[Sino-US Nuclear Grand Bargain Special Report] ② Changes in Sino-US Military Security Strategy and the Future of the East Asian Security Order

I. Introduction

This report discusses the balance of military power and strategic changes between the US and China, which have the most fundamental impact on seeking a path toward a Sino-US grand bargain, and the future security order in East Asia when both countries pursue their current military strategies. First, it analyzes the current balance of military power between the US and China. Then, it examines "Integrated Deterrence," the core concept of US security strategy as revealed in US strategic documents released since February 2022, and China's military strategy of pursuing military modernization and intelligentization (智能化) with the goal of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation by 2049. Finally, it forecasts the future of the East Asian security order if both countries continue to build their "Integrated Deterrence" and "Intelligentized Warfare" capabilities in the current manner.

II. Comparison of US-China Military Power

Before comparing the military strategies of the US and China, it is necessary to examine the balance of military power between the two countries. The relative distribution of capabilities between states reveals their positions in the international political structure (Waltz 1979), thus providing a basic framework for understanding the background factors of strategic changes between the US and China. A comparison of aggregate data shows that in terms of military spending, the US spent $8.01 trillion and China spent $2.93 trillion in 2022, a ratio of approximately 8:3. In terms of nuclear warheads, the US has 5,428 and China has 350, a ratio of 15:1 (SIPRI 2022). However, these aggregate indicators have limitations due to issues of reliability in China's military spending statistics, the difficulty of simply substituting aggregate statistics for actual capabilities that can be projected into the relevant region (e.g., the US projects military power globally, while China concentrates on East Asia), and the failure to reflect the capabilities of allied nations.

A 2015 study by the RAND Corporation on the US-China military balance (Heginbotham Eric et al. 2015) overcomes the limitations of aggregate data by comparatively assessing the warfighting capabilities of the US and China in each domain, such as air power balance, airspace penetration, airbase attack capabilities, surface warfare, anti-space warfare, and cyber warfare, making it a useful resource ([Figure 1]). According to this study, China's pursuit of Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2AD) capabilities has achieved significant results, with China's missile capabilities assessed as sufficient to deny US forces power projection within the first island chain. Consequently, even though the US overwhelms China in air power, including fifth-generation fighter capabilities, the risk of aircraft carriers entering the first island chain makes US power projection into East Asia significantly limited in the event of a Taiwan crisis. However, US submarine capabilities are assessed to possess the capacity to deter a Chinese amphibious landing operation within the first island chain, suggesting that China would incur substantial costs in a scenario of armed invasion of Taiwan. In terms of space capabilities, both the US and China possess the ability to destroy each other's military satellites.

Figure 2 US-China Military Balance (RAND 2015)

However, in terms of nuclear capabilities, the US maintains a significant advantage, still possessing a deterrent force that makes it difficult for China to engage in rash military actions. China possesses the full nuclear triad of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and strategic bombers. However, due to the high noise levels of Chinese submarines, making them vulnerable to anti-submarine warfare, and the uncertain capabilities of the H-6N strategic bomber, China's actual second-strike capability depends on the success of strengthening the survivability of its nuclear assets through mobile launchers (TELs) and underground facilities (UGFs) (Wu 2022). In addition to these limitations in nuclear delivery capabilities, with a limited inventory of nuclear warheads not exceeding 400, China itself may question whether it possesses the minimum deterrence level of nuclear forces required to establish mutual vulnerability with the US.

However, under the assumption that nuclear weapons are not used, there are reports indicating that in a Taiwan crisis scenario, US-China direct military conflict would result in a significantly unfavorable outcome for the US in wargames. While the US holds an advantage in the initial five days of conflict, it incurs substantial costs thereafter, and in many cases, fails to achieve its military objectives. Some analyses suggest that the cost ratio for the US to achieve its military objectives compared to China in a military clash within the first island chain is as high as 10,000:1 (Allison 2020). From this perspective, the current balance of military power between the US and China can be seen as one where neither country can confidently claim superiority in limited or full-scale war scenarios, at least within the East Asian theater.

III. US Security Strategy: Integrated Deterrence

To counter China's area denial capabilities within the first island chain, the US Army developed and discussed the concept of "multi-domain operations" from the late 2010s, and began emphasizing the concept of "Integrated Deterrence" from 2021. This concept, frequently mentioned in the speeches of Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III (Austin 2021, 2022a, 2022b), is described as the core concept of future US defense strategy in all strategic documents released by the US in 2022, namely the "Indo-Pacific Strategy," "National Security Strategy (NSS)," "National Defense Strategy (NDS)," and "Nuclear Posture Review (NPS)."

According to the NSS explanation (Whitehouse 2022), 'Integrated Deterrence' is 'the seamless combination of capabilities' that can convince a potential adversary that the costs of hostile actions outweigh the benefits. This implies that Integrated Deterrence is an "all of us giving our all" strategy that integrates military domains (land, sea, air, space, cyber, non-kinetic), regions (e.g., Europe and the Indo-Pacific), the spectrum of conflict (from armed conflict to gray zone), governmental capabilities (diplomacy, intelligence, economy), and allied capabilities.

Secretary of Defense Austin explains that the reason the US must shift to an Integrated Deterrence strategy is the rapidly changing security environment, which requires the US to "track, understand, and respond" to targets at an unprecedented speed (Austin 2021). Specific tasks include: (1) air command-and-control framework, (2) surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities, (3) resilient basing, sustainment, and communications, (4) long-range strike capabilities, (5) space resilience, (6) resilience in cyber infrastructure, and (7) modernization of our nuclear capabilities.

The NDS (Department of Defense 2022) explains that the reason the US is adopting an Integrated Deterrence strategy is that it is currently navigating a "decisive decade." That is, by around 2030, there is a "near-simultaneous conflict with two nuclear-armed states," and preparations must be made for this. To counter multiple nuclear-armed states, it is necessary for the US to achieve its tactical objectives quickly at the outset of a conflict, which requires a significant enhancement of long-range detection and strike capabilities. While it is difficult to accurately ascertain the strategic judgments of the US leadership, the following facts suggest that the US is preparing to respond to the security crisis of the 2030s by strengthening strike capabilities based on long-range surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities.

First, the NDS prioritizes "Deterrence by Denial," "Deterrence by Resilience," and "Deterrence by Direct and Collective Cost Imposition" for strengthening US deterrence capabilities, emphasizing the enhancement of long-range strike, hypersonic, undersea, and autonomous weapon systems, and information sharing as the most urgent tasks. Second, when discussing R&D cooperation between allies and the US to build an integrated deterrence system, AI and hypersonic missile capabilities are emphasized (Austin 2022b). Third, the aforementioned RAND report and wargame results indicate US concerns about the strengthening of Chinese A2AD capabilities in the East Asian theater. Furthermore, the fact that prominent US think tank experts raise issues at international conferences regarding the inefficiency of Missile Defense (MD) systems (impossible to guarantee 100% defense and requiring astronomical costs for system development) (EAI-Belfer October Dialogue 2023) also suggests that US focus lies on denial through preemptive actions rather than defensive measures.

IV. China's Security Strategy: Intelligentized Warfare (智能化戰)

In contrast to the US NDS, China's relevant document is "China's National Defense in the New Era," published in July 2019 (State Council Information Office 2019). This document reveals China's basic perception that the US is using new technologies to contain China in order to maintain global hegemony amidst fundamental changes in the global power distribution structure, and that China must formulate a military security strategy with Chinese characteristics based on Xi Jinping Thought in response. The primary objective is presented as the "rejuvenation of the Chinese nation," and to achieve this, it emphasizes first, preventing Taiwan's independence and the separatism of Tibet and Xinjiang, and second, supporting China's sustainable economic development. In this context, it is made clear that preventing third-party military intervention within the first island chain is the capability China must prioritize. Simultaneously, to focus on the paramount task of the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, China pledges not to pursue hegemony but to expand alliances and partnerships and to contribute to world peace and common prosperity. Furthermore, with this direction, China sets military development goals to be pursued over the next 30 years according to important milestones for the Communist Party of China. First, by 2027, the centenary of the People's Liberation Army, it aims to "accelerate the building of mechanization, informatization, and intelligentization capabilities." Second, by 2035, it aims to reach the stage of "basic completion of military modernization." Third, by 2049, the centenary of the founding of the People's Republic of China, it aims to achieve "the construction of a world-class military" capable of defeating the US.

The direction outlined in "China's National Defense in the New Era" is maintained in President Xi Jinping's work report delivered at the 20th Party Congress in October 2022 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China 2022). To achieve the "great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation" by 2049, it pursues political, social, and military modernization. In this context, key tasks include achieving self-reliance and self-strengthening in advanced technologies, cultivating scientific and technological talent, improving people's livelihood and welfare, enhancing the ecological environment, achieving common prosperity, promoting the domestic market through the "dual circulation" economic strategy to reduce reliance on external supply chains, and promoting civil-military integration (军民融合) in the technological field. "Security (安全)" is also mentioned 91 times, explained as "people's security" (ultimate goal), "political security" (fundamental task), "economic security" (foundation), and "military, technological, cultural, and social security" (key pillars). Achieving military security on the foundation of economic security, which then contributes to achieving political and people's security, aligns with the US concept of integrated deterrence, which proposes the mobilization of national resources from a security strategy perspective.

More directly, the effort to build "integrated capabilities" is evident in expressions such as "all-domain linkage (全域联动)," "integration of mechanization, informatization, and intelligentization (机械化信息化智能化融合)," and "optimizing the joint operational command system and strengthening reconnaissance and early warning, joint strike, battlefield support, and comprehensive support systems and capabilities (优化联合作战指挥体系，推进侦察预警、联合打击、战场支撑、综合保障体系和能力建设)." This is essentially very similar to the Integrated Deterrence pursued by the US. The emphasis on the concept of "Intelligentized Warfare" in operating forces according to the "characteristics and laws of informatized and intelligentized warfare (信息化智能化战争特点规律)" is also for building a "complex system" that integrates military forces across various domains, and the fusion of humans and technology through AI is also emphasized in this context (Kania 2021). The US Department of Defense (Department of Defense 2022) expresses concern and emphasizes preparedness for China's "Multi-Domain Precision Warfare (多域精确战)," a concept introduced by China in 2021, which involves identifying US vulnerabilities based on C4ISR capabilities utilizing big data and AI, and conducting precision strikes with joint forces.

As the concept of "Intelligentized Warfare" itself suggests, China, even more directly and overtly than the US, positions AI technology as the core axis for building integrated capabilities. Effective integration across air, sea, land, space, electronic warfare, and cyber domains is only possible through the application of AI, big data, and cloud computing technologies (CNA 2022-08-11), and disrupting the adversary's integrated capabilities is also possible through electronic warfare employing AI. Therefore, future warfare is reduced to a "game of algorithms," and in this context, data acquisition emerges as the most critical task. Interestingly, China's proposed Intelligentized Warfare also ultimately focuses on increasing the tempo, accuracy, and efficiency of military operations, and the key capability required for this is presented as "remote, precise, miniaturised, large-scale unmanned attacks" (Kania 2021).

V. Prospects for the Future East Asian Security Order

As examined above, both the US and China are making the integrated operation of national power across all domains the core of their defense strategies, ultimately pursuing "deterrence by denial," which aims to "frustrate the attack itself by attacking first before the adversary can attack." The "long-range strike and hypersonic, undersea, and autonomous weapon systems" emphasized by the US and the "remote, precise, miniaturised, large-scale unmanned attacks" pursued by China are essentially not significantly different. Therefore, what is the future of the East Asian security order when we overlap the US's Integrated Deterrence and China's Intelligentized Warfare?

Three possibilities can be considered. First, in a situation where both countries compete, one country, either the US or China, succeeds in building an integrated capability system. In this case, the "nuclear balance" based on "second-strike capability" and "mutual vulnerability," which provided the fundamental basis for the US-Soviet détente, would not be established between the US and China. This would make China easily fall into the "use-it-or-lose-it" dilemma, potentially escalating a conventional limited conflict (e.g., the Taiwan Strait) between the US and China into a nuclear war instantaneously.

As a second possibility, if China's efforts to build Intelligentized Warfare develop concurrently with the US's efforts to build an Integrated Deterrence posture, both sides would possess first-strike capabilities that could neutralize an adversary's attack attempt by detecting and striking it in real-time. This would lead to a military order entirely different from the "mutual vulnerability" based on second-strike capability in the past, and its exact form is difficult to predict as it is unprecedented in human history. It is possible that a new form of "balance of terror" could be formed, where both sides maintain strategic balance by adopting a "Launch on Warning" doctrine. However, there is also a possibility that a conventional limited conflict could rapidly escalate into a nuclear war due to miscalculation or AI errors caused by cyberattacks.

A third possible future, unlike the previous two scenarios, is one where the US and China agree to establish a regime that regulates the combination of new technologies and nuclear strategy, thereby partially halting the arms race in integrated security capabilities. In this case, the issue of US-China nuclear imbalance would be partially resolved, as China would expand its nuclear warhead inventory to achieve minimum deterrence capabilities, making it impossible for the US to achieve "deterrence by denial" through preemptive strikes. Coupled with changes such as economic growth slowdown in the US and China due to decoupling or de-risking strategies, and a relaxation of nationalistic domestic politics, the possibility arises for the US and China to cooperate by maintaining only the minimum capabilities necessary for MAD, similar to the past US-Soviet relationship, and preventing unnecessary investment in nuclear capabilities.

In summary, the future of the East Asian security situation, influenced by changes in US-China military strategy, depends on whether the US and China can jointly control the pace of their respective efforts to build integrated capabilities and the extent to which new technologies are combined with nuclear capabilities. If the US and China fail to agree on establishing a regime for regulating new technologies, one side may succeed in building integrated capabilities faster than the other, overwhelming the adversary, which would significantly increase regional security instability. If both sides' capabilities develop at a similar pace, it could form a new type of MAD, but it would also create a highly unstable situation where conventional conflicts could rapidly escalate into nuclear war.

Ultimately, for the current vertical nuclear proliferation and the US-China nuclear competition to create a structural turning point for a new US-China détente, the US and China must meet, dialogue, and reach an agreement to create a strong regulatory regime that controls the speed at which new technologies are integrated into nuclear capabilities, or prevents the application of new technologies such as AI and quantum computing to nuclear weapon strategy altogether. Therefore, the future of the East Asian security order depends not only on who succeeds first in the militarization of new technologies, but also on whether the US and China can politically agree to constrain them.

References

Allison, Graham. 2020. “The U.S.-China Strategic Competition: Clues From History.” In Leah Bitounis and Jonathon Price (eds). The Struggle for Power: U.S.-China Relations in the 21st Century. Aspen Strategy Group.

Austin III, Lloyd J. 2021. “Secretary of Defense Remarks for the U.S. INDOPACOM Change of Command.” Transcript of speech delivered at Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, April 30. Honolulu, Hawaii, U.S.A.

___________________. 2022. “Prepared Remarks Before the House Armed Services Committee.” Transcript of speech delivered to the House Armed Services Committee, April 5. Washington, DC, U.S.A.

___________________. 2022. “Remarks at the Shangri-La Dialogue by Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III (As Delivered).” Transcript of Speech delivered at Shangri-La Dialogue, June 11. Singapore.

Heginbotham, Eric, Michael Nixon, Forrest E. Morgan, Jacob L. Heim, Jeff Hagen, Sheng Tao Li, Jeffrey Engstrom, Martin C. Libicki, Paul DeLuca, David A. Shlapak, David R. Frelinger, Burgess Laird, Kyle Brady, and Lyle J. Morris. 2015. The U.S.-China Military Scorecard: Forces, Geography, and the Evolving Balance of Power, 1996–2017. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation.

Kania, Elsa B. 2021. “Artificial Intelligence in China’s Revolution in Military Affairs.” Journal of Strategic Studies 44, 4: 515-542.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. 2022. “Report to the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China.” October 16.

State Council Information Office. 2019. “China’s National Defense in the New Era.” July 24.

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). 2022. SIPRI Yearbook 2022: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

U.S. Department of Defense. 2022. “2022 National Defense Strategy”. October 27.

_____________________. 2022. “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2022.” November 29.

Waltz, Kenneth N. 1979. Theory of International Politics. Long Grove, Illinois: Waveland Press.

White House. 2022. “National Security Strategy.” October 12.

Wu, Riqiang. 2022. “Assessing China-U.S. Inadvertent Nuclear Escalation.” International Security 46, 3: 128–162.

■ Kim Yang-gyu, Senior Research Fellow at EAI. Lecturer at the Department of Political Science and International Relations, Seoul National University.

■ Managed and Edited by:Park Ji-soo , EAI Research Fellow

    Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | jspark@eai.or.kr