[US-China Nuclear Détente Special Report] ① The Horror of Full-Scale Nuclear War Between the US and China and the Possibility of Détente

I. Militarization of US-China Strategic Competition and an Uncertain Future

The bilateral relationship between the United States and China is defined by strategic competition. As competition intensifies over core strategic interests, the relationship could lead to full-scale confrontation, or it could result in healthy competition and cooperation. It could also lead to a catastrophe culminating in nuclear war amidst uncontrolled competition and confrontation, or it could achieve détente and a grand bargain, similar to the strategic cooperation initiated by the US-China détente in 1972.

Both countries appear to emphasize the need for cooperation and share a consensus on preventing competition from escalating into confrontation and catastrophe. This is because they must prevent military conflicts from escalating into full-scale confrontation, given the broad common interests in preventing war, nuclear non-proliferation, joint responses to climate change and health issues, and the establishment of regulatory regimes for new technologies. The leaders of the US and China are exploring ways to ensure crisis stability and maintain communication channels through summit meetings and promoting exchanges between high-level officials. There are also signs of seeking ways to cooperate while reducing the risks arising from interdependence, rather than pursuing a complete decoupling between the two countries.

Nevertheless, strategic competition will likely persist for a considerable period. Concerns that the strategic competition between the US and China may become militarized, with intensifying competition in the military domain—including gray zone tactics, conventional forces, and even nuclear and new weapons systems—are expected to continue. While economic and technological competition between the US and China are subjects of concern for many countries, a military conflict would be a matter of life and death. South Korea, situated on the front lines of potential US-China military conflict, is particularly concerned about such a scenario. As transnational threats like climate change continue to grow, the absence of US-China cooperation could itself lead to the risk of human extinction, and furthermore, a military conflict between two nuclear powers could signal the end of international politics.

In this context, enhancing cooperation between the US and China, and further, fostering a basis for cooperation through a grand bargain, is a matter of global significance. The two countries have a precedent of pursuing strategic mutual interests through the experience of détente in 1972, and this adjustment of interests and vision of coexistence would bring significant benefits not only to both countries but also to the international community. We will consider whether the attention and efforts of the US, China, and the international community, which must prevent military conflict, can indeed lead to a US-China grand bargain and, further, to a new world order of coexistence, and how South Korea can play a role in facilitating cooperation in this process.

II. Historical Evolution of the US-China Strategic Relationship and the Current Phase

Historically, the US-China relationship has oscillated between hostility and strategic cooperation. During the Korean War, the United States and China were belligerents engaged in actual combat, while after Nixon's visit to Beijing in 1972, they established a strategic cooperative relationship. The US-China détente occurred amidst significant changes, including shifts in the nuclear balance and arms reduction efforts between the US and the Soviet Union, changes in the interests and weakening cohesion of countries within the two major Cold War blocs, and the establishment of new strategic relationships between countries across blocs, as seen in Europe in the 1960s.

Despite the profound transformation of the end of the Cold War, the United States and China generally maintained a cooperative relationship based on shared strategic interests. Although US-China relations became strained after the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989, the Clinton administration maintained cooperation with China in the 1990s. Following the Clinton-Jiang Zemin summit in October 1997, a new relationship of "constructive strategic partnership" was established.

With China's accession to the WTO in 2001, the United States believed that China's economic development could contribute to mutual interests between the two countries. However, after the 2008 economic crisis, China began to question US global leadership and criticized the Western capitalist economic model that underpinned neoliberal globalization. China gradually shifted its national strategy from 'hiding its capabilities and biding its time' (韬光养晦), pursued since the reform and opening up in 1978, to a strategy of actively securing global influence, such as 'striving for achievement' (奮發有爲).

Although tensions were high during the Obama-Hu Jintao era, a cooperative relationship, often referred to as a "new model of great power relations," was generally maintained through the 2010s. The current era of full-blown US-China strategic competition began with the advent of the Trump administration in 2017 and the formal adoption of the Indo-Pacific strategy by President Trump at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in November of that year. The US had attempted to engage China for over 40 years but ultimately failed, solidifying the perception that China sought to establish an alternative world order centered on China, departing from the US-led liberal rules-based order within which it had grown.

As a result, a relationship of competition and confrontation has emerged between the US and China, extending from trade disputes to the economy as a whole, values, norms, and military security. The era of strategic competition and so-called decoupling between the US and China, which began at the Hanoi summit, saw its scope expand throughout the entire Trump administration, increasing the potential for confrontation and conflict, and leading to an irreconcilable relationship characterized by value polarization.

Since the Biden administration took office, US-China relations are still characterized by competition, but following the US-China summit in Bali, Indonesia, on November 15, 2022, the two countries agreed to enter an era of crisis management and a complex period of strategic cooperation and competition. If the Hanoi paradigm of the past five years was an era of full-scale competition leading to confrontation, the Bali paradigm, initiated in 2022, can be described as a period of strategic adjustment aimed at managing crises and reconciling differences through diplomatic means. This period of strategic adjustment is defined as de-risking rather than complete decoupling. This era entails de-securitizing all excessively securitized issues and restoring diplomatic dialogue mechanisms that can prevent crises of conflict, while pursuing a better relationship through bilateral competition.

However, fundamental differences in perspectives on the bilateral relationship still exist between the US and China, and there is a lurking risk of escalating into military and diplomatic conflict if risk management fails. In particular, since Russia's invasion of Ukraine, not only has the threshold for the use of military force been lowered, but criticism from various countries opposing the US-led international order has also intensified. China perceives that the international order pursued by the US is unsustainable and that a situation may arise where it can pursue an alternative order led by China.

In this process, even while pursuing a relationship of cooperation and competition, there is a prevalent perception that military and security confrontation must ultimately be prepared for. In particular, as instability in the Taiwan Strait increases and the perception expands that China's policy of changing the status quo could lead to a forceful unification attempt against Taiwan in the future, US-China relations are facing greater difficulties. China aims to realize its 'strong military dream' by 2027, the 100th anniversary of the founding of the People's Liberation Army, and is making efforts to secure the world's strongest military thereafter. It is reorganizing military regions, preparing for intelligent warfare and multi-domain operations in line with the paradigm of changing new technologies, and pursuing military modernization suitable for the Fourth Industrial Revolution through the integration of civilian and military technologies.

III. Intensification of US-China Nuclear Competition and the Destructive Impact of New Technologies

Amidst these evolving trends, the ultimate dimension that will determine US-China military conflict is the balance of nuclear forces. Currently, China is simultaneously pursuing efforts to secure influence in gray zone areas such as the South China Sea, resolve sovereign territorial disputes like the Taiwan Strait, and enhance its global military standing. However, if these efforts infringe upon existing US national interests, military confrontation between the US and China may become unavoidable. A low-intensity conflict using conventional weapons, if it escalates repeatedly, could progress from full-scale conventional warfare to ultimately nuclear war.

Comparing the military capabilities of the US and China in terms of aggregate data, the US spent $8.01 trillion in 2022, while China spent $2.93 trillion, showing a ratio of approximately 8:3. In terms of nuclear warheads, the US has 5,428 and China has 350, a ratio of 15:1. However, these aggregate indicators have limitations due to issues of reliability in China's military spending statistics, the difficulty of simply translating aggregate statistics into actual capabilities that can be projected within the relevant region, and the exclusion of allied capabilities.

In terms of nuclear capabilities, the US overwhelmingly surpasses China, maintaining a deterrent force that makes it difficult for China to engage in rash military actions. China possesses the full nuclear triad—intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and strategic bombers—but its submarine noise levels are high, making it vulnerable to anti-submarine warfare, and the capabilities of its H-6N strategic bombers are uncertain. Consequently, China's actual second-strike capability depends on the success of enhancing the survivability of its nuclear assets, including mobile launchers (TELs) and underground facilities (UGFs). In addition to these limitations in nuclear delivery capabilities, the fact that it possesses no more than 400 nuclear warheads raises questions as to whether China itself possesses the minimum deterrence nuclear forces necessary to create mutual vulnerability between the US and China.

Comparing US and Chinese strategies, the 'integrated deterrence' pursued by the US is a 'seamless combination of capabilities' designed to convince potential adversaries that the costs of hostile actions outweigh the benefits. This implies that integrated deterrence is an 'all of us giving our all' strategy that integrates military domains (land, sea, air, space, cyber, non-military), regions (e.g., Europe and the Indo-Pacific), conflict spectrums (from armed conflict to gray zone), governmental capabilities (diplomacy, intelligence, economy), and allied capabilities.

China is also focusing on building 'integrated capabilities,' as evidenced by expressions such as 'all-domain coordination' (全域联动), 'integration of mechanization, informatization, and intelligentization' (机械化信息化智能化融合), and 'optimizing the joint operational command system and strengthening reconnaissance and early warning, joint strike, battlefield support, and comprehensive support systems and capabilities' (优化联合作战指挥体系，推进侦察预警、联合打击、战场支撑、综合保障体系和能力建设). This is essentially very similar to the integrated deterrence pursued by the US.

If we overlay the US's 'integrated deterrence' with China's 'intelligentized warfare,' what does the future of the East Asian security order look like? Three possibilities can be considered. First, in a situation where both countries are competing, one country, either the US or China, successfully builds an integrated capability system. In this case, the 'nuclear balance' based on 'second-strike capability' and 'mutual vulnerability,' which provided the fundamental basis for US-Soviet détente, will not be established between the US and China. This would make it easy for China to fall into the 'use-it-or-lose-it' dilemma, potentially escalating a conventional regional conflict (e.g., in the Taiwan Strait) into nuclear war instantaneously.

As a second possibility, if China's efforts to build intelligentized warfare develop at a similar pace to the US's efforts to build an integrated deterrence posture, both sides would possess first-strike capabilities capable of neutralizing an adversary's attack attempt in real-time, thereby nullifying the attack itself. This would lead to a military order entirely different from the past 'mutual vulnerability' based on second-strike capability, the exact form of which is difficult to predict. While it might be possible to maintain strategic balance by adopting a 'Launch on Warning' (预警反击) doctrine, there is also a risk of conventional regional conflicts rapidly escalating into nuclear war due to miscalculation or cyberattacks leading to artificial intelligence errors.

A third possible future, unlike the previous two scenarios, is one where the US and China agree to establish a regime to regulate the combination of new technologies and nuclear strategies, thereby partially halting the unchecked race to build integrated security capabilities. In this case, the issue of US-China nuclear imbalance would be partially resolved as China expands its nuclear warhead stockpile to a level where the US cannot achieve 'deterrence by denial' through a first strike. If this is accompanied by changes such as a slowdown in US-China economic growth due to decoupling or de-risking strategies, and a softening of nationalistic domestic political sentiment, the possibility of cooperation between the US and China could open up, where they maintain only the minimum capabilities necessary for MAD (Mutually Assured Destruction) like the US and Soviet Union, and prevent unnecessary investment in nuclear capabilities.

Nuclear disarmament agreements are based on mutual interests in sharing vulnerabilities and preventing unnecessary nuclear arms races beyond survival for mutual security. This was the premise applied to the US and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, but the current US-China nuclear competition is different. That is, with the advancement of artificial intelligence, space power, and cyber technology, the reality of neutralizing an adversary through highly sophisticated military intelligence and precision strikes is approaching. If this happens, the hypothesis of mutually assured destruction, based on the possession of retaliatory capabilities by both sides, will collapse. Currently, with the combination of nuclear forces and new technologies due to the development of new technologies, it is uncertain how the hypothesis of mutual deterrence will change. If the US and China engage in an unlimited arms race, including new technologies, strategic stability based on mutually assured destruction cannot be guaranteed. Ultimately, this could lead to a situation where the security of both countries is severely undermined by an unpredictable arms race, and the security of the entire world is jeopardized by an unintended nuclear war.

Currently, both the US and China are engaged in an arms race, believing that they can gain an advantage by building integrated security capabilities that combine new technologies and nuclear strategies. While the clear nuclear imbalance between the US and China currently prevents this imbalance from escalating the US-China strategic competition into full-scale military conflict, given China's economic and technological development, a certain degree of nuclear balance between the US and China is expected by the 2030s. This will incentivize China to become more assertive in gray zone areas and conventional warfare. If a balance of military power, including nuclear capabilities, is achieved between the US and China in the 2040s, in the absence of an agreement on new technology regulatory regimes, the nature of military conflict in the Indo-Pacific region is likely to fundamentally change.

IV. The Necessity of Cooperation Arising from the Competition in Nuclear Weapons and New Weapons Systems

If the competition over nuclear weapons between the US and China continues, strategic stability will inevitably be severely undermined. Both countries will exhibit instability in their arms buildup, pursuing the augmentation of nuclear arsenals, and the risk of military conflict between the US and China escalating into nuclear war will also increase. Therefore, controlling the possibility of nuclear armament and nuclear war, which would result in catastrophic damage to both the US and China, is a common interest for both nations.

It is true that strong incentives for cooperation currently exist between the US and China. For example, issues like climate change are existential threats to humanity; if the US and China do not cooperate, both countries and all of humanity will face difficulties. The control of new technologies, if it leads to an unchecked race, could also lead both countries into uncontrollable risks.

However, the possibility of nuclear war is what will most acutely impress upon them the necessity of cooperation. The nuclear competition between the US and China is not merely an issue for the two countries but also affects Asian nations and, indeed, the entire globe.

If US-China nuclear competition intensifies, it will also impact the armament of their allies and strategic partner countries. North Korea is already advancing its nuclear capabilities in an environment where the threshold for nuclear weapon augmentation and use is lowering. This is a major factor of strategic instability for Northeast Asian countries and, above all, an impetus for South Korea to pursue its own nuclear armament. If both the United States and China fully recognize the immense future risks that their current strategic competition could lead to nuclear conflict, the incentive for cooperation will be stronger than in any other area.

If the US-China détente of 1972 was aimed at pursuing Cold War stability and jointly containing the Soviet Union, which infringed upon the sovereignty of other nations, similar strategic cooperation incentives exist today. Considering the impending strategic balance of mutually assured destruction between the US and China, the increase in new security threats combining nuclear competition and new technologies, the strengthening of the environment for nuclear armament competition that could promote nuclear armament among all Indo-Pacific nations, and the rapid erosion of the global non-proliferation regime that could prevent these outcomes, the incentives for US-China cooperation remain very strong, despite the atmosphere of strategic competition. Even if the US and China engage in a power balance competition seeking superiority, a balance of interests for common good is possible, and this process could lay the foundation for long-term relationship development. Conversely, the failure of cooperation, leading to an increased risk of nuclear war and a fundamental crisis for the security of both nations and the visible threat of human extinction, also presents a negative incentive for cooperation.

V. Four Initiatives for US-China Cooperation

Can we find an opportunity for cooperation in the nuclear field to prevent these risks and anticipate future risks between the US and China, thereby making cooperation tangible? Cooperation between the US and China in the nuclear field extends beyond the security interests of the two countries, impacting stability, nuclear non-proliferation, and nuclear safety at the regional, Indo-Pacific, and global levels. As ways to foster US-China cooperation, we can propose to both countries: ① a New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), ② a Non-Proliferation Initiative in the Indo-Pacific, ③ a Nuclear Security Initiative to prevent nuclear terrorism, and ④ a Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula Initiative.

To achieve a grand bargain and détente between the US and China, the following alternatives must be pursued. First, both the United States and China must share a sober recognition that common interests still exist, even as they engage in a competition for future leadership and power superiority. A balance of power does not always have to align with a balance of interests. Furthermore, various actors within both countries, such as corporations and civil society groups, prioritize mutual cooperation.

The US currently emphasizes fair and rules-based competition with China. However, at the same time, voices advocating for continued pressure on China based on a vague notion of hegemonic competition are gaining traction. Domestic politics in the US is a crucial variable in this process. During the détente of 1972, the domestic political situation was such that Nixon could effectively withdraw from Indochina with China's help, which would aid his re-election bid. However, today, the Democratic and Republican parties are competing over US-China competition. In such circumstances, a structure prone to overbalancing rather than détente with China is likely to emerge.

Conversely, there is an atmosphere in China that does not acknowledge the competition between the US and China itself. However, inwardly, China is already engaged in competition with the US in a positive sense and recognizes that it can develop through competition. The problem is the anxiety that China, being at a disadvantage in overall national strength, might have to bear unexpected losses in national strength while competing with the US. While China's authoritarian system has maintained an efficient policy-making structure internally, if economic development slows and demands for democratization increase, it may pursue a hardline foreign policy to appease domestic discontent. Ultimately, an awareness is needed to ensure that the domestic political dynamics within both the US and China do not diminish the possibility of cooperation through a grand bargain.

Within the context of US-China strategic competition, separate from the balance of power, a balance of interests that does not affect the relative gains of the two sides can exist. In particular, mutual annihilation through war is a situation that both the US and China must bear in mind even during competition. Therefore, it is necessary to urge the recognition of the military stability and prevention of mutual annihilation that are essential for the continuation of US-China competition.

Second, it is necessary to closely examine various aspects of the nuclear arms control negotiations between the US and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Reviewing the strategic arms reduction treaties between the US and the Soviet Union, which began in the 1970s, reveals that pursuing arms control negotiations is beneficial for the security interests of both countries when they reach a point where mutually assured destruction is possible. Currently, there is a significant imbalance in nuclear capabilities between the US and China, but a balance point for mutually assured destruction will soon be reached as China's nuclear capabilities increase. It is important to recognize in advance the necessity of nuclear arms control that will arrive in the 2030s by accurately presenting the future outlook of nuclear capabilities for both the US and China. Nuclear experts from both the US and China must prepare a roadmap for initiating arms control negotiations and establish a very concrete strategic dialogue system for this purpose.

Third, it must be recognized that if there is no US-China nuclear détente, various countries in Northeast Asia, and indeed in the Indo-Pacific region, may pursue nuclear armament or augment their nuclear capabilities, regardless of the intentions of the US and China. In addition to North Korea's illicit nuclear development, the possibility of nuclear armament by South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan is also presented in this study if denuclearization is not achieved.

If the US and China fail to establish a non-proliferation regime in the nuclear domain at the Northeast Asian, Indo-Pacific, and global levels amidst their power struggle, it will have catastrophic consequences for the security interests of both nations. Both countries must create an opportunity for cooperation to initiate comprehensive efforts for nuclear non-proliferation not only through bilateral arms control but also at regional and global levels.

Fourth, US-China nuclear cooperation is not limited to nuclear weapons but must also encompass various concerns related to nuclear security, prevention of nuclear terrorism, and the peaceful use of atomic energy. Both the US and China have made efforts in nuclear security and the prevention of nuclear terrorism in various forms. It is essential to recognize the critical importance of cooperation on these issues at the multilateral level for maintaining the international security order and to create opportunities for cooperation.

VI. Implementation Measures for US-China Grand Bargain

Can efforts to reduce the risk of nuclear war, which could lead to mutual annihilation between the US and China, lead to broader cooperation? This approach involves first strengthening the foundation for overall cooperation, starting with the military domain, including nuclear forces which are critical to the survival of both nations, and then pursuing the adjustment of broad core interests. It is also useful to reflect on the détente of 1972 and compare it with the present. That is, from the perspective of 2023, are the conditions for a US-China grand bargain in place?

At the time of the US-China détente in 1972, the power disparity between the two countries was so vast that neither could be considered a rival in terms of hegemonic or strategic competition. Since there was almost no interdependence between the US and China, the elements of conflict in their interests prior to détente were not directly significant. However, today, China has become so powerful that it rivals US national strength, and the deep interdependence between the US and China means that the elements of conflict, both geopolitically and economically, are incomparably larger than they were then.

While the détente of 1972 stemmed from the triangular relationship between the US, China, and the Soviet Union, today it is difficult to identify a great power that both the US and China could consider a common enemy or threat. In 1972, Nixon's domestic political situation was such that effectively withdrawing from Indochina with China's help would aid his re-election bid. However, today, the Democratic and Republican parties are competing over US-China competition. In such circumstances, a structure prone to overbalancing rather than détente with China is likely to emerge.

Nevertheless, we can consider the fundamental factors for a US-China grand bargain. First, it is important to present an analysis and outlook for the changing international landscape. In a world undergoing complex macro-transitions, there are aspects that align with Nixon's "structure of peace" strategy.

Second, similar to the 1960s, there is a diversification of interests among US allies and a variability in bloc cohesion. Not all countries in the world will be divided by the competition between the US and China. Due to diverse interests and interdependence that transcends blocs, the US and China will inevitably have to compromise to some extent by reflecting the positions of various countries in different fields. Furthermore, the US also needs to diversify its China strategy to reflect the interests of its various allies. Additionally, South Korea needs to clarify its position.

Third, it is necessary to consider and argue whether the interests of the Biden administration, or the ruling party in the US, can be complementary to a policy of détente with China. Amidst considerable debate and discourse competition regarding the ultimate form of the US's China strategy, research and consideration are needed for the schools of thought and forces that advocate for the necessity of détente, grand bargain, and engagement with China within the US.

The following are potential facilitating factors for realizing a US-China grand bargain in the future. First, given that US-China nuclear competition is becoming visible and its risks are sufficiently foreseeable, a consensus on the need to prevent competition, and even nuclear war, and discussions on disarmament are likely. Despite the strategic competition between the US and China, the two countries share significant common interests, and the mutual benefits of cooperation are substantial. Therefore, it is unlikely that there are no voices calling for compromise and cooperation outside of geopolitical considerations.

As mentioned earlier, the outcomes of scenarios 1 and 2, where the US and China fail to establish a new technology regulatory regime, would be catastrophic not only for the US and China but for humanity as well. While it seems inevitable that the US and China will continue their competition in building integrated security capabilities combining new technologies and nuclear capabilities until the 2030s, if the US-China arms race continues into the 2040s, both nations will realize the consequences of self-destructive competition in advance and will need to engage in nuclear negotiations around the late 2030s. In particular, while the US, currently leading in AI and semiconductors, may be confident of overwhelming China, it is highly likely that it will recognize that such superiority could compel China to adopt offensive nuclear strategies and provoke actions such as the destruction or disabling of satellites in the vulnerable space domain. The US is likely to acknowledge its inability to achieve 'deterrence by denial,' which would pave the way for establishing a US-China new technology regulatory regime. If this is supported by the domestic political and economic conditions of the US and China, the conditions for US-China nuclear disarmament negotiations and a grand bargain will be met.

The US and China can pursue a 'New START' treaty, developing upon the US-Soviet arms control agreement model. For nuclear disarmament between the two countries, it is necessary not only to mutually reduce the number of nuclear warheads but also to limit the capabilities for reconnaissance and surveillance of the adversary's nuclear weapons and delivery systems, and to strike them with extreme precision. Currently, major military powers, including the US and China, are engaged in a precision competition. If there are no limits on precision, the suspicion that the adversary's nuclear weapons can be eliminated through a first strike will increase.

Mutual disarmament of missile defense systems is also necessary. If the vulnerability to nuclear attack from an adversary is weakened by advanced missile defense systems, the hypothesis of mutually assured destruction will collapse. Furthermore, if artificial intelligence, which will rapidly advance in the future, is connected to nuclear command and control systems, the premise of prudence and the balance of terror based on the shared understanding that 'there are no winners in nuclear war' will crumble.

Since surveillance and reconnaissance functions are linked to space and cyber technologies, future US-China nuclear disarmament must include measures for increasing transparency and establishing standards for mutual reduction in military technologies in the cyber and space domains.

Second, a US-China agreement for an Indo-Pacific Non-Proliferation Initiative should be pursued. In the process of establishing a regional nuclear non-proliferation regime, efforts for crisis management and confidence-building are needed, including: (1) establishing and activating crisis management communication mechanisms at the military command and defense ministry levels between the US, China, and regional countries; (2) reaffirming political and military red lines and refraining from provocative actions by the US, China, and regional countries; and (3) initiating public-private dialogue on the deployment of nuclear weapons, missile defense systems, and the operation and management of advanced weapons.

Third, there is the agenda of US-China cooperation on nuclear terrorism and safety. Cooperation should be strengthened in areas of common interest, such as responding to the threat of attacks on nuclear power plants by state militaries, which has sharply emerged since the war in Ukraine, and addressing the escalating nuclear proliferation threats and deepening nuclear security and safety issues in the Northeast Asian region due to nuclear competition. Furthermore, sophisticated agenda-setting on nuclear security issues is necessary to manage the US-China nuclear competition so that it does not fall into bloc logic and weaken cooperation incentives despite clear common interests, and to avoid a situation where the US and China fundamentally fail to find common ground due to the entanglement of terrorism and human rights issues.

Fourth, a US-China agreement on the denuclearization of North Korea should be pursued. Both countries agree that North Korea's denuclearization is in their mutual interest. If North Korea is recognized as a nuclear state, South Korea and Japan may also pursue nuclear armament, and the global non-proliferation regime pursued by the US will be severely damaged. China also finds the strengthening of the US-South Korea alliance and the US-Japan alliance due to North Korea's nuclear armament to be a very burdensome situation. Furthermore, it would be awkward for China to fail to exercise leadership in the global non-proliferation regime. North Korea demands the right to development and survival for regime security in the future, and establishing a peace regime that can guarantee this is a major challenge for all Northeast Asian countries. The US and China can agree on providing North Korea with the rights and regime security it claims in exchange for complete denuclearization. If a denuclearized North Korea does not lean towards either the US or China, maintains geopolitical neutrality, and does not cause significant changes in relative gains in the current US-China strategic competition, the possibility of US-China cooperation is high. Therefore, North Korea's denuclearization can serve as an important stepping stone for negotiations, as it allows both the US and China to uphold the global non-proliferation regime and maintain their leadership.

North Korea demands the right to development and survival for future regime security, and establishing a peace regime that can guarantee this is a major challenge for all Northeast Asian countries. The US and China can agree on providing North Korea with the rights and regime security it claims in exchange for complete denuclearization. If a denuclearized North Korea does not lean towards either the US or China, maintains geopolitical neutrality, and does not cause significant changes in relative gains in the current US-China strategic competition, the possibility of US-China cooperation is high. Therefore, North Korea's denuclearization can serve as an important stepping stone for negotiations, as it allows both the US and China to uphold the global non-proliferation regime and maintain their leadership.

VII. US-China Grand Bargain and South Korea's Considerations

If cooperation between the US and China in the security domain expands into a grand bargain in other areas, a more stable international environment will be created. In the case of 1972, the US and China achieved cooperation by pursuing mutual recognition and comprehensive mutual interests, including economics, along with issues of Taiwan and security on the Korean Peninsula. The US and China are now realizing that market-based interdependence cannot be completely severed, moving beyond the decoupling attempts of the past five years. The risk reduction or de-risking paradigm being pursued between the US and China this year aims to strengthen strategic cooperation while maintaining the US-China competitive relationship.

The US indicates that economic cooperation is possible if China maintains fair market practices in line with the liberal economic order. Secretary of the Treasury Yellen has also advocated for maintaining US-China economic relations through constructive engagement. While it is true that the US is concerned about economic cooperation with military and security implications, if a foundation for cooperation in nuclear and regional security is established as discussed earlier, a significant portion of the obstacles to economic cooperation can be removed. This opens the door for cooperation in areas that are not private items with security implications.

China suspects that the US is trying to thwart its economic development and claims that the US is pursuing high tariffs and decoupling of advanced technologies for this purpose. However, if the interdependence between the US and China is maintained, progress is made on tariff reduction agreements in the trade sector, and security competition surrounding new technologies can be resolved within security negotiations, the issue of decoupling advanced technologies can also be resolved.

The US and China can move towards a grand bargain encompassing economics, politics, and society on the foundation of mutual cooperation stemming from core security interests. In doing so, the US and China will begin efforts to reset their overall political relationship, recognizing each other's systems and coexisting and co-prospering.

Looking back at past détente experiences, the readjustment of relations between major neighboring powers has significantly impacted South Korea's interests as well. Above all, preventing war between major powers, especially nuclear war, is a matter of existential importance for the nation. It is also crucial to prevent the great power competition from fueling the proliferation of North Korean nuclear weapons and skepticism about denuclearization amidst the ongoing advancement of North Korea's nuclear program. At the same time, it is important to remember that while the US-China détente of the past seemed beneficial for South Korea in terms of easing Cold War tensions, South Korea experienced considerable confusion and difficulties during the process leading to détente and the détente phase itself.

The lesson learned from détente is that changes in great power politics dictate the scope of diplomatic options for relatively weaker nations like South Korea. South Korea found it difficult to predict and prepare for the Nixon administration's rapid withdrawal from Asia and the withdrawal of US forces from Korea, as well as the normalization of US-China relations, with sufficient time. A mini-détente on the Korean Peninsula, which was not strategically prepared for, also ended in failure. North Korea utilized the détente phase to accelerate its peace offensive towards South Korea and sought to achieve the withdrawal of US forces from Korea and the unification desired by North Korea through the July 4th South-North Joint Communiqué. The provisional mini-détente, stemming from the conflicting positions between South and North Korea, could not last. North Korea, judging that unification through a peace offensive was impossible, unilaterally declared an end to the inter-Korean dialogue in August 1973, thus bringing the détente on the Korean Peninsula to a close.

South Korea must thoroughly prepare and strive to protect its national interests in the process of the grand bargain that may be pursued between the US and China, while simultaneously urging the US and China to prevent nuclear war, armed conflict, and to achieve stable conflict resolution and crisis prevention, considering the interests of various countries in the Indo-Pacific or Northeast Asian region.

■ Chun Jae-sungDirector of the National Security Research Center at the East Asia Institute. Professor, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Seoul National University.

■ Kim Yang-gyuSenior Research Fellow at the East Asia Institute. Lecturer, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Seoul National University.

■ Managed and Edited by: Park Ji-soo, EAI Research Fellow

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