasibility, and thus, the fear of nuclear terrorism is viewed by mainstream scholars as akin to a 'mythical monster' (Jenkins 2008).

The POICN (Profiles of Incidents Involving CBRN and Non-state Actors) database, jointly established by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and the University of Maryland (Binder and Ackerman 2021), presents specific figures supporting this assertion. Between 1990 and 2017, out of a total of 517 incidents of terrorism or related crimes (theft of hazardous materials, smuggling, etc.) involving weapons of mass destruction (biological, chemical, radiological, and nuclear weapons) by non-state criminal and terrorist groups worldwide, or attempts thereof, 55 incidents (10.64%) were related to radiological materials and 16 incidents (3.09%) to nuclear weapons, all of which were either unsuccessful attempts or were detected and thwarted. A total of 94 incidents (18.18%) resulted in one or more casualties; 75.86% of the total number of injuries (5,662) during the investigation period were caused by just 11 terrorist attacks, all of which involved the use of poisons or chemical substances. The most significant damage was caused by an IS chemical weapons attack on the small Iraqi city of Taza in 2016, resulting in a total of 1,308 casualties.8 victims. victims. The data above clearly demonstrates that terrorist groups, facing significant constraints in manpower, cost, and resources compared to state actors, strongly prefer biochemical terrorism over nuclear terrorism, and that such methods of terrorism have a higher probability of actual success than nuclear terrorism.

(2) Current Assessment of Nuclear Terrorism Threats

So, is nuclear terrorism no longer a concern? As long as the US government maintains its current level of pressure on terrorist groups and international cooperation on the protection of nuclear materials continues, the threat of nuclear terrorism does not appear to be significant.

However, as pointed out by various studies, including those by Graham Allison, the possibility of nuclear terrorism due to the proliferation and transfer of nuclear materials and nuclear weapons cannot be dismissed (Allison 2018; Dalton 2021). The reason why nuclear weapon terrorism has not occurred so far is not because the possibility of nuclear weapon terrorism itself is low, but rather because of the effectiveness of various measures introduced by the international community and individual countries, who have taken the threat of nuclear weapon terrorism seriously and implemented them to prevent it. In particular, US-Russia cooperation for the security of Russian nuclear weapons and the strengthening of the global nuclear security regime during the Obama administration have yielded significant results (Allison 2018). Furthermore, as demonstrated by the 9/11 attacks and numerous suicide bombings, it must be considered that terrorist groups may carry out nuclear attacks even if they anticipate damage to their own organizations in order to achieve maximum political effect (Bell 2019). It is also true that the miniaturization of nuclear warheads and the digitalization of nuclear delivery systems have increased the underlying technologies that can be easily used for nuclear terrorism.

Furthermore, nuclear terrorism does not solely refer to terrorism using nuclear weapons. Major scholars and experts (Galatas 2020; Gale and Armitage 2018) consider the risk of radiological terrorism to be more serious than nuclear weapon terrorism. First, radiological terrorism causes actual damage and economic/social disruption through radioactive contamination rather than nuclear explosions, and can be broadly categorized into four types. The first is the use of a "dirty bomb," which disperses radioactive material using conventional explosive devices. The second is the covert direct dispersal of radioactive materials into air, water, or soil, causing contamination. The third type involves covertly installing Radiological Emission Devices (REDs) in public facilities to induce radioactive contamination. The fourth type involves attacking facilities that handle or store radioactive materials, such as nuclear power plants (hereinafter referred to as NPPs), nuclear waste storage sites, and hospital radiation facilities, to cause radioactive contamination. Radiological terrorism can be an attractive means for terrorist groups because it does not require the complex technology for nuclear weapon development or access to weapons-grade highly enriched nuclear materials, and can be carried out with relatively low cost and risk.

Therefore, while the threat of "weaponized" nuclear terrorism may have largely disappeared, it is difficult to conclude that the threat from "improvised" devices, such as radiological terrorism using "dirty bombs," has also disappeared. Moreover, the threat of using "weapons of mass disruption" by destroying nuclear power plants is clearly an existing threat. In particular, if the US-China nuclear competition continues and this "vertical proliferation" leads to "horizontal proliferation," the threat of "nuclear weapon transfer" by North Korea, which is suffering from severe economic hardship, and the threat of "leakage" of small tactical nuclear weapons from the India-Pakistan border region to terrorist organizations are likely to increase in the future (Allison 2018).

2. US-China Nuclear Terrorism Strategies and Future Challenges

(1) Overview

Following terrorist incidents in the Middle East and the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, the epicenter of terrorism has tended to shift to Africa, and US counter-terrorism efforts in the region continue. China, for its part, has security concerns about the spread of extremism from Afghanistan. While China attempts to expand economic cooperation by leveraging its close relationship with the Taliban, China's core interests include security interests related to Uyghur armed groups pursuing competition with the West through the liberation of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region and the establishment of an Islamic state. In this regard, the need for US-China cooperation on counter-terrorism continues. Furthermore, as pointed out earlier, despite the persistent threats of (1) radiological terrorism, (2) nuclear weapon transfer by North Korea, and (3) leakage of nuclear weapons to terrorist organizations from the India-Pakistan border region, it is by no means desirable for cooperation in the field of nuclear terrorism to remain a peripheral issue in the international community amidst the dynamics of relations between geopolitical rivals like China and Russia and the United States. Therefore, it is necessary to organize the current positions of the United States and China on the issue of nuclear terrorism, identify threat factors that could hinder cooperation between the two countries, and consider ways to strengthen US-China cooperation.

(2) United States

In his April 2009 Prague speech, President Obama emphasized that terrorist organizations have a strong desire to acquire, build, or steal nuclear weapons, and that if nuclear weapons fall into the hands of terrorists, they will use them without hesitation. This perception created a sense of urgency, shifting the discussion from "if" a nuclear terrorist attack would occur to "when" it would occur. From 2010 to 2016, through four Nuclear Security Summits, various cooperation measures were discussed to block all pathways through which nuclear materials that could be used to manufacture nuclear weapons or radiological dispersal devices (RDDs) could fall into the hands of terrorists: namely, "transfer" from nuclear-armed states to terrorist organizations, "leakage" through theft, or "indigenous production" by terrorist organizations (Litwak 2016).

However, during the Trump administration, various international cooperation efforts to strengthen nuclear security were halted. The United States' achievements in nuclear security have significantly regressed due to deepening social divisions within the US, prolonged vacancies in key government positions, and increasing polarization within American political parties (Nuclear Threat Initiative 2018, 14). This weakening of US leadership has led to an increase in threats of nuclear material leakage and nuclear facility sabotage in 54 countries. The Biden administration, which took office in 2021, has made consistent efforts to overcome these challenges. In a speech at the Munich Security Conference in 2021, it emphasized the restoration of international cooperation on the protection of nuclear materials (Roth 2022), and through the "National Security Memorandum to Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism and Advance Nuclear and Radioactive Material Security" released in March 2023 (The White House 2023a), it is making efforts to restore US efforts and leadership in the field of nuclear security within the international community.

(3) China

China views terrorism as a matter of political security, a "fundamental task" of national security. According to the <China's National Defense in the New Era> report (State Council Information Office 2019b), China has been deploying the People's Armed Police (PAP) for operational missions since 2012 and adopted the Counter-Terrorism Law in 2015, obligating internet and telecommunications companies to actively cooperate with state responses to terrorist organizations. In terms of international cooperation, it defines counter-terrorism as a key task for "humanity's shared future" and "win-win cooperation," but practical joint responses are primarily conducted through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the Quadrilateral Cooperation and Coordination Mechanism (QCCM) comprising Afghanistan, China, Pakistan, and Tajikistan. In particular, it conducts joint counter-terrorism exercises with Russia.

(4) Future Challenges

The three main threat factors that the US and China must consider when pursuing enhanced cooperation in the field of nuclear terrorism in the future are summarized below.

Issue 1. Weakening of International Nuclear Non-Proliferation Governance and Increased Nuclear Security Vulnerability Following the Ukraine War

Allison argues that the possibility of nuclear terrorism remains high due to several factors: (1) the inability to take effective measures against North Korea, which has repeatedly challenged US red lines; (2) the increasing ease of transferring nuclear development know-how due to advancements in technology and science; (3) the persistent backlash against US counter-terrorism efforts creating new resistance forces; (4) the potential for increased vulnerability in nuclear material protection due to the territorial dispute between India and Pakistan over the Kashmir region and the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in border areas; (5) the significant decline in the effectiveness of counter-terrorism efforts due to reduced cooperation between the US and Russia; (6) the increased possibility of nuclear leakage due to intensifying US-China nuclear competition; and (7) the weakening credibility of the international non-proliferation regime (Allison 2018, 11-16).

Among these, the severance of US-Russia cooperation in the nuclear non-proliferation domain following the Ukraine war poses a significant problem for international counter-terrorism capabilities. As mentioned earlier, the weakening of the UN Security Council and the NPT regime significantly diminishes the "deterrence by punishment" capability, a key countermeasure to prevent the transfer of nuclear materials and technology. This, in the short term, increases the possibility of a chain reaction of illicit nuclear proliferation from states to non-state actors (Litwak 2016). In particular, the risk of nuclear technology or materials spreading to terrorist organizations from North Korea and Pakistan, which already possess significant nuclear capabilities, may increase. For example, the nuclear reactor under construction in Al-Kibar, Syria, which was destroyed by an Israeli airstrike in 2007, is known to have been built with North Korean assistance (Allison 2018). Furthermore, amidst border closures due to the COVID-19 pandemic and severe economic hardship resulting from prolonged international sanctions, North Korea is strongly tempted to sell nuclear, biochemical, and missile technology and weapons to countries like Iran, Egypt, Yemen, and Syria to overcome its crisis (Dalton 2021). The US-China nuclear competition, particularly China's rapid enhancement of its nuclear capabilities, adds further burden to the nuclear non-proliferation governance that has been weakened since the Ukraine war. The decline in cooperation between the US and Russia, and between the US and China, in the nuclear non-proliferation domain, along with the weakening of international non-proliferation governance, simultaneously weakens the deterrence by punishment in the area of "nuclear transfer" and the "deterrence by denial" in the area of "nuclear leakage," which have been relatively successfully maintained since the 9/11 attacks, thereby significantly increasing the possibility of nuclear terrorism.

Issue 2. Pursuit of Divergent Policies in Afghanistan and Africa

Following its withdrawal from Afghanistan, the United States is wary of the strengthening of the Taliban regime and its harboring and support of terrorist groups. Conversely, China wishes to expand its influence throughout the region while preventing threats from the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), which has joined ISIS-K based in Afghanistan, and Uyghur and Central Asian fighters. The Taliban is known to have responded to China's concerns by relocating Uyghurs linked to ETIM from Badakhshan Province, near the Chinese border, to central Afghanistan. These divergent policies of the US and China can be seen as conflicting policy directions that hinder counter-terrorism cooperation.

The African continent is currently facing various terrorist threats, and the United States has designated Africa as an important theater for counter-terrorism support. China, on the other hand, views Africa as a key region for its Belt and Road Initiative, prioritizing economic exchange, political influence expansion, and support for authoritarian regimes. While the US trains law enforcement agencies in countries like Kenya and Somalia to respond to terrorist attacks and collect evidence for criminal prosecution, it also provides training and equipment to enhance airport security in Morocco, Senegal, and other countries. The US pursues policies to support frontline states in their self-defense against terrorism. Conversely, the US views China's Belt and Road policy as creating debt traps and fostering dependency. In this context, African authoritarian or fragile regimes may have a reduced likelihood of pursuing cooperative policies with both the US and China in their efforts to effectively counter terrorist groups.

Issue 3. Linking Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights Issues

Most discussions on counter-terrorism in China now refer to the response to separatists in the Xinjiang region (Tanner and Bellacqua 2016). Consequently, terrorism has become considered a core interest of China's national security, leading to large-scale operations employing surveillance cameras and biometric data, as well as human rights abuses such as collective detention, forced labor, indoctrination, and torture (Byman and Saber 2019). While the white paper "Combating Terrorism and Extremism and Protecting Human Rights in Xinjiang" emphasizes that since 2014, China has apprehended 1,588 terrorist organizations and 12,995 members, removed 2,052 explosive devices, and punished 30,645 terrorist members in the Xinjiang Uyghur region (State Council Information Office 2019a), the UN has characterized these actions as serious human rights violations involving torture, detention, and suppression of freedom of religion and expression, using "vague and unclear concepts" (OHCHR 2022). If the US and China cannot agree even on the definition of terrorism, cooperation between them on nuclear terrorism will be difficult to achieve.

3. Specific Action Plans for US-China Cooperation

(1) Prospects and Challenges

Nuclear terrorism has long been considered a prime area for US-China cooperation. Notably, China has shown considerable cooperation in efforts to address nuclear security issues, which were a focus during the Obama administration. The Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), a non-profit organization based in Washington, D.C., has published the "NTI Nuclear Security Index Report" every two years since the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit, evaluating the performance of all countries possessing nuclear materials or facilities in terms of "Theft of Nuclear Materials" and "Protect Facilities" against sabotage. Although this report is no longer published after 2020, it provides the most credible indicators for evaluating each country's efforts in nuclear security.

As shown in [Table 1] and [Table 2], in the 2020 report, China ranked 14th in nuclear material protection with 65 points (compared to France at 69 points for 12th and Russia at 57 points for 16th), and 22nd in nuclear facility defense with 74 points (compared to South Korea at 77 points for 18th and Russia at 64 points for 30th), demonstrating a respectable performance. In particular, it showed the most significant progress in preventing the theft of nuclear materials, second only to Japan (increasing from 52 points in 2012 to 71 points in 2019). During the Nuclear Security Summits, China exhibited high transparency in regulations, management, monitoring, and emergency response, met international norms, and demonstrated a "long-standing self-perception as the most responsible of the major nuclear powers" (Kutchesfahani 2019).

Table 1 Nuclear Material Protection Ranking (2020) Table 2 Nuclear Facility Defense Ranking (2020)

Consequently, US-China cooperation in nuclear security was close during the Obama administration, leading to the joint establishment of the State Nuclear Security Technology Center in Beijing in 2016. The U.S.–China Track 1.5 Nuclear Dialogue, maintained from 2009 to 2020 before the Trump administration announced its termination, consistently discussed the prevention of nuclear terrorism, non-proliferation, and the peaceful use of nuclear energy as key areas of cooperation between the two countries (Roberts et al. 2020).

Indeed, there are significant overlaps in US and Chinese interests, such as the protection of nuclear power plants, weapons of mass disruption, containment of IS, and response to domestic homegrown terrorist organizations. Furthermore, there are many areas where success can only be achieved through cooperation between the two countries, including export controls, prevention of technology acquisition, control of fissile materials, and theft prevention. In particular, the Ukraine war has brought the threat of intentional attacks on nuclear facilities by state militaries, rather than terrorist organizations, to the forefront as a realistic threat. Moreover, North Korea's inadequate safety measures for its nuclear facilities, despite its advancing nuclear capabilities, further underscores the need for US-China cooperation on nuclear security and safety.

Nevertheless, if the current situation persists, the likelihood of short-term US-China cooperation to prevent nuclear terrorism is low. The reasons are: first, cooperation in the field of nuclear terrorism is heavily influenced by the overall US-China strategic competition. The 1.5-track dialogue, suspended by the Trump administration in 2020, has not yet resumed. If the US continues its aggressive policy of containment against China in areas such as new technologies and supply chains, China's expectation of upholding the existing order will continue to decrease, making it difficult for the US and China to cooperate on various issues, including nuclear terrorism. Although the US policy towards China has somewhat softened from "Decoupling" to "De-risking" (The White House 2023b), and a brief period of reconciliation was created with the meeting between Secretary of State Blinken and Foreign Minister Qin Gang on June 18, the subsequent rapid cooling of relations due to Biden's remark calling Xi Jinping a "dictator" on June 22 indicates that the current phase of competition and conflict is difficult to resolve easily.

Second, in a similar vein, the current US-China security strategies, which focus on building integrated capabilities based on concepts of integrated deterrence and intelligent warfare, are leading to competition for alliances. China is responding to counter-terrorism issues through the SCO and alliances with authoritarian states, while the US is responding through cooperation with like-minded countries in the Indo-Pacific region and Europe, showing a deepening of US-China competition. As mentioned earlier, the confrontation between democracy and authoritarianism has intensified following the Ukraine war. Therefore, if the current trend continues, cooperation on nuclear security or safety issues is likely to be increasingly influenced by bloc logic.

Third, based on the recent statements by the US and Chinese governments, the very concepts of terrorism they define are diverging. In particular, the US and other Western countries characterize China's equation of separatists in the Xinjiang region with terrorists as human rights oppression. This makes it difficult for the US and China to cooperate under the banner of counter-terrorism in the future. If they were to discuss cooperation on nuclear terrorism, they would face a situation where they would have to debate who constitutes a terrorist organization rather than achieve practical results, which would be a significant long-term burden in finding cooperative measures.

(2) Policy Recommendations for the US and China and South Korea's Role

Considering the foregoing discussions, it is highly challenging for the US and China, with their divergent perceptions of terrorism, to reach a grand compromise through joint responses. Given the current strained relations between the two countries, it is also difficult to restore US-China cooperation in the field of nuclear terrorism in the short term. However, the strong common interests in nuclear security and safety issues are undeniable, as confirmed during the closed-door roundtable meeting among South Korea, the US, and China, jointly organized by the East Asia Institute (EAI), the Harvard Belfer Center, Peking University, and the Guoguan Institute on May 10.

Therefore, this report proposes nuclear terrorism as an agenda that can serve as a catalyst for the US and China to ease competition and tension and attempt a change in the situation, rather than adopting the perspective that US-China cooperation in nuclear security can only be restored when strategic competition is eased. To achieve this goal, strategic and careful agenda setting is necessary to maximize areas of common interest and minimize areas of conflict in the issue of nuclear terrorism. South Korea can contribute to paving the way for US-China compromise by strengthening the trend towards cooperation between the two countries in solidarity with the international community. In particular, as a party directly involved in the North Korean issue, South Korea has a role to play in discussions linking the Korean Peninsula issue with nuclear security and safety.

Maximizing Common Interests: Responding to New Nuclear Security Issues and Deepening Nuclear Safety Concerns

Among the areas of common interest where the US and China must cooperate, one of the most urgent tasks is the threat of state military attacks on nuclear power plants. During the Ukraine war, Russia set a dangerous precedent by shelling and attempting to occupy the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant. While existing nuclear security cooperation has primarily focused on scenarios such as nuclear power plant destruction attempts by terrorist organizations, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) "Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material" legally prohibits the illicit trafficking of nuclear materials or the destruction of nuclear facilities, this convention does not address attacks or threats against nuclear facilities by state actors (Rodriguez and Sukin 2022).

As of May 2023, out of 410 operating nuclear power plants worldwide, 93 are in the United States (1st globally) and 57 are in China (2nd) (World Nuclear Industry Status Report, n.d.). While the US, the world's largest holder of nuclear power plants, and France, the third largest, are each constructing only one new reactor, China, the second largest, is pursuing the construction of 23 new reactors, accounting for half of the 58 reactors currently under construction worldwide. Therefore, if states intentionally destroy enemy nuclear power plants during warfare to achieve military objectives, it could cause immense damage comparable to the use of nuclear weapons. The countries most severely exposed to this threat are the United States and China. Consequently, adopting a convention that legally prohibits attacks on nuclear power plants by state militaries and undertaking concrete efforts to implement it is a matter of significant national interest for both the US and China.

Second, there is the response to the escalating nuclear proliferation threat in Northeast Asia and the resulting deepening of nuclear security and safety issues. China's rapid expansion of its nuclear warhead stockpile, aiming to increase from the current approximately 400 to 1,000 by 2030 (Department of Defense 2022, 97), is a direct issue between the US and China, making negotiations difficult. However, alongside this vertical proliferation between the US and China, the horizontal proliferation occurring in Northeast Asia, particularly North Korea's advancement of nuclear capabilities and adoption of an offensive nuclear strategy, and the potential nuclear weapon development attempts by Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan in response, are issues that seriously undermine the national interests of both the US and China. From the US perspective, North Korea's advancing nuclear capabilities are a significant challenge to maintaining the legitimacy of the global non-proliferation regime and strengthening the nuclear security regime. From China's perspective, regional nuclear proliferation could pose significant constraints when considering strategic options in the Taiwan Strait. Furthermore, given that North Korea, which is solely focused on increasing its nuclear weapon capabilities, lacks the capacity for meticulous attention to nuclear safety, China, which shares a border with North Korea, faces serious nuclear safety threats. In this context, nuclear proliferation in Northeast Asia, especially the nuclear safety of North Korea's nuclear facilities, is a common interest issue where both the US and China can cooperate relatively easily.

As a party directly involved in the Korean Peninsula's nuclear issue, South Korea is in a position to play an active role in guiding US-China cooperation on this matter. South Korea, more than any other country in the region, cannot help but take the nuclear threat posed by North Korea most seriously, and it is also a sovereign nation that can autonomously decide its response policy among options such as independent nuclear weapon development, strengthening the US nuclear umbrella, and enhancing advanced technology-based military capabilities. Furthermore, when seeking cooperation directions between the US and China on new nuclear security issues, South Korea, as a nuclear power (5th in nuclear facility ownership, 4th in joint new construction) and a party directly threatened by intentional attacks on nuclear facilities by North Korea, can contribute to ensuring that discussions between the US and China proceed within the framework of international multilateral regimes.

Minimizing Areas of Conflict: Bloc Logic in Nuclear Proliferation and Linking Xinjiang Human Rights Issues with Terrorism

While there are clear areas of common interest between the US and China on nuclear security and safety issues, there are also equally clear areas of conflicting interests. The most representative of these is the bloc logic of nuclear competition. Nuclear proliferation in Northeast Asia potentially poses serious nuclear security and safety threats, but the US-China strategic competition logic is the very driver of this proliferation. As US integrated deterrence strengthens, China is compelled to develop corresponding military capabilities, and from this perspective, Russian or North Korean nuclear weapons could be perceived as assets by China. Although nuclear security and safety are important issues for the survival of global citizens, if (1) the possibility of nuclear weapon use by terrorist organizations is relatively very low, and (2) possessing "second-strike capability" is considered a core national interest, then China has no incentive to actively cooperate for a joint response to nuclear terrorism. Therefore, it is necessary to appropriately manage the level of conflict between the US and China so that the issue of nuclear proliferation does not become trapped in bloc logic. While South Korea's influence on this matter is limited, it is important to make diplomatic choices that avoid positioning that exacerbates US-China conflict.

Second, the US and China must be mindful of agenda setting when discussing nuclear terrorism. Specifically, they should avoid raising the issue of the "Xinjiang region," which China considers a core national security interest, in connection with human rights issues, and technically separate "counter-terrorism" from "nuclear security." Therefore, the initial discussions between the US and China should focus on cooperative measures to prevent the proliferation of nuclear materials used for the protection of nuclear power plants and the development of weapons of mass disruption to terrorist organizations.■

References

Allison, Graham. 2018. “Nuclear Terrorism: Did We Beat the Odds or Change Them?” PRISM 7, 3: 2-21.

Bell, Mark S. 2019. “Defending the ‘Acquisition-Use Presumption’ in Assessing the Likelihood of Nuclear Terrorism.” International Studies Quarterly 63, 3: 774-778.

Binder, Markus K., and Gary A. Ackerman. 2021. “Pick your POICN: Introducing the profiles of incidents involving CBRN and non-state actors (POICN) database.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 44, 9: 730-754.

Byman, Daniel L., and Israa Saber. 2019. “Is China Prepared for Global Terrorism? Xinjiang and Beyond.” Global China: Assessing china’s Growing Role in the World.

Dalton, Toby. 2021. “The Most Urgent North Korean Nuclear Threat Isn’t What You Think.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 15.

Finlay, Brian, and Jeremy Tamsett. 2009. “Global and National Efforts to Prevent Jihadist Access to WMD.” In Jihadists and Weapons of Mass Destruction, 319-342. CRC Press.

Galatas, Ioannis. 2020. Prevention of CBRN Materials and Substances Getting into the Hands of Terrorists. International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT).

Gale, Robert P., and James O. Armitage. 2018. “Are we prepared for nuclear terrorism?” New England Journal of Medicine 378, 13: 1246-1254.

House Hearing Before the Committee on Armed Services. 2017. “The Evolving Threat of Terrorsm and Effective Counterterrorism Strategies.” 115 Congress, 5.

Jenkins, Brian Michael. 2008. Will Terrorists Go Nuclear? Prometheus Books.

Kutchesfahani, Sara Z. 2019. “And the prize for global nuclear security goes to… China.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, December 6.

Litwak, Robert S. 2016. “Deterring Nuclear Terrorism.” The Wilson Center.

McIntosh, Christopher, and Ian Storey. 2018. “Between acquisition and use: Assessing the likelihood of nuclear terrorism.” International Studies Quarterly 62, 2: 289-300.

Mueller, John. 2012. Atomic Obsession: Nuclear Alarmism from Hiroshima to Al-Qaeda. Oxford University Press.

Mueller, John. 2009. “The Atomic Terrorist?”. Report prepared for the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament, April 30.

Nuclear Threat Initiative. 2018. “2018 Annual Report.” https://media.nti.org/documents/NTI_2018AnnualReport_online-FINAL.pdf (Accessed: 2023. 08. 22)

Roberts, Brad et al. 2020. “Taking Stock: U.S.-China Track 1.5 Nuclear Dialogue.” Center for Global Security Research. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. https://cgsr.llnl.gov/content/assets/docs/CGSR_US-China-Paper.pdf.

Rodriguez, Luis and Lauren Sukin. “Russian actions at Zaporizhzhia show need for better legal protections of nuclear installations.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, October 28.

Roth, Nikckolas. 2022. “The Ukraine invasion highlights why Biden’s Nuclear Posture Review should endorse bold new vision for nuclear security.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, February 28.

State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China. 2019a. “The Fight Against Terrorism and Extremism and Human Rights Protection in Xinjiang.” March 18. http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2019/03/18/content_281476567813306.htm. (Accessed: 2023. 08. 22.)

_____________________________________________________________. 2019b. “China’s National Defense in the New Era.” July 24. http://english.scio.gov.cn/2019-07/24/content_75026800.htm. (Accessed: 2023. 08. 22)

Tanner, Murray Scot and James Bellacqua. 2016. “China’s Response to Terrorism.” CNA Analysis & Solutions.

The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). 2022. “OHCHR Assessment of human rights concerns in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, People’s Republic of China.” United Nations. August 31. https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/country-reports/ohchr-assessment-human-rights-concerns-xinjiang-uyghur-autonomous-region. (Accessed: 2023. 08. 22)

The White House. 2023a. “FACT SHEET: President Biden Signs National Security Memorandum to Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism and Advance Nuclear and Radioactive Material Security.” March 2.

________________. 2023b. “Remarks by National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan on Renewing American Economic Leadership at the Brookings Institution.” April 27.

U.S. Department of Defense. “2022 Report on Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China.” November 29.

■ Kim Yang-gyu_Senior Researcher, East Asia Institute. Lecturer, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Seoul National University.

■ Lee Jeong-seok_Assistant Professor, Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, Taejae University.

■ Managed and Edited by: Park Ji-soo, EAI Researcher

    Inquiries and Editing: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | jspark@eai.or.kr