[EAI Dialogue] A Correct Understanding of 'Forced Mobilization Diplomacy'

■ President Son Yeol: On March 6th, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs presented a solution for forced mobilization, and ten days later, a bilateral summit between Korea and Japan, which had been stalled for over a decade, was held. While this has created an opportunity for improving Korea-Japan relations, there is significant internal conflict within South Korea regarding Japan, comparable to the internal conflicts surrounding North Korea relations. Consequently, opposing views of "humiliating diplomacy" and "future-oriented diplomacy" are clashing over the solution. The issue of Korea-Japan relations has become politicized and a subject of partisan conflict, with the ruling and opposition parties amplifying their disputes, preventing substantive discussion of the issue's core and devolving into a battle of sensational rhetoric.

Today's dialogue aims to discuss the essence of the current issue. First, we will examine the historical background for an accurate understanding of the forced mobilization issue, then review the diplomatic consultations between South Korea and Japan over the past four and a half years since the Supreme Court's en banc decision in 2018, and explore the background and factors behind the agreement. Only after this discussion can we properly evaluate the government's solution and discuss future tasks.

■ Professor Lee Won-deok: The root of the forced mobilization issue can be found in the 2012 Supreme Court ruling that acknowledged the liability of Japanese companies for compensation.[1] The Supreme Court ruling mandated that compensation be provided to 15 victims of forced mobilization by enforcing the assets of Japanese companies invested in South Korea. In a sense, this went beyond the '1965 system.' Until then, the basic stance of both the South Korean and Japanese governments was that the issue of compensation for forced mobilization victims had been resolved by the 1965 Claims Settlement Agreement. The final conclusion of the joint public-private committee in 2005, during the Roh Moo-hyun administration, was no different. While issues such as comfort women, Sakhalin Koreans, and atomic bomb victims among Koreans still carried legal responsibility for Japan, other issues, including forced mobilization, were considered settled by the 1965 Claims Settlement Agreement. Nevertheless, the 2012 Supreme Court ruling went beyond the 1965 agreement, and in that sense, it conflicted with the international law of the Claims Settlement Agreement.

Similar lawsuits were filed in Japan starting in the 2000s. The Japanese Supreme Court's ruling stated that "individual claims cannot be said to have been extinguished, but the right to sue does not exist." In other words, because the issue was resolved by the 1965 Claims Settlement Agreement, victims could no longer assert their right to sue. Ultimately, the South Korean Supreme Court's ruling conflicts with the content of the Claims Settlement Agreement, an international treaty, and the rulings of the Japanese judiciary on the same issue. In essence, the issue of compensation for forced mobilization victims is a point of conflict between domestic and international law, and between Japanese and South Korean law.

The Japanese government and companies immediately stated they could not comply with the ruling ordering the payment of approximately 100 million won in damages to each plaintiff, while the South Korean government maintained an ambiguous stance. The Moon Jae-in administration theoretically considered three possible solutions: first, to jointly file a case in a third court, such as the International Court of Justice (ICJ), viewing the issue as a conflict between South Korean and Japanese law; and second, to resolve the issue by forming an arbitration committee according to Article 3 of the Claims Settlement Agreement. During the Moon Jae-in administration, Japan demanded the formation of an arbitration committee, but South Korea refused, effectively abandoning judicial resolution.

If the forced mobilization issue were brought before the ICJ, there could be conflicts regarding the framing of the issues. For example, Japan would likely want to ask whether the issue was resolved by the Claims Settlement Agreement. South Korea, on the other hand, would seek to obtain a favorable ruling by questioning whether forced labor constituted an anti-humanitarian act and, if so, whether Japan committed an unlawful act based on the prohibition of slavery and international humanitarian law at the time. It is believed that reaching an agreement on these issues would have been difficult.

The second solution was to forcibly execute and monetize Japanese assets in accordance with domestic law. Japan had declared that it would retaliate in various ways if forced execution occurred, and the Moon Jae-in administration was also concerned that this method was not a suitable solution. While it might be a satisfactory solution for the victims, the diplomatic repercussions would have been significant. Japan would not only have devised various retaliatory measures but also likely pursued various legal challenges, citing violations of the Korea-Japan Investment Treaty.

As a third solution, the idea of forming a fund centered around Korean and Japanese companies to pay compensation emerged. Former National Assembly Speaker Moon Hee-sang and former Prime Minister Lee Nak-yon, among others, devised solutions involving fund formation, but these were ultimately not adopted. According to Speaker Moon Hee-sang, a bill based on fund formation was pursued, but President Moon Jae-in rejected it at the last moment. The so-called 'third-party payment plan' of the Yoon Suk-yeol administration is a continuation of this, and it is one of the plans widely considered since the Moon Jae-in administration. Therefore, it is not a surprising or new solution, and it is evaluated as perhaps the only method that can provide substantial relief to victims while maintaining legal consistency.

The public likely expected symbolic participation from the Japanese defendant companies in the fund for victim support and a sincere apology from the Japanese government and companies for the forced mobilization itself. Given that South Korea made a decisive move before receiving a response from Japan, it is understandable that the public and opposition parties hold opposing views. However, considering the lack of other viable alternatives, as mentioned earlier, this point must be taken into account.

■ President Son Yeol: Ultimately, the options of liquidation through forced execution and judicial arbitration were politically untenable, leading to the current proposal through diplomatic consultations. Once the issue enters the realm of diplomatic consultation, negotiations and compromises between Korea and Japan are inevitable. Consequently, it is almost impossible to reach an agreement that satisfies all stakeholders, making domestic controversy over the pros and cons of the negotiations an unavoidable step. However, the negotiation framework can be summarized as South Korea proposing the so-called 'third-party payment plan' while demanding corresponding measures from Japan. The core of these corresponding measures were the participation of the defendant companies in the fund and a statement of apology from the Japanese government. Public opinion in South Korea considers Japan's corresponding measures to be insufficient, and attention is focused on whether Japan will be able to provide a response that meets the expectations of the South Korean public in the future.

■ Professor Lee Won-deok: The Yoon Suk-yeol administration's decision, while taking the form of diplomatic negotiations, is largely a unilateral decision. As indicated by Foreign Minister Park Jin's statement about waiting for Japan's response or reciprocation, it is like throwing down a challenge: "We have filled half the glass; now Japan must fill the other half." Despite nearly a year of consultations between officials, Japan's stance remained unyielding. Japan maintained a principled position, interpreting its legal responsibility in relation to the court ruling, which prevented its companies from acting or the government from apologizing. In response, South Korean government officials reportedly maintained the position that negotiations would break down if Japanese companies did not participate, even at the Korea-Japan foreign ministers' meeting held ten days before the solution was announced.

Given that South Korea changed its position and made a unilateral decision without Japan's reciprocation, it is understandable that the South Korean public may harbor doubts about the context. However, Japan will not acknowledge legal responsibility for the South Korean Supreme Court ruling under any circumstances. If Japan's maximum concession is limited to symbolic participation, it appears the South Korean government judged that it would not be detrimental to take the initiative and resolve the issue.

The forced mobilization issue is not only a historical point of friction between Korea and Japan but also, on another level, a human rights issue. For a long time, both the South Korean and Japanese governments considered compensation for forced mobilization victims to be a legally settled matter, leaving the issue in a kind of blind spot. From this perspective, it can be interpreted that South Korea, prioritizing human rights as emphasized by international norms, extended a hand to the victims first and then demanded Japan's share, thereby fulfilling its obligations.

Even mainstream Japanese media outlets have positively evaluated South Korea's proactive measures while criticizing their own government for not responding adequately. Furthermore, from the international community's perspective, the situation where both Korea and Japan neglected such a significant human rights issue and remained paralyzed by legal disputes would not be viewed favorably. In that sense, South Korea's proactive measures and demand for a response from Japan can be considered a meaningful diplomatic choice.

While it might have been a realistic option to first secure measures such as fund participation and apologies from the Japanese side before South Korea presented its solution, achieving a comprehensive settlement with Japan brought to its knees, as expected by the public and opposition parties opposing the solution, is nearly impossible given the current diplomatic realities. In that sense, viewing this issue as a matter of historical settlement based on pro-Japan or anti-Japan sentiments, or nationalist logic, is an unrealistic line of reasoning. Moreover, the perspective of viewing this issue as a matter of national grievance is vastly distant from reality. Rather, it can be seen as an issue of how actively one addresses human rights issues, and therefore, it is not necessarily an issue that defines winners and losers in historical disputes.

However, the possibility of indirect, symbolic participation from Japanese companies can be considered. The compensation amounts in question in the Supreme Court ruling are relatively small for companies, and there are aspects that could be paid as part of corporate social responsibility. In fact, discussions were held within the two companies, but the controversy surrounding the ruling escalated into a battle of historical justifications, limiting the space for companies to act. With South Korea's proactive measures, much of that tension has been resolved, making it possible for Japanese companies to express goodwill without it escalating into a legal liability issue. However, whether the victims can accept this is a separate matter.

■ President Son Yeol: Those who oppose the government's current proposal raise the question of why Korean companies, not Japanese companies, should raise funds to compensate victims. However, considering the historical context since the Claims Settlement Agreement, this cannot be definitively stated.

■ Professor Lee Won-deok: That is correct. As revealed in diplomatic documents from 2005 during the Roh Moo-hyun administration, the issue of forced mobilization was discussed during the negotiations between the Korean and Japanese governments surrounding the conclusion of the Claims Settlement Agreement. Specifically, during the 5th preliminary meeting in 1961, Japan indicated a willingness to pay individual victims their outstanding claims, but South Korea stated that it would handle the victim issue internally if Japan provided a lump sum payment with a compensatory nature. [2] Based on this understanding, South Korea received $800 million in loans and grants over ten years starting in 1965. As part of the measures for victims, the "Act on Compensation for Private Claims Against Japan" was enacted in 1971, and approximately 300,000 won was paid to the bereaved families of over 8,000 deceased individuals from 1975 to 1977.[3] The funds received from Japan were largely used for economic infrastructure development, such as POSCO, the Gyeongbu Expressway, and dam construction. Measures for victims were partially implemented ten years later. An amount equivalent to about one-tenth of the $300 million in grants was paid to the bereaved families of the deceased under a special law.

Despite this, victims continued their movement demanding government compensation. When the diplomatic documents were released in 2005, the public-private committee, led by then-Prime Minister Lee Hae-chan, thoroughly reviewed the documents, and then-President Moon Jae-in, as Senior Secretary for Civil Affairs, also participated in the committee. The conclusion was not to make further demands on Japan regarding the forced mobilization issue and to handle it domestically. Accordingly, the "Act on Support for Victims of Forced Mobilization Abroad During the Pacific War and Other Wars" was enacted in 2007, and approximately 580 billion won was additionally paid to victims.

However, the payments in 2007 were limited to the bereaved families of the deceased and injured among the 210,000 forced mobilization victims, with approximately 20 million won and 10 million won paid respectively. For survivors, only about 800,000 won for one year of hospital expenses was provided. The plaintiffs in the current Supreme Court ruling are understood to be primarily those who were omitted from the South Korean government's compensation measures thus far. Although the South Korean government eventually took compensatory measures for the victims, there were omissions or imbalances in the process, which ultimately led to the Supreme Court lawsuit.

Therefore, the compensation issue for the fifteen individuals in the current Supreme Court ruling can be defined as an issue concerning those who were relatively neglected among the total 210,000 victims. Compensation for these 15 individuals does not directly lead to the resolution of the forced mobilization issue. These individuals will receive approximately 270 million won, including support funds, through the government's current measures. The bereaved families of the deceased and injured who received compensation earlier are dissatisfied with the larger amounts being paid to surviving victims and are campaigning for a new special law. There are high expectations that similar measures will be taken for them following the government's actions, but this is realistically difficult.

■ President Son Yeol: The proposal presented by the government this time is not a solution to the specific historical issue of forced mobilization. It is merely a measure to avoid the execution of the monetization of Japanese company assets in accordance with the Supreme Court ruling. Furthermore, the task of reconciling perceptions of the historical fact of forced mobilization between the two countries, or achieving historical reconciliation, still remains. The Japanese government is even disputing the fact that the mobilization was 'forced,' isn't it? Therefore, this measure cannot overcome the past. However, the intention to improve Korea-Japan relations using this measure as a turning point is extremely important.

Due to over a decade of strained Korea-Japan relations, both countries have incurred significant costs in various areas, including politics, economy, and security. Therefore, the calculation of the gains and losses from the current diplomatic consultations should not be limited to the give-and-take surrounding the forced mobilization issue but should also include the benefits derived from improving bilateral relations. In other words, an evaluation should be made from a broader perspective of how this measure will benefit the nation. However, a very narrow debate is currently unfolding in both Korea and Japan. In fact, if the government had provided sufficient opportunities to explain the diplomatic, security, and economic effects of improving Korea-Japan relations before announcing the solution, and if it could have presented the national benefits of this measure more comprehensively during the post-announcement debate, perhaps such a wasteful controversy could have been somewhat avoided.

■ Professor Lee Won-deok: In reality, Korea and Japan have a complex relationship not only in historical issues but also in economic, security, and cultural aspects. The Korea-Japan relationship over the past decade has deteriorated more than necessary, and a highly abnormal situation has persisted in all areas. The origin of this complex conflict was the forced mobilization issue. Particularly after 2018, due to the forced mobilization issue, Japan implemented export restrictions and removed South Korea from its whitelist, leading to a vicious cycle where South Korea, in response, terminated the Korea-Japan Military Information Protection Agreement (GSOMIA). Therefore, resolving the forced mobilization issue will naturally resolve export restrictions and the GSOMIA issue, restoring the framework for economic and security cooperation. Consequently, this measure is expected to be effective in shifting the situation from conflict to cooperation. Of course, many tasks remain, but the government's decision can be understood as entering the path toward normalizing relations. In the process of pursuing an upgraded version of the Kim Dae-jung-Obuchi Declaration, which has been discussed since the early days of the Yoon Suk-yeol administration, this measure can be seen as the starting point for fundamentally resolving bilateral relations.

■ President Son Yeol: Even during periods when Korea-Japan relations were relatively smooth, historical issues sometimes hindered overall friendly relations. On the other hand, there was a certain gap in national interests or foreign policy between Korea and Japan. That is, there was a policy and strategic gap due to changes in the national strategies of both countries. The previous South Korean government prioritized improving inter-Korean relations and addressing North Korean issues as its primary foreign policy goal, leading to significant differences in perceptions of regional dynamics with Japan. Furthermore, a distancing occurred on key regional foreign policy issues such as the Indo-Pacific strategy, the Quad, and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). Particularly, as historical issues surfaced, these policy distances widened, creating significant strategic burdens for both sides. In that regard, while the forced mobilization solution has created an opportunity for improving relations, it is not a panacea, and efforts for dialogue to narrow differences and build trust in various areas are essential. To this end, a comprehensive reflection on the diplomatic relations between the two countries over the past four and a half years, from the Supreme Court ruling to the forced mobilization solution, is necessary, and lessons must be drawn from it.

■ Professor Lee Won-deok: Over the past four and a half years, there has been a change of government in South Korea, so we must consider that each administration had different foreign and security strategy objectives. The Moon Jae-in administration focused on improving inter-Korean relations, and thus, it was inevitable that it would accept strategic friction with Japan. Conversely, it must be acknowledged that the Yoon Suk-yeol administration's foreign and security policies have significantly reduced points of conflict with Japan.

From the perspective of resolving historical issues, viewing Korea-Japan relations as a zero-sum game in the historical dimension is a very narrow perspective. As South Korea's national power has grown and the power balance between Korea and Japan has become more equal, a significant portion of historical issues have already been effectively overcome. Fundamentally resolving historical issues would require reforming the minds of individual Japanese citizens, which is an impossible task. Rather, the path to victory lies in South Korea first presenting universal logic or norms regarding historical issues and guiding Japan. In that sense, rather than South Korea succumbing to Japan now, it is actively addressing issues of human rights and victim relief from state violence, which in turn guides Japan's closed historical perception. Therefore, I would define this as a game that appears to be a loss but is actually a win.

Given the current geopolitical situation, both Korea and Japan are simultaneously positioned within the context of US-China strategic competition, and they share significant fundamental strategic interests. Conflict between Korea and Japan over some conflicting points is undesirable not only for South Korea's national interests but also from the perspective of pursuing peace and common prosperity in Northeast Asia. Therefore, it is necessary to view Korea-Japan relations from a broader perspective, and we must avoid the mistake of missing the bigger picture by being bogged down in history. Korea and Japan are entering an era where cooperation yields more benefits than conflict, and in that sense, the normalization of bilateral relations through the recent decision holds great significance. From a strategic perspective, efforts to expand areas of shared interest through dialogue between Korea and Japan will continue to be required.

■ President Son Yeol: Ten years ago, intellectuals from both Korea and Japan conducted the "Korea-Japan New Era Joint Research Project" and published its results.[4] The basic idea at the time was that the world was changing rapidly and that China's rise would be a decisive factor in the future of Korea and Japan, necessitating a plan that encompassed China. However, as soon as this forward-looking vision emerged, the comfort women issue and the forced mobilization issue surfaced, causing it to be shelved due to a backlash from the past.

Over the following decade, as Korea and Japan clashed over the past, the world actually evolved in a direction that demanded greater cooperation between the two countries. The intensification of US-China strategic competition has expanded the scope of shared interests in security between Korea and Japan. Economically, as deglobalization unfolded, the external environment for both countries, which had achieved prosperity as trading nations, significantly worsened, increasing the incentives for bilateral cooperation. Both nations face the common challenge of transitioning from deglobalization to reglobalization. Furthermore, in line with the global trend of economic and security interdependence, they are witnessing an expanding scope for mutual cooperation in economic security. They share a common incentive to avoid situations where economic interdependence is constrained by the excessive security logic of great powers. Finally, there is a clear convergence of mutual interests in jointly addressing transnational threats such as the climate crisis and the COVID-19 health crisis. In other words, compared to a decade ago, both Korea and Japan find themselves in a situation where the necessity and urgency of cooperation have grown, and the scope for cooperation has broadened. Therefore, it is time to make renewed efforts for a "New Era Korea-Japan 2.0."

■ Professor Lee Won-deok: Considering the changes in the landscape of Korea-Japan relations between ten years ago and the present, the direction proposed in the joint research for a new era of Korea-Japan relations was by no means mistaken, and its necessity has become even more urgent. The most significant changes compared to that time are the unprecedented severity of US-China technological competition and the disruption of global supply chains. Furthermore, the power balance in Northeast Asia has also shifted more rapidly than anticipated. Taking these factors into account, we have entered an era where multilayered Korea-Japan coordination and cooperation are even more critical for both countries. I find it regrettable that the foresight presented a decade ago has been buried by historical disputes.

There is a need to upgrade the new era research and present the direction for Korea and Japan to move forward in a discussion of policy, and government authorities are likely to have considerable sympathy for the necessity of such discussions. It would also be meaningful to set the goal of 2025, the 60th anniversary of the normalization of Korea-Japan relations, to research strategic cooperation measures between the two countries in each sector and to summarize the results in the form of a "Yoon Suk-yeol-Kishida Partnership Declaration."■

[1] Supreme Court Ruling, May 24, 2012, Sentence 2009da68620

[2] Supreme Court Ruling, October 30, 2018, Sentence 2013da61381

[3] Park Myung-hee. 2018. "Status and Tasks of Redress for Victims of Forced Mobilization during the Japanese Colonial Period." National Assembly Research Service, "Issues and Discussions," No. 1529.

[4] Joint Research Project for a New Era of Korea-Japan. 2011. *Proposals for a New Era of Korea-Japan (Building a Complex Network for Coexistence)*. Paju: Hanul Academy; Joint Research Project for a New Era of Korea-Japan. 2013. *Seven Core Tasks for a New Era of Korea-Japan Cooperation*. Paju: Hanul Academy.

■ Author: Son Yeol_Director of EAI. Professor at Yonsei University's Graduate School of International Studies. He earned his Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Chicago and, after serving at Chung-Ang University, is currently a professor at Yonsei University's Graduate School of International Studies and Director of the East Asia Institute (EAI). He has served as Dean of Yonsei University's Graduate School of International Studies, Head of the Underwood International College, Director of the Institute for Sustainable Development, and Director of the Institute for International Studies. He was a specially appointed visiting professor at the University of Tokyo and a visiting scholar at the University of North Carolina (Chapel Hill) and the University of California (Berkeley). He served as President of the Korean Political Science Association (2019) and President of the Association for Modern Japanese Studies (2012). He has been a Fulbright, MacArthur, and Japan Foundation Senior Fellow at the Advanced Research Institute for the Humanities, Waseda University, and has served as an advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, the Northeast Asian History Foundation, and the Korea Foundation, as well as a specialist committee member of the Presidential Committee for the North Korean Development. His research areas include Japanese foreign policy, international political economy, East Asian international politics, and public diplomacy. His recent publications include *Conditions for Presidential Success in 2022* (2021, co-edited), *Policy Recommendations for the New Government in 2022* (2021, co-edited), *The Global Appeal of BTS* (2021, co-edited), *Korea's Choices After the Crisis* (2021, co-edited), Japan and Asia's Contested Order(2019, with T. J. Pempel), Understanding Public Diplomacy in East Asia(2016, with Jan Melissen), "South Korea under US-China Rivalry: the Dynamics of the Economic-Security Nexus in the Trade Policymaking," The Pacific Review23, 6 (2019), and *Middle Power Diplomacy of Korea* (2017, co-edited).

■ Author: Lee Won-deok_Professor of Japanese Studies at Kookmin University. He graduated from Seoul National University with a degree in Diplomacy and received a Master's degree in Political Science from the same university, followed by a Ph.D. in International Relations from the University of Tokyo. He has served as an advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Unification, the Northeast Asian History Foundation, and the National Unification Advisory Council, and was the Korean coordinator for the Joint Research Project for a New Era of Korea-Japan (2009-2013). He has been a visiting researcher at the University of Pittsburgh, a visiting professor at the University of Tokyo, Director of the Institute of Japanese Studies at Kookmin University, President of the Association for Modern Japanese Studies, and Vice President of the Korean Political Science Association.

His recent articles include <The Nature of the 65-Year System in Korea-Japan Relations and the Tasks for a New Era of Korea-Japan> (2021) and (2019). His books include *Korea-Japan Negotiations* (2022), translated works such as *History of Korea-Japan Relations* (2022), and co-authored works such as *Korea-Japan Relations in the Heisei Era* (2020) and *Japan Imagines Korea* (2021).

■ Responsible Editor: Park Han-soo_EAI Researcher

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