[US-China Nuclear Rapprochement Special Report] III. US-China Nuclear Competition and the New START Treaty

I. US-China Nuclear Capabilities and Nuclear Competition

1) The Imbalanced State of US-China Nuclear Capabilities

Currently, China's nuclear capabilities are overwhelmingly inferior to those of the United States in both quantitative and qualitative aspects. The United States and Russia each possess approximately 6,000 nuclear warheads. In contrast, China possesses around 350 nuclear warheads, showing a deficit of less than one-fifteenth in absolute nuclear armament. The United States does not rule out a preemptive nuclear strike against non-NPT signatory states like North Korea or Iran, and has adopted a highly offensive nuclear strategy that allows for the use of nuclear weapons if there is a significant security threat to allies or the U.S. itself, even if it is not a nuclear attack on the U.S. (US Department of Defense 2022). In reality, out of its approximately 6,000 nuclear warheads, the U.S. is known to have deployed around 700 strategic missiles armed with approximately 2,200 nuclear warheads in a state of constant readiness for launch. Since the development of its nuclear missiles, China has adhered to the principle of No First Use (NFU), pledging not to use nuclear weapons unless first attacked. Furthermore, it has maintained a Minimum Deterrence strategy, pursuing only the minimum necessary deterrent capability (Liping 2021).

China's inferiority is not only in quantity but also more severe in the quality of its weapon systems. The United States and Russia maintain a robust nuclear deterrence capability through a triad system comprising Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs), and nuclear missiles carried by strategic bombers, capable of launch from land, sea, and air at any time. In contrast, China's strategic nuclear arsenal primarily consists of a few dozen land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles. Moreover, these nuclear weapons are reportedly stored separately during peacetime, making them highly vulnerable to a preemptive nuclear strike by an adversary in an emergency (Stokes 2010).

Figure 1. Global Nuclear Warhead Status Figure 2. Nuclear Warhead Possession Forms

As indicated by the latest data from The Economist, this contrasts with the situation in 2022, where the United States and Russia each had approximately 2,000 nuclear warheads deployed and ready for launch. The reason China's 350 nuclear warheads are marked as reserve forces rather than deployed is significant. Consequently, from China's perspective, it faces a reality of absolute insufficiency in nuclear deterrence to prevent potential threats and interference from the United States. Given the accelerating US-China competition and the heightened possibility of conflict in the Taiwan Strait following the war in Ukraine, it is concluded that China would be forced to yield to US nuclear threats in the event of a military conflict.

2) Prospects for US-China Nuclear Competition

Over the next decade, China will likely prioritize efforts to increase its nuclear warhead production and missile development to narrow the gap in absolute numbers of nuclear weapons. China's strategic nuclear warhead count is projected to reach approximately 1,000 by 2030 and 1,500 by 2035. This means China will strive to minimize the nuclear gap with the United States and secure a substantial, albeit minimal, nuclear deterrent by 2030-2035. Concurrently, alongside narrowing the quantitative gap, it will also focus on enhancing its qualitative deterrent capabilities (U.S. Office of the Secretary of Defense 2021).

In his report to the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in 2017, marking the beginning of his second term, President Xi Jinping presented a blueprint for China to become the world's strongest power by 2050. To achieve this, he outlined a three-step timetable: "The People's Liberation Army must achieve mechanization and informatization by 2020, realize modernization of national defense and the armed forces by 2035, and build a world-class military by 2050." Since then, the Chinese military has embarked on a full-scale modernization drive to realize President Xi's 'strong military dream.' In accordance with Xi's directive to build a world-class military capable of confronting the United States within 30 years, the Chinese People's Liberation Army has initiated significant personnel reforms and equipment modernization. Xi emphasized that technological prowess is key to enhancing combat effectiveness, and that the People's Liberation Army must improve its information technology and modern warfare strategies, adding that high-ranking officer personnel reforms, integration of civilian and defense sectors, and strengthening border defense capabilities are also urgent.

President Xi's plan to build a world-class military is underpinned by China's growing security anxieties. According to Chinese military experts, despite decades of peace following the end of the Cold War, China now faces numerous security concerns. President Xi and the Chinese leadership keenly feel that the combat capabilities of the Chinese military are still insufficient compared to superpowers like the United States in a situation where war could break out at any time.

Therefore, China will strive to secure its significantly weakened minimum nuclear deterrence in the 21st century. This will involve efforts to narrow the quantitative gap, which is currently more than tenfold in terms of warhead numbers. Simultaneously, it will work towards completing its triad system, including mobile solid-fuel-based ICBMs, strategic submarines, and bombers. According to a 2022 U.S. Department of Defense report, China is constructing three new vertical silo bases capable of storing and launching 300 new solid-fuel-based ICBMs. Furthermore, it is reported to have acquired over 400 nuclear warheads, exceeding its current inventory of 350. With the plan to fundamentally complete the modernization of the Chinese military by 2035, it is expected to strive to secure 1,500 nuclear warheads by that time (Secretary of Defense 2022). Alongside quantitative expansion, China is developing and deploying multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) capable of carrying five nuclear warheads, as well as systems for launching them from mobile vehicles, trains, and vertical silos. It is also attempting to deploy six Jin-class strategic nuclear missile submarines and develop new strategic nuclear bombers (Secretary of Defense 2022).

II. US-China Nuclear Crisis in the 21st Century

1) The Taiwan Issue and the US-China Nuclear Crisis

It is unlikely that China will actively pursue nuclear arms control until it narrows the absolute gap in nuclear capabilities with the United States. According to U.S. intelligence agencies, China is pursuing "the most rapid increase in nuclear weapons holdings and platform diversification in history" and is analyzed to be "at least doubling its nuclear stockpile over the next decade" (Secretary of Defense 2020). In particular, China is observed to be seriously concerned about the possibility of military conflict with the United States, given the statements by U.S. officials since the Trump administration that deny the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party and the regime itself, the firm stance of U.S. leadership regarding Taiwan, and the strong military unity of NATO and the U.S. following the recent war in Ukraine (Gale 2022).

China currently adopts a Minimum Deterrence strategy and adheres to the principles of No First Use (NFU) and non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states (Information Office 2006). The United States declares its willingness to use nuclear weapons if necessary, even in response to conventional attacks, in cases of significant harm or threat to its homeland or allies. Furthermore, it proclaims an offensive nuclear doctrine that does not rule out the use of nuclear weapons against rogue states like North Korea or Iran, which are not signatories to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

The rapid military competition between the United States and China could lead to a Cold War-style nuclear competition and confrontation, reminiscent of the decades-long standoff between the U.S. and the Soviet Union after World War II. In such a scenario, the possibility of mutual miscalculation becomes a serious reality. The necessity of nuclear arms control between the U.S. and the Soviet Union during the Cold War was acutely felt through the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. When the Soviet Union deployed medium-range nuclear missiles in Cuba under the pretext of protecting its ally, the United States imposed a naval blockade, bringing both nations to the brink of nuclear war—the greatest crisis in Cold War history. Subsequently, the U.S. and the Soviet Union engaged in close communication regarding nuclear weapons through hotlines and arms control measures. However, China's current nuclear program and its intentions regarding the role of its nuclear weapons are conducted with extreme secrecy. Instead of participating in nuclear arms control negotiations with the United States, China demands that Washington reduce its nuclear arsenal first.

Currently, neither the U.S. nor China desires a full-scale war, but a military clash between the two is anticipated due to the Taiwan issue. The problem is that in the event of a crisis in the Taiwan Strait, not only a full-scale military conflict between the U.S. and China but also the possibility of nuclear war due to miscalculation arises. The necessity of discussions on mutual nuclear doctrines and preliminary measures such as rules of engagement is raised to prevent a full-scale nuclear war between the U.S. and China in such a scenario. For example, implicit or explicit red lines could be established regarding the operation of U.S. strategic assets such as nuclear submarines or bombers deployed in the Taiwan Strait, and rules of engagement or guidelines for naval engagements could be discussed in the event of a Chinese blockade of the Taiwan Strait. Of course, China would also need to redefine its no-first-use doctrine, as seen in the current war in Ukraine, to exclude the use of its nuclear weapons in the event of a Taiwan crisis.

Chinese strategists still believe that the likelihood of direct U.S. military intervention in a conflict near China's shores is low, unless it poses a direct threat to China's national security. In this context, China's military operations could be highly aggressive. Specifically, China's military strategy emphasizes gaining the initiative in conventional warfare. Consequently, it proposes the rapid and preemptive use of cyber warfare or missiles at the outset of a conflict (Laird 2017). This could lead to unexpected escalation, which in turn might prompt U.S. intervention.

Another issue is the tendency for the distinction between conventional and nuclear warfare to become blurred in modern warfare. For instance, Chinese strategic documents emphasize dominance in the space domain in modern warfare and present scenarios for attacking adversaries' satellites, including those of the United States, at the beginning of a conflict. However, U.S. satellites play a crucial role in command, control, and early warning for both conventional missiles and nuclear weapons. Even if China's satellite attack is intended to weaken conventional forces, the U.S. might interpret such an action as an attempt by China to neutralize its missile defense systems prior to a nuclear attack. Consequently, an initial Chinese satellite attack could be misconstrued as a measure severely damaging U.S. nuclear capabilities, potentially provoking a U.S. preemptive nuclear strike.

A similar risk of entanglement between nuclear and conventional forces could apply in reverse. The People's Liberation Army Rocket Force, responsible for China's nuclear arsenal, is organized into brigades that include both conventional and nuclear missile units. However, as they use the same supply and logistics chains for their mobile platforms, complex movements during wartime could lead to confusion in distinguishing between them. Furthermore, China's nuclear submarine forces are known to use the same communication systems as conventional submarines. Notably, China's primary missiles, such as the DF-21 and DF-26 intermediate-range missiles, can be equipped with either conventional or nuclear warheads on the same missile. This makes distinguishing between them in a real combat situation extremely difficult. In fact, some of these missiles have been observed in training exercises being used interchangeably with conventional and nuclear warheads (LaFoy and Pollack 2020). In this context, an attack on China's conventional missile or submarine forces could ultimately lead to a strike on the same command or control facilities as nuclear missiles, severely damaging China's nuclear capabilities.

In this scenario, it remains uncertain how the Chinese leadership would perceive and respond to potential strikes on their intermediate-range nuclear missiles or nuclear submarines. Moreover, the United States might be tempted to attack China's intermediate-range nuclear forces, which could severely impact its regional operations. Even if the U.S. does not carry out such operations, China might feel pressured to use its nuclear forces first, considering such a possibility. These dilemmas on both sides would be exacerbated by the fog of war, uncertain information environments, and the pressure for rapid decision-making during wartime.

2) New Military Technologies and US-China Strategic Competition

The US-China arms race in the 21st century is unfolding simultaneously in new domains and with new weapons utilizing Fourth Industrial Revolution technologies, alongside the nuclear arms race of the Cold War era. The emergence of these new technologies offsets the advantages of conventional weapons and domains from the Cold War era, while also combining with these conventional fields to create complex arms race dynamics. In particular, the combination of nuclear weapons, which represented strategic weapons during the Cold War, with these new technologies exacerbates the risks of nuclear arms competition and the difficulties of arms control in the 21st century. China, in particular, is striving to develop new weapon systems and strategies utilizing these new technologies to offset its conventional military inferiority compared to the United States.

China is currently focusing on enhancing AI, space, cyber, and drone capabilities through Military-Civil Fusion (MCF) to overcome its military inferiority vis-à-vis the U.S. (U.S. Office of the Secretary of Defense 2022). At the 19th Party Congress in 2017, President Xi Jinping emphasized the need to "accelerate the development of military intelligentization and improve joint and theater operational capabilities based on cyber information systems. We must scientifically foresee the profound impact of artificial intelligence on the military field, innovate military theory, and develop new weapons and equipment" (Kania 2019). The direction of China's military modernization under Xi Jinping can be summarized as the construction of an 'intelligentized military.' To this end, the Chinese military has established the Strategic Support Force, which is responsible for tasks such as intelligence reconnaissance, satellite management, electronic countermeasures, network attack and defense, and psychological warfare. Centered around the Strategic Support Force, China is preparing for future warfare, characterized by unmanned, intangible, silent, and borderless operations, through its MCF efforts.

Through military-civil fusion, China aims to overcome its disadvantages compared to the United States while simultaneously developing cutting-edge technologies that can exploit the vulnerabilities of U.S. military power. The areas China is focusing on are AI, space, cyber, and deep-sea capabilities. Firstly, AI is the core capability driving the intelligentization of the People's Liberation Army. By integrating AI technology, which possesses capabilities for analyzing billions of data points and self-learning, China aims not only to develop next-generation unmanned autonomous weapons but also to innovate military structures and tactics for the future era of intelligent warfare. In his speech at the 20th Party Congress in 2022, which decided his third term, President Xi continuously emphasized the importance of intelligent warfare utilizing next-generation AI technology (Epstein and Nelson 2022). In its Next Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan, which sets the goal of becoming an AI superpower by 2030, the Chinese State Council declared, "China will advance all types of AI technology and rapidly incorporate them into national defense innovation." Through this, China aims to achieve a cutting-edge intelligent military by leading the 5G era before the United States.

Secondly, the space domain. China's space program is growing rapidly. According to the U.S. report on China's military power, China is investing heavily in improving its capabilities in reconnaissance and surveillance, satellite communications, satellite navigation, and meteorology, including manned spaceflight and unmanned robotic space exploration (Burke 2019). China is developing various bases and infrastructure to enhance its capabilities in areas related to space vehicles, launch platforms, command and control, and data downlink. In particular, to overcome the quantitative advantage the U.S. holds in satellites, China is developing multi-faceted counter-space strike capabilities to deny and deter enemy space satellites during crises or conflicts. Representative examples include improving ground-based anti-satellite intercept capabilities and utilizing space-based satellites for enemy satellite interception (Davenport 2019).

Thirdly, the cyber domain. After analyzing the results of the U.S. Gulf War in the early 1990s, China began to recognize the importance of advanced science and technology and cyber warfare capabilities in the military sphere. It recognized that a method to offset the vastly superior U.S. electronic warfare capabilities was to paralyze the U.S. electronic warfare system by enhancing its own cyber warfare capabilities. The Network and Information Warfare units of the Chinese military's Strategic Support Force, established in 2016, aim to acquire operational capabilities to paralyze or neutralize the enemy's electronic warfare systems by injecting Trojan horse viruses into enemy government agencies, military units, overseas embassies, and scientific research institutions, and by capturing relay stations (Dyer 2019). In other words, it aims to attack the critical vulnerabilities of the U.S., which leads in electronic warfare.

Fourthly, enhancing operational capabilities using unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). For example, to overcome its inferiority in naval power, where the U.S. holds a decisive advantage, China is enhancing its deep-sea capabilities to disrupt U.S. naval operations. China has developed the unmanned submersible 'Qianlong' for deep-sea terrain observation and mineral resource exploration under state initiative. 'Qianlong' is designed to be capable of diving and surfacing without propulsion and to autonomously cope with various exploration activities and unexpected situations at depths of 4,500 meters. It is known that China is exploring the possibility of using unmanned submersibles, initially developed for civilian exploration, for military operations against U.S. strategic nuclear submarines and carrier strike groups, considered the most vulnerable aspects of U.S. naval power (Sutton 2023; Panneerselvam 2023).

In response to the U.S.'s large-scale maritime operational capabilities, China is building and deploying three aircraft carriers. However, in terms of performance and operation, it still remains at a significant disadvantage compared to the U.S.'s accumulated technology and operational capabilities, which have built a formidable fleet of over ten aircraft carriers through the Cold War era. The issue is that the military situations predicted for China in the future, including the Taiwan issue, are likely to unfold primarily in the maritime areas along China's coast, such as the South China Sea and the East China Sea. In such a scenario, China could face a critical weakness in a war with the U.S. Pacific Fleet, which relies on its overwhelming aircraft carrier groups and strategic nuclear submarines. In other words, since it is currently insufficient to match the U.S. naval strength in quantitative terms, China intends to disrupt or deny the actions and operations of the U.S. Navy by enhancing its deep-sea operational capabilities (Radio Free Asia 2022). In this process, China's denial strategy utilizing new military technologies could conflict with U.S. nuclear assets. The use of military operations employing new technologies, blurring the lines between conventional and nuclear warfare, could lead to a more dangerous phase in the 21st-century US-China strategic competition compared to the Cold War era.

III. Managing US-China Strategic Nuclear Competition in the 21st Century: The New START

Given the instability of the US-China nuclear competition discussed above and the current volatile regional situation, dialogue and institutional frameworks are urgently needed to ensure at least a minimum nuclear balance and stability between the U.S. and China. To this end, drawing upon the experience of nuclear arms control during the US-Soviet Cold War, a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) should be pursued between the U.S. and China, similar to the one that ensured nuclear disarmament and stability between the U.S. and Russia after the Cold War. In July 1991, Presidents George H.W. Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev met in Moscow and signed the START treaty, agreeing on limits for nuclear delivery systems such as ICBMs, SLBMs, and strategic bombers, as well as nuclear warheads. They also agreed on regular exchanges of information about each other's nuclear weapons and specific methods for mutual verification of treaty implementation. In 2010, the two countries further agreed to reduce nuclear weapons by signing the New START treaty, which remains in effect today.

The United States and China should pursue a New START treaty, an evolution of the US-Soviet model, to enhance nuclear balance and stability in the 21st century. For nuclear disarmament between the two countries, not only mutual reduction of nuclear warhead numbers but also limitations on the capabilities to surveil and precisely strike the adversary's nuclear weapons and delivery systems are necessary. Currently, major military powers, including the U.S. and China, are engaged in a precision race. If there are no limits on precision, suspicions will grow that a first strike could eliminate the adversary's nuclear arsenal. Since surveillance and reconnaissance functions are linked to space and cyber technologies, future US-China nuclear disarmament must include increased transparency in military technologies in cyber and space domains and the establishment of mutual reduction standards. This will help secure 'Mutually Assured Minimum Deterrence' to stabilize the unstable nuclear competition between the U.S. and China, and simultaneously pursue 'Mutually Integrated Deterrence' between conventional and nuclear weapons, which has become unstable due to the emergence of new technologies.

1) Achieving Mutually Assured Minimum Deterrence (MAMD)

During the Cold War, the strategic nuclear competition between the U.S. and the Soviet Union maintained deterrence stability through the mechanism of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), based on each side's second-strike capability. As examined earlier, the US-China nuclear competition in the 21st century is in a dual state of instability and danger, characterized by an imbalance in nuclear deterrence capabilities between the U.S. and China and a complex imbalance between nuclear and conventional weapons. The current US-China new Cold War, or Cold War 2.0, appears to be unfolding in a more precarious situation compared to the US-Soviet Cold War. Firstly, as the possibility of conflict between China and its neighbors increases, the likelihood of confrontation with the United States, which pursues military cooperation with these neighboring countries directly or indirectly, also rises. The Taiwan Strait is a prime example. However, during the Cold War, the U.S. and the Soviet Union had a mechanism that prevented military conflicts between the two blocs from escalating into direct full-scale confrontation: the nuclear balance of terror, known as Mutually Assured Destruction, due to nuclear weapons. During the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, facing the brink of military conflict over Soviet medium-range nuclear missiles deployed in Cuba, both the U.S. and the Soviet Union reached a dramatic diplomatic compromise.[1]

Currently, there is no such established mutual nuclear deterrence between the U.S. and China. While China possesses approximately 350 nuclear warheads, seemingly providing a symbolic minimum deterrence, the reality is that the nuclear balance between the U.S. and China is highly unstable due to the overwhelming quantitative and qualitative disparity with U.S. nuclear capabilities. This is particularly recognized as a serious issue by China itself. Furthermore, analyses suggest that the missile defense systems built by the U.S. and recent advancements in nuclear attack technologies have made the nuclear balance in the 21st century even more precarious, potentially allowing U.S. nuclear strategy to overwhelm not only China but also existing nuclear powers like Russia in a crisis scenario (Lieber and Press 2017).

In the event of a US-China nuclear war, it is known that the United States can intercept most Chinese missiles through its intercontinental ballistic missile defense systems in San Francisco and Alaska, and its sea-based Aegis missile defense systems operated primarily around Japan and Guam. Additionally, with a first strike using superior U.S. reconnaissance satellites and spy drones, it is believed that the U.S. possesses the capability to effectively destroy almost all of China's missiles. This means that with the advancement of new technologies and the missile defense systems established by the U.S., there is no confidence in China's second-strike capability. Consequently, the imbalance and risks of US-China nuclear competition may increase in the absence of a nuclear balance akin to the Mutually Assured Destruction of the Cold War era.

In this situation, China fears that the U.S. will intervene militarily with its formidable nuclear capabilities in the event of a crisis, such as the Taiwan issue or other contingencies. In such a scenario, China would be forced to yield not only to the superior conventional military power of the U.S. but also to its nuclear threat. This is why China is compelled to exert all its efforts to narrow the nuclear gap with the United States. If the current trend continues, China is expected to accelerate the completion of its nuclear triad by securing at least 1,000 to 1,500 nuclear warheads by 2030-2035, along with the deployment of strategic nuclear submarines, performance improvements of existing ICBMs, and strategic bombers. From China's perspective, these are measures to establish a minimum, substantial, and assured nuclear deterrence system against the United States.

The problem is that there are various risks involved as China strives to achieve the desired Mutually Assured Minimum Deterrence over the next decade. Therefore, during this period, the U.S. and China need to establish minimum communication and crisis management mechanisms to ensure mutual nuclear balance and reliability. Through this process, sincere dialogue and discussion between both countries are necessary regarding the conditions and technical scope of minimum assured deterrence that can be mutually recognized and trusted over the next ten years.

To overcome the urgent current nuclear instability, the U.S. and China must discuss a New START agreement concerning when and under what conditions China will achieve substantial minimum nuclear deterrence, given their asymmetrical nuclear capabilities, and what mutual confidence-building measures can be taken by both sides during this process. Furthermore, discussions on establishing crisis management systems and arms control for situations in the Taiwan Strait, South China Sea, and East China Sea are necessary. Simultaneously, discussions are needed on how China will perceive the deployment of missile defense systems, in which the U.S. holds an advantage, in regional contexts such as the Korean Peninsula or Japan. In this process, various forms of bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral discussions involving not only the U.S. and China but also South Korea and Japan, if necessary, would be effective.

First, to achieve this, the United States should consider declaring a No First Use (NFU) policy towards China. By confirming China's already declared NFU policy, it is necessary to mutually assure NFU between the U.S. and China and alleviate mutual distrust. This would be a significant step in removing China's anxiety that its nuclear deterrence might not function in the event of a U.S. preemptive nuclear strike, given the overwhelming U.S. nuclear capabilities and missile defense systems. Simultaneously, it could preemptively eliminate the possibility of China using medium- and long-range nuclear missiles in regional conflicts or other military crises under the pretext of such a situation.

Second, measures must be taken to alleviate mutual distrust between the U.S. and China regarding U.S. missile defense systems against North Korean nuclear missiles. Mutual arms reduction of missile defense systems is also necessary. If the vulnerability to nuclear attack from the adversary is weakened by advanced missile defense systems, the hypothesis of Mutually Assured Destruction collapses. Furthermore, if artificial intelligence, which will rapidly advance in the future, is linked to nuclear command and control systems, the premise of a balance of fear and caution based on the shared understanding that 'there are no winners in nuclear war' will crumble.

The U.S. missile defense currently aims to intercept the maximum number of missiles North Korea could launch against the U.S. in a contingency. The U.S. defense system, designed for an attack of about ten North Korean missiles, is similar to the number of surviving Chinese missiles for a second strike in the event of a U.S. preemptive nuclear attack. This is why China reacts sensitively to U.S. missile defense against North Korea. As North Korea's nuclear capabilities strengthen in the future, the U.S. missile defense response capabilities will also be enhanced. This, in turn, will intensify China's suspicion and anxiety.

To prevent this vicious cycle, it is crucial for the U.S. and China to first attempt a joint assessment and analysis of North Korea's nuclear and missile capabilities. Currently, the U.S. tends to overestimate North Korea's nuclear capabilities, while China tends to underestimate them. Honest exchange of views between experts from both sides to grasp the objective reality of the North Korean nuclear threat could be the first step towards building mutual trust and alleviating distrust surrounding North Korean nuclear weapons and U.S. missile defense. In particular, if South Korea, a U.S. ally, assists in this joint assessment by the U.S. and China and facilitates dialogue, it could further encourage China's willingness to participate.

Third, discussions are also needed on the nature and scope of the missile defense systems the U.S. is pursuing, and what corresponding measures China can take to stabilize their strategic nuclear balance. In particular, this should include discussions on the impact and coordination measures on the US-China strategic nuclear balance not only of missile defense systems centered around the U.S. homeland but also of missile defense systems deployed in Japan or South Korea or being developed by these countries themselves. If necessary, various forms of bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral discussions involving not only the U.S. and China but also countries like South Korea and Japan would be effective in this process.

2) Mutually Integrated Deterrence Based on New Technologies and Conventional Weapons

In the medium to long term, for the management and control of US-China nuclear competition, discussions on the conditions and domains of 'Mutually Integrated Deterrence (MID)' combining 21st-century new technologies with nuclear weapons are necessary. That is, communication must occur simultaneously regarding how the rapidly emerging new technologies are changing the conditions and circumstances of traditional nuclear deterrence. In other words, the application of 21st-century new technologies is blurring the distinction between conventional and nuclear weapons, increasing the risk of entanglement between them. Therefore, an approach and countermeasures are needed not merely for mutual deterrence based on nuclear weapons as during the Cold War, but for integrated deterrence combining nuclear weapons, conventional weapons, and new technologies.

Discussions are urgently needed, at least between the U.S. and China, to control and establish red lines for cyber warfare, space-based weapons, and autonomous weapons, for which international norms and regulations are currently non-existent, given the intense mutual interactions already occurring. In particular, discussions are urgent regarding areas where these weapon systems are linked to the use of nuclear weapons. Attacks on enemy satellites aimed at disrupting or interfering with conventional military operations can pose a serious threat to the launch and control of nuclear weapons, thus requiring distinctions and rules of engagement for such actions.

According to The Economist, which analyzed the ongoing war in Ukraine, large-scale wars between modern states are imminent, and high-intensity warfare of a different order than before is expected. In particular, the remarkable technologies such as drones, satellites, and artificial intelligence have enabled information gathering and processing through this war. Consequently, information gathering and processing are expected to become even more crucial in future wars. This is expected to be a new factor in future wars not only in Europe but also in other regions. In Asia, if the U.S. and China were to fight over Taiwan, there is a possibility that the two countries would attack each other in space due to the importance of information warfare via satellites in the initial stages. However, the problem is that the disabling of these early warning, command, and control satellites could lead to nuclear escalation.

It is well known that research on the application of artificial intelligence in the military domain is actively underway, led by the U.S. and China. For example, AI systems are expected to penetrate competitors' networks and data centers to manipulate algorithms or damage data. Furthermore, these technologies can play a crucial role in lethal autonomous weapon systems, including unmanned aircraft and underwater drones. The recent development of generative AI technology based on natural language processing raises concerns about the emergence of more fake content or deepfakes through fake text, images, or videos. These nascent technologies raise uncertainties regarding data integrity, bias, and reliability issues, which could lead to unintended consequences (Dominguez 2023a). Moreover, mutual penetration in cyberspace or counter-satellite operations in space can not only affect conventional warfare but also cause severe damage to the entire integrated military power and systems, including nuclear weapons.

Discussions are needed on at least the conditions for mutual deterrence and rules of engagement, or joint response measures, to prevent escalation in the fields of cyber, space, artificial intelligence, and unmanned systems, each of which is directly or indirectly linked to or affected by nuclear weapons. Furthermore, a new approach is needed for integrated deterrence measures concerning the areas where these technologies are integrated and interconnected and their effects. The problem is that, apart from nuclear weapons, new technology fields tend to be mired in secrecy in their initial development stages by both the U.S. and China. Moreover, they themselves often lack concrete ideas or plans regarding their effects and potential. Consequently, discussions on manuals, control regulations, and guidelines are insufficient in a stage where there is no concrete blueprint for the future that emerges from these new technologies, individually or in combination. When this extends to the international level, discussions have not even begun.

The recent controversy surrounding the development of generative artificial intelligence is a prime example. While some global companies are racing to develop it, a group of developers and researchers have proposed a six-month moratorium to establish basic norms that everyone can agree upon. However, despite concerns that artificial intelligence could surpass human capabilities or commands, development in this field is already moving in an uncontrollable direction. Moreover, these regulatory movements are primarily occurring in the U.S. and the West. China, in particular, is leading AI development under government direction, and some analyses suggest it is ahead of the U.S. in research and development (Dominguez 2023b). The problem is that no one knows what purpose or ideas China has in its development.

This is why dialogue is needed in the medium to long term between the U.S. and China, who are engaged in a technological hegemony competition in the 21st century, for mutually integrated deterrence combining these new technologies with nuclear weapons. First, dialogue and communication are needed among stakeholders and experts in this field at various levels, including governments, non-governmental organizations, and individuals. Greater engagement and dialogue are immediately needed between U.S. and Chinese policymakers. Various levels of official and unofficial dialogue between Chinese and U.S. officials, and dialogues between delegations of recently retired officials, will help resolve misunderstandings, improve understanding of risk factors and mutual red lines, and prevent unnecessary conflicts. Although some dialogues have occurred at an unofficial level in recent years, Beijing remains hesitant to pursue official dialogues on nuclear weapons. However, given the significant mutual distrust in the current bilateral relationship, regular dialogue is more important than ever.

As a concrete measure, the U.S. and China need to reactivate crisis management mechanisms, such as the Crisis Communications Working Group (CCWG), which was first held in 2020. Through this mechanism, which was not reconvened after China's cancellation in 2021, high-level strategic communication and hotlines, conducted during the Obama administration a decade ago, can be resumed, and military communication channels, which have been largely suspended, can be revived and expanded. Securing such communication channels is particularly urgent not only for their political and military significance but also for technical and practical discussions to prevent misjudgments between the U.S. and China arising from technological risks such as deepfakes, which are emerging with the advent of artificial intelligence.

References

Burke, Arleigh A. 2019. “China’s New 2019 Defense White Paper.” CSIS, July 24.

Davenport, Christian. 2019. “Another front in the tensions between the U.S. and China: Space.” The Washington Post, July 26.

Dominguez, Gabriel. 2023a. China takes ‘stunning lead’ in key technological research, think tank says.” The Japan Times, March 3. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2023/03/03/world/china-lead-tech/

__________________. 2023b. “The next arms race: China leverages AI for edge in future wars.” The Japan Times, April 20. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2023/04/20/asia-pacific/china-ai-future-wars/

Dyer, Geoff. 2019. “How China’s formidable cyber capabilities sparked a tech cold war.” The Financial Times, July 23.

Gale, Alastair. 2022. “China Is Accelerating Its Nuclear Buildup Over Rising Fears of U.S. Conflict,” The Wall Street Journal, April 9. https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-is-accelerating-its-nuclear-buildup-over-rising-fears-of-u-s-conflict-11649509201

Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China. 2006. “China’s National Defense in 2006.” http://www.andrewerickson.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/China-Defense-White-Paper_2006_English-Chinese_Annotated.pdf (Accessed: 2023. 08. 22)

Kania, Elsa B. 2019. “Innovation in the New Era of Chinese Military Power.” The Diplomat, July 25.

Kaufman, Alison A. and Daniel M. Hartnett. 2016. “Managing Conflict: Examining Recent PLA Writings on Escalation Control,” CNA: 81–82, https://www.cna.org/cna_files/pdf/DRM-2015-U-009963-Final3.pdf

Laird, Burgess. 2017. “War Control: Chinese Writings on the Control of Escalation in Crisis and Conflict,” Center for a New American Security. https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/war-control (Accessed: 2023. 08. 22)

Lieber, Keir A. and Daryl G. 2017. “The New Era of Counterforce: Technological Change and the Future of Nuclear Deterrence.” International Security 41, 4: 9–49. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00273

Liping, Xia. “Impacts of China’s Nuclear Doctrine on International Nuclear Disarmament.” Nuclear Threat Initiative. https://www.nti.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/Xia_Liping.pdf (Accessed: 2023. 08. 22)

Nelson, Amy J. and Gerald L. Epstein. 2022. “The PLA’s Strategic Support Force and AI Innovation.” Brookings Commentary, December 23. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-plas-strategic-support-force-and-ai-innovation-china-military-tech/

Panneerselvan, Prakash. 2023. Unmanned Systems in China’s Maritime ‘Gray Zone Operations.’ The Diplomat, January 23.

Pollack, Joshua and Scott LaFoy. 2020. “China’s DF-26: A Hot-Swappable Missile?” Arms Control Wonk, May 17. https://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/1209405/chinas-df-26-a-hot-swappable-missile/ (Accessed: 2023. 08. 22)

Radio Free Asia. 2022. “China develops extra-large underwater drones,” September 20. https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/china-underwater-09202022053815.html

Stokes, Mark A. 2010. “China’s Nuclear Warhead Storage and Handling System,” Project 2049 Institute, March 12.

Sutton, H. I. 2020. “China Deployed 12 Underwater Drones In Indian Ocean.” Forbes, March 22. https://www.forbes.com/sites/hisutton/2020/03/22/china-deployed-underwater-drones-in-indian-ocean/?sh=372c58a46693

U.S. Office of the Secretary of Defense. 2020. “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” https://media.defense.gov/2020/Sep/01/2002488689/-1/-1/1/2020-DOD-CHINA-MILITARY-POWER-REPORT-FINAL.PDF(Accessed: 2023. 08. 22)

_______________________________________. 2021. “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China.” https://media.defense.gov/2021/Nov/03/2002885874/-1/-1/0/2021-CMPR-FINAL.PDF (Accessed: 2023. 08. 22)

_______________________________________. 2022a. “Nuclear Posture Review 2022” in US National Defense Review 2022. https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/27/2003103845/-1/-1/1/2022-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY-NPR-MDR.PDF#page=33 (Accessed: 2023. 08. 22)

_______________________________________. 2022b. “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China.” https://media.defense.gov/2022/Nov/29/2003122279/-1/-1/1/2022-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA.PDF (Accessed: 2023. 08. 22)

[1]Certainly, the outcome was purely a matter of luck, and some argue that there were several instances of full-scale nuclear war during the tense 13-day military standoff. Nevertheless, it is an undeniable fact that the leadership of Kennedy and Khrushchev shared a fundamental stance of avoiding nuclear war.

■ Shin, Sung-ho, Professor, Graduate School of International Studies, Seoul National University.

■ Contact and Editing:Park, Ji-soo, EAI Research Fellow

    Inquiries and Editing: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | jspark@eai.or.kr