[EAI Special Report Series] Evaluation of the Yoon Suk-yeol Administration's First Year and Tasks for the Next Four Years ②: Domestic Governance

I. Introduction

In 2021, the East Asia Institute (EAI) presented several pieces of advice, categorized by policy area, for the winner of the 20th presidential election to successfully complete their term (Son Yeol & Kang Won-taek 2021). The advice pertaining to domestic governance can be summarized as follows. First, excessive reliance on the Presidential Office's staff for state administration is inadvisable; instead, authority should be decentralized to various government agencies to enhance the executive branch's autonomy. Second, while communication and policy coordination between the government and the ruling party are important, the ruling party's autonomy should be respected in the selection process for party officials and public office candidates to establish a sound party-government relationship. Third, continuous communication with lawmakers from both the ruling and opposition parties should foster mutual trust and achieve cooperation based on dialogue and compromise.

Of course, these recommendations are not exclusively applicable to the 20th presidential election but serve as general guidelines for a successful presidency within the context of Korean politics. However, it is also true that no president has fully implemented them, and consequently, it is difficult to find presidents who are evaluated as successful after leaving office. Moreover, the escalating partisan confrontation and political polarization further narrow the possibility of a successful presidency, while simultaneously amplifying the importance of the aforementioned advice for precisely these reasons.

So, what has President Yoon Suk-yeol, who won the 20th presidential election, demonstrated over the past year? This article aims to evaluate the first year of President Yoon Suk-yeol's administration, which began on May 10, 2022, using the aforementioned recommendations as a benchmark. Through an evaluation of the state administration over the past year, we intend to derive meaningful implications regarding what President Yoon Suk-yeol should keep in mind during his remaining term to be remembered as a successful president.

II. Moving Beyond the "Cheong Wa Dae Government"

The Korean presidential system is often described as an "imperial presidency." While there is room for debate regarding the extent to which the Korean president's powers are truly imperial, one of the reasons why past presidents have largely fit this description can be found in the excessive concentration of power within the presidential secretariat and the president's over-reliance on it for state administration (Park Sang-hoon 2018).

Certainly, the presidential secretariat is one of the various resources available to the president for governance. However, when the president becomes overly dependent on the secretariat, other resources such as government ministries, bureaucrats, and the ruling party are marginalized, leading to an imbalance in governance resources (Kang Won-taek 2021). Furthermore, individuals appointed to the presidential secretariat are often those who have been with the president since the election campaign, meaning their appointments are based on personal relationships with the president-elect rather than objective verification of their expertise and capabilities for public service. Therefore, their excessive influence in the state administration process is difficult to reconcile with the principle of political accountability.

Past presidents have recognized the problems of this "Cheong Wa Dae government" and have indeed attempted to reduce the size and staff of the Presidential Office immediately after taking office. President Yoon Suk-yeol is no exception; during his candidacy, he stated, "I will replace the staff of the Presidential Office to assist communication between the president and ministers, with the cabinet taking the lead in close communication with ministers (Kwanhun Club 2021)," thus announcing plans to downsize the Presidential Office. Indeed, President Yoon Suk-yeol reorganized the Presidential Office from the previous administration's three offices and eight bureaus system to a two-office and five-bureau system, abolishing the Senior Secretary for Civil Affairs and the Senior Secretary for Personnel. Most symbolically, the president's office was relocated from Cheong Wa Dae to the Ministry of National Defense building in Yongsan. Although relocating the presidential office had been a major pledge of past presidents, it had been repeatedly postponed for various practical reasons. However, President Yoon Suk-yeol pushed ahead with the relocation under the pretext of moving beyond the imperial presidency and enhancing communication with citizens.

So, how successfully has President Yoon Suk-yeol's first year deviated from the "Cheong Wa Dae government"? The answer to this question can be paradoxically glimpsed in the process of relocating the office from Cheong Wa Dae. Initially, the presidential office relocation plan considered the Government Complex Seoul in Gwanghwamun. However, when the Gwanghwamun relocation was frustrated for reasons similar to those faced by previous presidents, the relocation site was abruptly changed to the Ministry of National Defense building in Yongsan. Within about 50 days of this plan being announced, all processes were completed, and President Yoon Suk-yeol began his work at the Yongsan Presidential Office upon his inauguration. In other words, regardless of the merits or demerits of the office relocation, the decision-making and execution process was carried out without seeking explanation or understanding from the public or the National Assembly. This means that the relocation, intended to move away from the imperial presidency, could not escape criticism for being pushed forward in an imperial manner.

The situation that unfolded after the relocation of the Presidential Office is similar. One of the justifications President Yoon Suk-yeol provided for the relocation was to strengthen communication with the public, and as part of this effort, he initiated daily question-and-answer sessions with reporters on his way to work (Doorstepping). Unlike the Cheong Wa Dae era, where the president's office and the press room were far apart, limiting direct contact between the president and the media outside of official press conferences, the Yongsan Presidential Office reflected a willingness to frequently engage with reporters' questions. Consequently, despite various controversies, the doorstepping sessions themselves held considerable significance by allowing the media and the public to hear the president's thoughts directly and unfiltered. However, after about six months, the doorstepping sessions were unilaterally suspended following a dispute with a specific media outlet, and subsequent contact between the president and media outlets significantly decreased.

Moving beyond the "Cheong Wa Dae government" and the imperial presidency is not achieved merely by changing the location of the presidential office. What is more important is the president's governing philosophy and methods. However, over President Yoon Suk-yeol's first year, there was no particular observation of enhanced capacity or autonomy within the formal organizations of the executive branch. Contrary to the promises made during the transition period, the Prime Minister, who should lead the executive branch in charge of policy, was largely invisible whenever major issues arose, and the Presidential Office continued to dominate most state agendas. Instead, the executive branch put forth half-baked policies, such as the Ministry of Education's early school admission policy for five-year-olds or the flexible 69-hour work week, and the Presidential Office repeatedly stepped in to clean up the mess when controversies and criticisms arose.

Consequently, during the first year of President Yoon Suk-yeol's administration, the "Cheong Wa Dae government" has merely changed its name to the "Yongsan government," with no significant change in the practice of the president relying on close aides and the secretariat for state administration.

III. Autonomy of the Ruling Party

For a president to successfully manage state affairs, legislative and policy support from the National Assembly is essential. The ruling party plays a crucial role in facilitating smooth communication and cooperation between the executive and legislative branches. Especially in a divided government situation where the president's support base in the National Assembly is inherently weak, the ruling party's role in persuading both the president and the opposition party and finding political compromises becomes even more significant.

For the ruling party to effectively serve as a link between the executive and legislative branches, a sound party-government relationship must be established. If the president excessively controls the ruling party due to excessive party-government integration, or if an overly tense relationship develops between the president and the ruling party due to mechanical party-government separation, communication and cooperation between the executive and legislative branches will be hindered, potentially leading to difficulties in the president's state administration.

A sound party-government relationship requires a balance between autonomy and interdependence between the ruling party and the government (Lim Seong-hak 2015). First, communication and consultation between the government and the ruling party should be strengthened through active personnel exchanges and party-government consultation bodies in the policy-making process. This is because the ruling party is a constituent of the legislature and, at the same time, a co-responsible party for the president's state administration. Indeed, since the launch of the Yoon Suk-yeol administration, party-government consultations have been actively held, with 22 sessions in 2022 alone, and frequent meetings between the president and the ruling party leadership have taken place, indicating active communication and consultation between the party and the government.

However, for a sound party-government relationship, the ruling party's autonomy in its routine activities, particularly in the nomination of public office candidates, must be guaranteed (Lee Hyun-chul 2021). In fact, President Yoon Suk-yeol declared at the disbandment ceremony of the election campaign headquarters immediately after his victory, "As I have become president, I cannot interfere in the party's affairs or politics (People Power Party 2022)," and has repeatedly stated that he would never intervene in party matters whenever the opportunity arose. However, shortly after the administration's launch, the leader of the ruling party, who led the party to victory in the election, was disciplined for unclear reasons following conflicts with the president and his associates, losing her position. Subsequently, the ruling party revised its primary election rules to reflect the president's intentions, resulting in the inauguration of a new party leader who was known to be supported by the Presidential Office. During this process, some within the ruling party even floated the absurd idea of appointing the president as honorary party leader.

Even if the honorary party leader controversy was a mere episode, a situation where the relationship between the president and the ruling party is described as "party-government integration" beyond party-government consultation is by no means desirable. The ruling party should remain a party that cooperates with the president and shares responsibility for state affairs, rather than degenerating into "the president's party." A ruling party overly integrated with the government struggles to fulfill its role as a mediator between the executive and legislative branches. A ruling party whose leadership is filled with individuals close to the president will also find it difficult to serve as a check on the government by conveying public sentiment to the president. And the continuation of such a situation is highly likely to be of little benefit to the president's successful state administration in the long run.

IV. Cooperation with the Opposition Party

It is inherently the role of the opposition party to criticize the state administration of the president and the ruling party and to propose alternatives. Therefore, the greatest dilemma a president faces in governing is the need to constantly persuade and seek cooperation from an entity that has no inherent reason to cooperate. Moreover, given that the Korean National Assembly adopts a consensus-based decision-making structure rather than a majority rule system, it is practically impossible for the president to legislate desired policies without the cooperation of the opposition party.

To achieve cooperation with the opposition party, a relationship based on mutual trust between the ruling and opposition parties must be formed, creating a legislative process based on dialogue and compromise rather than confrontation and conflict. To build mutual trust between the ruling and opposition parties, the president must continuously meet and communicate with lawmakers, regardless of party affiliation. Furthermore, the president must avoid judging politics from a perspective of good versus evil. Approaching politics with a standard of right and wrong amplifies inter-party conflict, making cooperation impossible (Choi Jun-young 2021).

The weakest aspect of President Yoon Suk-yeol's first year in office has been the effort to cooperate with the opposition party. As numerous media outlets have pointed out, the president has neglected efforts to seek cooperation from the opposition party in state administration, to the extent that he has not met with the opposition party's leadership even once since his inauguration. While it is impossible to confirm whether the ongoing prosecution and trial of the opposition party leader, as rumored, is the reason for avoiding a meeting, regardless of the reason, the fact that there is no communication whatsoever between the president and the opposition party leadership cannot be denied as a major obstacle to the president and the ruling party securing the opposition's cooperation.

The Yoon Suk-yeol administration's lack of effort to seek cooperation from the National Assembly, where the opposition party holds a majority of seats, is also evident from several indicators. According to the National Assembly's legislative information system, a total of 144 bills were submitted to the National Assembly by the government during the first year of President Yoon Suk-yeol's term, of which 36 (23 passed, 13 passed with amendments and abolished) were successfully legislated. While this may not be an exact statistic, as the government can also indirectly propose bills through ruling party lawmakers, it provides a general trend. In contrast, during the first year of President Moon Jae-in's term, the government submitted a total of 303 bills to the National Assembly, of which 71 (33 passed, 38 passed with amendments and abolished) were successfully legislated during the same period. Although a similar situation of a minority ruling party existed then, the proportion of government-submitted bills that were successfully legislated shows no significant difference between President Yoon Suk-yeol and President Moon Jae-in. The key difference, however, is that the Yoon Suk-yeol administration's attempts to legislate its policies through the National Assembly were less than half compared to the Moon Jae-in administration.

Instead of legislative efforts through the National Assembly, the Yoon Suk-yeol administration has sought to enact its policy agenda through other means. According to the Ministry of Government Legislation's National Law Information Center, 1,467 presidential decrees, prime ministerial decrees, and ministerial decrees were promulgated during the first year of President Yoon Suk-yeol's term. In contrast, only 150 presidential decrees, prime ministerial decrees, and ministerial decrees were promulgated during the same period under the Moon Jae-in administration. While these numbers may not accurately reflect the differences in governance styles of each administration, the fact that administrative orders are one way for the executive branch to unilaterally establish desired policies without legislative action by the National Assembly, and that the reliance on administrative orders has increased nearly tenfold by the current administration compared to the same period of the previous government, symbolically illustrates the Yoon Suk-yeol administration's stance on cooperation with the opposition party.

V. Conclusion

President Yoon Suk-yeol began his term with several political constraints. Korean society is experiencing extreme partisan confrontation and polarization, as evidenced by the narrowest margin of victory in the election history. With the opposition party holding a significant majority of seats, expecting legislative support from the National Assembly is difficult. The president himself lacks extensive experience and networks in politics. Conditions are such that neither bargaining nor persuasion, strategies mentioned by Neustadt (1960) for presidents to achieve their policy goals, can easily be employed. However, over the past year, President Yoon Suk-yeol has appeared less as a leader encompassing both ruling and opposition parties and more as a representative of one of the two camps dividing Korean society. This stance is likely to exacerbate, rather than alleviate, the political constraints President Yoon Suk-yeol faces.

So, what strategies can President Yoon Suk-yeol adopt to be remembered as a successful president? The answer is already established and was presented at the beginning of this article. From now on, he must ensure the policy autonomy and accountability of the executive branch, avoid excessive party-government integration and guarantee the autonomy and internal diversity of the ruling party, and finally, recognize the opposition party as a partner in state administration and strive for communication and cooperation. The president is not an arbiter to judge the right and wrong of the previous administration; differences in political positions cannot be framed as right or wrong. To be remembered as a successful president, he must move beyond mere governance and engage fully in politics. ■

References

Kang Won-taek. 2021. “Demolish the Cheong Wa Dae Government: How to Utilize the Presidential Secretariat.” In *Conditions for a Successful Presidency in 2022*, edited by Son Yeol and Kang Won-taek, 17-44. East Asia Institute.

Kwanhun Club. 2021. “Kwanhun Forum with People Power Party Presidential Candidate Yoon Suk-yeol.” *Kwanhun Journal*, December 14: 447. http://www.kwanhun.com/page/brd_view.php?idx=41441&startPage=0&listNo=236&table=cs_bbs_data&code=talk3

People Power Party. 2022. “Key Contents of Election Campaign Headquarters Disbandment Ceremony [Press Release].” March 10. https://www.peoplepowerparty.kr/news/comment_view/BBSDD0001/20737?page=38&

Park Sang-hoon. 2018. *Cheong Wa Dae Government: Thinking About "What is a Democratic Government"*. Humanitas.

Son Yeol and Kang Won-taek, eds. 2021. *Conditions for a Successful Presidency in 2022*. East Asia Institute.

Lee Hyun-chul. 2021. “Establish a Bridgehead for Stable State Administration: Enhance Execution Power by Strengthening Communication Among Party, Government, and the Presidential Office.” In *Conditions for a Successful Presidency in 2022*, edited by Son Yeol and Kang Won-taek. East Asia Institute.

Lim Seong-hak. 2015. “Party-Government Governance and the Development of Korean Democracy.” *East-West Review* 27, no. 2: 239-260.

Choi Jun-young. 2021. “Respect the National Assembly from the Perspective of Cooperation: Successfully Position the Relationship Between the National Assembly and the President.” In *Conditions for a Successful Presidency in 2022*, edited by Son Yeol and Kang Won-taek, 151-173. East Asia Institute.

■ Author: Jang Seung-jin, Professor of Political Science and International Relations, Kookmin University.

■ Edited by: Park Ji-soo, EAI Researcher

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