[US-China Nuclear Deal Special Report] IV. Asia-Pacific Nuclear Non-Proliferation Vision and US-China and Regional Cooperation Measures for It

1. Deepening US-China Conflict and the Challenge of Horizontal Nuclear Proliferation in the Asia-Pacific Region

Along with the deepening confrontation and conflict between the United States and China, leading to their vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons, the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Asia-Pacific region is a problem that must never be overlooked. Since the entry into force of the NPT regime in 1970, the Asia-Pacific region has continuously witnessed challenges to the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and norms. As a recent example, North Korea succeeded in developing nuclear weapons through six nuclear tests since the 2000s, and North Korea and China are currently among the countries most actively increasing the quality and quantity of their nuclear weapons worldwide. Furthermore, as the deepening US-China confrontation amplifies strategic uncertainty in the region, discussions about the necessity of nuclear armament have begun to emerge within numerous regional states that have not yet acquired nuclear weapons (Zhao 2022).

Of particular note in this regard are the numerous so-called 'nuclear threshold states' in the Asia-Pacific region. Nuclear threshold states are defined as countries possessing the technical and resource capabilities to develop nuclear weapons relatively quickly once a political decision for nuclear armament is made (Rublee 2010). In the Asia-Pacific region alone, numerous countries and political entities, including Japan, South Korea, Australia, and Taiwan, are classified as nuclear threshold states. They share the commonality of being official security allies of the United States (Japan, South Korea, Australia) or quasi-allies (Taiwan). Notably, with the exception of Japan, South Korea, Australia, and Taiwan have all attempted to develop and possess nuclear weapons in the past during the Cold War.

Examining South Korea first, it has a history of attempting independent nuclear weapon development and recently, voices advocating for independent nuclear armament have been growing among various domestic political factions. It is a well-known fact that under President Park Chung-hee in the 1970s, amidst a trend of weakening US defense commitments to Asia, South Korea secretly attempted nuclear weapon development but abandoned it under US pressure (Jang 2016). Since the end of the Cold War, with North Korea's rapid nuclear armament and increasing threats, voices for independent nuclear armament have once again risen among some experts and politicians in South Korea, with a notable number of lawmakers from the ruling People Power Party lending their support. Amidst this shift in domestic public opinion, President Yoon Suk-yeol mentioned the possibility of indigenous nuclear possession at a National Defense meeting in early 2023. Although not a concrete statement, it was unprecedented for a South Korean president to publicly mention the possibility of indigenous nuclear armament in an official setting (Mackenzie 2023). Through the 'Washington Declaration' resulting from the ROK-US summit in April of the same year, the United States took measures to strengthen extended deterrence for South Korea, including the establishment of a Nuclear Consultative Group, while South Korea reaffirmed its commitment to the existing NPT regime and non-possession of nuclear weapons, temporarily pushing the debate on South Korea's nuclear armament back under the surface (The White House 2023). However, with the advancement of North Korea's nuclear capabilities and the deepening US-China confrontation and conflict, public opinion in South Korea regarding independent nuclear armament has the potential to regain momentum at any time.

Australia can also be considered a prominent nuclear threshold state in the Asia-Pacific region. Since acceding to the NPT Treaty in 1973, Australia has exemplary adhered to the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. However, prior to that, during the 1950s and 1960s, it made active efforts to acquire nuclear weapons or related technology from the United Kingdom (Walsh 1997; Hymans 2000). Furthermore, Australia is the world's largest holder of uranium, possessing approximately 31% of the global uranium reserves. Although public opposition to indigenous nuclear armament is quite strong, and the Australian government publicly declares its adherence to the NPT regime and its non-pursuit of nuclear weapons acquisition or development, it tacitly permits the deployment and movement of US nuclear weapons within Australian territory under the traditional 'neither confirm nor deny' (NCND) policy. Additionally, the 'AUKUS' security cooperation framework established in 2021 among the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia implies that highly enriched uranium for submarines used by the US and UK will be provided to Australia, setting a significant precedent that deviates from existing stringent nuclear control measures (Acton 2021).

Taiwan also possesses the technical capability to develop nuclear weapons in a relatively short period and is known to have attempted nuclear weapon development from the 1960s to the 1980s, with its efforts thwarted by the US government (Albright and Gay 1998). Due to the US-Taiwan relationship, which is based on the domestic law 'Taiwan Relations Act' rather than a formal mutual defense treaty, providing only indirect military support, Taiwan is not officially under the US nuclear umbrella. Consequently, within Taiwan, opinions are being raised that indigenous nuclear armament is a viable alternative to deter Chinese military aggression, given Taiwan's situation of not benefiting from US extended deterrence (<Yonhap News> 2022; Clement 2022).

In the case of Japan, since Prime Minister Eisaku Sato announced the 'three non-nuclear principles' in 1967 – 'not to produce, possess, or introduce nuclear weapons' – it has maintained these as its basic policy stance on nuclear weapons. However, at the same time, Japan is the only non-nuclear-weapon state that operates a plutonium reprocessing facility and is known to possess over 40 tons of plutonium, enough to produce approximately 6,000 nuclear warheads (Kuperman and Acharya 2018). In this regard, Japan is classified as the country most capable of developing nuclear weapons technically and resource-wise, should a political decision and will be made. Although the Japanese government has repeatedly pledged to exemplary adhere to the NPT regime, many Japanese politicians have maintained an ambiguous stance on Japan's indigenous nuclear armament option, and Japan is assessed to be pursuing a nuclear 'hedging' policy through strategic ambiguity (Romei 2022).

2. Worst-Case Scenario: Regional Nuclear Dominoes and the Collapse of the Global Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime

Under the circumstances described above, if military tensions between the US and China in the region continue to escalate, and the nuclear capabilities of China and North Korea further advance, the possibility that these potential nuclear-armed states will embark on full-scale nuclear armament cannot be ruled out. While this scenario may not lead to direct destruction and mass casualties like a US-China nuclear war scenario, it warrants serious consideration due to the increased risk of global nuclear war and nuclear management crises.

Until now, nuclear threshold states in the Asia-Pacific region have refrained from pursuing nuclear armament due to the strong will of the United States to maintain the international nuclear non-proliferation regime based on the NPT, and the trust these states placed in US extended deterrence commitments. However, recent changes in the international situation and nuclear-related discourse indicate that cracks are beginning to appear in both of these factors. Although the current Biden administration still shows a stance of preventing nuclear development by allies through strengthening extended deterrence commitments, its announcement in 2021 to provide highly enriched uranium for submarines to Australia through the 'AUKUS' security cooperation framework demonstrated a contradictory stance to its previous strong commitment to nuclear proliferation control.

Furthermore, no one can guarantee that the US principle of prohibiting nuclear armament by allies will continue to be maintained over the next five to ten years, and beyond. Former US President Donald Trump, prior to the current Biden administration, mentioned in media interviews during his 2016 presidential campaign that he might support the nuclear armament of South Korea and Japan to reduce US defense spending for allies. Some experts suggest that if Trump regains the presidency in the 2024 US elections, US restraint on the nuclear armament of South Korea and Japan could significantly decrease (Gallo 2022). This cannot be dismissed as merely an individual aberration by Trump, as 'restrainers' who advocate for a substantial reduction in US defense spending for allies are increasingly gaining influence in Washington's political circles, encompassing both conservatives and progressives. Among civilian experts, opinions are openly emerging that instead of preventing nuclear armament by Asian allies such as South Korea and Japan, it should be supported to counter China and North Korea militarily (Kim Ji-eun and Lee Jeong-seok 2022).

Moreover, Russia's invasion of Ukraine in early 2022 has significantly influenced many countries in the Asia-Pacific region to raise their voices in favor of nuclear armament. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, Ukraine, which inherited Soviet nuclear weapons, received security assurances from Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom in exchange for transferring nuclear weapons to Russia, through the signing of the Budapest Memorandum in December 1994. However, these security assurance commitments were not honored at all during Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, and the Russia-Ukraine war that broke out in 2022 has led many countries worldwide to ask again whether the war would have occurred if Ukraine had possessed nuclear weapons, thereby amplifying the risk of horizontal nuclear proliferation globally once more (Einhorn 2022).

If even one of the numerous regional nuclear threshold states, such as South Korea, Japan, Australia, and Taiwan, succeeds in nuclear armament, a 'nuclear domino' effect could occur, leading other potential nuclear-armed states in the region to pursue nuclear weapons, which would result in the collapse of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. Since the entry into force of the NPT Treaty in 1970, the global nuclear non-proliferation regime has been evaluated as having successfully prevented the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons, thereby contributing to the maintenance of international order and peace. Since the establishment of the NPT regime, Israel, South Africa, India, Pakistan, and North Korea have succeeded in developing nuclear weapons. However, Israel, South Africa, India, and Pakistan were non-signatories to the NPT, and North Korea is the only country that withdrew from the NPT after joining and succeeded in possessing nuclear weapons.

South Korea, Japan, and Australia are all signatories to the NPT. If even one of these countries succeeds in nuclear armament with the implicit endorsement or active support of the United States, a traditional guardian of the NPT regime, other countries could sequentially pursue nuclear armament, setting off a chain reaction. This is a nightmarish scenario for China, as the nuclear armament of South Korea, Japan, and Australia—key members of the US-led military encirclement of China—would not only intensify threats against China but also stimulate Taiwan's nuclear development ambitions, potentially leading to Taiwan's nuclear armament, a scenario China least wants to imagine.

Furthermore, a nuclear domino effect in the Asia-Pacific region could lead to the collapse of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. Beyond the Asia-Pacific region, there are numerous nuclear threshold states in the Middle East, Europe, and South America, including Germany, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Brazil, and Argentina. A nuclear domino in the Asia-Pacific region could trigger nuclear dominoes in other regions, seriously threatening world peace by shaking the foundations of the existing nuclear non-proliferation system that has been maintained stably since the Cold War.

3. Asia-Pacific Nuclear Non-Proliferation Vision for Preventing Horizontal Nuclear Proliferation and Achieving Nuclear Disarmament

What areas should the United States, China, and regional states cooperate in, and what goals should they pursue, to prevent the aforementioned scenario from becoming a reality? For this purpose, this report proposes the 'Asia-Pacific Non-Proliferation Initiative' as a multilateral nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament cooperation regime that includes not only the US and China but also regional states. To prevent the instability and catastrophic consequences of uncontrollable nuclear proliferation in the Asia-Pacific region, a multilateral cooperation mechanism involving the United States, China, and regional states can offer a more effective and stable policy alternative.

Regarding the structure of the multilateral non-proliferation and disarmament cooperation regime to be established through the 'Asia-Pacific Non-Proliferation Initiative,' this report proposes a 'big deal' or 'package deal' encompassing the following five commitments. First, the United States and China will agree and declare to reduce nuclear warheads and delivery systems as a long-term goal, and regional states will co-sign the agreement as guarantors and supporters. Second, nuclear threshold states in the region, such as South Korea, Japan, and Australia, will reaffirm their commitment not to develop or possess nuclear weapons in the future. Third, China, in return, will provide security assurances to these states, pledging not to engage in military coercion or attacks using nuclear weapons. Fourth, the United States, as a reciprocal measure to China, will reaffirm its commitment not to support or assist the nuclear armament of these states. Fifth, all participating states will declare that they do not recognize North Korea as a nuclear-weapon state and will cooperate towards its denuclearization.

Figure 1. Asia-Pacific Nonproliferation Initiative

The structure described above is modeled after the NPT Treaty established in 1968. The NPT Treaty can be considered a package deal or 'grand bargain' containing three 'deals' between established nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states at the time (NTI 2022). The core contents can be summarized as follows: (1) Non-nuclear-weapon states forgo attempts at nuclear armament, and nuclear-weapon states do not provide nuclear weapons or related technology to non-nuclear-weapon states; (2) Non-nuclear-weapon states are guaranteed the right to the peaceful use of nuclear technology in exchange for renouncing nuclear armament; and (3) Nuclear-weapon states commit to halting the nuclear arms race and pursuing nuclear disarmament for the nuclear weapons they possess. The Asia-Pacific Non-Proliferation Initiative proposed in this report aims to prevent regional proliferation and resolve security anxieties of regional states by applying the first and third deal items of the NPT to the Asia-Pacific region, while adding additional policy commitments from China and the United States, and reaching an agreement among regional states on the North Korean nuclear issue.

The reason for proposing the structure described above is as follows. First, given the significant disparity in nuclear capabilities between the US and China, China's incentive to participate in bilateral disarmament negotiations is considerably lacking. Therefore, it is necessary to seriously consider presenting the commitment of non-nuclear armament by potential nuclear-possessing states in the region as a bargaining chip to bring China to the negotiating table. From China's perspective, the nuclear armament of South Korea, Japan, and Australia is threatening in itself, but the occurrence of such a nuclear domino effect could also stimulate Taiwan's nuclear development ambitions, making it a situation that must be prevented. In this regard, the reaffirmation of the renunciation of nuclear armament by these potential nuclear capability holders can serve as a negotiating item that provides China with an incentive to engage in disarmament negotiations.

Second, among the five commitments mentioned above, excluding the nuclear disarmament commitments of the United States and China, all other provisions are close to reaffirming principles that the respective countries have already adhered to, thus the threshold for negotiation and achievement is relatively low. Regional states such as South Korea, Japan, and Australia have consistently adhered to the NPT regime, and the United States has repeatedly reaffirmed that it will not tolerate or support their nuclear development. China, too, has stated that it will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states as part of its basic nuclear doctrine (Pan 2018). Furthermore, all regional states, including the United States and China, have officially agreed that the denuclearization of North Korea is essential for regional stability and peace. The aforementioned commitments can be a useful approach as they minimize the political burden on the leaders and governments of each country while alleviating the nuclear proliferation-related anxieties and uncertainties that have been growing in recent years.

Third, a disarmament agreement involving regional states in addition to the US and China will have greater political binding force as a multilateral mechanism than a simple bilateral US-China disarmament agreement. While it may be difficult to achieve legally binding force in practice, the fact that either the US or China would face political pressure from multiple regional states if they fail to faithfully implement or violate the disarmament agreement means that a multilateral agreement is expected to be more effective than a simple bilateral agreement.

Fourth, the establishment of a nuclear non-proliferation regime involving the US, China, and regional states will serve to eliminate the growing uncertainties related to regional nuclear proliferation at the regional level and to consolidate the gradually weakening NPT regime at the global level. As discussed earlier, in the Asia-Pacific region, political factors that have supported the existing nuclear non-proliferation system are gradually losing their influence due to the deepening US-China conflict and escalating regional tensions. The reaffirmation of commitments by potential nuclear-capable states to forgo nuclear armament, China's security assurance commitments in return, and the US commitment to forgo support for the nuclear armament of these states will eliminate growing uncertainties related to regional nuclear proliferation, facilitate peaceful changes in the regional order, and significantly contribute to the elimination of risks from nuclear proliferation at both regional and global levels.

4. Specific Implementation Measures for Realizing the Asia-Pacific Nuclear Non-Proliferation Vision

What specific policies should the United States, China, and other regional states adopt to achieve the aforementioned goals? In this regard, this report proposes the following specific implementation measures.

(1) Reaffirmation of Political and Military Red Lines and Refraining from Provocative Actions by the US, China, and Regional States

First, prior to substantive negotiations on the Asia-Pacific Nuclear Non-Proliferation Vision, regional tension reduction and confidence-building are necessary. To this end, the United States, China, and regional states should reaffirm each other's political and military red lines through bilateral and multilateral public-private dialogues and refrain from provocative policies and rhetoric. First, the Taiwan issue is a red line to which China reacts most sensitively. The United States and regional states need to refrain from high-level visits to Taiwan or political rhetoric that undermines the 'One China' principle. Meanwhile, China must reaffirm that altering the status quo of cross-strait relations by force is a red line that the United States cannot tolerate and should refrain from large-scale military exercises and provocative behavior that threaten this. Furthermore, in the East and South China Seas, the US, China, and regional stakeholders should be mindful that 'gray zone' provocative actions can escalate into accidental military clashes and wider conflicts at any time, and should avoid increasing military activities in these areas. Additionally, regarding the deployment of key strategic assets such as intermediate-range missiles, strategic bombers, and nuclear submarines in the region, the US, China, and regional states need to exercise particular caution in shaping their military posture to prevent an uncontrollable spiral of military distrust and anxiety.

(2) Establishment and Activation of Crisis Management Mechanisms at the Military Command and Ministry of Defense Levels of the US, China, and Regional States

In parallel, as another confidence-building measure (CBM) for establishing regional and multilateral nuclear disarmament regimes, the United States and China, as well as regional states closely involved in potential flashpoints of regional conflict such as Taiwan, the Korean Peninsula, and the South and East China Seas, must establish and activate crisis management communication mechanisms at the military command and Ministry of Defense levels.

Positive developments have already been observed in this regard. South Korea and China agreed at the Shangri-La Dialogue in 2022 to promptly establish direct communication lines between the South Korean Navy and the Chinese Eastern Theater Command Navy, and between the South Korean Air Force and the Chinese Eastern Theater Command Air Force, in addition to the existing three hotlines between the Ministries of Defense and between the South Korean and Chinese naval and air forces (Park Sung-jin 2022). In December 2022, China and the Philippines agreed to open a hotline between the two countries to prepare for contingencies in the South China Sea (Shiga 2022). More recently, in March 2023, a hotline call took place for the first time between the Japanese and Chinese Ministers of Defense, which was the fruition of an agreement reached between the two countries in 2018 (Yamaguchi 2023).

The issue lies in the reactivation of the US-China hotline. According to media reports, when a Chinese reconnaissance balloon violated US airspace and was shot down in February 2023, the Chinese Ministry of National Defense did not respond to US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin's request for hotline communication (Cooper 2023). This is a deeply concerning development, and the US and Chinese governments must promptly reactivate the hotline between their key ministries to prevent accidental clashes from escalating into large-scale military conflicts in case of emergencies.

It should be noted that for hotlines between China and regional states, the mere existence of the hotline is insufficient; trust must be built among them that the hotline will actually be used in times of crisis for it to function as a crisis management communication mechanism. Therefore, efforts should be made to activate them through regular communication.

(3) Creating and Securing Domestic Public Support Necessary for Building a Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Regime

Alongside these efforts, the United States, China, and regional states must reaffirm their government-level commitments to the fundamental spirit and principles of the existing NPT regime and strive to create and secure domestic public support for the establishment of a multilateral nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament cooperation regime in the Asia-Pacific region. To this end, leaders and government officials of each country must persuade their citizens that the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons could lead the entire Asia-Pacific region into the catastrophe of nuclear war, and that the discourse on nuclear armament by non-nuclear-weapon states in the region is a dangerous gamble that accelerates the risk of nuclear war rather than ensuring national security.

Furthermore, it is necessary to explain and make the public understand that the US and China's nuclear reduction commitments, the commitments of potential nuclear-capable states in the region to forgo nuclear weapons, China's security assurance commitments to these states, and the US commitment not to support the nuclear armament of these states are reaffirmations of a status quo-oriented agreement with a conservative objective to maintain and strengthen the existing NPT regime, and do not require significant policy changes or serious strategic sacrifices from any specific country. In reality, the core commitments of the multilateral nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament cooperation regime at the Asia-Pacific regional level proposed in this report do not significantly deviate from the principles that each country's government has upheld. The United States and potential nuclear-capable states in the region have thoroughly adhered to the NPT Treaty thus far, and China has long declared that it will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states in relation to its nuclear strategy. If the Asia-Pacific Non-Proliferation Initiative is perceived as requiring special political concessions and sacrifices, it could provoke a strong backlash in major regional countries, making negotiations and agreements difficult.

(4) Identifying and Negotiating Specific Items for Multilateral Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Cooperation

In conjunction with the aforementioned domestic efforts, the United States, China, and regional states need to identify specific items requiring agreement for the establishment of a multilateral nuclear disarmament cooperation regime in the Asia-Pacific region and commence negotiations at the working level.

Specifically, the issues that require priority consultation and negotiation include: (1) Whether the core agreement of the multilateral nuclear disarmament regime will be at the declaratory level, agreeing on abstract principles, or at the level of the US-Soviet Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) or Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START), including practical mutual inspection and monitoring measures; (2) If an agreement including practical mutual inspection and monitoring measures is to be reached, how will the process and procedures be prepared and conducted; (3) Whether nuclear warheads as well as delivery systems will be subject to negotiation, and if delivery systems are included, what range will be controlled or reduced; (4) Whether the multilateral nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation agreement will have a fixed term, like the initial NPT (25 years for the initial NPT), or be indefinite, like the current NPT; and (5) Whether its content and implementation performance will be reviewed and evaluated periodically through review conferences, as is done with the current NPT (review conferences are held every five years).

In addition, close discussions are needed on what specific issues require detailed consultation and negotiation for the establishment of a multilateral nuclear disarmament cooperation regime, considering the political and strategic situations of each country, and how to resolve them. This should take place through bilateral and multilateral dialogue channels involving key officials at the deputy minister level or higher from the foreign affairs and security ministries of the US, China, and regional states.

(5) Signing and Declaration of the Agreement by High-Level Officials

Finally, to maximize the political binding force and effectiveness of the Asia-Pacific Nuclear Non-Proliferation Vision, it is ideally necessary to hold a multilateral international conference involving heads of state, or at least ministers, to formalize and codify the agreement. While concrete and practical content will inevitably be negotiated at the working level, diplomatic protocols and rituals, such as signing and declaring by high-level officials at least at the ministerial level, are necessary to secure mutual trust regarding the faithful implementation of the final agreement. Through this approach, governments and the public will attach greater significance to the agreement, and the burden of violating the agreement will increase, leading to a more secure and reliable international agreement.

Figure 2. Policy Roadmap for Realizing the Asia-Pacific Nuclear Non-Proliferation Vision

References

Kim Ji-eun and Lee Jeong-seok. 2022. “The Evangelists of Restraint Strategy: A Study on the Production and Diffusion of the 'Restraint' Discourse in US Foreign Policy through the Lens of Policy Advocacy Theory.” Journal of Area Studies 26/3.

Park Sung-jin. 2022. "Defense Ministers' Meeting between South Korea and China after 2 Years and 7 Months... Wei Fenghe Expresses Interest in South Korea's Indo-Pacific Strategy." <Kyunghyang Shinmun>, June 10. https://m.khan.co.kr/politics/defense-diplomacy/article/202206101837001#c2b

<Yonhap News>. 2022. "Amid China's Military Show of Force, Taiwan's Nuclear Armament Debate Resurfaces." April 13. https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20220413098300009

Acton, James. 2021. “Why the AUKUS Submarine Deal is Bad for Nonproliferation—and What to Do about It.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Commentary, September 21. https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/09/21/why-aukus-submarine-deal-is-bad-for-nonproliferation-and-what-to-do-about-it-pub-85399

Albright, David, and Corey Gay. “Taiwan: Nuclear Nightmare Averted.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 54, 1: 54-60.

Clement, Antony Vigilious. 2022. “Taiwan’s Only Hope: Nuclear Capability.” Modern Diplomacy, August 16. https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2022/08/16/taiwans-only-hope-nuclear-capability/

Cooper, Helene. 2023. "China Isn’t Ready to Pick Up Phone After Balloon Incident." The New York Times. February 7. https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/07/us/politics/china-balloon-austin.html

Einhorn, Robert. 2022. “Will Russia’s War on Ukraine Spur Nuclear Proliferation?” Arms Control Today, October. https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2022-10/features/russias-war-ukraine-spur-nuclear-proliferation

Gallo, William. 2022. “As Trump Looms, South Koreans Mull Their Own Nukes.” Voice of America, November 24. https://www.voanews.com/a/as-trump-looms-south-koreans-mull-their-own-nukes/6848246.html

Hymans, Jacques. 2000. “Isotopes and Identity, Australia and the Nuclear Weapons Option, 1949-1999.” The Nonproliferation Review 7, 1: 1-23.

Kuperman, Alan, and Hina Acharya. 2018. “Japan’s Misguided Plutonium Policy.” Arms Control Today. October. https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2018-10/features/japan%E2%80%99s-misguided-plutonium-policy

Jang, Se Young. 2016. “The Evolution of US Extended Deterrence and South Korea’s Nuclear Ambitions.” Journal of Strategic Studies 39, 4: 502-520.

Mackenzie, Jean. 2023. “Why Koreans Want Nuclear Armament.” April 24. https://www.bbc.com/korean/articles/c2v5gl94xgpo

Nuclear Threat Initiative. 2022. “NPT: Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.” October 14. https://www.nti.org/education-center/treaties-and-regimes/treaty-on-the-non-proliferation-of-nuclear-weapons/#:~:text=The%20NPT%20is%20a%20multilateral,the%20non%2Dnuclear%20weapon%20states

Pan, Zhenqiang. 2018. “A Study of China’s No-First-Use Policy on Nuclear Weapons.” Journal of Peace and Nuclear Disarmament 1, 1: 115-136.

Romei, Sayuri. 2022. “The Legacy of Shinzo Abe: A Japan Divided about Nuclear Weapons.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. August 24. https://thebulletin.org/2022/08/the-legacy-of-shinzo-abe-a-japan-divided-about-nuclear-weapons/

Rublee, Maria Roast. 2010. “The Nuclear Threshold States: Challenges and Opportunities Posed by Brazil and Japan.” The Nonproliferation Review, 17, 1: 49-70.

Shiga, Yuichi. 2022. "China and Philippines to Open South China Sea Hotline." Nikkei Asia. December 30. https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/China-and-Philippines-to-open-South-China-Sea-hotline

The White House. 2023. Washington Declaration. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/04/26/washington-declaration-2/

Walsh, Jim. 1997. “Surprise Down Under: The Secret History of Australia’s Nuclear Ambitions.” The Nonproliferation Review 5, 1: 1-20.

Yamaguchi, Mari. 2023. "Defense Ministers from Japan, China Inaugurate Hotline to Avoid Clashes, Build Trust." Associated Press, May 26. https://apnews.com/article/japan-china-defense-hotline-102d78cb896121a1ab55810b984beee0

Zhao, Tong. 2022. “How to Promote Arms Control in the Asia-Pacific Region,” Asia-Pacific Leadership Network Commentary, October 26. https://www.apln.network/analysis/commentaries/how-to-promote-arms-control-in-the-asia-pacific-region

■ Lee, Jeong-seok, Assistant Professor, Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, Taejae University.

■ Contact and Editing:Park, Ji-soo, EAI Research Fellow

    Inquiries and Editing: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | jspark@eai.or.kr