[Sino-US Nuclear Competition Special Report] III. The Taiwan Issue and the Possibility of Sino-US Conflict

I. Current Situation Analysis

In terms of logic for China's unification with Taiwan, negative changes in Taiwanese public opinion after the Hong Kong crisis have led the Chinese authorities to support unification by force. China has considered both peaceful and non-peaceful methods for Taiwan's unification. While China officially adopted unification by force as a policy after the Chinese Civil War, it introduced the peaceful unification policy in 1979 with the advent of reform and opening up. Deng Xiaoping's persuasive argument was that Taiwan's unification should be pursued with a long-term perspective and that a peaceful environment must be created for economic development. However, now that China has achieved economic growth, it believes that the prospects for unification through peaceful means are dim. Above all, Taiwanese public opinion has deteriorated due to the Chinese authorities' suppression of the Hong Kong pro-democracy movement. While international concerns about the possibility of a military crackdown on Hong Kong's pro-democracy protests emerged in late May 2019, and an immediate conflict was averted, the retreat of democracy in Hong Kong became visible as the Chinese government pushed for the enactment of the Hong Kong National Security Law in May 2020. This event has led to a decline in support for cross-strait unification within Taiwan, particularly evidenced by an increase in public opinion favoring a gradual pursuit of independence. The proportion of respondents favoring a gradual move toward independence surged in 2019, doubling from 12.8% in 2018 to 25% in 2019. Conversely, support for moving toward unification dropped from 12.8% in 2018 to 6-7% after 2019. [1] In this context, President Xi Jinping reiterated at the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in October 2022 that while China will strive for peaceful unification with Taiwan, it will not renounce the option of using force (“尽最大努力争取和平统一的前景, 但决不承诺放弃使用武力”). [2]

Concurrently, China has been strengthening its military capabilities to prepare for unification by non-peaceful means. The Anti-Secession Law, enacted in 2005, authorizes the use of non-peaceful means. Since then, the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) has enhanced its military presence in the cross-strait region. The Eastern and Southern Theater Commands, which would be involved in a conflict with Taiwan, are concentrated with most of China's destroyers and frigates. These commands possess equipment necessary for military operations against Taiwan, including 49 landing ships, 35 attack submarines, 68 coast guard vessels, 700 fighter jets, and 250 bombers. [3] Taiwan is already militarily overwhelmed by the scale of these forces. In addition, China's Rocket Force operates 100 mobile launchers for cruise missiles, 200 for short-range missiles, and 250 for medium-range missiles. [4] Without US military intervention, a naval blockade of Taiwan by China is considered entirely feasible. [5]The year 2027 is being closely watched as a potential timeframe for China to acquire the necessary forces for an invasion of Taiwan. 2027 marks the completion of the first phase of China's three-step goal for defense force development. The three steps set by China are to achieve the centenary of the PLA's founding by 2027, modernize national defense and the military by 2035, and build a world-class advanced military by the mid-22nd century. The 2027 goal, newly established around 2020-2021, is understood as part of Xi Jinping's legacy project, with the 21st Party Congress in mind. [6]

II. Potential for Escalation and Conflict Scenarios

Under current conditions, the United States is expected to strengthen its defense commitments to Taiwan. In the event of a military conflict between China and Taiwan, the US is highly likely to become involved. With China's economic growth, it is increasingly perceived within the US as an economic and, consequently, a security threat. As a result, former President Trump expanded exchanges with Taiwan, including a phone call with President Tsai Ing-wen during his transition period. [7]The Biden administration also shares a common stance on containing China and prioritizes Taiwan's defense. Geopolitically, if China were to occupy Taiwan or force it to abandon its independent will, the US would be unable to prevent China's expansion into the open sea using the First Island Chain, which extends from the Ryukyu Islands, including Okinawa, to Taiwan. Furthermore, Japan's concerns about a China-influenced Taiwan could also prompt US intervention. Additionally, from the perspective of international alliance strategy, the US is highly likely to choose to intervene in the event of a conflict over Taiwan. Following the expansion of NATO after the war in Ukraine, cooperation between the US and its European allies has been emphasized. In the event of a conflict over Taiwan, the US could isolate China internationally through cooperation with its European and Indo-Pacific allies, and also expect military support from these allies.

Consequently, US policymakers are considering hypothetical scenarios of a Taiwanese invasion around 2027 and exploring measures to defend Taiwan. For instance, a wargame on a Taiwan conflict conducted by the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), which was also broadcast by NBC, posited that given the domestic trend of emphasizing Taiwan's distinct identity, Taiwanese political factions might emphasize resistance against China in the lead-up to the 2028 presidential election. [8] Amidst the growing societal trend of emphasizing Taiwan's distinct identity, not only the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) but also the Kuomintang (KMT) are emphasizing that they are not pro-China parties. [9] At this time, China may pursue unification by non-peaceful means. 2027 is also a time when President Xi needs to legitimize his continued rule, as he approaches his fourth term. For reference, a Chinese invasion of Taiwan is generally understood to be a calculated action rather than an accidental event. It is believed that once China achieves its military buildup goals by 2027, it will decide on military action to prevent Taiwan's independence movement, supported by the US. In this context, accusations against Taiwan or US actions would essentially be a pretext for invasion. [10]

Meanwhile, China is protesting US policy toward Taiwan, but it is difficult for China to rashly attempt military action against Taiwan under the current domestic and international conditions. Domestically, Chinese authorities are facing urgent economic problems. US sanctions imposed amid the Sino-US strategic competition have limited the growth of China's IT sector. The decoupling in science and technology between the US and China has dealt a greater blow to China than to the US. [11] Job losses due to the economic downturn are spreading not only in the IT sector but also into the finance and media industries. In addition, with the Xi Jinping leadership's zero-COVID policy, the livelihood economy has also contracted. China's economic growth rate was only 2.5% in the first half of this year, and more seriously, the youth unemployment rate reached 19.9% as of July 2022. [12] Considering that traditional China economic researchers have cited the need to create jobs for the new labor force as a reason why China cannot abandon its annual economic growth target of 7%, the high youth unemployment rate is expected to be a cause for concern for the Chinese ruling authorities.

Externally, relations between China and its neighboring countries have also deteriorated sequentially since the late 2010s. Sino-Australian relations have worsened since May 2020 when China imposed sanctions on Australia, and although efforts are being made to improve relations following the change of government in Australia in May of this year, progress has been slow. Sino-Indian relations also significantly deteriorated after the Galwan Valley clash in mid-2020. China's deepening isolation in the Indo-Pacific region was reflected in the first Quad summit in 2021. In South Korea, where anti-China sentiment has accumulated among the youth following China's THAAD sanctions and the subsequent Hallyu ban, a conservative government has taken office and values the upholding of international norms. Consequently, when President Biden visited South Korea and Japan in May of this year and announced the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), China must have keenly felt its shrinking international standing. Furthermore, the war in Ukraine has led to closer cooperation between the US and NATO, to the extent that China's ambitions and coercive policies are defined as a challenge to NATO's common interests in the Strategic Concept released in June 2022. [13]

Under these conditions, China is likely to continue its coercive diplomacy to deter Taiwan's independence through low-intensity options in the short term. China's main options for deterring Taiwan's independence policy through military leverage include incursions into Taiwan's airspace and territorial waters, intensive cyberattacks, and occupation of Taiwan's coastal islands. [14] First, incursions into Taiwan's airspace and territorial waters would go beyond the PLA's current incursions into Taiwan's Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) and involve military assets entering Taiwan's airspace and territorial waters. In this case, Taiwan is expected to open fire under its rules of engagement. China may seek to demonstrate its resolve to use military force by taking actions that escalate tensions. Second, the scenario of occupying Taiwan's coastal islands [such as Pratas Island] implies China independently occupying Dongsha or Penghu Island without a full-scale invasion of Taiwan. The Chinese military has reportedly indicated that occupying Dongsha itself is not militarily difficult and that political will is more crucial. In this regard, China could also mobilize militia or coast guard forces for the occupation of Dongsha, adding an element of gray-zone conflict. Such provocations by China could also backfire, leading to a strengthening of Taipei's independence policy due to public backlash in Taiwan. Third, China's cyberattack option is also drawing attention. Taiwan is reportedly already subjected to 20 to 40 million cyberattacks per month, and in the event of a full-scale cyberattack, Taiwan's critical infrastructure could become a target. Such cyberattacks could serve as a prelude to a full-scale invasion of Taiwan.

These Chinese coercive scenarios toward Taiwan also carry the potential for escalation into a crisis of Sino-US conflict. Recently, as the US government and Congress have visibly demonstrated their commitment to Taiwan's defense, the relevance of Taiwan's independence policy has also increased. Taiwan's determination to pursue an independence policy will inevitably lead to military responses or coercion from China. As a result of the repetition of these exchanges, cross-strait relations could evolve into a political confrontation. If China occupies Dongsha, independence movements within Taiwan may intensify, and consequently, if Chinese aircraft violate Taiwan's airspace, Taiwan might open fire, leading to localized conflict. In this process, China could also inadvertently trigger an accidental conflict between the US and China due to miscalculation in policy decisions or errors in policy execution, as it may tend to choose stronger measures to divert internal discontent amidst accumulating hardline domestic sentiment in the context of deteriorating cross-strait relations. By the 2030s, the possibility of cross-strait conflict escalating into a Sino-US conflict will further increase. Once China achieves a second-strike capability against the US through qualitative and quantitative improvements in its nuclear capabilities, it may be able to engage in localized warfare in the Taiwan region without fear of striking its mainland. Furthermore, the PLA also aims to achieve integrated operational capabilities by the 2030s at the earliest. [15] In the event of a full-scale Chinese invasion of Taiwan, it is also anticipated that the PLA would expand the scope of conflict by attacking Guam, Hawaii, and the US mainland (Alaska and California) to deter intervention by the US and its allies. [16]

Meanwhile, in the long term, concerns about Sino-US conflict surrounding the Taiwan issue may gradually diminish due to China's growth limitations and the easing of Sino-US competition. Perhaps by the 2040s, a trend of easing Sino-US competition may become apparent. While predictions of continued Chinese rise suggested a long-term intensification of Sino-US competition, recent analyses point to limitations in China's economic growth. These studies highlight that China faces challenges of low growth and population decline in the future. China's economic growth is projected to slow to the 3% range in the 2030s and the 2% range in the 2040s, [17] and it is added that this could further decrease due to China's declining population, the limits of capital-intensive growth, and declining productivity. Indeed, as of July 2021, China's birth rate was 7.52 per 1,000 people, already declining amidst slowing growth and job losses. [18] In this trend, China's national strength is expected to enter a phase of stagnation in the long term. If this argument is plausible, a scenario of easing Sino-US competition in the long term can be envisioned. Furthermore, the US perception of China as a threat is also expected to diminish over the long term. As China's growth moderates and the possibility of power transition decreases, the US perception of China as a threat may lessen. Additionally, regional powers in Asia capable of containing China will eventually emerge. With India's continuous growth in power, South Korea establishing itself as a middle power with a global strategic perspective, and Japan's military resurgence, these regional powers containing China could reduce US concerns about the emergence of a regional hegemon in Asia. In the long-term prospect of a failed power transition, the Sino-US confrontation over the Taiwan issue could be resolved by China returning to its stance of peaceful resolution.■

[1] National Chengchi University Election Study Center. 2022. “Taiwan Independence vs. Unification with the Mainland(1994/12~2022/06).” https://esc.nccu.edu.tw/PageDoc/Detail?fid=7801&id=6963. Regarding the low support for unification with China within Taiwan, the Brookings Institution analyzed in early 2022 that the Taiwanese public's negative stance toward the Chinese political system is the background for this low support for unification. Shelley Rigger, Lev Nachman, Chit Wai John Mok, and Nathan Kar Ming Chan. 2022. “Why is unification so unpopular in Taiwan? It’s the PRC political system, not just culture.” Brookings. February 7. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2022/02/07/why-is-unification-so-unpopular-in-taiwan-its-the-prc-political-system-not-just-culture/

[2]「新华社」. 2022. “习近平：高举中国特色社会主义伟大旗帜 为全面建设社会主义现代化国家而团结奋斗——在中国共产党第二十次全国代表大会上的报告.” October 25. http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2022-10/25/content_5721685.htm

[3] Office of the Secretary of Defense. 2021. “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China.” 161-162. https://media.defense.gov/2021/Nov/03/2002885874/-1/-1/0/2021-CMPR-FINAL.PDF

[4] Ibid., 163.

[5] Joel Wuthnow, Derek Grossman, Philip C. Saunders, Andrew Scobell, and Andrew N.D. Yang (eds.), 2022. Crossing The Strait: China's Military Prepares for War with Taiwan. Washington D.C.: NDU Press. 12.

[6] Brian Hart, Bonnie S. Glaser, Matthew P. Funaiole. 2021. “China‘s 2027 Goal Marks the PLA’s Centennial, Not an Expedited Military Modernization.” China Brief 21, 6. https://jamestown.org/program/chinas-2027-goal-marks-the-plas-centennial-not-an-expedited-military-modernization/

[7] Kim Kyung-yoon. 2016. “Trump, Phone Call with Taiwan President… First Time in 37 Years Since Severing Diplomatic Ties, US-China Relations ‘Tense’ (Comprehensive 2nd Report).” Yonhap News. December 3. https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20161203016152009

[8] Stacie Pettyjohn, Becca Wasser, and Chris Dougherty. 2022. “Dangerous Straits: Wargaming a Future Conflict over Taiwan.” Center for a New American Security Report. June 15. https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/dangerous-straits-wargaming-a-future-conflict-over-taiwans

[9] However, the KMT holds the view that Taiwan should be a stabilizing force rather than a fuse for a US-China conflict. Brookings. 2022. “Taiwan's path forward: A conversation with KMT Chairman Eric Chu.” June 6. https://www.brookings.edu/events/taiwans-path-forward-a-conversation-with-kmt-chairman-eric-chu/

[10] Wuthnow et al. 2022, 15.

[11] Kim Jin-bang. 2022. “Chinese Research Institute: ‘China’s Semiconductor and AI Face Limits Due to US-China Scientific and Technological Decoupling.’ ” Yonhap News. February 3.

[12] Bloomberg. 2022. “China Youth Jobless Rate Hits Record 20% in July on Covid Woes.” August 14. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-08-15/china-youth-jobless-rate-hits-record-20-in-july-on-covid-woes

[13] NATO. 2022. “NATO 2022 Strategic Concept.” June 29. https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/6/pdf/290622-strategic-concept.pdf

[14] Wuthnow et al. 2022, 101-105.

[15] Wuthnow et al. 2022, 72.

[16] NBC News. 2022. “War Games: The Battle for Taiwan.” May 14. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qYfvm-JLhPQ&t=580s&ab_channel=NBCNews

[17] Roland Rajah, Alyssa Leng. 2022. “Revising down the rise of China.” Lowy Institute. March 14, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/revising-down-rise-china

[18] Reuters. 2022. “China’s birth rate drops to record low in 2021.” January 17. https://www.reuters.com/world/china/birth-rate-mainland-china-2021-drops-record-low-2022-01-17/

■ Author: Lee Joong-gu_Senior Research Fellow, Korea Institute for Defense Analyses. He holds a Ph.D. in Diplomacy and Foreign Policy from Seoul National University and has served as a staff member for the National Assembly's Foreign Affairs and Unification Committee, a visiting scholar at the Renmin University of China's School of International Studies, an adjunct professor at Korea University's Graduate School of Policy Studies, and a visiting scholar at the National Security Strategy Institute (NDU INSS) of the National Defense University. At the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, he primarily researches North Korean nuclear strategy and North Korea-China relations, and is currently focusing on US-China relations surrounding the Korean Peninsula. His recent works include "A South China Sea Conflict and the ROK's Cooperation with the U.S.," The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis (2022), 34, 4, "A General Assessment of 10 Years of the Kim Jong-un Regime: In the Areas of the Military and Security," International Journal of Korean Unification Studies (2021), 30, 2, and "A Study on Changes in South and North Korea's Response Strategies According to US-China Relations" (2021, Korea Institute for Defense Analyses).

■ Managed and Edited by: Park Han-soo_EAI Research Assistant

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